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EXPLANATORY NOTES
s The Review of Maritime Transport 2012 covers data and events from January 2011 until June 2012. Where 
SRVVLEOHHYHU\HIIRUWKDVEHHQPDGHWRUHƅHFWPRUHUHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWV
s All references to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.
s Unless otherwise stated, “ton” means metric ton (1,000 kg) and “mile” means nautical mile.
s Because of rounding, details and percentages presented in tables do not necessarily add up to the totals.
s n.a.  Not available
s $K\SKHQtVLJQLƄHVWKDWWKHDPRXQWLVQLO
s In the tables and the text, the terms countries and economies refer to countries, territories or areas.
s Since 2007, the presentation of countries in the Review of Maritime Transport has been different from that 
LQSUHYLRXVHGLWLRQV6LQFHWKHQHZFODVVLƄFDWLRQLVWKDWXVHGE\WKH6WDWLVWLFV'LYLVLRQ8QLWHG1DWLRQV
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and by UNCTAD in its Handbook of Statistics. For the purpose 
of statistical analysis, countries and territories are grouped by economic criteria into three categories, which 
are further divided into geographical regions. The main categories are developed economies, developing 
economies, and transition economies.
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Vessel groupings used in the Review of Maritime Transport
$VLQWKHSUHYLRXV\HDUpV5HYLHZRI0DULWLPH7UDQVSRUWƄYHYHVVHOJURXSLQJVKDYHEHHQXVHGLQPRVWRI
the shipping tables in this year’s edition. The cut-off point for all tables, based on data from IHS Fairplay, 
LV}JURVVWRQV*7H[FHSWIRUWKHWDEOHVWKDWGHDOZLWKRZQHUVKLSZKHUHWKHFXWRIISRLQWLV*7
7KHJURXSVDJJUHJDWH}SULQFLSDOW\SHVRIYHVVHOFDWHJRU\DVQRWHGEHORZ
Review group Constituent ship types 
Oil tankers Oil tankers 
Bulk carriers Ore and bulk carriers, ore/bulk/oil carriers 
General cargo ships Refrigerated cargo, specialized cargo, roll-on roll-off
(ro-ro) cargo, general cargo (single- and multi-deck),
general cargo/passenger 
Container ships Fully cellular 
Other ships Oil/chemical tankers, chemical tankers, other tankers, 
OLTXHƄHGJDVFDUULHUVSDVVHQJHUURURSDVVHQJHUWDQN
EDUJHVJHQHUDOFDUJREDUJHVƄVKLQJRIIVKRUHVXSSO\DQG
all other types 
Total all ships Includes all the above-mentioned vessel types 
Approximate vessel-size groups referred to in the Review of Maritime Transport,
according to generally used shipping terminology
Crude oil tankers
ULCC, double hull 350,000 dwt plus
ULCC, single hull 320,000 dwt plus
VLCC, double hull 200,000–349,999 dwt
VLCC, single hull 200,000–319,999 dwt
Suezmax crude tanker 125,000–199,999 dwt
Aframax crude tanker 80,000–124,999 dwt; moulded breadth > 32.31m
Panamax crude tanker 50,000–79,999 dwt; moulded breadth < 32.31m
Dry bulk and ore carriers
Large capesize bulk carrier 150,000 dwt plus
Small capesize bulk carrier 80,000–149,999 dwt; moulded breadth > 32.31m
Panamax bulk carrier 55,000–84,999 dwt; moulded breadth < 32.31m 
Handymax bulk carrier 35,000–54,999 dwt
Handysize bulk carrier 10,000–34,999 dwt
Ore/oil carriers
VLOO 200,000 dwt
Container ships
Post-Panamax container ship moulded breadth > 32.31m
Panamax container ship moulded breadth < 32.31m
Source: IHS Fairplay.
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FOREWORD
Maritime transport is the backbone of international trade and a key engine driving globalization. Around 80 per 
cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent by value is carried by sea and is handled by ports worldwide; 
these shares are even higher in the case of most developing countries. 
UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime TransportKDVSURYLGHG}\HDUVRIXQLQWHUUXSWHGFRYHUDJHRIWKHNH\GHYHORSPHQWV
DIIHFWLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO VHDERUQH WUDGH VKLSSLQJ WKHZRUOG ƅHHW SRUWV IUHLJKWPDUNHWV DQG WUDQVSRUWUHODWHG
regulatory and legal frameworks. The Review also covers inland transport and intermodal connections. Keeping 
track of both long-term trends and the latest developments, the Review has become a standard reference work 
LQLWVƄHOG
,QFRPPRQZLWKSUHYLRXVLVVXHVWKH5HYLHZFRQWDLQVFULWLFDODQDO\VLVDQGDZHDOWKRIXQLTXHGDWDLQFOXGLQJ
ORQJWHUPGDWDVHULHVRQVHDERUQHWUDGHƅHHWFDSDFLW\VKLSSLQJVHUYLFHVDQGSRUWKDQGOLQJDFWLYLWLHV7KLV\HDUpV
5HYLHZQRWHVWKDWZRUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHJUHZE\SHUFHQWLQZKHUHDVWKHWRQQDJHRIWKHZRUOGƅHHWJUHZ
at a greater rate, by almost 10 per cent, as shipowners took delivery of vessels that had been ordered before 
WKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVEHJDQ:LWKVXSSO\RXWVWULSSLQJGHPDQGIUHLJKWUDWHVIHOOHYHQIXUWKHUWRXQSURƄWDEOHOHYHOV
for most shipping companies. For importers and exporters, however, the low freight rates helped to reduce 
transaction costs, which is important for helping to revive global trade. 
$VIUHLJKWWUDIƄFFRQWLQXHVWRJURZWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZWRHQVXUHWKHORQJWHUPVXVWDLQDELOLW\RIVXFKJURZWKLV
playing an increasingly important part in the policy debate on globalization, trade and development, environmental 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\HQHUJ\VHFXULW\DQGFOLPDWHFKDQJH5HƅHFWLQJWKHVHQHZUHDOLWLHVWKLV\HDUpVReview of Maritime 
Transport addresses a range of relevant issues in this context and includes a special chapter on sustainable freight 
transport. This chapter highlights the impacts of freight transport activity, for example on the environment, human 
KHDOWKDQGWKHFOLPDWHDQGWKHFRQVHTXHQWQHHGWRUHGXFHWKHVHFWRUpVHQHUJ\FRQVXPSWLRQDQGHPLVVLRQV
If left unchecked, such unsustainable patterns are likely to intensify, increasing the potential for global energy 
and environmental crises, and risk undermining progress being made on sustainable development and growth. 
3URPRWLQJDVKLIWWRZDUGVVXVWDLQDEOHIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWZLOOKHOSLPSURYHWKHVHFWRUpVHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\UHGXFHLWV
heavy reliance on oil, and limit environmental and climate change impacts. In this context, developing effective 
policies and measures, including for the purpose of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and ensuring 
DSSURSULDWHƄQDQFLQJDUHPDMRUFKDOOHQJHVHVSHFLDOO\IRUGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV*RYHUQPHQWVDQGWKHLQGXVWU\
are becoming increasingly aware of the need to mainstream sustainability criteria into their transport planning 
and policies, and it is hoped that this year’s Review of Maritime Transport will assist policymakers in their efforts 
to promote sustainable freight transport systems.
Supachai Panitchpakdi
Secretary-General of UNCTAD
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6HDERUQHWUDGHUHDFKHV}ELOOLRQWRQV
In tandem with developments in the world economy 
and global merchandise trade, international seaborne 
shipments continued to grow in 2011, albeit at a 
slower rate than in 2010. Fuelled by strong growth in 
container and dry bulk trades, world seaborne trade 
grew by 4 per cent in 2011, taking the total volume of 
JRRGVORDGHGZRUOGZLGHWR}ELOOLRQWRQV
In addition to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
DQG RWKHU GLIƄFXOWLHV IDFLQJ DGYDQFHG HFRQRPLHV
a number of factors have weighed down on global 
JURZWK 7KHVH LQFOXGH KHLJKWHQHG JOREDO ƄQDQFLDO
risks, political and social unrest in North Africa and 
Western Asia, natural disasters in Japan and Thailand 
which have disrupted regional and global supply 
chains, rising oil prices and volatility, the impact of 
the austerity measures introduced in many countries 
and the fading of the stimulus effect of 2010, and 
growing geopolitical tensions. Many of these factors 
have remained relevant in 2012 and, depending on 
how they evolve, may impact dramatically on the 
global economic and trade outlook and international 
seaborne trade.
:RUOGƃHHWJUHZE\SHUFHQWLQMXVW
four years
0RUHWKDQWKUHH\HDUVDIWHUWKHHFRQRPLFDQGƄQDQFLDO
FULVLV RI  WKH ZRUOG ƅHHW FRQWLQXHG WR H[SDQG
during 2011, reaching more than 1.5 billion deadweight 
WRQVGZWLQ-DQXDU\DQLQFUHDVHRIRYHU}SHU
FHQW LQ MXVW IRXU \HDUV$W WKHVDPH WLPHFRQWLQXHG
deliveries and a drastic downturn in new orders 
following the economic crisis has led to a reduction 
in the world order book by one third during the same 
period. Still largely responding to orders placed prior 
WR WKH HFRQRPLF FULVLV WKH PDMRU VKLSEXLOGHUV DUH
reluctant to cancel or postpone deliveries. China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea together built more 
than 93 per cent of the tonnage delivered in 2011, thus 
maintaining important employment in their shipyards. 
The resulting oversupply of ships represents a serious 
challenge for shipowners.
Developing countries continue to expand their 
market share in different maritime sectors, including 
shipbuilding, ownership, registration, operation, 
scrapping and manning. Shipowners of one third 
RI WKH ZRUOG ƅHHW DQG  RI WKH WRS  FRQWDLQHU
operators are from developing countries. Almost 
}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGƅHHWDUHUHJLVWHUHGLQ3DQDPD
/LEHULDDQGWKH0DUVKDOO,VODQGVDQGPRUHWKDQ}SHU
cent of scrapping in 2011 took place in India, China, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan.
)UHLJKWUDWHVUHSRUWHGDVXQSURƂWDEOH
for carriers
Freight rates in 2011 and at the beginning of 2012 
ZHUH RIWHQ DW XQSURƄWDEOH OHYHOV IRU VKLS RZQHUV
Substantial freight-rate reductions were reported 
ZLWKLQ WKH GU\ EXON OLTXLG EXON DQG FRQWDLQHUL]HG
cargo segments. Vessel oversupply continued to be 
a driving factor behind reductions in freight rates. Ship 
operators attempted to make savings through greater 
economies of scale by investing in large capacity ships 
in the tanker and dry bulk market segments.
Daily earnings of large Capesize vessels dropped 
EHORZ WKRVH RI WKH VLJQLƄFDQWO\ VPDOOHU +DQG\VL]H
class for several months. While smaller vessels offer 
JUHDWHUƅH[LELOLW\E\VHUYLQJPDQ\NLQGVRISRUWVODUJH
vessels are constrained to navigate between the 
world’s busiest trading centres that have seen both 
a downturn in business and increased oversupply in 
available tonnage.
The cost of transport expressed as a percentage of 
the value of the goods imported continues to decrease 
for developing countries in Asia and the Americas, 
converging to that of developed nations.
Container port throughput increased 
E\}SHUFHQW
World container port throughput increased by an 
HVWLPDWHG } SHU FHQW WR } PLOOLRQ IRRW
HTXLYDOHQWXQLWV7(8VLQLWVKLJKHVWOHYHOHYHU
This increase was less than the 14.5 per cent increase 
of 2010 that sharply rebounded from the slump of 
2009. Chinese mainland ports, utilized by many 
manufacturers and a partial indicator of the global 
demand for semi-manufactured and manufactured 
goods, maintained their share of total world container 
port throughput at 24.2 per cent.
xv
The UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) 
and its components showed a continuation in 2012 of 
the trend towards larger ships deployed by a smaller 
number of companies. Between 2011 and 2012, the 
number of companies providing services per country 
ZHQWGRZQE\}SHUFHQWZKLOHWKHDYHUDJHVL]HRIWKH
largest container ships increased by 11.5 per cent. Only 
}SHU FHQWRI FRXQWU\SDLUVZHUH VHUYHGE\GLUHFW
liner shipping connections; for the remaining country 
SDLUVDWOHDVWRQHWUDQVVKLSPHQWSRUWZDVUHTXLUHG
Legal issues and regulatory
developments
Important issues include the recent adoption of 
amendments to the 1996 Convention on Limitation 
of Liability for Maritime Claims (1996 LLMC), as well 
as a range of regulatory developments relating to 
maritime and supply-chain security, maritime safety 
and environmental issues. Among the regulatory 
measures worth noting is a set of technical and 
RSHUDWLRQDO PHDVXUHV WR LQFUHDVH HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\
and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
international shipping that was adopted under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) in July 2011 and is expected to enter into force 
on 1 January 2013. To assist in the implementation 
of these new mandatory measures, four sets of 
guidelines were also adopted at IMO in March 2012. 
Discussions on possible market-based measures for 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping continued and remained controversial. In 
respect of liability and compensation for ship-source 
oil pollution, a new UNCTAD report provides an 
overview of the international legal framework as well 
as some guidance for national policymaking.
At the World Trade Organization (WTO), negotiations 
continued on a future Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
While negotiators advanced on the draft negotiating 
text, it has been suggested that an agreement in trade 
facilitation might be reached earlier than in other areas 
of the Doha Development Round of negotiations.
Special focus: growing concerns
regarding sustainable freight transport
The importance of freight transport as a trade enabler, 
an engine of growth and a driver of social development 
is widely recognized. However, the associated 
adverse impacts of freight transport activity on the 
environment, human health and the climate are also 
cause for concern.
Overall, transport consumes over 50 per cent of global 
OLTXLGIRVVLOIXHOVDQGLVSURMHFWHGWRJURZE\SHU
cent per year from 2008 to 2035 and to account for 
SHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOSURMHFWHG LQFUHPHQW LQ OLTXLG
fuel use. Energy demand of commercial transportation 
— trucks, aeroplanes, ships and trains — will rise by 
PRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWIURPWRGULYHQE\
economic growth, particularly in developing countries. 
At the same time, the transport sector accounts for 
SHUFHQWRIDOOZRUOG*+*VRIZKLFK}SHUFHQW
are related to freight transport. Nearly 25 per cent of 
global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
are transport related and these are expected to 
LQFUHDVH E\ } SHU FHQW ZRUOGZLGH } SHU FHQW D
year) between 2005 and 2030.
If left unchecked, these unsustainable patterns are 
likely to intensify and potentially result in global energy 
and environmental crises, and undermine any progress 
being made in world sustainable development and 
growth. Sustainability imperatives in the freight 
transport sector lead to the need to reduce the 
sector’s energy consumption and emissions, including 
GHGs and air pollutants. Governments and industry 
have started to mainstream sustainability criteria into 
their planning processes, policies, and programmes; 
however, meeting effectively and in full the sector’s 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\REMHFWLYHVKDV\HWWREHDFKLHYHG
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In tandem with the world economy and global merchandise trade, international seaborne 
shipments continued to grow in 2011, albeit at a slower rate than in 2010. Fuelled by 
VWURQJJURZWK LQFRQWDLQHUDQGGU\EXONWUDGHVZRUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHJUHZE\}SHU
FHQWLQWDNLQJWKHWRWDOYROXPHRIJRRGVORDGHGZRUOGZLGHWR}ELOOLRQWRQV,Q
DGGLWLRQWRWKHVRYHUHLJQGHEWFULVLVLQ(XURSHDQGRWKHUGLIƄFXOWLHVIDFLQJDGYDQFHG
economies, a number of factors have weighed down on global growth. These include, 
LQ SDUWLFXODU KHLJKWHQHG JOREDO ƄQDQFLDO ULVNV SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO XQUHVW LQ 1RUWK
Africa and Western Asia, natural disasters in Japan and Thailand which have disrupted 
regional and global supply chains, rising oil prices and volatility, austerity measures, the 
fading of the stimulus effect of 2010, and geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. 
Many of these factors remained relevant in 2012 and, depending on how they evolve, 
they could impact dramatically on the global economic and trade outlook.
This chapter covers developments from January 2011 to June 2012, and where possible 
up to October 2012. Section A reviews the overall performance of the global economy 
and world merchandise trade. Section B considers developments in world seaborne 
trade volumes and examines trends unfolding in the economic sectors and activities that 
generate demand for shipping services, including oil and gas, mining, agriculture and 
steel production. Section C highlights selected trends that are currently transforming 
the landscape of international shipping and seaborne trade, focusing mainly on climate 
FKDQJH WKHFXUUHQWVKLIW LQJOREDOHFRQRPLF LQƅXHQFHDQGFKDQJLQJ WUDGHSDWWHUQV
and the rising bunker fuel prices and operating costs.
DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL 
SEABORNE TRADE
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of OECD Main Economic Indicators, May 2012; UCTAD, The Trade and Development 
Report 2012; UNCTAD Review of Maritime TransportYDULRXVLVVXHV:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQL]DWLRQ:72WDEOH}$DWKH:72
press release 658, April 2012, World Trade 2011, Prospects for 2012. The 2012 index for seaborne trade is calculated on 
the basis of the growth rate forecast by Clarkson Research Services in Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 2012.
A. WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND 
PROSPECTS1
1. World economic growth2
The global economy lost steam in 2011, with gross 
GRPHVWLF SURGXFW *'3 JURZLQJ E\ } SHU FHQW
FRPSDUHGZLWK } SHU FHQW LQ  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WR
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the slow recovery 
LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRI$PHULFDDQGRWKHUGLIƄFXOWLHV
facing advanced economies, a number of factors 
have weighed down on global growth. These include, 
LQSDUWLFXODUKHLJKWHQHGJOREDOƄQDQFLDOULVNVSROLWLFDO
and social unrest in North Africa and Western Asia, 
natural disasters in Japan and Thailand which have 
disrupted regional and global supply chains, rising oil 
prices and volatility, austerity measures, the fading of 
the stimulus effect of 2010, and geopolitical tensions in 
the Strait of Hormuz. Many of these factors remained 
relevant in 2012, and, depending on how they evolve, 
they could impact dramatically on the global economic 
outlook.
In 2011, world GDP, industrial production, merchandise 
trade and seaborne shipments continued to move 
LQ WDQGHP DV VKRZQ LQ ƄJXUH}  'XULQJ WKH \HDU
industrial production decelerated in the countries 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
'HYHORSPHQW2(&'DQGJUHZE\DPRGHVW}SHU
FHQWGRZQIURP}SHUFHQWLQ7KHLQGXVWULDO
RXWSXWRI-DSDQZDVFXWE\RYHU}SHUFHQWUHƅHFWLQJ
WKHHIIHFWVRIWKHFRPELQHGHDUWKTXDNHWVXQDPLDQG
nuclear accident that hit the country in March 2011, as 
well as the interruptions to the supply chains caused 
E\WKH1RYHPEHUƅRRGVLQ7KDLODQG
Tighter monetary policies in many developing regions
contributed to moderate growth in industrial activity.
In China for example, industrial production grew
E\ QHDUO\ } SHU FHQW GRZQ IURP } SHU FHQW LQ
2010. Brazil, India and the Russian Federation also
expanded their industrial output, albeit at a slower
rate than in 2010. Flooding in Thailand strongly
UHGXFHG WKH FRXQWU\pV LQGXVWULDO RXWSXW E\ } SHU
cent in October and November, and drove down
outputs in Singapore, Hong Kong (China), Malaysia
Figure 1.1. The OECD Industrial Production Index and indices for world GDP, world merchandise trade
and world seaborne trade (1975–2012) (1990 = 100) 
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and Taiwan Province of China, due to the interrupted 
supply chains.
Table 1.1 provides an overview of annual GDP growth 
over the 2008-2011 period and a forecast for 2012. 
While growth in developed economies weakened in 
2011, developing countries continued to drive world 
economic expansion and to account increasingly for 
a larger share of world GDP. This share is estimated 
E\81&7$'WRKDYHLQFUHDVHGIURP}SHUFHQWLQ
WR}SHUFHQWRIZRUOG*'3DWFRQVWDQWSULFHV
2005) in 2010.3 In 2011, growth in China remained 
UREXVW DOWKRXJK LW GHFHOHUDWHG WR}SHU FHQW 7KH
country continues to be, however, the engine of 
regional growth: on the one hand, the country’s middle 
class is expanding and the government is adopting 
policies to encourage growth in private consumption; 
on the other hand, as China moves up the value chain, 
lower-value manufacturing companies are relocating 
to other low-wage countries such as Bangladesh and 
Viet Nam.4
*URZWK LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD VORZHG LQ  UHƅHFWLQJ
the end of the stimulus effect, the sluggish growth 
in Europe and the hesitant recovery in the United 
States. Growth in Africa was held back by the unrest 
in North Africa and remains vulnerable to political 
instability, volatile commodity prices and potential 
Table 1.1. World economic growth, 1991–2012a (Annual percentage change)
Sources: UNCTAD Trade and Development ReportWDEOH}:RUOG2XWSXW*URZWK
a Average percentage change.
b Forecast.
Region/country 
1991–2004 
Averagea 2008 2009 2010 2011b 2012b
WORLD 2.9 1.5  4.1 2.7 2.3
Developed economies 2.6 0.0  2.8 1.4 1.1
  of which:
United States 3.4   3.0 1.7 2.0
Japan 1.0   4.4  2.2
European Union (27) 2.3 0.3  2.1 1.5 
of which:
Germany 1.5 1.1  3.7 3.0 0.9
France 2.0   1.7 1.7 0.3
Italy 1.6   1.8 0.4 
United Kingdom 3.1   2.1 0.7 
Developing economies 4.7 5.3 2.4 7.5 5.9 4.9
   of which:
Africa 3.2 4.8 0.9 4.5 2.5 4.1
South Africa 2.5 3.6  2.8 3.1 2.7
Asia 5.9 5.9 4.1 8.4 6.8 5.5
Association of Southeast
Asian Nations 
4.9 4.0 1.3 8.0 4.5 4.9
China 9.9 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.2 7.9
India 5.9 7.5 7.0 9.0 7.0 6.0
Republic of Korea 5.0 2.3 0.3 6.2 3.6 3.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.7 4.0  6.0 4.3 3.4
Brazil 2.6 5.2  7.5 2.7 2.0
Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs)
5.2 7.7 5.0 5.8 4.0 4.1
Transition economies .. 5.2  4.2 4.5 4.3
   of which:
Russian Federation .. 5.2  4.0 4.3 4.7
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droughts. Prospects for the region could, however, 
improve given large new gas discoveries in Tanzania 
DQG 0R]DPELTXH DQG SURPLVLQJ RLO ƄQGV LQ .HQ\D
and West Africa.5 As to the least developed countries 
/'&V WKHLU HFRQRPLHV H[SDQGHGE\ } SHU FHQW LQ
GRZQ IURP}SHUFHQW LQ UHƅHFWLQJ LQ
part a weaker global demand and a slowing Chinese 
HFRQRP\ (FRQRPLHV LQ WUDQVLWLRQ JUHZ E\ } SHU
cent in 2011, with growth being sustained by higher 
commodity prices, increased public infrastructure 
spending and strong agricultural output.
World economic developments in 2011 highlighted 
the continued strong interdependence among 
economies and to some extent weakened the case for 
a potential decoupling of growth between developed 
DQGGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV)URPWKHVHFRQGTXDUWHURI
2011, economic growth in most developing countries 
and economies in transition started to decelerate, 
suggesting that these countries are not immune to 
the problems facing advanced economies and that 
they remain vulnerable to contagion through various 
channels, including trade, supply chains and the 
JOREDOƄQDQFLDOV\VWHP
Looking to the future, global economic growth is 
SURMHFWHGWRIXUWKHUGHFHOHUDWHLQ7KLVRXWORRN
LVVXEMHFW WRDKLJKGHJUHHRIXQFHUWDLQW\DQG WKH
risk cannot be excluded that it will be skewed to 
the downside. A potential escalation of the debt 
VLWXDWLRQ LQ (XURSH UHPDLQV D PDMRU VRXUFH RI
concern, despite ongoing efforts to contain the 
crisis and avoid contagion, such as, for example, 
increasing pledges to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to raise its resources to above $1 trillion.6
To put this into context, the IMF provided Greece 
ZLWK b} ELOOLRQ DQG b} ELOOLRQ LQ 0D\  DQG
April 2012, respectively.7
Oil price developments constitute another concern as 
persistent high and volatile oil prices could become a 
drag on global demand. In 2011, oil prices increased 
E\ RYHU } SHU FHQW DQG DYHUDJHG  SHU EDUUHO
(pb) despite the release of strategic stocks from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries. 
The $32 increase in the average oil price during 2011 
WUDQVODWHG LQWRDQHW WUDQVIHURI}ELOOLRQ IURPRLO
importing to oil-exporting countries.8 It is estimated by 
IMF that a cut in oil supply from the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, due to sanctions, could lead to an initial world 
SULFHLQFUHDVHRIWR}SHUFHQWLIRWKHUSURGXFHUV
do not make up for the shortage.9 Under relatively 
weak global economic conditions, an increase of 
}SHU FHQW LQ RLO SULFHV VXVWDLQHG RYHU WKH FRPLQJ
two years could, according to IMF, lower growth by 
WR}SHUFHQW10
2. World merchandise trade
In tandem with the world economy, growth in world 
merchandise trade by volume (that is, trade in real 
WHUPVDGMXVWHGWRDFFRXQWIRULQƅDWLRQDQGH[FKDQJH
UDWH ƅXFWXDWLRQV SURJUHVVLYHO\ ORVW PRPHQWXP LQ
 DQG H[SDQGHG DW DQ DQQXDO UDWH RI } SHU
FHQWDVKDUSGURS IURPWKH}SHUFHQW UHFRUGHG
in 2010. In addition to a weaker world economy, 
trade in 2011 was particularly hampered by natural 
shocks disrupting supply chains and production 
processes in Japan and Thailand, civil unrest in North 
Africa and oil supply disruption in Libya. Meanwhile, 
supported by high commodity prices, the value of 
ZRUOGPHUFKDQGLVHH[SRUWVLQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQW
to reach $18.2 trillion, a relative slowdown from the 
}SHUFHQWUHFRUGHGLQ11
Developed economies performed better than expected 
ZLWKH[SRUWVULVLQJE\}SHUFHQWGXHWRVWURQJUDSLG
H[SRUWJURZWKLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV}SHUFHQWDQG
WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ}SHUFHQW0HDQZKLOHH[SRUWV
IURP-DSDQFRQWUDFWHGE\}SHUFHQW
([SRUWVRIGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVJUHZE\}SHUFHQW
GULYHQ E\ $VLD } SHU FHQW DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU ,QGLD
}SHUFHQW&KLQD}SHUFHQWDQGWKH5HSXEOLF
RI.RUHD}SHUFHQW([SRUWVLQ7KDLODQGFRQWUDFWHG
DVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI WKHƅRRGV LQ1RYHPEHU
ZKLOH H[SRUWV IURP $IULFD VOXPSHG E\ } SHU FHQW
GXHLQSDUWLFXODUWRWKH}SHUFHQWGURSRI/LE\DQRLO
shipments.12
The slowdown in demand and the overall weak 
growth in advanced economies translated into weaker 
imports in developed regions. In 2011, imports grew 
DWDPRGHVW}SHUFHQWDVKDUSIDOOIURPWKH}SHU
cent recorded in 2010. Japan recorded the slowest 
JURZWK } SHU FHQW IROORZHG LQ DVFHQGLQJ RUGHU
E\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ}SHUFHQWDQGWKH8QLWHG
States (3.7).
Imports into developing countries expanded at the 
PXFK IDVWHU UDWH RI } SHU FHQW ZLWK UHVRXUFH
H[SRUWLQJ UHJLRQV EHQHƄWLQJ IURP IDYRXUDEOH
commodity prices. Imports into Latin America 
DQG $IULFD JUHZ E\ } SHU FHQW DQG } SHU FHQW
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Table 1.2 Growth in the volume of merchandisea trade, by country groups and geographical region,
2008–2011 (Annual percentage change)
Sources: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics and Trade and Development Report, 2012.
a 'DWDRQWUDGHYROXPHVDUHGHULYHGIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHUFKDQGLVHWUDGHYDOXHVGHƅDWHGE\81&7$'XQLWYDOXHLQGLFHV
 Exports 
Countries/regions 
Imports
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011
2.4  13.9 5.9 WORLD 2.5  14.1 5.0
2.5  13.2 5.1 Developed economies   11.0 3.5
of which:
2.3  27.5  Japan   10.1 1.9
5.5  15.3 7.2 United States   14.8 3.7
2.4  12.0 6.0 European Union (27) 0.8  10.0 3.2
3.2  15.4 7.0 Developing economies 6.6  19.2 6.2
of which:
  8.7  Africa 10.6  7.1 3.9
  10.3 3.4 Latin America and the Caribbean 8.5  23.3 7.1
1.6  18.8 4.5 Asia 8.0  21.9 6.1
of which:
1.8  18.8 4.5 ASEAN 8  21.9 6.1
10.6  29.0 12.8 China 2.3  30.8 10.6
16.8  5.9 13.7 India 29.7  13.8 5.3
8.8 2.6 15.3 11.2 Republic of Korea 0.7  17.4 6.7
  11.5 6.0 Transition economies 15.5  15.5 17.0
respectively. In a separate development, a recent 
decline in the normally large trade surpluses of Japan 
and China is changing the trade landscape and 
constitutes a welcome development, as it could imply 
DUHEDODQFLQJRIWKHZRUOGHFRQRP\VHHWDEOH}13
/RRNLQJ WR WKH IXWXUH :72 SURMHFWV D IXUWKHU
deceleration in trade growth with global merchandise 
WUDGHYROXPHVH[SHFWHGWRJURZE\MXVW}SHUFHQW
LQDUDWHEHORZWKH}SHUFHQWDYHUDJHUHFRUGHG
over the period 1990–2008.
Apart from current global economic uncertainties, 
the outlook for merchandise trade is also clouded 
E\ WKH ULVN RI D ODFN RI WUDGH ƄQDQFH14 A report by 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and 
,0) UHYHDOHG DSHVVLPLVWLF RXWORRN IRU WUDGH ƄQDQFH
in 2012.150RUH WKDQ}SHUFHQWRI UHVSRQGHQWV WR
D UHOHYDQW VXUYH\ H[SHFWHG WUDGH ƄQDQFH LQ $VLD WR
LPSURYHDQGRQO\}SHUFHQWZHUHRSWLPLVWLFDERXW
WUDGHƄQDQFHLQ(XURSH16
A surge in protectionist measures is another driver of 
XQFHUWDLQW\ LQ YLHZ RI WKH FXUUHQW GLIƄFXOW HFRQRPLF
climate and the lack of progress on the adoption 
of a multilateral trading system under the WTO 
Doha Round negotiations. At the November 2011 
meeting of the G20, participants underscored their 
commitment to free trade and to the multilateral trade 
system.17 However, since mid-October 2011, 124 new 
restrictive measures have been recorded, affecting 
DURXQG}SHUFHQWRI*PHUFKDQGLVHLPSRUWVRU
} SHU FHQW RI ZRUOG LPSRUWV18 Relevant measures 
include trade remedy actions, tariff increases, import 
licenses and customs controls.19
B. WORLD SEABORNE TRADE20
1. General trends in seaborne trade
Preliminary data indicate that world seaborne trade 
KHOGVWHDG\LQDQGJUHZE\}SHUFHQWZLWKWRWDO
YROXPHVUHDFKLQJDUHFRUG}ELOOLRQWRQVWDEOHV
DQG DQG ƄJXUH} 7KLV H[SDQVLRQZDVGULYHQ
E\ UDSLGJURZWK LQGU\FDUJRYROXPHV }SHUFHQW
SURSHOOHGE\XSEHDWFRQWDLQHUDQGPDMRUEXONWUDGHV
ZKLFKJUHZE\}SHUFHQW H[SUHVVHG LQ WRQVDQG
}SHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\
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,Q  FRQWDLQHU WUDGH ƅRZV ZHUH VXVWDLQHG E\
non-mainlane trade as the United States and Europe 
continued to struggle with sluggish growth and 
uncertainty, while dry bulk volumes held strong with 
continued import demand for raw materials in large 
developing economies, notably China and India. Five 
PDMRUGU\EXONƅRZVZHUHVXVWDLQHGE\JURZWKLQLURQ
RUHWUDGH}SHUFHQWZKLFKFDWHUVWRDVWURQJLPSRUW
demand in China, a country accounting for about two 
thirds of global iron ore trade volumes in 2011. Tanker 
WUDGHYROXPHVFUXGHRLOUHƄQHGSHWUROHXPSURGXFWV
DQGOLTXHƄHGSHWUROHXPDQGJDVUHPDLQHGDOPRVWƅDW
JURZLQJE\ OHVVWKDQ}SHUFHQWGXHWR IDOOLQJFUXGH
RLO YROXPHV 7RJHWKHU WUDGH LQ UHƄQHG SHWUROHXP
SURGXFWVDQGJDVJUHZE\}SHUFHQWGXHPDLQO\WR
WKHUHFHQWERRPLQOLTXHƄHGQDWXUDOJDV/1*WUDGH
$VVKRZQLQWDEOHVDQGDQGLQƄJXUH}ZKLFK
feature global seaborne trade in volume terms (tons), oil 
trade continued to account for approximately one third 
of the total in 2011. During the same year, dry cargo, 
LQFOXGLQJ PDMRU DQG PLQRU GU\ EXONV FRQWDLQHUL]HG
trade and general cargo held the remaining two thirds 
RIWKHPDUNHW$VDSURSRUWLRQRIWRWDOGU\FDUJRPDMRU
EXONVDFFRXQWHGIRU}SHUFHQWFRQWDLQHUL]HGWUDGH
IRU}SHUFHQWDQGPLQRUEXONVIRU}SHUFHQW
7KHUHPDLQLQJVKDUHRI}SHUFHQWZDVDFFRXQWHG
for by other dry goods including general cargo.
A different picture emerges, however, when one 
considers the contribution of these market segments 
7DEOH 'HYHORSPHQWLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVHDERUQHWUDGHVHOHFWHG\HDUV0LOOLRQVRIWRQVORDGHG
Year Oil and gas Main bulksa Other dry cargo
 Total
(all cargoes)
1970 1 440  448  717 2 605
1980 1 871  608 1 225 3 704
1990 1 755  988 1 265 4 008
2000 2 163 1 295 2 526 5 984
2005 2 422 1 709 2 978 7 109
2006 2 698 1 814 3 188 7 700
2007 2 747 1 953 3 334 8 034
2008 2 742 2 065 3 422 8 229
2009 2 642 2 085 3 131 7 858
2010 2 772 2 335 3 302 8 409
2011 2 796 2 477 3 475 8 748
Sources: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries and as published on the relevant 
government and port industry website, and by specialist sources. The data for 2006 onwards have been revised and upated 
WRUHƅHFWLPSURYHGUHSRUWLQJLQFOXGLQJPRUHUHFHQWƄJXUHVDQGEHWWHULQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHEUHDNGRZQE\FDUJRW\SH
Figures for 2011 are estimated based on preliminary data or on the last year for which data were available.
a Iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite/alumina and phosphate. The data for 2006 onwards are based on various issues of the Dry Bulk 
Trade Outlook, produced by Clarkson Research Services.
to the value of world seaborne trade. While recent 
data, including for 2011, are not readily available, 
existing estimates for 2007 may provide some insight 
into the distribution of world seaborne trade by 
value and allow for some comparisons to be made. 
In 2007, it was not tanker cargo (oil and gas) that 
accounted for the largest share of global trade, but 
FRQWDLQHUL]HG FDUJRZLWKPRUH WKDQ } SHU FHQW RI
WKH WRWDO WKLV UHƅHFWLQJ WKH KLJKHU YDOXH RI JRRGV
carried in containers. Tanker trade accounted for 
OHVV WKDQ } SHU FHQW ZKLOH JHQHUDO DQG GU\ FDUJR
DFFRXQWHGIRU}SHUFHQWDQG}SHUFHQWRIWKHYDOXH
respectively.21 More recent analysis of the 2008 and 
2009 United Nations trade data shows an increase in 
WKHYDOXHRIGU\EXONFDUJRUHƅHFWLQJWRDODUJHH[WHQW
the strong import demand for these commodities from 
emerging developing countries, in particular China.22
As developing countries contribute increasingly 
larger shares and growth to both world GDP and 
merchandise trade, their contribution to world 
seaborne trade has also been increasing. In 2011, a 
WRWDORI}SHUFHQWRIWKHYROXPHRIZRUOGVHDERUQH
WUDGH RULJLQDWHG LQ GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG } SHU
cent of this trade was delivered on their territories 
ƄJXUH  D 'HYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DUH QRZPDMRU
world players both as exporters and importers, a 
remarkable shift away from earlier patterns when they 
served mainly as loading areas of high volume goods 
(mainly of high volume raw materials and resources) 
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Table 1.4. World seaborne trade in 2006–2011, by type of cargo, country group and region
 Country group Year
Goods loaded Goods unloaded
Total Crude
Petroleum 
products 
and gas Dry cargo Total Crude
Petroleum 
products 
and gas Dry cargo
Millions of tons
 World 2006  7 700.3  1 783.4   914.8  5 002.1  7 878.3  1 931.2   893.7  5 053.4
2007  8 034.1  1 813.4   933.5  5 287.1  8 140.2  1 995.7   903.8  5 240.8
2008  8 229.5  1 785.2   957.0  5 487.2  8 286.3  1 942.3   934.9  5 409.2
2009  7 858.0  1 710.5   931.1  5 216.4  7 832.0  1 874.1   921.3  5 036.6
2010  8 408.9  1 787.7   983.8  5 637.5  8 443.8  1 933.2   979.2  5 531.4
2011  8 747.7  1 762.4  1 033.5  5 951.9  8 769.3  1 907.0  1 038.6  5 823.7
 Developed economies 2006  2 460.5   132.9   336.4  1 991.3  4 164.7  1 282.0   535.5  2 347.2
2007  2 608.9   135.1   363.0  2 110.8  3 990.5  1 246.0   524.0  2 220.5
2008  2 715.4   129.0   405.3  2 181.1  4 007.9  1 251.1   523.8  2 233.0
2009  2 554.3   115.0   383.8  2 055.5  3 374.4  1 125.3   529.9  1 719.2
2010  2 865.4   135.9   422.3  2 307.3  3 604.5  1 165.4   522.6  1 916.5
2011  2 966.2   123.3   423.3  2 419.5  3 615.3  1 109.6   569.9  1 935.7
 Transition economies 2006   410.3   123.1   41.3   245.9   70.6   5.6   3.1   61.9
2007   407.9   124.4   39.9   243.7   76.8   7.3   3.5   66.0
2008   431.5   138.2   36.7   256.6   89.3   6.3   3.8   79.2
2009   505.3   142.1   44.4   318.8   93.3   3.5   4.6   85.3
2010   515.7   150.2   45.9   319.7   122.1   3.5   4.6   114.0
2011   510.4   138.7   49.7   322.0   154.7   4.2   4.4   146.1
 Developing economies 2006  4 829.5  1 527.5   537.1  2 765.0  3 642.9   643.6   355.1  2 644.3
2007  5 020.8  1 553.9   530.7  2 932.6  4 073.0   742.4   376.3  2 954.3
2008  5 082.6  1 518.0   515.1  3 049.6  4 189.1   684.9   407.2  3 097.0
2009  4 798.4  1 453.5   502.9  2 842.0  4 364.2   745.3   386.9  3 232.1
2010  5 027.8  1 501.6   515.6  3 010.5  4 717.3   764.4   452.0  3 500.9
2011  5 271.2  1 500.3   560.5  3 210.3  4 999.3   793.2   464.3  3 741.8
     Africa 2006   721.9   353.8   86.0   282.2   349.8   41.3   39.4   269.1
2007   732.0   362.5   81.8   287.6   380.0   45.7   44.5   289.8
2008   766.7   379.2   83.3   304.2   376.6   45.0   43.5   288.1
2009   708.0   354.0   83.0   271.0   386.8   44.6   39.7   302.5
2010   754.0   351.1   92.0   310.9   416.9   42.7   40.5   333.7
2011   787.7   344.5   108.9   334.2   371.3   40.1   43.4   287.8
     America 2006  1 030.7   251.3   93.9   685.5   373.4   49.6   60.1   263.7
2007  1 067.1   252.3   90.7   724.2   415.9   76.0   64.0   275.9
2008  1 108.2   234.6   93.0   780.6   436.8   74.2   69.9   292.7
2009  1 029.8   225.7   74.0   730.1   371.9   64.4   73.6   234.0
2010  1 172.6   241.6   85.1   846.0   448.7   69.9   74.7   304.2
2011  1 260.0   254.0   93.5   912.4 491.5 74.1 79.3 338.1
     Asia 2006  3 073.1   921.2   357.0  1 794.8  2 906.8   552.7   248.8  2 105.3
2007  3 214.6   938.2   358.1  1 918.3  3 263.6   620.7   260.8  2 382.1
2008  3 203.6   902.7   338.6  1 962.2  3 361.9   565.6   286.8  2 509.5
2009  3 054.3   872.3   345.8  1 836.3  3 592.4   636.3   269.9  2 686.2
2010  3 094.6   907.5   338.3  1 848.8  3 838.2   651.8   333.1  2 853.4
2011  3 216.4   900.1   357.9  1 958.4  4 122.0   679.0   337.7  3 105.3
     Oceania 2006   3.8   1.2   0.1   2.5   12.9   0.0   6.7   6.2
2007   7.1   0.9   0.1   2.5   13.5   0.0   7.0   6.5
2008   4.2   1.5   0.1   2.6   13.8   0.0   7.1   6.7
2009   6.3   1.5   0.2   4.6   13.1   0.0   3.6   9.5
2010   6.5   1.5   0.2   4.8   13.4   0.0   3.7   9.7
2011   7.1   1.6   0.2   5.3   14.5   0.0   3.9   10.6
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries, and data obtained from the 
relevant government, port industry and other specialist websites and sources. The data for 2006 onwards have been revised 
DQGXSGDWHGWRUHƅHFWLPSURYHGUHSRUWLQJLQFOXGLQJPRUHUHFHQWƄJXUHVDQGEHWWHULQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHEUHDNGRZQE\
cargo type. Figures for 2011 are estimated based on preliminary data or on the last year for which data were avaialble.
Percentage share
 World 2006   100.0  23  12  65  100  25  11  64 
2007   100.0  23  12  66  100  25  11  64 
2008   100.0  22  12  67  100  23  11  65 
2009   100.0  22  12  66  100  24  12  64 
2010   100.0  21  12  67  100  23  12  66 
2011   100.0  20  12  68  100  22  12  66 
 Developed economies 2006   32.0  7  37  40  53  66  60  46 
2007   32.5  7  39  40  49  62  58  42 
2008   33.0  7  42  40  48  64  56  41 
2009   32.5  7  41  39  43  60  58  34 
2010   34.1  8  43  41  43  60  53  35 
2011   33.9  7  41  41  41  58  55  33 
 Transition economies 2006   5.3  7  5  5  1  0  0  1 
2007   5.1  7  4  5  1  0  0  1 
2008   5.2  8  4  5  1  0  0  1 
2009   6.4  8  5  6  1  0  0  2 
2010   6.1  8  5  6  1  0  0  2 
2011   5.8  8  5  5  2  0  0  3 
 Developing economies 2006   62.7  86  59  55  46  33  40  52 
2007   62.5  86  57  55  50  37  42  56 
2008   61.8  85  54  56  51  35  44  57 
2009   61.1  85  54  54  56  40  42  64 
2010   59.8  84  52  53  56  40  46  63 
2011   60.3  85  54  54  57  42  45  64 
     Africa 2006   9.4  20  9  6  4  2  4  5 
2007   9.1  20  9  5  5  2  5  6 
2008   9.3  21  9  6  5  2  5  5 
2009   9.0  21  9  5  5  2  4  6 
2010   9.0  20  9  6  5  2  4  6 
2011   9.0  20  11  6  4  2  4  5 
     America 2006   13.4   14.1   10.3   13.7   4.7   2.6   6.7   5.2
2007   13.3   13.9   9.7   13.7   5.1   3.8   7.1   5.3
2008   13.5   13.1   9.7   14.2   5.3   3.8   7.5   5.4
2009   13.1   13.2   7.9   14.0   4.7   3.4   8.0   4.6
2010   13.9   13.5   8.7   15.0   5.3   3.6   7.6   5.5
2011   14.4   14.4   9.0   15.3   5.6   3.9   7.6   5.8
     Asia 2006   39.9   51.7   39.0   35.9   36.9   28.6   27.8   41.7
2007   40.0   51.7   38.4   36.3   40.1   31.1   28.9   45.5
2008   38.9   50.6   35.4   35.8   40.6   29.1   30.7   46.4
2009   38.9   51.0   37.1   35.2   45.9   34.0   29.3   53.3
2010   36.8   50.8   34.4   32.8   45.5   33.7   34.0   51.6
2011   36.8   51.1   34.6   32.9   47.0   35.6   32.5   53.3
     Oceania 2006  0.0  0.1  0.01  0.0   0.2 –   0.7   0.1
2007  0.1  0.1  0.01  0.0   0.2 –   0.8   0.1
2008  0.1  0.1  0.01  0.0   0.2 –   0.8   0.1
2009  0.1  0.1  0.02  0.1   0.2 –   0.4   0.2
2010  0.1  0.1  0.02  0.1  0.2 –  0.4  0.2 
2011  0.1  0.1  0.02  0.1  0.2 –  0.4  0.2 
Table 1.4. World seaborne trade in 2006–2011, by type of cargo, country group and region (continued)
 Country group Year
Goods loaded Goods unloaded
Total Crude
Petroleum 
products 
and gas
Dry 
cargo Total Crude
Petroleum 
products 
and gas Dry cargo
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Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, various issues. For 2006–2012, the breakdown by type of dry cargo is based on 
Clarkson Research Services’ Shipping Review & Outlook, various issues. Data for 2012 are based on a forecast by Clarkson 
Research Services in Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 2012.
)LJXUH ,QWHUQDWLRQDOVHDERUQHWUDGHE\FDUJRW\SHVHOHFWHG\HDUV0LOOLRQVRIWRQVORDGHG
 0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
Container  102  152  234  371  598  969 1 076 1 193 1 249 1 127 1 275 1 385 1 498
Other dry cargo 1 123  819 1 031 1 125 1 928 2 009 2 112 2 141 2 173 2 004 2 027 2 090 2 219
Five major bulks  608  900  988 1 105 1 295 1 709 1 814 1 953 2 065 2 085 2 335 2 477 2 547
Oil and gas 1 871 1 459 1 755 2 050 2 163 2 422 2 698 2 747 2 742 2 642 2 772 2 796 3 033
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)LJXUHD :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHE\FRXQWU\JURXS3HUFHQWDJHVKDUHLQZRUOGWRQQDJH
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries, and data obtained from the 
relevant government, port industry and other specialist websites and sources. Figures are estimated based on preliminary 
data or on the last year for which data were available.
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Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, various issues.
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries, and data obtained from the 
relevant government, port industry and other specialist websites and sources. Figures are estimated based on preliminary 
data or on the last year for which data were available.
CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 11
DVVKRZQLQƄJXUH}E:LWKUHJDUGVWRGHYHORSHG
countries, their share of imports outweighed exports, 
WRWDOOLQJ } SHU FHQW DQG } SHU FHQW UHVSHFWLYHO\
Transition economies continued to account for the 
remaining trade, their contribution to world seaborne 
H[SRUWVDQG LPSRUWVWRWDOOLQJ}SHUFHQWDQG}SHU
cent, respectively. Geographically, Asia maintained its 
lead position and continued to fuel world seaborne 
trade with its share of goods loaded amounting to 
}SHU FHQWZKLOH WKDWRI JRRGVXQORDGHG UHDFKLQJ
}SHUFHQWƄJXUHF
For 2012, Clarkson Research Services are forecasting 
D }SHUFHQWDQQXDOJURZWK UDWH LQ WKHYROXPHRI
world seaborne trade. However, several downside 
risks continue to stand in the way of a robust and 
sustainable recovery in shipping, including the current 
global economic uncertainty, security concerns and 
PDULWLPHSLUDF\OLPLWHGWUDGHƄQDQFHDQGJHRSROLWLFDO
tensions, as well as a potential rise in trade restrictions.
2. Seaborne trade in ton-miles23
The unit of ton-miles offers a measure of true demand for 
shipping services and tonnage as it takes into account 
distance, which determines ships’ availability. Between 
1999 and 2011, ton-miles have increased for all cargoes, 
DQGDUHSURMHFWHGWR ULVH IXUWKHU LQ WDEOH} D
ƄJXUHVDDQGE7KHPRVWLPSUHVVLYHJURZWK
RYHU WKLV SHULRG KDV EHHQ LQ /1* } SHU FHQW
IROORZHGE\LURQRUH}SHUFHQWJUDLQ}SHUFHQW
FRDO}SHUFHQWSHWUROHXPSURGXFWV}SHUFHQWDQG
FUXGHRLO}SHUFHQW6LQFHDVXUJHLQ&KLQDRI
import demand for industrial commodities necessary 
for steel production has fuelled rapid growth in the iron 
ore and coal trades. The growing appetite of China for 
these commodities has heightened the need to diversify 
sources of supply, and include more distant locations 
such as Brazil, the United States and South Africa. While 
the estimated average distance of global iron ore trade 
increased from 5,451 miles in 1998 to 6,260 miles in 
2011, iron ore ton-miles are expected to increase further 
as new mines in the Arctic and West Africa start up.24
Steam and coking coal ton-miles varied both over 
WLPH DQG EHWZHHQ WKH $WODQWLF DQG WKH 3DFLƄF
regions.25 In 2011, coal trade patterns shifted, with 
JURZWK LQ WRQPLOH H[SRUWV IDOOLQJ E\ } SHU FHQW LQ
WKH 3DFLƄF DQG ULVLQJ IRU WKH ƄUVW WLPH VLQFH 
LQ WKH$WODQWLF DW DQ DQQXDOL]HG UDWH RI }SHU FHQW
7KH WRQPLOHGHFUHDVH LQ WKH3DFLƄF UHVXOWHG LQSDUW
IURPWKH$XVWUDOLDQƅRRGVZKLFKUHGXFHGVXSSO\DQG
drove coal prices up.26 Meanwhile, higher demand for 
thermal coal in Europe and a rise in coal exports from 
the United States have boosted the Atlantic trade. 
7KHSUHGRPLQDQFHRIWKH3DFLƄFFRDOWUDGHFRQWLQXHV
however, with China in particular emerging as a net 
importer, and with Indonesian exports predominantly 
catering for this demand. In view of the relatively short 
distances between China and Indonesia, compared 
with the United States or South Africa, estimated 
average distances fell from 4,998 miles in 1998 to 
3,910 miles in 2011.27
5HƄQHG SHWUROHXP SURGXFWV IRU H[DPSOH JDVROLQH
and kerosene) and crude oil recorded the smallest ton-
PLOHJURZWKUHƅHFWLQJWKHVORZSDFHDWZKLFKFUXGH
oil trade has been evolving over the past decade. 
Tanker trade patterns, including associated ton-mile 
demand, are changing as a result of the strategies 
seeking to diversify crude oil supply sources. In China, 
ZKHUH FUXGH LPSRUWV LQFUHDVHG QHDUO\ ƄYH WLPHV
between 2001 and 2011, the share of the country’s 
ton-mile trade sourced from Western Asia has been 
decreasing, while the proportion of its ton-miles 
sourced from the Caribbean has increased.28 The 
share of crude ton-miles from Western Asia fell from 
}SHUFHQWRI WKHFRXQWU\pV WRWDO LQ WR}SHU
cent in 2011, while the Caribbean share increased 
IURP}SHUFHQW WR}SHUFHQW29 The Western Asia 
share of crude ton-miles to North America fell from 
}SHUFHQWLQWR}SHUFHQWLQZKLOHWKH
shares of the Caribbean and West Africa helped offset 
this decline.30 In 2014, the crude ton-mile demand of 
China is expected to surpass that of North America.31
,Q  DOWKRXJK FUXGH RLO ƅRZV GHFOLQHG WUDGH
distances rose in certain regions. Europe, for example, 
replaced crude oil from Libya with longer-haul 
substitutes from Western Asia, the Black Sea, and 
Western Africa.32 Furthermore, tankers trading between 
Western Asia and the Atlantic coast of the United States 
are increasingly travelling greater distances to avoid 
piracy off the coast of Somalia in the Indian Ocean.33
Oil products have also shown slower ton-mile growth 
RYHUWKHSDVWGHFDGHDVDQLQFUHDVHGUHƄQHU\FDSDFLW\
in Asia implies a lesser need for long-haul petroleum 
products imports. However, with the closing of three 
UHƄQHULHV LQWKH(DVW&RDVWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKH
country’s ton-mile demand for crude oil imports will 
likely be reduced. This means, in parallel, that its ton-
PLOH GHPDQG IRU UHƄQHG SURGXFWV FDQ EH H[SHFWHG
to rise with higher import volumes from Europe, India 
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7DEOH}D :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHLQFDUJRWRQPLOHVDQGE\FDJRW\SHt(VWLPDWHG}ELOOLRQVRIWRQPLOHV
Sources:  Based on data from Clarkson Research Services’ Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 2012.
a Includes soybean period.
b Includes iron ore, coal, grain bauxite/alumina and rock phosphate.
c Estimated period.
d Forecast period.
Year Crude Products
Oil
trade LPG LNG
Gas
trade Iron ore Coal Grain a
Five
main dry 
bulks b
Other
dry 
cargoes
All 
cargoes
1999 7 761 1 488 9 249  188  267  456 2 338 2 196 1 122 6 046 11 191 26 942
2000 8 014 1 487 9 500  199  317  516 2 620 2 420 1 224 6 649 12 058 
2001 7 778 1 598   182  341  2 698 2 564 1 293 6 922  29 168
2002 7 553 1 594 9 146  192  360  552 2 956 2 577 1 295 7 212 12 587 29 497
 8 025 1 697   187  399  586 3 148 2 771 1 382 7 710  
2004 8 550 1 836   192  429  621 3 667 2 901 1 397 8 424  
2005 8 643 2 057 10 701  187  444  3 900 2 984 1 459 8 819 14 570 
2006 8 875 2 192 11 067  195  537  4 413 3 103 1 496 9 508 15 759 
2007 8 836 2 223 11 060  198  614  812 4 773 3 177 1 610 10 090  
2008 8 965 2 277 11 241  205  660  865 5 000 3 260 1 721  16 646 
2009 8 138 2 233   193  668  862 5 569 3 060 1 693 10 715 14 988 
2010 8 688 2 272 10 960  198  861 1 059 6 121 3 540 1 948 12 042 16 829 40 891
2011c 8 762 2 351 11 112  201  955 1 155 6 608 3 664 1 920 12 666 17 861 42 794
2012d 8 918 2 449   213 1 065 1 278 6 948 3 763 1 940  18 754 44 540
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Figure 1.4 (a). World seaborne trade in cargo ton-miles, 1999–2012 (Billions of ton-miles)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat based on data from Clarkson Research Services’ Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 2012.
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DQG:HVWHUQ$VLD5HƄQHU\GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WKHRLO
producing regions could help shift a larger share of the 
RLOWUDGHIURPFUXGHRLOWRUHƄQHGSHWUROHXPSURGXFWV
(for example, gasoline, kerosene, and the like).
Table 1.5 (b) features estimated annual deadweight 
ton-miles (dwt-miles), which are calculated by 
multiplying the number of voyages between each port 
by the distance and individual vessel dwt. Therefore, 
unlike cargo ton-miles, dwt-miles measure total annual 
vessel activity not only when the ship is laden but also 
ZKHQLQEDOODVW7KXVWKLVPHDVXUH LVQRWHTXLYDOHQW
to measuring the potential ton-mile capacity, as data 
LQ WDEOH}  E UHƅHFW YR\DJHV DFWXDOO\ PDGH DQG
do not account for unused ship supply capacity 
(for example, ships that are laid up, waiting or out 
of service). Therefore, the dwt-mile data presented 
LQ WDEOH} EGRQRWPHDVXUHVXSSO\RUGHWHUPLQH
utilisation. The dwt-miles to cargo ton-miles ratio over 
WKHtSHULRGLVDURXQGUHƅHFWLQJLQSDUW
the difference between the two measures. 
Bearing in mind these differences, the evolution of dwt-
PLOHV DV VKRZQ LQ WDEOH}  E DSSHDUV WR EH LQ OLQH
with the trends observed in cargo ton-miles as shown 
LQ WDEOH}  D 7KH SHUIRUPDQFH RI GZWPLOHV FOHDUO\
highlights the impact of the 2009 downturn when global 
trade collapsed, as well as the strong rebound in trade 
volumes recorded since 2010. Rapid growth in gas trade 
DQGPRUH VSHFLƄFDOO\ WKH UHFHQW VXUJH LQ /1* WUDGH
have been key drivers of growth in dwt-miles over the 
tSHULRG7DEOH}EDOVRVKRZVWKHUHODWLYH
resilience of dry bulk trade owing to the booming Asian 
demand for commodities such as iron ore and coal.
7DEOHE :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHLQGZWPLOHV(VWLPDWHG}ELOOLRQVRIGZWPLOHV
Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 2012. www.lloydslistintelligence.com
Year Container General Cargo RoRo Reefer Dry Bulk Oil Gas World Total 
2008 18 400 2 800 1 812  496 25 606   80 962
2009   1 217  405 24 550 26 228  
2010 16 508 2 457 1 468  26 784 27 787  78 659
2011 18 756 2 472 1 578   28 181  86 947
-
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Other dry cargo 11 191 12 058 12 347 12 587 13 072 13 975 14 570 15 759 16 390 16 646 14 988 16 829 17 861 18 754
Five main dry bulks 6 046 6 649 6 922 7 212 7 710 8 424 8 819 9 508 10 090 10 523 10 715 12 042 12 666 13 141
Oil 9 249 9 500 9 376 9 146 9 723 10 386 10 701 11 067 11 060 11 241 10 371 10 960 11 112 11 367
Gas  456  516  523  552  586  621  631  732  812  865  862  1'059  1'155  1'278 
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Figure 1.4 (b). World seaborne trade in cargo ton-miles and by cargo type, 1999–2012 (Billions of ton-miles)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat based on data from Clarkson Research Services’ Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 2012.
a Estimated.
b Forecast.
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3. Seaborne trade by cargo type
Tanker trade34
Crude oil production and consumption35
In 2011, world oil consumption grew marginally by 
}SHUFHQWWRUHDFK}PLOOLRQEDUUHOVSHUGD\ESG
While consumption in the OECD countries declined 
E\}SHUFHQWLWURVHE\}SHUFHQWLQGHYHORSLQJ
countries. Interestingly, after growing by an average 
RI}SHUFHQWDQQXDOO\EHWZHHQDQGRLO
consumption growth in China slowed down in 2011, 
UHƅHFWLQJ LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH HIIHFW RI WKH FRXQWU\pV
WLJKWHUPRQHWDU\DQGƄVFDOSROLFLHV
*OREDO SURGXFWLRQ LQFUHDVHG E\ } SHU FHQW WR
UHDFK}PLOOLRQESGLQZLWKPHPEHUVRIWKH
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) leading the growth. Non-OPEC supply 
UHPDLQHGƅDWDVJURZWKLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&DQDGD
the Russian Federation and Colombia was offset 
by declines in Norway and the United Kingdom. 
$Q RYHUYLHZ RI PDMRU SURGXFHUV DQG FRQVXPHUV LV
SUHVHQWHGLQWDEOH}
Recent developments in drilling activity point to future 
oil supply increases. Drilling activity picked up in 2011 
due in part to the allocation of new drilling permits in the 
Gulf of Mexico. This follows the end, in October 2010, 
of the moratorium established in this region after the 
Deepwater Horizon incident. Activity also revived with 
WKH HPHUJHQFH RI QHZH[SORUDWLRQ RI ƄHOGV LQ%UD]LO
DQG WKH *XOI RI *XLQHD *KDQD $QJROD (TXDWRULDO
*XLQHDDQGWKH&RQJRDQGZLWKQHZSURMHFWVEHLQJ
launched in 2011.
Crude oil shipments
Over the past decade, crude oil volumes increased at 
a relatively slower pace than other market segments. 
Between 2000 and 2011, crude oil shipments grew 
DQQXDOO\ DW DQ DYHUDJH UDWH RI OHVV WKDQ } SHU FHQW
ZKLOHLQWKH\GHFOLQHGE\}SHUFHQW,Q
the total volume of crude oil loaded globally amounted 
WRDERXW}ELOOLRQWRQV:HVWHUQ$VLDUHPDLQHGWKH
largest loading area, followed,  Africa, developing 
$PHULFDDQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQHFRQRPLHV0DMRULPSRUWLQJ
areas were in ascending order, Japan, North America, 
Europe and developing Asia.
Tanker trade patterns are changing as crude oil source 
GLYHUVLƄFDWLRQFRQWLQXHV$QHZPDSRIFUXGHVXSSOLHV
is being drawn up as new oil discoveries are made in 
different regions and as new market suppliers emerge. 
8QGHUSLQQLQJ WKHGLYHUVLƄFDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ LV WKHDFWLYH
move by China to secure its energy supply through 
foreign investments.36 In March 2009, China lent up 
WR}ELOOLRQWRWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ.D]DNKVWDQ
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Brazil,37 in 
exchange for oil, while its investment in the mining sector 
in sub-Saharan Africa accounted for about one third of 
the country’s foreign direct investment (FDI).38 There are 
now 50 countries in which Chinese oil companies have 
more than 200 upstream investments.39 The extent to 
ZKLFK WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO WDQNHU PDUNHW ZRXOG EHQHƄW
IURPWKH IXOORSSRUWXQLWLHVDULVLQJ IURPWKHVHSURMHFWV
remains unclear as the strategy being developed 
by China also aims to ensure that, by 2015, half the 
country’s crude imports are shipped on domestic ship 
tonnage. Another trend reshaping the market is the 
falling demand in the United States – the world’s largest 
RLO FRQVXPHU t DQG WKH FRQVHTXHQW UHRULHQWDWLRQ RI
FDUJRƅRZVWRZDUGV$VLD
Current sanctions applying to the oil trade of the 
,VODPLF5HSXEOLFRI,UDQDUHDOVRLQƅXHQFLQJWKHWDQNHU
market and raising uncertainties. The sanctions have a 
direct impact on this country’s oil exports as well as on 
the oil trade that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. 
An escalation of these geopolitical tensions could 
lead to a shutdown of the Strait, which in turn would 
create oil shortages and raise oil prices to potentially 
extreme levels, including the range of $200–$400.40
Although temporary waivers have been issued for a 
number of countries, concerns remain with respect 
to the likely severe impact of the sanctions, including 
those enacted by the European Union. These latter 
sanctions prohibit insurers in Europe – marine insurers 
are to a large extent based in Europe and the United 
States – from issuing or maintaining insurance to 
tankers involved in servicing the oil trade of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Pressure is particularly high for some 
key crude importers, which could be forced to provide 
sovereign guarantees to tankers.
In a separate development, tanker trade has also been 
affected by rising operating costs resulting from the 
higher oil and bunker fuel prices that prevailed in 2011. 
Tanker operators had to reduce speed to optimize 
fuel consumption and also absorb excess tonnage 
capacity. Slow steaming has been implemented in 
the tanker trade, with most voyages taking place 
at an average of 13 knots (compared to 14 knots), 
and at 10–11 knots when sailing in ballast (see also 
VHFWLRQ}&
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7DEOH 0DMRUSURGXFHUVDQGFRQVXPHUVRI
oil and natural gas, 2011
(World market share in percentage)
Source: UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data published in 
the British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2012 -XQH}
Note: Oil includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and natural 
JDV OLTXLGV1*/VŸ WKH OLTXLGFRQWHQWRIQDWXUDOJDV
where this is recovered separately). The term excludes 
OLTXLG IXHOV IURPRWKHU VRXUFHVDVELRPDVVDQGFRDO
derivatives.
World oil production World oil consumption
Western Asia  33 $VLD3DFLƂF  32 
Transition economies  16 North America  24 
North America  14 Europe  16 
Africa  11 Latin America  9 
Latin America  12 Western Asia  10 
$VLD3DFLƂF  10 Transition economies  5 
Europe  5 Africa  4 
World natural gas production World natural gas consumption
North America  25 North America  25 
Transition economies  24 Europe  16 
Western Asia  16 Asia  17 
$VLD3DFLƂF  15 Transition economies  18 
Europe  8 Western Asia  14 
Latin America  7 Latin America  7 
Africa  6 Africa  3 
5HƂQHU\GHYHORSPHQWVVKLSPHQWVRISHWUROHXP
products and gas
,Q  JOREDO UHƄQHU\ WKURXJKSXWV LQFUHDVHG
PDUJLQDOO\E\}SHUFHQWDQGDYHUDJHG}PLOOLRQ
bpd. The drop in the OECD output was offset 
by increased production in developing countries, 
including India, China and those of Latin America. For 
WKH ƄIWK WLPH LQ VL[ \HDUVJURZWK LQ WKURXJKSXWZDV
RXWSDFHGE\JURZWKLQWKHJOREDOUHƄQLQJFDSDFLWLHV
ZKLFKH[SDQGHGE\}SHUFHQWLQ7KHODUJHVW
capacity growth continues to take place in the Asia–
3DFLƄFUHJLRQDQGLQ:HVWHUQ$VLD
5HƄQHUV LQ(XURSHDUH FRQIURQWHGZLWK D QXPEHURI
GLIƄFXOWLHV7KHVHLQFOXGHDIDOOLQJGHPDQGLQ(XURSH
and the United States (the largest market for European 
JDVROLQHWKHVKXWGRZQRIVHYHQUHƄQHULHVWKHQHHG
to seek alternative markets in Africa and Western Asia 
for European gasoline, and a supply and demand 
PLVPDWFK ZLWK UHƄQHULHV LQ (XURSH EHLQJ JHDUHG
towards gasoline production and global demand 
VXSSRUWLQJGLHVHO7KHFORVLQJRIUHƄQHULHVLQ(XURSH
however, could mean greater European imports of oil 
products in the future.
In 2011, world shipments of petroleum products and 
JDVLQFOXGLQJ/1*DQGOLTXHƄHGSHWUROHXPJDV/3*
LQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQWWDNLQJWKHWRWDOWR}ELOOLRQ
WRQV7KHJURZWKUDWHUHƅHFWVWKHERRPLQJ/1*WUDGH
If gas trade were to be excluded, and using estimates 
for LNG and LPG trade published by Clarkson 
Research Services (Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 
2012), the growth rate would moderate and amount 
WR}SHUFHQW,QWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVEHFDPHD
QHWH[SRUWHURIUHƄQHGSHWUROHXPSURGXFWVIRUWKHƄUVW
time on record.
Natural gas supply and demand
Natural gas is the third largest source of energy 
consumed globally, after oil and coal. North America 
continues to account for the largest share of world gas 
consumption, although the largest growth rate was 
recorded in the Asian market.
,QQDWXUDOJDVFRQVXPSWLRQLQFUHDVHGE\}SHU
cent, with consumption in North America expanding 
E\}SHUFHQWGXHWRORZJDVSULFHV(OVHZKHUHWKH
largest growth was recorded in China, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Japan. The combined effect of a weak 
economic situation, relatively high gas prices, warmer 
weather conditions and an incremental shift towards 
greater use of renewable power generation has led 
gas consumption in the European Union to drop by 
}SHUFHQW
,QJOREDOQDWXUDOJDVSURGXFWLRQJUHZE\}SHU
cent, with production in the United States growing by 
}SHUFHQWDQG WKLVFRXQWU\ UDQNLQJDV WKH ODUJHVW
world producer. The United States has been gradually 
reducing its dependency on foreign energy supplies, 
in part through increased exploitation of its shale gas.
Output of natural gas grew rapidly in Qatar, the 
Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, which helped 
to offset the lost output from Libya and the United 
Kingdom. Production in the European Union also 
declined as demand in the region weakened and gas 
ƄHOGVPDWXUHGRUZHUHXQGHUPDLQWHQDQFH
/LTXHƂHGQDWXUDOJDVVKLSPHQWV
,QJOREDOQDWXUDOJDVWUDGH LQFUHDVHGE\}SHU
FHQWZLWK}SHUFHQWRI WKLV WUDGHEHLQJFDUULHGDV
LNG on board gas carriers and the remaining share 
being carried via pipelines. Shipments of LNG grew 
E\}SHUFHQW LQ WDNLQJWKHWRWDOYROXPHWR
} ELOOLRQ FXELF PHWHUV *URZWK ZDV IXHOOHG E\
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increasing exports from Qatar and increasing imports 
LQWR WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP } SHU FHQW -DSDQ
} SHU FHQW DQG WKH 5HSXEOLF RI .RUHD } SHU
FHQW $VLD DFFRXQWHG IRU } SHU FHQW RI JOREDO
LNG imports, with Japan remaining the world largest 
importer, followed by the Republic of Korea.
Over the past few years LNG has been one of the 
fastest-growing cargoes owing to the increasing 
interest in LNG as a greener alternative to other fossil 
fuels. Interest in LNG heightened in 2011 as the fallout 
from the disaster in Japan highlighted the risk of a great 
reliance on nuclear power over the long term. New 
and expanding LNG-receiving terminals (for example, 
in the United Kingdom, the United States, China, the 
United Arab Emirates, Chile, and Thailand) are being 
VHW XS DQG D WRWDO RI ƄYH QHZ OLTXHIDFWLRQ SURMHFWV
started operations between 2010 and 2011, including 
those in Qatar, Peru and Norway. Overall, the outlook 
for LNG is positive and is supported by growing 
GHPDQG IURP $VLD LQFOXGLQJ D SURMHFWHG JURZWK LQ
demand from traditionally large LNG exporters such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia.
2QH VWXG\ SURMHFWV WKDW E\  1RUZD\ DQG WKH
Russian Federation will be driving global exports of 
LNG and that these two countries will lead the fourth 
wave of LNG exports.417KHƄUVWZDYHLVWDNLQJSODFH
at the present time and is led by Qatar, the second 
ZDYHLVSURMHFWHGWRRFFXULQZLWK$XVWUDOLDDQG
WKH$VLD3DFLƄF UHJLRQEHLQJPDMRUSOD\HUV DQG WKH
third wave is expected to occur around 2020 and be 
driven by West Africa.42
Dry cargo trades: major and minor dry bulks
and other dry cargo 43
In 2011, the momentum was maintained for dry 
FDUJRWUDGHZKLFKLQFUHDVHGE\DƄUP}SHUFHQW
WDNLQJWKHWRWDOWRQHDUO\}ELOOLRQWRQV'U\EXONFDUJR
LQFOXGLQJ WKH ƄYHPDMRU FRPPRGLWLHV LURQRUH FRDO
grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock) and minor 
bulks (agribulks, fertilizers, metals, minerals, steel and 
IRUHVWSURGXFWVLQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQWGRZQIURP
WKH}SHUFHQWLQFUHDVHUHFRUGHGLQ7KHWRWDO
YROXPHRIGU\EXONWUDGHDPRXQWHGWR}ELOOLRQWRQV
in 2011.
Major dry bulks: iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/
alumina and phosphate rock
,Q  WKH ƄYH PDMRU GU\ EXONV DFFRXQWHG IRU
DSSUR[LPDWHO\}SHUFHQWRI WRWDOGU\FDUJRGULYHQ
by iron ore volumes, which accounted for the largest 
VKDUH}SHUFHQWIROORZHGE\FRDO}SHUFHQW
JUDLQ}SHUFHQWEDX[LWHDOXPLQD}SHUFHQWDQG
SKRVSKDWHURFN}SHUFHQW
*URZWKLQWKHƄYHPDMRUEXONVUHPDLQHGFORVHO\OLQNHGWR
steel production, growing infrastructure development 
needs of emerging developing countries, urbanization 
and the evolution of the global manufacturing base. 
World consumption and production of steel, a key 
product supplier to many industries, continued to 
expand in 2011 despite prevailing global economic 
uncertainties and volatilities. In 2011, world steel 
FRQVXPSWLRQ JUHZ E\ } SHU FHQW GRZQ IURP
}SHUFHQW LQ7KHGHFHOHUDWLRQ UHƅHFWV WKH
overall weakness of the world economy and the 
slight slowdown in the economic expansion of China. 
With most of Chinese steel demand being driven 
by expenditure on investment and construction, the 
FRXQWU\pVVWHHOFRQVXPSWLRQJUHZE\}SHUFHQW LQ
2011, a slower pace than in 2010.
World steel production is estimated to have grown 
E\}SHUFHQWLQUHDFKLQJDUHFRUG}ELOOLRQ
tons. Steel production in China increased, albeit at 
a slower pace, and still accounted for almost half of 
the global output in 2011. Other emerging developing 
economies such as India, Brazil, the Republic of Korea 
and Turkey, which have featured among the top 10 
steel producers for the past 40 years, also increased 
RXWSXW0DMRUZRUOGVWHHOSURGXFHUVDQGFRQVXPHUV
DUHIHDWXUHGLQWDEOH}
Coal production, consumption and shipments
:LWK D VKDUH RI } SHU FHQW RI JOREDO HQHUJ\
consumption, coal is the second most important 
primary energy source and is used mainly in power 
JHQHUDWLRQ*OREDOFRDOFRQVXPSWLRQJUHZE\}SHU
cent in 2011, with consumption outside the OECD 
FRXQWULHVOHGE\&KLQD}SHUFHQWULVLQJE\}SHU
cent. Despite growth in Europe, overall consumption 
LQWKH2(&'FRXQWULHVGHFOLQHGE\}SHUFHQWGXHWR
falling demand in the United States and Japan.
&RDOSURGXFWLRQJUHZE\}SHUFHQW LQZLWK
most of the growth occurring in developing countries 
and with China accounting for over two thirds of 
this expansion. Since China has emerged as a 
net importer of coal, coal prices have been rising, 
as have new investments in exporting countries, 
including Australia, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, 
0RQJROLDDQGPRUHUHFHQWO\0R]DPELTXHZKLFKKDV
CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 17
7DEOH 0DMRUGU\EXONVDQGVWHHOPDLQ
producers, users, exporters and
LPSRUWHUV0DUNHWVKDUHV
in percentages)
Steel producers Steel users
China  46 China  45 
Japan  7 European Union 27  11 
United States  6 North America  9 
Russian Federation  5 Confederation of Independent States  4 
India  5 Middle East  4 
Republic of Korea  4 Latin America  3 
Germany  3 Africa  2 
Ukraine  2 Other  22 
Brazil  2 
Turkey  2 
Others  18 
Iron ore exporters Iron ore importers
Australia  42 China 63
Brazil  31 Japan  12 
Others  10 European Union 15  10 
India  7 Republic of Korea  6 
South Africa  5 Middle East  2 
Canada  3 Others  6 
Sweden  2 
Coal exporters Coal importers
 Indonesia  34  Japan   18 
 Australia  30  Europe  18 
 United States  10  China  13 
 Colombia   8  India  13 
 South Africa  7  Republic of Korea  13 
 Russian Federation  6  Taiwan Province of China  6 
 Canada   3  Malaysia  2 
 Others   2  Thailand  2 
 China  1 Israel  1 
 Others  12 
Grain exporters Grain importers
United States  36 Asia 33
European Union  12 Latin America 21
Argentina  11 Africa 22
Australia  10  Middle East  14 
Canada  9  Europe  6 
Others  23  Confederation of Independent States  3 
Source:  UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data from the 
World Steel Association (2012), Clarkson Research 
Services, published in the June 2012 issue of Dry bulk 
Trade Outlook, and the World Grain Council, 2012.
been attracting investors, especially from Brazil and 
,QGLD7KH\HDUVDZWKHƄUVWFRDOVKLSPHQWIURP
0R]DPELTXH44
In 2011, the volume of coal shipments (thermal and 
FRNLQJ WRWDOOHG}PLOOLRQ WRQVXSE\}SHUFHQW
compared with 2010. In 2011, coking coal shipments 
GHFOLQHGE\}SHUFHQWUHƅHFWLQJGHYHORSPHQWVRQ
the demand side as well as supply side constraints 
resulting from tighter market conditions caused by 
RXWSXW FXWV IURP $XVWUDOLD 7KH ƅRRGV LQ $XVWUDOLD
interrupted coal mine operations, which reduced 
supply and raised coal prices. This in turn depressed 
demand, especially from China, where domestic 
supplies provide a better alternative to less competitive 
coal imports.
Growth in overall coal shipments held strong due to an 
LQFUHDVHRI}SHUFHQWLQWKHUPDOFRDOWUDGH*URZLQJ
HQHUJ\UHTXLUHPHQWVLQHPHUJLQJGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
in Asia, a stronger demand for steam coal in Europe, 
for a short while, high oil prices and the aftermath of 
the nuclear accident in Japan have all contributed to 
boost demand for thermal coal.
In 2011, Indonesia remained the leading exporter of 
WKHUPDOFRDOZLWKDVKDUHRI}SHUFHQW IROORZHG
E\$XVWUDOLD}SHUFHQW6WURQJGHPDQGLQ&KLQD
and India as well as in Europe has boosted thermal 
coal imports. Import levels in Japan and the United 
States dropped due, in part, to the aftermath of the 
March 2011 disaster in Japan, stringent environmental 
regulation and comparatively low gas prices in the 
United States.
2QH VWXG\ SURMHFWV WKDW $XVWUDOLD ZLOO RYHUWDNH
Indonesia as the biggest exporter of coal by 2016.45
Australia is investing in the establishment of new 
mines and expanding existing ones. According to 
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics and Sciences, by October 2011 there 
ZHUHFRPPLWWHGFRDOPLQLQJSURMHFWVLQWKHFRXQWU\
and 76 proposals.46 Meanwhile, some observers are 
noting that the growing power generation needs in 
Indonesia may constrain the country’s exports starting 
in 2014.47 This would likely provide an opportunity for 
other suppliers, including those situated in locations 
distant from China, to step in and meet the growing 
demand. Potential new players that may develop 
a bigger role include the United States, the Russian 
Federation, South Africa and Mongolia. Main world 
FRDOLPSRUWHUVDQGH[SRUWHUVDUHIHDWXUHGLQWDEOH}
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The outlook for coal trade remains promising, as 
GHYHORSLQJQDWLRQV FRQWLQXH WR UHTXLUHPRUH FRDO WR
PHHWWKHLUHQHUJ\QHHGV,WUHPDLQVVXEMHFWKRZHYHU
to developments in coal production and consumption 
patterns in China, as the scale of the country’s large 
domestic supply means that any small shift could turn 
the country into a net exporter again.48 Additionally, the 
country’s Five-Year Plan for the period 2011 to 2015, 
which aims to reduce the energy and carbon intensity 
of the economy, is likely to impact on coal trade.
Iron ore and steel production and consumption
,Q  LURQ RUH WUDGH H[SDQGHG E\ } SHU FHQW
WDNLQJWKHWRWDOYROXPHSDVW}ELOOLRQWRQV7KLVJURZWK
remains highly concentrated with China being the 
main driver.
0DMRULURQRUHH[SRUWHUVLQZHUH$XVWUDOLD%UD]LO
,QGLD 6RXWK $IULFD DQG &DQDGD WDEOH}  :LWK D
MRLQWPDUNHWVKDUHRI}SHUFHQW$XVWUDOLDDQG%UD]LO
LQFUHDVHG WKHLU H[SRUW YROXPHVE\}SHU FHQW DQG
} SHU FHQW UHVSHFWLYHO\ ([FHSW IRU ,QGLD ZKHUH
iron ore exports were constrained by the introduction 
of mining and export bans, as well as higher export 
duties, all other exporters have recorded positive 
export growth.
5HƅHFWLQJWKHLUZHDNHUHFRQRPLFVWDQFH(XURSHDQ
FRXQWULHVUHGXFHGWKHLULURQRUHLPSRUWVE\}SHU
cent, while Asian developing countries recorded an 
LQFUHDVHRI}SHUFHQW$OWKRXJKSRVLWLYH WKLV UDWH
LV GZDUIHG E\ WKH } SHU FHQW UHFRUGHG LQ 
Import demand in China increased by a strong 
} SHU FHQW DQFKRULQJ WKH FRXQWU\pV GRPLQDQFH
in this particular trade. Most other Asian countries 
increased their imports, but Japan and Indonesia 
UHFRUGHG D GHFOLQH RI } SHU FHQW DQG } SHU
cent, respectively.
In 2011, concerns were raised regarding new port 
restrictions introduced by Chinese authorities. These 
would restrict access to the purpose-built very large 
ore carriers (VLOCs) of 400,000 dwt, owned or ordered 
by Vale to service booming iron ore demand from 
China (see also chapters 2 and 4 for more detailed 
information). For Brazil, in particular, the strategic 
importance of its bilateral trade with China cannot be 
overemphasized. Brazilian exports to China increased 
E\ } SHU FHQW LQ  WR UHDFK } ELOOLRQ XS
IURP}ELOOLRQ LQZKLOHH[SRUWV IURP&KLQD
WR%UD]LOJUHZE\}SHUFHQWWR}ELOOLRQ49 Iron 
RUHDFFRXQWV IRU}SHUFHQWRI%UD]LOLDQH[SRUWV WR
&KLQDVR\EHDQVIRU}SHUFHQWFUXGHRLOIRU}SHU
FHQW SLJ LURQ IRU } SHU FHQW DQG VXJDU IRU } SHU
cent. Brazil and China are increasingly investing in 
SRUW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH SURMHFWV WR DGGUHVV DQ\ SRWHQWLDO
bottlenecks that may hinder this trade.50
$OWKRXJK LW UHPDLQV VXEMHFW WR GHYHORSPHQWV LQ WKH
wider economy and the steel-making sector, and 
more importantly, to the effect of new macroeconomic 
policies being instigated by China, the outlook for iron 
WUDGH UHPDLQV SRVLWLYHZLWK VKLSPHQWV SURMHFWHG E\
&ODUNVRQ5HVHDUFK6HUYLFHVWRJURZE\}SHUFHQWLQ
2012.
Grain shipments
Total grain production in the crop year 2010/2011 fell 
E\}SHUFHQWWR}ELOOLRQWRQVZKLOHSURGXFWLRQ
LQ WKH FURS \HDU  LQFUHDVHG E\ } SHU
FHQWWDNLQJWKHWRWDOWR}ELOOLRQWRQV:RUOGJUDLQ
FRQVXPSWLRQ LQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQW LQ
WR UHDFK } ELOOLRQ WRQV DQG IXUWKHU LQFUHDVHG
LQ  E\ } SHU FHQW WDNLQJ WKH WRWDO WR
}ELOOLRQWRQV
World wheat consumption is expected to increase 
IURP}PLOOLRQWRQVLQWR}PLOOLRQWRQV
LQXSE\}SHUFHQW)RRGXVHDFFRXQWV
for over two thirds of the total growth. However, with 
maize supplies being more limited and prices being 
higher, lower-grade wheat becomes a good alternative 
for use as feedstock. Industrial use remains small but 
is expected to grow as demand for wheat-based 
ethanol increases.
:RUOGJUDLQVKLSPHQWVWRWDOOHG}PLOOLRQWRQVLQWKH
IXOO\HDUXSE\}SHUFHQWRYHU:KHDW
DQGFRDUVHJUDLQDFFRXQWHGIRU}SHUFHQWRIWKH
total grain shipments. For the crop year 2011/12, 
YROXPHVRIZKHDWH[SRUWVLQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQW
due to a strong demand, especially from developing 
economies, and improved harvests. These factors 
eased wheat prices. Wheat export increases were 
UHFRUGHGLQ$UJHQWLQD}SHUFHQW$XVWUDOLD}SHU
FHQWDQG&DQDGD}SHUFHQW([SRUWVE\PDMRUV
such as the United States and the European Union 
GURSSHG E\ } SHU FHQW DQG } SHU FHQW
respectively, due in particular to better priced grain 
from other regions, including from the Black Sea. 
Meanwhile, shipments of coarse grains increased by 
}SHUFHQWZLWKODUJHLQFUHDVHVUHFRUGHGLQ$XVWUDOLD
}SHUFHQWDQG$UJHQWLQD}SHUFHQW
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Bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock
%DX[LWHRUHLVPLQHGDQGWKHQWUDQVIHUUHGWRDUHƄQHU\
for the processing and extraction of alumina. The 
world’s largest bauxite deposits are located in Guinea, 
Australia, Brazil and Jamaica. In 2011, world production 
RIDOXPLQDLQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQWRYHU*URZWK
resulted mainly from the increased production of bauxite 
}SHUFHQWIURPH[SDQGHGQHZDQGUHRSHQHGPLQHVLQ
Brazil, China, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Suriname and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Bauxite production in 
$XVWUDOLDGHFOLQHGVOLJKWO\EHFDXVHRIWKHƅRRGLQJWKDW
forced production cuts at some mines. World trade in 
EDX[LWHDOXPLQD LQFUHDVHGE\DVWURQJ}SHUFHQW
WRWDOOLQJ}PLOOLRQWRQVLQ
:RUOGSKRVSKDWHURFNSURGXFWLRQFDSDFLW\LVSURMHFWHG
WR LQFUHDVHE\QHDUO\}SHUFHQWEHWZHHQDQG
2015, with most of the increases occurring in Africa, 
in particular Morocco. Other new mines are planned 
in Australia, Brazil, Namibia, and Saudi Arabia. World 
FRQVXPSWLRQRISKRVSKDWHURFNIRUIHUWLOL]HUVLVSURMHFWHG
WRJURZDWDUDWHRI}SHUFHQWSHU\HDUGXULQJWKHQH[W
5 years, with the largest increases being in Asia and 
South America. Phosphate rock volumes increased by 
}SHUFHQWGRZQIURP}SHUFHQWUHFRUGHGLQ
7RWDOYROXPHVUHDFKHG}PLOOLRQWRQVUHƅHFWLQJLQSDUW
WKHFRQWLQXHGLPSURYHGHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQLQWKHƄUVW
half of the year. With no substitutes for phosphorus in 
agriculture, increased demand for grain and improved 
production levels have also contributed to the continued 
growth. Growing demand for fertilizers and increased 
production by new or expanding plants in producing 
countries are expected to sustain growth in phosphate 
rock trade.
Dry cargo: minor bulks 
In line with developments in the world economy and 
WKHGHFHOHUDWLRQRIJURZWKVLQFH WKH WKLUGTXDUWHURI
2011, growth in minor bulks trade decelerated to 
}SHUFHQW*OREDOYROXPHVUHDFKHG}ELOOLRQWRQV
D OHYHO VXUSDVVLQJ WKH SUHFULVLV SHDN RI } ELOOLRQ
tons achieved in 2007. Exports of metals and minerals 
UHFRUGHG WKH VHFRQG IDVWHVW JURZWK } SHU FHQW
DIWHU DJULEXONV } SHU FHQW ZKLOH PDQXIDFWXUHV
H[SDQGHG E\ } SHU FHQW DQG IHUWLOL]HUV H[FOXGLQJ
SKRVSKDWH URFN JUHZ E\ } SHU FHQW 7KH RQO\
contraction recorded was in sugar volumes, which 
IHOO E\ } SHU FHQW IROORZLQJ D JURZWK RI } SHU
cent in 2010. Looking to the future, trade in minor 
EXONVLVSURMHFWHGWRH[SDQGIXUWKHULQDOEHLWDW
DVORZHUUDWH UHƅHFWLQJ LQSDUW WKHZHDNHQLQJ LQ WKH
world economy and the slowdown in steel production 
activity, an important source of demand for a number 
of minor bulks.
Containerized cargo
$FFRXQWLQJ IRU DERXW } SHU FHQW RI WKH UHPDLQLQJ
}ELOOLRQWRQVRIGU\FDUJRHVZRUOGFRQWDLQHUWUDGH
H[SUHVVHG LQ IRRW HTXLYDOHQW XQLWV 7(8V JUHZ
E\}SHUFHQWLQGRZQIURP}SHUFHQWLQ
2010. According to Clarkson Research Services, total 
FRQWDLQHUWUDGHYROXPHVDPRXQWHGWR}PLOOLRQ7(8V
LQ  HTXLYDOHQW WR DERXW } ELOOLRQ WRQV 7KHVH
KHDGOLQHƄJXUHVFRQFHDOVRPHGLIIHUHQFHVDWUHJLRQDO
DQG URXWH OHYHOV WKDWKDYHVLJQLƄFDQWO\ LPSDFWHG WKH
container trade market during the year.
Global growth in 2011 was limited by the slowdown 
recorded on the mainlane East–West trade. As shown 
RQWDEOH}WUDGHRQWKHWUDQV3DFLƄFURXWHGHFOLQHG
E\}SHUFHQWZKLOHYROXPHVRQWKH$VLDt(XURSHDQG
WUDQV$WODQWLF URXWHV H[SDQGHGE\ } SHU FHQW DQG
}SHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\ƄJXUHVDE}F
DQGWDEOH}
Growth was mainly generated by increased demand 
for imports in developing regions, with container trade 
volumes expanding strongly on the non-mainlane 
East–West, North–South and intraregional lanes. Non-
PDLQODQH(DVWt:HVWWUDGHJUHZE\}SHUFHQWZKLOH
North–South and intraregional trades expanded by 
}SHUFHQWDQG}SHUFHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\51 According 
to data from Clarkson Research Services, in 2011, the 
WKUHHPDLQODQHWUDGHVWRWDOOHG}PLOOLRQ7(8VZKLOH
WKHQRQPDLQODQHWUDGHVUHDFKHG}PLOOLRQ7(8V52
One current opinion maintains that greater 
containerization could help generate additional cargo 
for container shipping. It is argued that unconventional 
commodities can be carried increasingly in containers. 
These include, for example, larger volumes of 
scrap steel and recycled paper from North America 
and Europe to Asia, and general cargo and bulk 
commodities that can be transported in smaller batches 
and containerized (for example, segments of food 
commodities and raw materials). Other commodities 
include more refrigerated cargo, chemicals and even 
Handysize loads of bulk commodities, such as iron 
ore, which is reported to have already been shipped in 
small parcels from Africa to China. For these ideas to 
materialize, however, prevailing price and cost barriers 
need to be removed and cost-effectiveness and vessel 
VSHFLƄFDWLRQVQHHGWREHDVVHVVHG53
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E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Source: UNCTAD based on Drewry Shipping Consultants, Container Market Review and Forecast 2008/2009; and Clarkson 
Research Services, Container Intelligence Monthly, various issues.
Source: UNCTAD based on Clarkson Research Services’ Shipping Review & Outlook, spring 2012.
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The policy of China to move up the value chain in global 
manufacturing is causing manufacturing operations 
of low-value goods to relocate to other lower-cost 
production sites such as in Viet Nam, Bangladesh and 
Indonesia.54 Chinese manufacturers have been moving 
XS WKH YDOXH FKDLQ DV H[SRUWV LQ SRZHU HTXLSPHQW
auto parts and electronics are growing faster than 
average.55 Research from the Boston Consulting Group 
argues that with rapidly rising labour costs in China, 
manufacturing business could shift operations from 
China back to the United States.56 Another research 
by Cost and Capital Partners suggests that relocation 
is taking place towards Mexico rather than the United 
States in view of Mexico’s cost competitiveness and 
more reliable supply chains.57 This is further illustrated 
by recent data from Piers indicating that exports from 
-
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Source: Based on the Global Insight Database as published in Bulletin FAL, issue number 288, number 8/2010 (International maritime 
transport in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2009 and projections for 2010). ECLAC.  Data for 2010 and 2011 are based 
RQWDEOH}
7DEOH (VWLPDWHGFRQWDLQHUL]HGFDUJRƃRZVRQPDMRU(DVWt:HVWFRQWDLQHUWUDGHURXWHVt
0LOOLRQVRI7(8VDQGSHUFHQWDJHFKDQJH
Source: UNCTAD based on Container Trade Statistics, March 2012; Containerisation International, 1 September 2012; and the 
Global Insight Database as published in Bulletin FAL, issue number 288, number 8/2010 (International maritime transport in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2009 and projections for 2010), ECLAC.
Year 7UDQVSDFLƂF  Europe Asia  Transatlantic 
 Asia–North
America 
 North America– 
Asia   Asia–Europe  Europe–Asia 
 Europe–North 
America 
 North America– 
Europe 
2009  10.6  6.1  11.5  5.5  2.8  2.5 
2010  12.8  6.0  13.5  5.6  3.1  2.8 
2011  12.7  6.0  14.1  6.2  3.4  2.8 
Percentage change 
2010–2011 1.2 0.9 4.6 10.6  2.8
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China to the United States have been growing at a 
PXFKVORZHUUDWH}SHUFHQWIRUWKHPRQWKSHULRG
up to January 2012) than exports from Mexico to the 
8QLWHG6WDWHV }SHU FHQW RYHU WKH VDPHSHULRG58 
Overall, both the cost and the transit time of shipping 
are viewed as key considerations for moving from 
China to Mexico.
Import demand from China could also have a deep 
impact on future container trade patterns. Supported 
by the policy within China of promoting greater 
consumer spending, some rebalancing of container 
WUDGH ƅRZV LV HPHUJLQJ EUHDNLQJ DZD\ IURP SDVW
trends as containerships are increasingly sailing full to 
China.597KHVKLIWQRWRQO\UHƅHFWVWKHUREXVW&KLQHVH
demand for raw materials and commodities, including 
metals, waste paper and plastics, but also its growing 
demand for higher-value goods.60 These include 
items such as machine tools and instruments, hi-tech 
products, luxury goods and cars.61
In a separate development and against a background 
of increasing costs and lower earnings, container 
shipping witnessed a structural change in 2011 
with the emergence of alliances and oligopolistic 
competition (see chapter 2).62 At the same time, 
decisions to maintain exemptions of liner shipping 
from the application of competition laws have 
been made by a number of administrations during 
the year. In February 2012, a study for the United 
States Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) did not 
FRQƄUP WKHPHULW RI UHSHDOLQJ WKHH[HPSWLRQZKLOH
in Singapore, the block exemption from competition 
rules for liner shipping agreements was extended 
until 2016. Japan also decided to maintain its 
antitrust immunity system till at least 2015, while 
DQ DJUHHPHQW E\ WKH $VLDt3DFLƄF (FRQRPLF
Cooperation (APEC) forum was adopted in 2011 
setting up guidelines on maritime competition rules 
for consortia. In Europe, however, where such 
exemptions were repealed in 2008, compliance with 
the competition law continues to be enforced by the 
(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQZKLFK LQ0DUFK  ƄQHG
14 international logistics companies, including UPS 
DQG .XHKQH DQG 1DJHO b}PLOOLRQ IRU RSHUDWLQJ
IRXUSULFHƄ[LQJFDUWHOV63
Finally, another important concern for the container 
industry was dealt with in 2011 as the call by the 
shipping and port industries for mandatory controls 
on the weighing of freight containers received full 
attention at the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). An amendment to the International Convention 
for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) to create a new legal 
REOLJDWLRQ UHTXLULQJ FRQWDLQHUVp DFWXDO ZHLJKW WR EH
YHULƄHG SULRU WR ORDGLQJ DERDUG D VKLS LV QRZEHLQJ
considered by IMO.64
C. SELECTED EMERGING TRENDS
AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING
Against a background of economic uncertainty, 
faltering demand and the burden of ship tonnage 
overcapacity (see chapter 2), the shipping industry 
is also confronted by a rapidly changing operating 
environment, in which some trends are reshaping the 
industry’s future and altering global seaborne trade 
patterns. Shipping and logistics will need to address 
these developments to adapt to the new realities and 
remain operational and competitive. Featuring high on 
the list of these trends are:
s Climate change;
s 6KLIWLQJOREDOHFRQRPLFLQƅXHQFHDQGFKDQJLQJ 
trade patterns;
s Rising bunker fuel prices and operating costs;
s Maritime piracy (see chapters 5 and 3);65
s Growing momentum of sustainability imperatives   
(see chapter 6).66
While all these issues warrant due consideration, the 
following section focuses on three developments 
that entail particularly long-term implications, namely 
climate change, shifting global economic mass and 
trade patterns, and rising fuel and operating costs.
1. Transport and the climate change
challenge
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing 
our societies, economic structures and environmental 
V\VWHPV$ VLJQLƄFDQW ULVNPXOWLSOLHU FOLPDWH FKDQJH
XQGHUPLQHVWKHREMHFWLYHVRIVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQW
by exacerbating other interconnected global problems, 
including poverty, food shortages, water scarcity, 
energy insecurity and environmental degradation.
Transportation and the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions that it generates are at the centre stage 
of the current climate change debate. While the 
entire sector needs to reduce its carbon footprint, 
international shipping, in particular, has attracted 
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and economic integration with supply chains acting 
as transmission channels entail additional costs. A 
localized impact on ports can have ripple effects 
that extend beyond borders to affect industries, 
stakeholders and economies in distant locations. 
Although not necessarily driven by climate change, 
supply chain disruptions resulting from damage 
to ports caused by natural disasters in Japan and 
Thailand in 2011 provide a poignant illustration.
The implications of any damage or disruption to 
transport networks, including ports, can be particularly 
challenging for the transport and trade of developing 
countries such as small island developing States 
(SIDS). The challenge for SIDS is of greater magnitude 
given their high economic, geographic and climatic 
vulnerabilities and their generally limited adaptive 
capacity.69 In this context, building the capacities of 
developing countries, including SIDS, with a view to 
reducing their vulnerability and managing disaster 
risks is crucial and should be pursued as a matter of 
priority.70
Assessing with any certainty the costs for ports 
and their hinterland connections associated with 
WKH LPSDFWV RI FOLPDWH FKDQJH LV GLIƄFXOW 7KHUH LV
no doubt, however, that these impacts can reach 
extreme proportions in ports and port cities.71 A 
study by OECD assessed the exposure of the world’s 
ODUJHVWSRUWFLWLHVWRFRDVWDOƅRRGLQJLQDQGKDV
estimated the total value of assets exposed across all 
136 port cities examined to be $3 trillion.72 A more 
recent study examining the same 136 port megacities 
has found that, assuming a sea-level rise of 0.5 metres 
by 2050, the value of exposed assets may be as high 
as $28 trillion.73 These costs are rising in tandem 
with ever increasing urbanization, population growth, 
investment in port and transport infrastructure, and 
wealth expansion around coastal areas.
Against this background, the case for designing and 
implementing appropriate adaptation strategies to 
address climate-change impacts on transport, and 
PRUHVSHFLƄFDOO\RQSRUWV LVDVWURQJRQH*LYHQWKH
long lifetime of transport infrastructure, adaptation 
KDVWRKDSSHQQRZWRDYRLGKLJKUHWURƄWWLQJFRVWV74
However, a review of the available literature reveals 
that adaptation action in ports appears to be scarce.75
Over recent years, various studies have addressed 
the impacts of climate change on transportation 
infrastructure generally, for example in the case of 
the United States,76 Canada, Australia and the United 
Kingdom. Most of these studies, however, are not 
attention because the GHG emissions generated 
by this sector are not covered under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Another reason for this heightened interest 
is the renewed opportunity provided by the current 
climate negotiations under UNFCCC and IMO to 
DGRSWIRUWKHƄUVWWLPHDELQGLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJLPH
Some regulatory measures focusing on technical and 
operational aspects of international shipping have 
recently been adopted by IMO while other measures, 
such as market-based instruments, are still being 
considered (see chapters 5 and 6). Mitigation action 
is also gathering momentum among the shipping 
and port industries with a number of measures 
being planned or having already been implemented 
(see chapter 6). However, although mitigation action 
LQPDULWLPH WUDQVSRUW LV FULWLFDO LW LV QRW VXIƄFLHQW WR
effectively address climate change and its related 
LPSDFWV$GDSWDWLRQDFWLRQEDVHGDVDSUHUHTXLVLWH
on a good understanding of risks and vulnerabilities is 
fundamental to help minimize the effects of unmitigated 
climate change on transport and trade. While 
adaptation action in maritime transport is increasingly 
recognized as important, it should be noted that it is 
a newcomer to the climate change policy debate and 
has so far attracted much less interest than mitigation.
Within the transport sector, the special case of 
VHDSRUWVFDOOVIRUSDUWLFXODUDWWHQWLRQ:LWK}SHUFHQW
of world trade by volume being carried by sea, 
SRUWVIXOƄODFULWLFDOIXQFWLRQDVOLQNVRIJOREDOVXSSO\
chains and constitute engines of economic growth. 
At the same time, these key infrastructural assets are 
vulnerable to climate change impacts and associated 
risks, given their location in coastal zones, low-lying 
areas and deltas.
Risks for maritime transport include accelerated 
coastal erosion, port and coastal road inundation or 
VXEPHUVLRQ LQFUHDVHG UXQRII DQG VLOWDWLRQ UHTXLULQJ
increased dredging, restrictions on access to docks, 
deterioration of conditions and problems with the 
structural integrity of pavements and railway tracks 
within port areas and related hinterland connections.67
In addition to these impacts on physical infrastructure, 
climate change also affects shipping volumes and 
costs, cargo loading and capacity, sailing and/
or loading schedules, storage and warehousing.68
These impacts are likely to impose costs that will be 
correlated to the degree of exposure and vulnerability, 
as well as constraints on the adaptive capacity. 
Furthermore, greater global interconnectedness 
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to transport or ports, a study produced by the World 
Bank estimates that, for developing countries, the 
cost of adapting to an increase in temperature by 
approximately 2° C by 2050 would be, for the period 
t LQ WKH UDQJH RI } ELOOLRQt} ELOOLRQ
annually.82
(VWLPDWHV IRU %DUEDGRV WKDW DUH PRUH VSHFLƄF IRU
transportation, based on the Intergovernmental 
3DQHORQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH,3&&HPLVVLRQSURMHFWLRQ
scenarios SRES B283 and SRES A2, indicate that by 
2050 the total impact of climate change on international 
WUDQVSRUWH[SHQGLWXUHVFRXOGUDQJHIURP}ELOOLRQ
VFHQDULR65(6% WR } ELOOLRQ VFHQDULR65(6
A2).84 The costs for maritime transportation alone 
UDQJHEHWZHHQ}ELOOLRQ 65(6%DQG}ELOOLRQ
(SRES A2).85 Another study has estimated the total 
costs of climate change for international transportation 
LQ 0RQWVHUUDW WR EH EHWZHHQ } PLOOLRQ DQG
}ELOOLRQXQGHUVFHQDULRV65(6%DQG65(6$
respectively,86 while for maritime transport, estimates 
DPRXQWHG WR EHWZHHQ } PLOOLRQ 65(6 % DQG
}PLOOLRQ65(6$87
1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH EHQHƄWV RI DGDSWDWLRQ LQ WHUPV
of the effects on frictions to international trade and 
development are expected to outweigh the costs.88
One study which compared the cost of adaptation 
with the cost of inaction at the European Union level 
ƄQGV WKDW E\  WKH QHW EHQHƄW RI DGDSWLRQ ZLOO
UDQJHEHWZHHQb}ELOOLRQORZVHDOHYHOULVHVFHQDULR
DQG b} ELOOLRQ KLJK VHDOHYHOULVH VFHQDULR 7KHVH
EHQHƄWVDUHH[SHFWHGWRLQFUHDVHIXUWKHUE\89
Some of these critical considerations have been 
considered as part of the activities of UNCTAD aimed 
at addressing the climate change challenge from the 
maritime transport perspective.90 These include the 
ƄUVWVHVVLRQRIWKH0XOWL\HDU([SHUW0HHWLQJRQ
Transport and Trade Facilitation, which had as title 
Maritime Transport and the Climate Change Challenge, 
the 2010 Joint UNECE-UNCTAD Workshop on 
Climate Change Impacts on International Transport 
Networks, the 2011 UNCTAD Ad Hoc Expert Meeting 
entitled Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation: A 
Challenge for Global Ports, and the new book entitled 
Maritime Transport and the Climate Change Challenge,
edited by UNCTAD and co-published by the United 
Nations and Earthscan/Routledge in May 2012.91
Some of the key messages emerging from this work 
include the wide recognition that adaptation action 
LQ WUDQVSRUWDQGPRUHVSHFLƄFDOO\ LQSRUWVVKRXOGEH
PRGHVSHFLƄF DQG YHU\ IHZ VSHFLƄFDOO\ IRFXV RQ
ports.77 Within the existing literature available in the 
public domain, the United States report, Impacts of 
Climate Change and Variability on Transportation 
Systems and Infrastructure: Gulf Coast Study, 
Phase I, is of particular relevance for ports and their 
hinterland connections.78 Other studies worth noting 
include the report commissioned by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), which focuses on the case 
RI WKH 7HUPLQDO 0DULWLPR 0XHOOHV HO %RVTXH 0(%
in Cartagena, Colombia. The aim of this study was 
to help develop knowledge, tools and methods for 
analysing climate-related risks and opportunities, and 
IRUHYDOXDWLQJDGDSWDWLRQUHVSRQVHV(TXDOO\UHOHYDQW
is the study commissioned by the International 
Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH), Seaports 
and Climate Change – An Analysis of Adaptation 
Measures.79
While adaptation strategies in ports may vary 
(for example, retreat/relocate, protect, and/or 
DFFRPPRGDWH WKHXOWLPDWHREMHFWLYH LV WR HQKDQFH
the resilience of facilities and systems. This may be 
achieved by, for example, changes in operations, 
management practices, planning activities, design 
VSHFLƄFDWLRQV DQG VWDQGDUGV 7KLV PD\ LQYROYH
integrating climate change considerations into 
transport and port investment and planning decisions, 
as well as into broader transport and port design 
and development plans. A number of factors could, 
nevertheless, potentially delay or pose challenges to 
adaptation action. Firstly, as ports involve multiple 
players in the decision-making process, it may be 
GLIƄFXOW WR SURFHHG HIIHFWLYHO\ ZLWK DGDSWDWLRQ SODQV
and strategies.80 Secondly, factors such as a high 
perception of uncertainty, limited information about 
the cost-effectiveness of adaption options and about 
the cost of inaction, the need for realistic predictions of 
impacts and for science-based policy formulation that 
WDNHV LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH VSHFLƄFV RI WKH UHJLRQ
and resource intensiveness and costs could all, either 
individually or in combination, hamper adaptation 
action in ports.
0RUH VSHFLƄFDOO\ FRVWV DQG WKH FRQVWUDLQWV RI
ƄQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV FRXOG SRVH D JUHDW FKDOOHQJH WR
adaptation action. Existing studies on adaptation 
costs provide only a wide range of estimates and 
have many information gaps. Much more knowledge 
LV UHTXLUHG UHJDUGLQJ WKH LPSDFWV RI FOLPDWH FKDQJH
and how they interact, and regarding information on 
relevant adaptation options.81 $OWKRXJK QRW VSHFLƄF
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pursued without delay, and that adaptation planning 
for those impacts that are already known should be a 
priority. Furthermore, collaboration between scientists, 
engineers, policy makers, governments and industry 
LV NH\ DQG VKRXOG EH LPSURYHG (TXDOO\ FRPSLOLQJ
more data, in particular data on local impacts and 
vulnerabilities, and conducting cases studies and pilot 
SURMHFWV LV FUXFLDO $ZDUHQHVVUDLVLQJ DFWLYLWLHV QHHG
to continue and guidance as well as best practices 
should be compiled and widely disseminated.
To sum up, climate change impacts on ports and 
their hinterland connections and related adaptation 
UHTXLUHPHQWVDUHGHYHORSPHQWFKDOOHQJHVZLWKGLUHFW
implications for trade and growth. While more work 
is needed to help advance understanding of the 
various issues at stake and better assess their full 
implications, adaptation action in transport generally 
and, especially, in ports, is an imperative and a sound 
investment with high returns in the long term.
 6KLIWLQJOREDOHFRQRPLFLQƃXHQFH
and changing trade patterns
Over the past few years developing countries have been 
OHDGLQJ D JOREDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ ZKLFK HQWDLOV PDMRU
implications for the global economy, geopolitics and 
international trade. The 2008/2009 crisis has deepened 
WKHVKLIWRILQƅXHQFHDQGHFRQRPLFPDVVIURPDGYDQFHG
economies to emerging developing countries. This trend 
is creating a multipolar global economy92 (see previous 
discussion on a global new design in the Review of 
Maritime Transport 2011, section C).
,W LVSURMHFWHGWKDWE\ IDVWJURZLQJGHYHORSLQJ
economies and transition economies, led by China, 
ZLOOJURZRQDYHUDJHE\}SHUFHQWSHU\HDUEHWZHHQ
2011 and 2025, with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, the 
Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation expected 
WRDFFRXQWIRUPRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWRIJOREDOJURZWK93
By comparison, GDP growth in advanced economies 
LV IRUHFDVW WRJURZDW OHVVWKDQKDOI WKLVUDWH }SHU
cent) over the same period.94 The share of merging 
developing economies in global real GDP is forecast 
WRH[SDQGIURP}SHUFHQWLQWR}SHUFHQW
in 2025.95 In line with economic growth, the share of 
DOO GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGH ƅRZV
has also increased over the past few decades, rising 
IURP}SHUFHQWLQWRDQHVWLPDWHG}SHUFHQW
in 2010. Much of this growth is being generated by 
South–South and intraregional trade.96
Some observers argue that the winner of globalization 
will be Asia, with rising intra-Asian trade becoming 
the focus of the global economy. South–South 
interregional trade is also expected to grow and gather 
momentum.97 Supply chains, greater integration in the 
world economy, growing regional concentration and a 
shift of technology will all propel East Asian countries 
(led by China) to become the largest trading bloc in 
2015, surpassing the areas of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Euro.98 Such a 
development will have tangible implications for global 
transport and trade patterns. One recent analysis 
predicts that in 2015 China will be the top exporter 
and importer and that by 2030 the world’s largest 
trade corridor will not involve the United States or 
Europe, but will instead extend from the advanced 
to the emerging Asia of Thailand and Viet Nam.99
,W LV IRUHFDVW WKDW E\  } SHU FHQW RI H[SRUWV
from advanced Asia will go to emerging Asia, thus 
reinforcing the move eastwards and South–South 
trade.100
,Q SDUDOOHO WR SURMHFWHG HFRQRPLF DQG WUDGH JURZWK
freight transport is expected to expand. It has been 
SURMHFWHGE\2(&'WKDWE\ZRUOGIUHLJKWƅRZV
will be from two to four times above their 2010 levels, 
GULYHQ E\ JURZWK RXWVLGH 2(&' ZKHUH ƅRZV DUH
expected to be between two and six times higher 
than in 2010.101 This has implications for international 
VKLSSLQJ DQG VHDERUQH WUDGH DQG ZLOO UHTXLUH WKDW
appropriate policies and strategies be elaborated to 
effectively respond to the new realities. All shipping 
market segments are likely to be affected through 
FKDQJHVDQGDGMXVWPHQWV WR LQIUDVWUXFWXUHVHUYLFHV
HTXLSPHQWDQGRSHUDWLRQVDVZHOODVWRWKHXQGHUO\LQJ
legal and regulatory frameworks. For its part, the 
transport and logistics industry is also making efforts 
to ensure that it remains relevant and maintains a 
competitive edge by being more responsive to the 
needs of its customers. This is illustrated by the 
increasing tendency within this industry to reach out 
to its customer base to solicit its input and help map 
RXWLWVQHHGVDQGUHTXLUHPHQWV102
To better understand the full impact of the changing 
global transport and trade landscape, a number 
RI NH\ TXHVWLRQV KRZHYHU UHPDLQ DQG QHHG WR EH
addressed. Relevant considerations include how 
shipping energy consumption patterns and carbon 
emissions, production processes, decisions about 
production plant location and infrastructure investment 
will all be affected.
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3. Rising bunker fuel prices and
operating costs 
Bunker fuel prices increased in tandem with global 
oil prices, as shown by the price of 380 centistokes 
F6WLQ6LQJDSRUHZKLFKLQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQWWR
reach $647 per ton in 2011. Higher fuel costs have a 
disproportionate effect on transportation companies, 
as fuel is a necessary cost input. Fuel costs are 
HVWLPDWHGWRKDYHPDGHXS}SHUFHQWRIWRWDOIUHLJKW
earnings on the benchmark very large crude carrier 
(VLCC) Western Asia to Far East voyage – taking an 
average bunker price of $630 per ton for March 2011. 
7KLVVKDUHZDVRQO\}SHUFHQWLQ-XQH7RSXW
this in perspective, in 2008 the annual capital cost 
IRU D QHZ 3DQDPD[ EXONHU ZDV }PLOOLRQ DQG WKH
DQQXDO EXQNHU FRVW }PLOOLRQ ,Q  WKH FRVWV
ZHUH}PLOOLRQDQG}PLOOLRQUHVSHFWLYHO\VHHDOVR
FKDSWHU}103
In addition to fuel expenses, other cost items are also 
increasing. Drewry estimates that ship-operating costs 
KDYHULVHQEHWZHHQDQG}SHUFHQWGHSHQGLQJRQ
the market segment. This has been due to increases 
in commodity prices, which drove up lube, repair and 
maintenance costs, as well as to additional insurance 
cover against piracy.104 These developments have 
VLJQLƄFDQWO\ZHLJKHG GRZQ RQ WKH VKLSSLQJ LQGXVWU\
DQG XQGHUPLQHG LWV SURƄWDELOLW\ t DQ LQGXVWU\ ZKLFK
has been, in addition, struggling with excess tonnage 
capacity, slowing demand and falling freight rates. In 
the tanker market, for example, the Republic of Korean 
RSHUDWRU 6DPKR 6KLSSLQJ ƄOHG IRU FRXUW SURWHFWLRQ
DJDLQVW FUHGLWRUV IROORZLQJ PRQWKV RI ƄQDQFLDO
GLIƄFXOWLHV5HDVRQVFLWHGLQFOXGHGLQFUHDVLQJEXQNHU
costs, low freight rates and the costs associated 
with piracy attacks against its vessels.105 In the liner 
industry, the overall loss in 2011 was estimated at over 
}ELOOLRQ106
In a context of increasingly higher costs and weak 
HFRQRPLF MXQFWXUH FRVW PDQDJHPHQW DQG FRQWURO
is becoming important. Relevant cost-cutting 
measures include speed management through slow 
VWHDPLQJ EXQNHU DGMXVWPHQW SDSHU KHGJHV DQG
selection of the most economical routing options. 
Among these strategies, slow steaming has evolved 
into a key cost-cutting measure that reduces bunker 
fuel consumption and helps absorb capacity. Today, 
slow steaming is implemented across various market 
segments and in particular container trade, which 
relied heavily on this strategy during the 2008/2009 
FULVLV7KHJOREDOFRQWDLQHUVKLSƅHHWKDVEHHQFXWWLQJ
VDLOLQJVSHHGVE\DQDYHUDJHRI}SHUFHQWLQ
on a number of mainlane trades107 and has continued 
to reduce sailing speed from 24–25 knots to 21 knots 
(slow steaming), 18 knots (extra-slow steaming) and 
15 knots (super-slow steaming).108 In the tanker 
trade, slow steaming has been implemented with 
most voyages occurring at an average of 13 knots 
(compared to 14 knots), and 10–11 knots when 
sailing in ballast (see also previous section on crude 
oil shipments and chapter 2).109
Some argue that slow steaming has its limitations 
and that it may not be advisable to implement it in all 
cases. First, slow steaming may be better limited to a 
few long-haul routes and not used for short-haul ones. 
Second, there is a need to assess the implications of 
HPSOR\LQJDGGLWLRQDOVKLSVDQGFRQWDLQHUHTXLSPHQW
Furthermore, increased transit time, especially for 
the dominant leg, may not be acceptable for supply 
chains, as shown by a study investigating the merits of 
slow steaming.110 This study argued that other factors 
need to be accounted for, including the auxiliary 
bunker costs and the sensitivity of demand to transit 
time. Figures for January 2010 indicated a limited 
use of slow steaming on the Europe–South American 
WUDGHVZLWKDURXQG}SHUFHQWRIVHUYLFHVRSHUDWLQJ
VORZVWHDPLQJDVFRPSDUHGZLWKRYHU}SHUFHQWRI
services operating slow steaming on those between 
Europe and the Far East. The study concludes that a 
differentiated strategy by shipping lines of sailing at a 
different speed depending on the leg, or of using hubs 
instead of direct services maybe recommended. Such 
differentiated strategy would also take into account 
the sensitivity of demand to transit time, such as, for 
example, by distinguishing between frozen and dry 
and fresh products.
While slow steaming is viewed by many as a short-term 
Ƅ[RWKHUVFRQVLGHULWWREHDORQJWHUPWUHQG,QYLHZ
of current developments in the energy sector, growing 
demand, constrained and uncertain supply, as well 
as ongoing geopolitical risks affecting oil producing 
regions, oil prices and therefore bunker fuel costs will 
not doubt continue to trend upward.111 Interestingly 
however, the historical correlation between bunker 
and crude prices seems to have changed slightly in 
2011, as the rise in bunker prices exceeded that of 
crude oil. A potential reason for this could be that the 
large ship deliveries of recent years have increased 
demand for marine fuels against a slower supply.112
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:LWK EXQNHU IXHO EHLQJ D UHVLGXDO RI WKH UHƄQLQJ
SURFHVV LW LV SRVVLEOH WKDW HIIRUWV E\ UHƄQHULHV WR
maximize the middle distillates output have reduced 
WKHTXDQWLW\RI UHVLGXDOPDULQH IXHOV$QRWKHU UHDVRQ
WKDW FRXOG KDYH UHGXFHG WKH TXDQWLW\ RI UHVLGXDO
marine fuels is the combination of increased demand 
for petroleum products from Japan that followed the 
disaster in March 2011 and the cuts in oil supply from 
Libya during the course of the year.113
:RUOG HQHUJ\ GHPDQG LV SURMHFWHG WR JURZ DQG
DGG VRPH } SHU FHQW WR JOREDO FRQVXPSWLRQ E\
2030, with almost all the growth being generated in 
developing regions.114 :KHWKHU DGHTXDWH OHYHOV RI
energy at affordable prices will be available to match 
WKH LQFUHDVHG JOREDO HQHUJ\ UHTXLUHPHQWV UHPDLQV
uncertain (see Review of Maritime Transport 2011, 
for a detailed discussion of oil supply and demand 
fundamentals). It is worth noting in this respect that 
global replacement costs of existing fossil fuel and 
nuclear power infrastructure are estimated at $15 
WULOOLRQWRWULOOLRQDWOHDVWHTXLYDOHQWWREHWZHHQ
DQG } SHU FHQW RI JOREDO*'3115 Geopolitical risks 
and tensions, including economic sanctions, civil 
XQUHVWDQGFRQƅLFWVDOVRZHLJKGRZQRQ WKHVXSSO\
side. Some observers forecast that the price of crude 
oil will reach extreme levels if current geopolitical risks 
escalate and if strategic transit points for oil trade are 
closed. According to Drewry Supply Chain Advisors, 
(XURSHLVUHOLDQWRQ6XH]WUDQVLWVIRUDERXW}SHUFHQW
RILWVFUXGHDQGWKHEXQNHUDGMXVWPHQWIDFWRUFDQEH
H[SHFWHGWRLQFUHDVHE\WR}SHUFHQWDQQXDOO\RYHU
the next three years on trade between South China 
and Northern Europe.116
$QRWKHU PDMRU GHYHORSPHQW ZLWK D EHDULQJ RQ WKH
EXQNHUPDUNHW UHODWHV WR WKH UHTXLUHPHQW XQGHU WKH
IMO International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) annex VI, governing 
air pollution and Emission Control Areas (ECAs) in the 
European Union and North America, for ships to use 
ORZVXOSKXU IXHO VHH FKDSWHU  6KLSV DUH UHTXLUHG
between now and 2020 to burn a more expensive 
but less polluting fuel, namely distillate grade fuel. 
The price differential with residual fuel is currently 
HVWLPDWHGDW}SHUFHQW:KLOHVKLSVDUHDOORZHGWR
use technology such as cleaning systems for exhaust 
gas (scrubbers), the effective widespread use of such 
scrubbers remains uncertain. These developments 
raise concerns about their potential economic impact 
on shipping, especially at a time when fuel costs 
account for more than two thirds of operational ship 
expenditure. The price differential between low-
VXOSKXU IXHO DQG UHVLGXDO EXQNHU IXHO LV SURMHFWHG WR
increase further with growing demand not being 
matched by increased supply. Other concerns relate 
to the potential for inducing an undesirable modal 
shift. Recent studies supported by the European 
Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) have 
VXJJHVWHG WKDW DSSO\LQJ WKH } SHU FHQW OLPLW RQ
sulphur fuel could result in a modal shift from water to 
surface transport which could be detrimental for local 
shipping and the environment. This concern is shared 
with respect to trade in the Great Lakes of Canada 
and the United States.
To sum up, rising energy prices and fuel costs remain 
a great challenge for the shipping industry in view, in 
particular, of rising demand, supply pressures and 
increasing environmental regulation. Cost control 
and fuel consumption management is essential 
and may involve a range of strategies. These may 
include speed management through slow steaming, 
selection of the most economical routing options 
and technology-based solutions. These strategies 
will impact on the design of vessels and propulsion 
systems, as well as on other technology-related 
strategies and operational measures. While these may 
apply differently, depending on the vessel and type of 
operations, overall a combination of technology-based 
DQGRSHUDWLRQDOPHDVXUHVKDYHDVLJQLƄFDQWSRWHQWLDO
to help address rising fuel and operational costs. As 
VKLSSLQJ KDV RYHU UHFHQW \HDUV LQWHQVLƄHG HIIRUWV WR
optimize fuel consumption, in view in particular of the 
more stringent environmental regulatory framework 
and given the concerns over climate change, new 
options and solutions are being increasingly developed 
and tested.
The trends discussed above are all interconnected 
and entail both challenges and opportunities for 
the shipping industry. By altering costs, prices and 
comparative advantages, these developments and 
related impacts on shipping and seaborne trade can 
greatly determine countries’ trade performance and 
competitiveness. Improved understanding of these 
issues and their impacts, both individually and in 
FRPELQDWLRQLVUHTXLUHGZLWKDFWLYHLQYROYHPHQWE\
all stakeholders, including policy makers, investors, 
transport planners, operators and managers.
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This chapter presents the supply-side of the shipping industry. It covers the vessel 
W\SHV DJH SURƄOH RZQHUVKLS DQG UHJLVWUDWLRQ RI WKH ZRUOG ƅHHW 7KH FKDSWHU DOVR
reviews deliveries, demolitions and tonnage on order.
0RUHWKDQWKUHH\HDUVDIWHUWKHHFRQRPLFDQGƄQDQFLDOFULVLVRIWKHZRUOGƅHHW
FRQWLQXHGWRH[SDQGGXULQJUHDFKLQJPRUHWKDQ}ELOOLRQGHDGZHLJKWWRQVGZW
LQ-DQXDU\DQLQFUHDVHRIRYHU}SHUFHQWLQMXVWIRXU\HDUV$WWKHVDPHWLPH
continued deliveries and a drastic downturn in new orders following the economic crisis 
has led to a reduction in the world order book by one third during the same period. The 
RUGHUERRN LQHDUO\ DPRXQWV WRDSSUR[LPDWHO\ }SHU FHQWRI WKHH[LVWLQJƅHHW
WRQQDJHGRZQIURPDERXW}SHUFHQWIRXU\HDUVHDUOLHU
6WLOOODUJHO\UHVSRQGLQJWRRUGHUVSODFHGSULRUWRWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVWKHPDMRUVKLSEXLOGHUV
are reluctant to cancel or postpone deliveries. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea 
WRJHWKHUEXLOWPRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWRIWKHWRQQDJHGHOLYHUHGLQWKXVPDLQWDLQLQJ
important employment in their shipyards. The resulting oversupply of ships represents a 
serious challenge for shipowners. Importers and exporters, on the other hand, potentially 
EHQHƄWIURPDPSOHVXSSO\RIVKLSSLQJFDSDFLW\WRWUDQVSRUWLQWHUQDWLRQDOVHDERUQHWUDGH
Developing countries continue to expand their market share in different maritime sectors, 
including shipbuilding, ownership, registration, operation, scrapping and manning. One 
WKLUGRIWKHZRUOGƅHHWLVRZQHGE\VKLSRZQHUVLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVDQGRIWKHWRS
FRQWDLQHURSHUDWRUVDUHIURPGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV$OPRVW}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG
ƅHHWDUHUHJLVWHUHGLQ3DQDPD/LEHULDDQGWKH0DUVKDOO,VODQGVDQGPRUHWKDQ}SHU
FHQWRIVFUDSSLQJLQWRRNSODFHLQ,QGLD&KLQD%DQJODGHVKDQG3DNLVWDQ
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A. STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD FLEET
 :RUOGƃHHWJURZWKDQGSULQFLSDO
vessel types
)ROORZLQJDQDQQXDOJURZWKRIDOPRVW}SHUFHQWLQ
-DQXDU\WKHZRUOGƅHHWUHDFKHGDWRWDOWRQQDJH
RI } PLOOLRQ GZW At the beginning of the year, 
there were 104,305 seagoing commercial ships in 
service (see annex II). The largest growth of tonnage 
ZDVLQGU\EXONFDUULHUVSOXV}SHUFHQWEULQJLQJWKLV
FDWHJRU\WR}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGWRWDOFDSDFLW\
WKHZRUOG GU\ EXON ƅHHW KDV VXUJHG E\ } SHU FHQW
LQ MXVWIRXU\HDUV2LOWDQNHUFDSDFLW\ZKLFKJUHZE\
}SHUFHQWQRZDFFRXQWVIRU}SHUFHQWRI WKH
ZRUOGƅHHW&RQWDLQHUVKLSVDIWHUDQLQFUHDVHRI}SHU
FHQWPDNH XS}SHU FHQW RI WKHZRUOG WRQQDJH
7KH FRQYHQWLRQDO JHQHUDO FDUJR ƅHHW FRQWLQXHG LWV
UHODWLYHGHFOLQHEHLQJWKHRQO\PDMRUYHVVHOW\SHZLWKD
smaller tonnage in January 2012 than one year earlier. 
6LQFH WKHJHQHUDOFDUJRƅHHWKDVGHFOLQHGE\
}SHUFHQWZKLOHWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHZRUOGƅHHWJUHZ
E\PRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWWDEOH}ƄJXUH}
Dry bulk ships
Freight costs are an important component of the 
landed price of most dry bulk commodities. In order 
WRUHPDLQFRPSHWLWLYHDQGPDLQWDLQUHDVRQDEOHSURƄW
margins, distant suppliers such as Brazilian iron ore 
SURGXFHUVVHHWKHXVHRIODUJHVKLSVDVDSUHUHTXLVLWH
to achieve economies of scale. It may be useful to 
recall that transporting dry bulk in a small Handymax 
ship was, in March 2012, three times as expensive per 
ton-mile than shipping the cargo in a large Capesize 
bulk carrier.1
The year 2011 saw a particularly interesting 
GHYHORSPHQW LQ WKH GU\ EXON PDUNHW DV D PDMRU
supplier of iron ore aimed at gaining more control over 
the supply chain by ordering historically large vessels. 
7R EHQHƄW IURP WKH DERYHPHQWLRQHG HFRQRPLHV RI
scale in the iron ore trade, in 2011 and early 2012 
the Brazilian mining conglomerate Vale took delivery of 
the largest existing cargo carrying ships, the so-called 
Valemax ships of up to 400,000 dwt capacity.2 The 
VKLSVFUHDWHGDGLIƄFXOWVLWXDWLRQIRU9DOHKRZHYHUDV
permission for them to enter Chinese ports was still 
under discussion with Chinese authorities. Reportedly, 
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)LJXUH :RUOGƃHHWE\SULQFLSDOYHVVHOW\SHVVHOHFWHG\HDUVa%HJLQQLQJRI\HDUƂJXUHV}PLOOLRQVRIGZW
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 gross tonnage (GT) and above.
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Chinese shipowners and iron ore producers opposed 
the entry of the Brazilian Valemax ships into Chinese 
ports, arguing that the operation of such large ships 
might not be safe, and fearing that Vale could gain 
monopolistic control of the supply chain for iron ore. 
Ports would also need to expand stockpiling capacity 
to store the imported ore.3
Vale is planning to take delivery of 35 such ships by 
WKHHQGRIZLWKDWRWDOLQYHVWPHQWRI}ELOOLRQ
The Valemax ships are built in shipyards in the Republic 
RI.RUHDDQG LQ&KLQD.HHSLQJ LQPLQGWKHEHQHƄWV
RIORZHUWUDQVSRUWFRVWVHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\DQGIXUWKHU
South-South trade and collaboration between Brazil 
and China, several industry observers expressed hope 
that the ban for Valemax ships to enter Chinese ports 
would soon be lifted.4 History has shown, however, 
that attempts by exporters to control the maritime 
supply chain have often been short-lived, and in the 
longer term the traditional shipowners may resume 
their role as providers of maritime transport services.
Oil tankers
7KHRLOWDQNHUWRQQDJHUHDFKHGPRUHWKDQKDOID}ELOOLRQ
dwt in January 2012. A part of this tonnage is used for 
storage, rather than for transporting oil. For example, 
in March 2012, the world’s second-largest oil tanker 
was booked by Petroleo Brasileiro to be deployed as a 
storage facility. Increasing production in Latin America 
has spurred demand for more ships to store crude 
oil.57KHLQFUHDVHLQRLOVWRFNVDOVRUHƅHFWVIHDUVRID
possible future shortage of oil – for example, due to 
SROLWLFDOFRQƅLFWLQWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI,QWKHVKRUWWHUP
the increase in the use of ships to store oil helps to 
reduce the oversupply of tonnage. In the medium-
term future, the release of the stored oil will reduce 
the demand for oil transport and at the same time will 
increase available tanker capacity, again resulting in an 
oversupply of tonnage.
Container ships
In terms of deadweight tonnage, container ships have 
DVKDUHRIMXVW}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGƅHHW7KHUROH
of container ships for global trade is, however, more 
important than this tonnage share would suggest, 
DV}SHUFHQWRIVHDERUQHWUDGH LQGROODUWHUPVDUH
containerized.6 If the deadweight tonnage share of 
different vessel types is compared with the share of 
the value of the cargo carried, on average each dwt of 
container ships carries 27 times more seaborne trade 
(in monetary terms) than a dwt of dry bulk carriers (see 
DOVRWDEOH}EHORZ
In terms of actual transport capacity, the average box-
carrying capacity of container ships reached 3,074 
IRRWHTXLYDOHQWXQLWV7(8LQHDUO\DIXUWKHU
LQFUHDVHRI}SHUFHQWRYHUWKHSUHYLRXV\HDUWDEOH}
1HZ FRQWDLQHU VKLSV GHOLYHUHG LQ ZHUH } SHU
cent larger than those delivered throughout 2010.
0RUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWRIWKHQHZO\GHOLYHUHGFRQWDLQHU
ships were gearless, that is, consisting of ships 
dependent on specialized container cranes in the 
SRUWVƄJXUH*HDUHGVKLSVZKLFKFDWHUPRUHIRU
secondary ports, often in developing countries, tend 
to be smaller than gearless ones, which serve on the 
7DEOH :RUOGƃHHWE\SULQFLSDOYHVVHOW\SHV
 2011–2012a (Beginning-of-year
ƂJXUHVWKRXVDQGVRIGZW
percentage share in italics)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of 
data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 GT and 
above. Percentage shares are shown in italics.
Principal
types 2011 2012
Percentage 
change 
2012/2011
Oil tankers  474 846  507 454 6.9
34.0 33.1 -0.9
Bulk carriers  532 039  622 536 17.0
38.1 40.6 2.5
General cargo ships  108 971  106 385 
7.8 6.9 -0.9
Container ships  183 859  198 002 7.7
13.2 12.9 -0.3
Other types of ships  96 028  99 642 3.8
6.9 6.5 -0.4
/LTXHƂHGJDV
carriers  43 339  44 622 3.0
3.1 2.9 -0.2
Offshore supply  33 227  37 468 12.8
2.4 2.4 0.1
Ferries and
passenger ships  6 164  6 224 1.0
0.4 0.4 0.0
Other/ n.a.  13 299  11 328 
1.0 0.7 -0.2
World total 1 395 743 1 534 019 9.9
100.0 100.0
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PDMRU URXWHV IRU WKH ODUJHU YROXPHVRI FRQWDLQHUL]HG
trade. In 2011, new geared ships were on average two 
ƄIWKVRIWKHVL]HLQ7(8RIJHDUOHVVVKLSV
In parallel with this long-term development, seaports
increasingly deploy ship-to-shore gantry cranes
to cater for gearless vessels. Between 2000 and
Table 2.2. Long-term trends in the cellular
FRQWDLQHUVKLSƃHHWa
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of 
data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Fully cellular container ships of 100 GT and above. 
%HJLQQLQJRI\HDU ƄJXUHV H[FHSW WKRVH IURP 
ZKLFKDUHPLG\HDUƄJXUHV
Beginning of year Number of vessels TEU capacity
Average 
vessel size 
(TEU)
1987  1 052 1 215 215  1 155
1997  1 954 3 089 682  1 581
2007  3 904 9 436 377  2 417
2008  4 276 10 760 173  2 516
2009  4 638 12 142 444  2 618
2010  4 677 12 824 648  2 742
2011  4 868 14 081 957  2 893
2012  5 012 15 406 610  3 074
Growth 2012/2011
(per cent) 2.96 9.41 6.26 
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Figure 2.2. Trends in deliveries of container ships (New container ships, in TEU, 2007–2011)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, based on data provided by Lloyd’s List Intelligence: www.lloydslistintelligence.com.
2010, the number of gantries deployed increased
E\ } SHU FHQW WR UHDFK  XQLWV ZRUOGZLGH7
For some developing countries, however, this trend
poses a challenge, as their ports may not always be
DEOHWRFDWFKXSZLWKPDUNHWUHTXLUHPHQWV'XULQJ
the same period, gantries deployed in Africa, for
H[DPSOH LQFUHDVHG E\ MXVW } SHU FHQW UHDFKLQJ
only 200 units in 2010. Many African ports are
not yet ready to accommodate the latest gearless
container ships.
Specialized ships
Owners of specialized reefer tonnage have suffered 
from the competition of container ships that also 
cater for refrigerated containers. Containers today 
DFFRXQW IRU DERXW } SHU FHQW RI UHHIHU FDUJR DQG
new container ships increasingly include large reefer 
capacities.8 While the trend of containerization of 
refrigerated cargo will continue, the replacement of 
older dedicated reefer ships by more modern tonnage 
LQ FRPLQJ \HDUVZLOO DOORZ DPLQLPXP ƅHHW RI WKHVH
specialized vessels to be maintained. This should be 
able to cater for surges in demand during harvest 
time in many developing countries, which the regular 
container lines would not cover on their own.
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7DEOH $JHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHZRUOGPHUFKDQWƃHHWE\YHVVHOW\SHDVRI-DQXDU\
(Percentage of total ships and dwt)
Country grouping and 
types of vessels
0–4 
years
5–9 
years
10–14 
years
15–19 
years
20 years 
and +
Average 
age (years)
2012
Average 
age (years)
2011
Percentage
change 
2012/2011
WORLD
   Bulk carriers  33.7  14.3  11.3  12.4  28.2 13.18 15.29 
Dwt  41.5  16.6  11.3  13.1  17.6 10.52 12.49 
Average vessel size (dwt)  78 098  73 344  63 300  66 520  39 569
   Container ships  23.8  27.9  18.3  17.4  12.6 10.90 10.70 0.20
Dwt  32.8  31.0  16.6  12.0  7.5 8.93 8.84 0.09
Average vessel size (dwt)  54 465  43 915  35 837  27 267  23 718
   General cargo  11.5  10.7  8.2  11.2  58.4 23.26 24.15 
Dwt  21.4  13.7  11.8  10.2  42.8 18.80 20.27 
Average vessel size (dwt)  9 698  6 670  7 451  4 723  3 795
   Oil tankers  24.7  21.2  11.0  10.5  32.6 15.70 16.37 
Dwt  34.7  29.0  18.4  9.4  8.5 9.44 9.74 
Average vessel size (dwt)  63 483  61 884  75 896  40 588  11 756
   Other types  10.6  9.7  9.2  8.4  62.0 25.06 25.19 
Dwt  27.2  18.3  10.7  7.7  36.1 17.12 17.11 0.01
Average vessel size (dwt)  4 417  3 240  1 992  1 580  1 006
   All ships  15.1  12.5  9.9  10.0  52.6 21.90 22.49 
Dwt  35.8  22.5  14.3  11.2  16.2 11.51 12.59 
Average vessel size (dwt)  34 827  26 518  21 378  16 431  4 543
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(6
Bulk carriers  34.9  14.3  9.9  12.1  28.8 12.96 14.99 
Dwt  41.4  16.0  9.5  13.2  19.8 10.81 12.77 
Average vessel size (dwt)  77 386  72 977  62 730  71 136  44 843
Container ships  25.1  26.7  16.8  18.0  13.3 11.00 10.83 0.17
Dwt  34.7  30.7  14.6  12.3  7.7 8.80 8.71 0.10
Average vessel size (dwt)  51 780  43 083  32 702  25 532  21 563
General cargo  11.5  11.3  7.5  9.1  60.5 23.31 24.07 
Dwt  22.1  13.4  9.8  9.8  44.8 19.00 20.39 
Average vessel size (dwt)  10 547  6 487  7 160  5 932  4 074
Oil tankers  24.0  18.6  9.8  9.9  37.7 16.69 17.15 
Dwt  35.4  27.7  15.8  9.9  11.2 9.94 10.33 
Average vessel size (dwt)  65 045  65 891  71 308  44 408  13 102
Other types  14.2  11.0  7.7  8.3  58.9 23.67 24.33 
Dwt  24.2  15.5  9.4  7.7  43.2 18.94 19.06 
Average vessel size (dwt)  3 384  2 802  2 442  1 839  1 454
All ships  17.8  13.3  8.7  9.7  50.4 20.74 21.61 
Dwt  36.4  21.2  12.1  11.6  18.7 11.92 13.11 
Average vessel size (dwt)  35 395  27 677  24 061  20 607  6 435
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Bulk carriers  23.2  11.4  15.1  16.7  33.6 16.51 18.13 
Dwt  37.3  17.2  17.8  13.8  13.8 10.78 12.06 
Average vessel size (dwt)  94 354  88 638  69 250  48 620  24 230
Container ships  16.3  33.5  24.7  17.0  8.4 10.84 10.28 0.56
Dwt  23.1  35.5  23.8  12.0  5.5 9.44 9.12 0.32
Average vessel size (dwt)  74 141  55 339  50 293  36 726  34 295
General cargo  16.8  13.3  14.1  20.8  35.0 19.00 19.66 
Dwt  27.4  18.2  20.4  12.3  21.7 14.14 15.19 
Average vessel size (dwt)  7 234  6 040  6 395  2 613  2 741
REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201238
Country grouping and 
types of vessels
0–4 
years
5–9 
years
10–14 
years
15–19 
years
20 years 
and +
Average 
age (years)
2012
Average 
age (years)
2011
Percentage
change 
2012/2011
Oil tankers  21.5  29.1  15.1  16.7  17.6 13.47 13.67 
Dwt  27.9  37.5  23.8  8.5  2.3 8.45 8.18 0.27
Average vessel size (dwt)  57 139  56 766  69 511  22 286  5 730
Other types  8.1  10.2  13.3  9.6  58.7 24.96 24.91 0.04
Dwt  21.8  24.1  18.8  10.9  24.4 15.02 15.49 
Average vessel size (dwt)  2 789  2 454  1 467  1 185   434
All ships  10.8  12.6  13.6  11.9  51.1 22.54 22.66 
Dwt  28.3  29.9  20.7  10.3  10.7 10.49 10.78 
Average vessel size (dwt)  20 949  18 961  12 106  6 846  1 675
&28175,(6:,7+(&2120,(6,175$16,7,21
Bulk carriers  35.0  5.9  4.2  13.7  41.2 15.73 17.99 
Dwt  34.1  6.9  5.9  17.3  35.8 15.06 17.33 
Average vessel size (dwt)  37 094  44 555  55 500  48 770  37 922
Container ships  14.5  20.3  6.3  23.8  35.2 16.16 15.95 0.22
Dwt  21.0  33.1  2.5  16.0  27.4 13.30 12.35 0.94
Average vessel size (dwt)  40 165  42 901  10 454  17 638  21 347
General cargo  7.5  10.9  6.3  8.9  66.4 24.19 24.68 
Dwt  10.1  9.7  5.5  5.8  68.9 24.34 25.68 
Average vessel size (dwt)  4 713  2 980  2 987  1 932  4 098
Oil tankers  18.1  14.8  5.5  8.2  53.3 20.76 22.19 
Dwt  38.4  30.0  6.8  10.9  13.8 10.04 10.97 
Average vessel size (dwt)  41 006  38 211  25 681  22 196  5 051
Other types  7.1  6.7  3.9  7.4  74.9 25.69 25.71 
Dwt  37.6  29.1  7.2  9.2  17.0 10.57 11.55 
Average vessel size (dwt)  41 006  38 211  25 681  22 196  5 051
All ships  11.7  9.6  5.1  9.2  64.4 23.21 23.90 
Dwt  31.3  17.9  6.0  12.9  31.9 14.84 16.24 
Average vessel size (dwt)  29 687  21 209  14 351  19 149  10 267
7(10$-2523(1$1',17(51$7,21$/5(*,675,(6
Bulk carriers  38.0  16.9  11.6  11.8  21.6 11.20 13.08 
Dwt  43.2  18.0  10.5  12.4  15.9 9.75 11.49 
Average vessel size (dwt)  82 215  76 751  65 422  75 977  53 264
Container ships  26.2  30.0  17.5  16.9  9.4 9.86 9.61 0.25
Dwt  35.8  30.6  14.9  11.6  7.0 8.40 8.28 0.12
Average vessel size (dwt)  54 691  40 978  34 341  27 591  29 737
General cargo  18.6  13.9  12.2  12.0  43.3 17.90 18.58 
Dwt  27.0  15.7  13.4  10.0  33.8 15.20 16.21 
Average vessel size (dwt)  14 264  11 140  10 834  8 236  7 680
Oil tankers  35.9  29.7  14.9  7.1  12.4 9.53 9.81 
Dwt  35.4  28.1  20.7  9.1  6.8 8.80 9.14 
Average vessel size (dwt)  77 377  74 168  109 146  99 893  42 802
Other types  23.6  12.6  10.6  7.0  46.2 19.72 20.49 
Dwt  32.2  17.9  9.1  5.6  35.2 16.09 15.84 0.25
Average vessel size (dwt)  17 049  17 780  10 687  10 034  9 507
All ships  28.9  19.5  12.9  10.8  27.9 13.88 14.79 
Dwt  38.3  22.8  14.5  10.7  13.8 10.16 11.10 
Average vessel size (dwt)  57 487  50 618  48 467  43 152  21 396
7DEOH $JHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHZRUOGPHUFKDQWƃHHWE\YHVVHOW\SHDVRI-DQXDU\
(Percentage of total ships and dwt) (continued)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 GT and above.
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The supply–demand balance is more favourable for 
shipowners of product tankers, for which fewer orders 
have been placed in recent years, but demand has 
increased due to longer distances between regions of 
supply and demand.
Regarding other types of specialized ships, offshore
supply vessels continued to grow in 2011 at an above-
DYHUDJHUDWHSOXV}SHUFHQWUHDFKLQJDVKDUHRI
}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGƅHHWLQ-DQXDU\2IIVKRUH
specialized ships have been in growing demand,
notably in Nigeria, Ghana and other Western African
countries, where oil exploration has recently expanded.
2. Age distribution of the world
PHUFKDQWƃHHW
7KHDYHUDJHDJHRIWKHZRUOGƅHHWGHFUHDVHGVOLJKWO\
during 2011 as a result of continued newbuilding 
deliveries and increased demolitions. In January 2012, 
WKHDYHUDJHDJHRIWKHƅHHWSHUGZWZDV\HDUV
while the average age per vessel was almost twice as 
high at 21.9 years, indicating that older ships tend to 
EHPXFKVPDOOHU WDEOH}$Q LPSUHVVLYH}SHU
FHQWRIGU\EXON WRQQDJH LV OHVV WKDQ ƄYH \HDUVROG
following the historical spree of new construction of 
the last few years. Container ships continue to be the 
youngest market segment, with an average age per 
GZWRIEHORZQLQH\HDUVDQGDOPRVW}SHUFHQWRIWKH
ƅHHW\RXQJHUWKDQ\HDUV7KHROGHVWVKLSVFRQWLQXH
to be general cargo and other types of vessels, with 
DERXWWKUHHRXWRIƄYHVKLSVEHLQJROGHUWKDQ\HDUV
$PRQJFRXQWU\JURXSLQJV WKHPDMRURSHQUHJLVWULHV
FRQWLQXHGWRKDYHWKH\RXQJHVWƅHHWDIWHUUHFRUGLQJD
further reduction in the average age, from 11.1 to 10.2 
years per dwt. The modernization of the open registry 
ƅHHW LV DOVR UHƅHFWHG LQ WKH SDUWLFXODUO\ KLJK VKDUH
RI IRUHLJQƅDJJHG VKLSV DPRQJ WKH  GHOLYHULHV
ƄJXUHVDQG
7KH UHFHQW JURZWK RI WKHZRUOG ƅHHW LV LOOXVWUDWHG LQ
ƄJXUH},QVSLWHRIWKHHFRQRPLFFULVLVRIt
PRUH WRQQDJHZDVDGGHGWR WKHZRUOGƅHHW LQ
and 2011 than in any previous year, this fact resulting 
from orders placed prior to the economic crisis (see 
DOVR ƄJXUH}  7KH KLJK YROXPH RI RQH\HDUROG
tonnage also explains the reduction in the average 
DJHRIWKHƅHHWWDEOH}0RVWRIWKHDGGLWLRQVWRWKH
ZRUOGƅHHWGXULQJZHUHUHJLVWHUHGXQGHUIRUHLJQ
ƅDJV
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data from IHS Fairplay, for vessels of 1000 GT and above.
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3. Domestic shipping
Apart from international seaborne trade, domestic 
shipping is an important additional source of 
HPSOR\PHQW IRU VKLSV DQGSROLF\PDNHUV IUHTXHQWO\
aim at supporting coastal maritime transport because 
RI WKH HQYLURQPHQWDO EHQHƄWV RI UHGXFLQJ WKH FDUJR
moved by road. Demand for intra-country (cabotage) 
shipping has helped to absorb some of the new 
tonnage that entered into service in 2011. For example, 
DERXW}SHUFHQWRIVPDOOHUGU\EXONFDUULHUVEXLOWLQ
China are deployed exclusively in Chinese cabotage.9
Cabotage shipping is not governed by most of the 
international maritime regulations, such as the phasing 
out of single-hull tankers. Nigerian shipowners, for 
example, mostly deploy single-hull tankers for the 
coastal transport of oil.10 Vessels deployed in cabotage 
services are also often older than the internationally 
GHSOR\HGƅHHWLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIRUH[DPSOHPRUH
WKDQKDOIRIWKHFDERWDJHƅHHWLVROGHUWKDQ\HDUV11
7KHGU\EXONƅHHWRZQHGE\&KLQHVHLQWHUHVWVLQFOXGHV
DERXW}SHUFHQWPRUHVKLSVRI\HDUVDQGROGHU
than the world average, which is mostly due to its 
deployment in coastal shipping.12
In many countries, cabotage is reserved for nationally 
ƅDJJHGVKLSVZKLFKUHGXFHVFRPSHWLWLRQIURPIRUHLJQ
providers. In order to further promote coastal shipping 
DQGEHQHƄW IURPPRUHFRPSHWLWLYHPDULWLPHWUDQVSRUW
services, some countries are considering opening 
certain cabotage services to non-national operators. 
For the case of India, for example, it has been argued 
that a relaxation of the cabotage restrictions would help 
promote trans-shipment in Indian ports.13 In Nigeria, the 
issuance of waivers for foreign providers of cabotage 
services has in practice become the rule rather than an 
exception.14 Other countries have chosen to maintain a 
more restrictive policy, with a view to promoting national 
shipbuilding and the employment of national seafarers. 
Indonesia, for example, is reportedly considering 
prohibiting the import of older ships for cabotage 
services, hoping that this will increase the demand for 
shipbuilding in Indonesian yards.15
B. OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF 
THE WORLD FLEET
1. Ship-owning countries 
Among the top 35 ship-owning economies, there 
are 17 in Asia, 14 in Europe and 4 in the Americas 
WDEOH}  3UDFWLFDOO\ KDOI RI WKH ZRUOG WRQQDJH
}SHUFHQWLVRZQHGE\VKLSSLQJFRPSDQLHVIURP
MXVW IRXU FRXQWULHV t *UHHFH -DSDQ *HUPDQ\ DQG
China. Owners from Bermuda, Brazil and the Isle of 
Man specialize mostly in large ships, notably tankers 
and dry bulk carriers. Owners from Indonesia, the 
Russian Federation and Viet Nam have a large number 
of smaller ships, including vessels deployed in coastal 
and inter-island services.
7DEOH}  GHSLFWV WKH PDMRU VKLSRZQLQJ FRXQWULHV
and their share in different market segments (in dwt 
percentage share), as well as an estimation of their share 
in the transport of global seaborne trade (in $ percentage 
share). Containerized cargo accounts for an estimated 
}SHUFHQWRIWKHYDOXHRIJOREDOVHDERUQHWUDGHDQG
countries with a high share of containerized tonnage will 
thus also have a high share in global seaborne trade 
that is transported by their nationally owned ships.
As the largest owner of ship containerized tonnage, 
*HUPDQ\ } SHU FHQW RI WKH FRQWDLQHU VKLS ƅHHW
becomes the country whose ships also account for 
WKH ODUJHVW VKDUH PRUH WKDQ } SHU FHQW RI JOREDO
seaborne trade carried. The second largest shipowner 
LV -DSDQ ZLWK D VKDUH RI } SHU FHQW RI JOREDO
VHDERUQH WUDGHFDUULHG IROORZHGE\*UHHFH }SHU
FHQW&KLQD}SHUFHQWDQG'HQPDUN}SHUFHQW
2ZQHUVKLSRIWKHƅHHWGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\LPSO\WKDW
the ship-owning countries effectively operate or control 
the shipping operations. In particular, the German-
RZQHG FRQWDLQHU VKLSV DUH IUHTXHQWO\ FKDUWHUHG RXW
to liner shipping operators based in other countries, 
such as Maersk (Denmark), MSC (Switzerland) or 
CSAV (Chile). Neither would there necessarily exist a 
relationship between a country’s own foreign trade and 
LWVƅHHWRZQHUVKLS3UHYLRXVDQDO\VLVLQGLFDWHVWKDWRLO
exporting countries are more likely to own the oil tankers 
used for their own national exports, while the exporters 
of containerized cargo are much less likely to own the 
container ships used for their own foreign trade.16
2. Container shipping operators
The top 20 carriers
The largest container ship operators in January 
2012 continue to be Maersk Line (Denmark), MSC 
(Switzerland) and CMA CGM (France). Together, these 
WKUHH FRPSDQLHV RSHUDWH DOPRVW }SHU FHQW RI WKH
JOREDOFRQWDLQHUFDUU\LQJFDSDFLW\ LQ7(8UHƅHFWLQJ
the continued process of industry concentration of 
the last few years. Compared with January 2011,
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Country or territory of
ownership b
Number of vessels Deadweight tonnage
National 
ƃDJc
Foreign 
ƃDJ Total
National 
ƃDJc
Foreign 
ƃDJ Total
Foreign
ƃDJDVD
percentage
of total
Estimated
 market 
share
1 January 
2012
Greece   738  2 583  3 321 64 921 486 159 130 395 224 051 881 71.02 16.10
Japan   717  3 243  3 960 20 452 832 197 210 070 217 662 902 90.60 15.64
Germany   422  3 567  3 989 17 296 198 108 330 510 125 626 708 86.23 9.03
China  2 060  1 569  3 629 51 716 318 72 285 422 124 001 740 58.29 8.91
Korea, Republic of   740   496  1 236 17 102 300 39 083 270 56 185 570 69.56 4.04
United States   741  1 314  2 055 7 162 685 47 460 048 54 622 733 86.89 3.92
China, Taiwan Province of   470   383   853 28 884 470 16 601 518 45 485 988 36.50 3.27
Norway   851  1 141  1 992 15 772 288 27 327 579 43 099 867 63.41 3.10
Denmark   394   649  1 043 13 463 727 26 527 607 39 991 334 66.33 2.87
Chinese Taipei   102   601   703 4 076 815 34 968 474 39 045 289 89.56 2.81
Singapore   712   398  1 110 22 082 648 16 480 079 38 562 727 42.74 2.77
Bermuda   17   251   268 2 297 441 27 698 605 29 996 046 92.34 2.16
Italy   608   226   834 18 113 984 6 874 748 24 988 732 27.51 1.80
Turkey   527   647  1 174 8 554 745 14 925 883 23 480 628 63.57 1.69
Canada   205   251   456 2 489 989 19 360 007 21 849 996 88.60 1.57
India   455   105   560 15 276 544 6 086 410 21 362 954 28.49 1.53
Russian Federation  1 336   451  1 787 5 410 608 14 957 599 20 368 207 73.44 1.46
United Kingdom   230   480   710 2 034 570 16 395 185 18 429 755 88.96 1.32
Belgium   97   180   277 6 319 103 8 202 208 14 521 311 56.48 1.04
0DOD\VLD   432   107   539 9 710 922 4 734 174 14 445 096 32.77 1.04
Brazil   113   59   172 2 279 733 11 481 795 13 761 528 83.43 0.99
Saudi Arabia   75   117   192 1 852 378 10 887 737 12 740 115 85.46 0.92
Netherlands   576   386   962 4 901 301 6 799 943 11 701 244 58.11 0.84
Indonesia   951   91  1 042 9 300 711 2 292 255 11 592 966 19.77 0.83
Iran   67   71   138  829 704 10 634 685 11 464 389 92.76 0.82
France   188   297   485 3 430 417 7 740 496 11 170 913 69.29 0.80
United Arab Emirates   65   365   430  609 032 8 187 103 8 796 135 93.08 0.63
Cyprus   62   152   214 2 044 256 5 092 849 7 137 105 71.36 0.51
Viet Nam   477   79   556 4 706 563 1 988 446 6 695 009 29.70 0.48
Kuwait   44   42   86 3 956 910 2 735 309 6 692 219 40.87 0.48
Sweden   99   208   307 1 070 563 5 325 853 6 396 416 83.26 0.46
,VOHRI0DQ   6   38   44  226 810 6 131 401 6 358 211 96.43 0.46
Thailand   277   67   344 3 610 570 1 542 980 5 153 550 29.94 0.37
Switzerland   39   142   181 1 189 376 3 700 886 4 890 262 75.68 0.35
Qatar    48    37    85   881 688  3 745 663  4 627 351 80.95 0.33
7RWDOWRSHFRQRPLHV   14 941   20 793   35 734  374 029 685  952 927 192 1 326 956 877 71.81 95.34
Other owners   2 172   1 816   3 988  22 491 261  42 344 181  64 835 442 65.31 4.66
Total of known economy
of ownership   17 113   22 609   39 722  396 520 946  995 271 373 1 391 792 319 71.51 100.00
Others, unknown economy
of ownership   7 179  126 317 184
World Total   46 901 1 518 109 503
7DEOH 7KHFRXQWULHVDQGWHUULWRULHVZLWKWKHODUJHVWRZQHGƃHHWVDVRI-DQXDU\a (Dwt)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Vessels of 1000 GT and above, ranked by deadweight tonnage – excluding the United States Reserve Fleet and the United 
6WDWHVDQG&DQDGLDQ*UHDW/DNHVƅHHWVZKLFKKDYHDFRPELQHGWRQQDJHRI}PLOOLRQGZW
b 7KHFRXQWU\RIRZQHUVKLSLQGLFDWHVZKHUHWKHWUXHFRQWUROOLQJLQWHUHVWWKDWLVWKHSDUHQWFRPSDQ\RIWKHƅHHWLVORFDWHG,Q
VHYHUDOFDVHVGHWHUPLQLQJWKLVKDVUHTXLUHGPDNLQJFHUWDLQMXGJHPHQWV7KXVIRUH[DPSOH*UHHFHLVVKRZQDVWKHFRXQWU\
RIRZQHUVKLSIRUYHVVHOVRZQHGE\D*UHHNQDWLRQDOZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIƄFHVLQ1HZ<RUN/RQGRQDQG3LUDHXVDOWKRXJK
the owner may be domiciled in the United States.
c ,QFOXGHVYHVVHOVƅ\LQJWKHQDWLRQDOƅDJEXWUHJLVWHUHGLQVHFRQGUHJLVWULHVVXFKDVWKH'DQLVK,QWHUQDWLRQDO6KLS5HJLVWHU
(DIS), the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) or the French International Ship Register (FIS).
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the largest growth was recorded by MOL (Japan), 
ZLWK DQ LQFUHDVH LQ 7(8RI }SHU FHQW IROORZHG
E\&6&/&KLQD}SHUFHQWLQFUHDVHDQG+DSDJ
/OR\G*HUPDQ\}SHUFHQWLQFUHDVH7KHODUJHVW
decline in capacity was recorded by CSAV (Chile), 
ZKLFK VDZ LWV RSHUDWHG 7(8 GHFUHDVH E\ } SHU
FHQWWDEOH}
Financial performance
$V D FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH FRQWLQXHG RYHUVXSSO\
of tonnage, which effectively continued to worsen 
throughout 2011, most carriers incurred important 
ƄQDQFLDO ORVVHV 7KH FRQWDLQHU VKLSSLQJ FRPSDQLHVp
FRPELQHG ORVV ZDV HVWLPDWHG DW RYHU } ELOOLRQ LQ
 IROORZLQJ D SURƄW RI } ELOOLRQ LQ  DQG
D ORVVRI}ELOOLRQ LQ17$ ORVVRI}ELOOLRQ
in 2011 was reported by COSCO (including non-
container shipping businesses), CSAV reported a 
ORVV RI } ELOOLRQ &0$ &*0 } PLOOLRQ +DQMLQ
}PLOOLRQ DQG12/}PLOOLRQ 7KH \HDU 
GRHVQRWDSSHDUWREHPRUHSRVLWLYH'XULQJWKHƄUVW
TXDUWHURI&6$9UHSRUWHGDORVVRI}PLOOLRQ
+DQMLQRI}PLOOLRQ+DSDJ/OR\GRI}PLOOLRQ
0DHUVN/LQHRI}PLOOLRQDQG12/RI}PLOOLRQ18
Confronted with such a bleak picture, many industry 
observers expect a surge in bankruptcies in coming 
years, as banks “are seeking to recover what they can 
from a debacle they helped to create”.19
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(VWLPDWHGVKDUHRIZRUOGƃHHWGZWE\PDLQYHVVHOW\SH
Container  100  37.0  8.8  6.8  6.3  8.8  4.8  0.3  3.2  3.3  2.2  1.5  2.3  0.2  0.6  0.4  0.1  0.4  13.1 
Dry bulk  100  4.8  22.7  19.9  14.0  1.1  3.4  1.4  6.3  2.0  4.5  3.1  0.4  0.3  2.1  0.2  1.5  0.9  11.3 
Tankers  100  4.6  12.5  20.8  5.2  3.4  1.7  3.4  2.8  3.9  3.0  5.0  1.8  2.8  1.6  0.8  2.7  2.2  21.7 
General 
cargo  100  13.3  12.4  2.4  11.0  1.1  1.6  12.0  2.3  1.4  1.8  1.0  0.2  3.7  3.4  4.5  2.2  2.0  23.7 
(VWLPDWHGVKDUHRIJOREDOVHDERUQHWUDGHFDUULHGE\QDWLRQDOO\RZQHGVKLSVE\PDLQYHVVHOW\SH
Container  52  19.2  4.6  3.5  3.3  4.6  2.5  0.2  1.7  1.7  1.1  0.8  1.2  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.2  6.8 
Dry bulk  6  0.3  1.4  1.2  0.8  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.7 
Tankers  22  1.0  2.7  4.6  1.1  0.7  0.4  0.7  0.6  0.9  0.7  1.1  0.4  0.6  0.4  0.2  0.6  0.5  4.8 
General 
cargo  20  2.7  2.5  0.5  2.2  0.2  0.3  2.4  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.0  0.7  0.7  0.9  0.4  0.4  4.7 
TOTAL  100  23.2  11.2  9.8  7.5  5.6  3.4  3.4  3.1  3.0  2.4  2.3  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2  17.0 
Table 2.5. Countries/territories of ownership, by main vessel types (Dwt and dollars as percentages,
January 2012 estimates)
Source: Estimations by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS FairplayZRUOGƅHHWDQGWKH:RUOG6KLSSLQJ
Council (share of seaborne trade by vessel type).
Investing in circles
&DUULHUV KDYH LQYHVWHG LQ HYHU ODUJHU VKLSV WR EHQHƄW
from economies of scale. The pressure to reduce costs 
is increased by historically low freight rates. However, 
building more and larger ships also adds to the general 
oversupply of capacity, thus putting further downward 
pressure on the freight rates. While an investment in 
larger ships may make sense for an individual company, 
for the industry as a whole this actually leads to a vicious 
cycle of more oversupply of tonnage and a further 
ZRUVHQHG ƄQDQFLDO SHUIRUPDQFH )URP WKH FOLHQWVp
perspective this pattern could also be considered as 
a virtuous cycle, where technological progress and 
HQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\KHOSWRUHGXFHWUDQVSRUWFRVWVZKLFK
in turn help to promote trade and investment in larger 
DQGPRUHHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQWVKLSV
Not all carriers have shown procyclical investment 
patterns. Evergreen, which in recent years had been the 
RQO\PDMRUFDUULHUWKDWKDGQRWH[SDQGHGDQGLQYHVWHG
in ultralarge container ships, has in early 2012 placed 
an order for 10 vessels of 13,800 TEU each, this being 
the highest capacity range of container ships. The new 
container ships are reportedly to be among the most 
HQHUJ\HIƄFLHQWHYHUEXLOW&RPELQHGZLWKRWKHURUGHUV
for new tonnage, Evergreen’s order book in May 2012 
DPRXQWHGWR}SHUFHQWRILWVH[LVWLQJƅHHWSRLQWLQJWR
an ambitious anticyclical expansion plan.20
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ZRXOG EH SRVLWLYH IRU FDUULHU SURƄWDELOLW\ SURSRVHG
candidates for mergers were, for example, the three 
largest Japanese lines.22 Some analysts predict that 
WKHPDMRU (DVWt:HVW FRPSDQLHV qZLOO VKULQN WR  WR
10 carriers by the mid-2020s”.23 $OO PDMRU VKLSSLQJ
lines have in recent years increased vessel-sharing 
DUUDQJHPHQWV ZLWK RWKHU FDUULHUV DQG WZR PDMRU
alliances – the Grand Alliance and the New World 
$OOLDQFH t KDYH MRLQHG IRUFHV WR IRUP WKH QHZ *
Alliance.24 Feeder operators have also created alliances 
among themselves to better defend themselves 
against competition from the larger shipping lines.25
Several lines sought support from the public sector. 
The French CMA CGM has reportedly “approached 
a French sovereign wealth fund”.26 The China 
Shipowners’ Association reportedly demanded 
carriers to seek government support and set freight 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data provided by Lloyd’s List Intelligence: www.lloydslistintelligence.com. 
Note: ,QFOXGHV DOO FRQWDLQHU FDUU\LQJ VKLSV 1RW IXOO\ FRPSDUDEOH WR WDEOH} ZKLFK FRYHUV RQO\ WKH VSHFLDOL]HG IXOO\ FHOOXODU
container ships. 
Ranking
(TEU) Operator Country/ territory
Number
of
vessels
Average
vessel
size
TEU
Share of
ZRUOGWRWDO7(8
(percentage)
Cumulated 
VKDUH
TEU
(percentage)
Growth
in
TEU over
2011
(percentage)
1 Maersk Line Denmark  453 4 646 2 104 825 11.8 11.8 15.6
2 MSC Switzerland  432 4 688 2 025 179 11.3 23.1 14.9
 CMA CGM Group France  290 4 004 1 161 141 6.5 29.5 8.5
4 APL Singapore  144 4 168  600 168 3.4 32.9 1.4
5 COSCO China  145 4 304  624 055 3.5 36.4 10.3
6 Evergreen Line China, Taiwan Province of  159 3 590  570 843 3.2 39.6 
7 +DSDJ/OR\G*URXS Germany  145 4 476  648 976 3.6 43.2 15.8
8 CSCL China  124 4 493  557 168 3.1 46.3 20.9
9 Hanjin Korea, Republic of  101 4 927  497 641 2.8 49.1 11.2
10 MOL Japan  107 4 194  448 727 2.5 51.6 23.6
11 OOCL China, Hong Kong SAR  88 4 516  397 433 2.2 53.8 6.1
12 Zim Israel  82 3 708  304 074 1.7 55.5 8.0
 HMM Korea, Republic of  70 4 497  314 770 1.8 57.3 10.4
14 NYK Japan  93 4 129  383 964 2.1 59.4 8.8
15 Yang Ming China, Taiwan Province of  84 4 089  343 476 1.9 61.3 6.4
16 Hamburg Sud Germany  99 3 728  369 057 2.1 63.4 10.0
17 K Line Japan  79 4 336  342 572 1.9 65.3 
18 CSAV Chile  85 4 095  348 035 1.9 67.2 
19 PIL Singapore  104 2 279  236 978 1.3 68.6 
20 Wan Hai Lines Limited
China, Taiwan 
Province of  89 2 080  185 146 1.0 69.6 8.8
Total top 20 carriers 2 973 3 979 12 464 228 69.6 69.6 10.0
Others 7 093  768 5 445 054 30.3 30.4 10.7
:RUOGFRQWDLQHUVKLSƃHHW 10 066 1 678 17 909 282 100.0 100.0 10.2
Table 2.6. The 20 leading service operators of container ships, 1 January 2012 (Number of ships and total
shipboard capacity deployed, in TEUs)
Consolidation and restructuring
Lines are taking different approaches to confront 
losses. The Malaysian shipping company MISC has 
effectively discontinued its container activities and now 
IRFXVHVVROHO\RQGU\DQGOLTXLGEXON7KH&KLOHDQFDUULHU
&6$9 KDV LQ  GUDVWLFDOO\ PRGLƄHG LWV VWUDWHJ\
LQFUHDVLQJWKHVKDUHRIMRLQWO\RSHUDWHGVHUYLFHVIURP
WRPRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWDQGLQFUHDVLQJWKHVKDUH
of owned versus chartered-in tonnage.21 Zim (Israel) 
is in negotiations with creditors to obtain additional 
funding and with shipyards to delay the delivery of 
previously ordered ships. Reports suggest that both 
CMA CGM and MSC are considering selling stakes in 
port operation businesses.
Several industry representatives suggest that further 
mergers among shipping lines can be expected and 
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 GT and above; ranked by deadweight tonnage.
Flag
of registrations
Number
of
vessels
Deadweight 
tonnage,
in thousands
dwt
Average 
vessel 
size,
dwt
Share 
of world 
total,
dwt
(per cent)
Cumulated 
share,
dwt
(per cent)
Tonnage 
registered
for foreign 
owners in 
thousands dwt
Per cent
of tonnage 
owned by 
foreigners
 Dwt growth 
2012/2011,
(per cent) 
Panama   8 127   328 210   40 385  21.39  21.39  328 112  99.97  7.25 
Liberia   3 030   189 911   62 677  12.38  33.77  189 911  100.00  14.24 
0DUVKDOO,VODQGV   1 876   122 857   65 489  8.01  41.78  122 857  100.00  24.40 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR   1 935   116 806   60 365  7.61  49.40  87 907  75.26  27.33 
Singapore   2 877   82 084   28 531  5.35  54.75  59 910  72.99  21.99 
Greece   1 386   72 558   52 351  4.73  59.48  7 520  10.36  1.59 
0DOWD   1 815   71 287   39 277  4.65  64.12  71 241  99.94  16.30 
Bahamas   1 409   69 105   49 046  4.50  68.63  68 620  99.30  2.43 
China   4 148   58 195   14 030  3.79  72.42  5 983  10.28  10.34 
Cyprus   1 022   32 986   32 276  2.15  74.57  30 940  93.80  2.06 
Japan   5 619   23 572   4 195  1.54  76.11   398  1.69  6.18 
,VOH2I0DQ    410   22 542   54 980  1.47  77.58  22 315  98.99  16.06 
Italy   1 667   21 763   13 055  1.42  79.00  3 523  16.19  11.95 
Republic Of Korea   2 916   19 157   6 570  1.25  80.25  1 460  7.62 
United Kingdom   1 662   18 664   11 230  1.22  81.46  16 615  89.02  9.80 
Norway (NIS)    535   17 896   33 450  1.17  82.63  3 248  18.15 
Germany    868   17 482   20 141  1.14  83.77   123  0.70 
India   1 443   16 141   11 186  1.05  84.82   668  4.14  5.65 
Antigua and 
Barbuda   1 322   14 402   10 894  0.94  85.76  14 402  100.00  3.67 
Denmark (DIS)    534   13 846   25 929  0.90  86.66   372  2.69 
Indonesia   6 332   13 512   2 134  0.88  87.54  3 483  25.78  11.63 
United States   6 461   11 997   1 857  0.78  88.32  4 585  38.22 
Bermuda    164   11 598   70 722  0.76  89.08  9 301  80.19  6.80 
0DOD\VLD   1 449   10 895   7 519  0.71  89.79   990  9.09  1.58 
Turkey   1 360   9 535   7 011  0.62  90.41   710  7.45  9.03 
Netherlands   1 382   8 279   5 991  0.54  90.95  3 338  40.31  17.67 
France (FIS)    161   7 973   49 521  0.52  91.47  4 980  62.47  1.17 
Russian Federation   3 362   7 413   2 205  0.48  91.95  1 632  22.01  0.18 
Philippines   1 995   6 694   3 355  0.44  92.39  5 834  87.16 
Belgium    235   6 663   28 352  0.43  92.83   326  4.90 
Viet Nam   1 525   6 072   3 982  0.40  93.22   845  13.92  2.94 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines    857   5 636   6 577  0.37  93.59  5 636  100.00 
China, Taiwan 
Province of    906   4 328   4 777  0.28  93.87   147  3.40  0.43 
Thailand    850   4 249   4 999  0.28  94.15   398  9.36 
Kuwait    206   3 976   19 301  0.26  94.41   1  0.02  32.27 
7RWDOWRSƃDJV
of registration   71 846  1 448 285   20 158  94.41  94.41 1 082 977  10.65 
World total   104 305  1 534 019   14 707  100.00  100.00 1 133 417  9.91 
7DEOH 7KHƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQZLWKWKHODUJHVWUHJLVWHUHGGHDGZHLJKWWRQQDJH
(ranked by deadweight tonnage), as of 1 January 2012a
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UDWHVMRLQWO\27 The German Federal State of Hamburg 
has increased its share in Hapag-Lloyd, to avoid that 
the company would “fall victim to a global monopoly”.28
Container ships are often owned by charterers, that 
is, companies that do not themselves provide the liner 
shipping service, but rather charter their vessels out to 
the operators. Many of these charterer owners have 
EHHQXQGHUƄQDQFLDOSUHVVXUHDQGVRPHZHUHIRUFHG
to auction their ships.29 Such sales, however, will not 
withdraw the capacity from the market.
C. REGISTRATION OF SHIPS
1. Flags of registration
The year 2011 saw a further increase in the use of 
open registries. Among the tonnage delivered in 2011, 
DQHVWLPDWHG}SHUFHQWZDVUHJLVWHUHGDEURDGƄJXUH
 DQG DQ HVWLPDWHG } SHU FHQW RI WKH ZRUOG
WRQQDJH LV QRZ UHJLVWHUHG XQGHU D IRUHLJQ ƅDJ WKDW
LVYHVVHOVRSHUDWHXQGHUDGLIIHUHQWƅDJWRWKDWRIWKH
QDWLRQDOLW\RI WKHRZQHU ƄJXUH$FFRUGLQJO\ WKH
JURZWKRIPRVWRIWKHPDMRUƅDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQZDV
KLJKHUWKDQWKHJURZWKRIWKHWRWDOƅHHW7KHUHJLVWULHV
RI+RQJ.RQJ&KLQDSOXV}SHUFHQWWKH0DUVKDOO
,VODQGV SOXV } SHU FHQW DQG 6LQJDSRUH SOXV
}SHUFHQWVDZSDUWLFXODUO\ LPSUHVVLYH LQFUHDVHV LQ
WKHLUƅHHWVWDEOH}
A process of concentration is also observed in 
this maritime sector. Among the different country 
JURXSLQJVWKHPDMRURSHQUHJLVWULHVFRQWLQXHGWR
H[SDQGWKHLUPDUNHWVKDUHDPRXQWLQJWR}SHUFHQW
LQ-DQXDU\7KHRSHQUHJLVWU\ƅHHWKDVLWVKLJKHVW
VKDUHLQEXONFDUULHUV}SHUFHQW7KHVKDUHRIWKH
ƅHHWUHJLVWHUHGLQWKHGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVRI$VLDDOVR
experienced a positive growth, while all other country 
groupings saw their market share decline between 
DQGWDEOH}
2. Nationality of controlling interests
As vessel registries compete for business, the 
WUDGLWLRQDOGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQRSHQƅDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQ
DV FRPSDUHG ZLWK ƅDJV WKDW FDWHU RQO\ IRU QDWLRQDO
owners becomes increasingly blurred. As illustrated in 
ƄJXUH}WRGD\DOPRVWDOOUHJLVWULHVFDWHUIRUQDWLRQDO
and foreign owners. 
$PRQJ WKH WRS  ƅDJV RI UHJLVWUDWLRQ WKUHH FDWHU
exclusively for foreign-owned tonnage, notably 
Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and Antigua and 
40
45
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65
70
75
Pecentage of dwt  41.5  42.8  43.9  46.2  48.6  49.6  50.6  53.3  55.4  58.0  60.8  60.6  62.4  63.2  63.4  64.5  65.1  66.6  66.4  67.0  68.6  68.4  68.1  71.5 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
)LJXUH *OREDOVKDUHRIIRUHLJQƃDJJHGƃHHWa%HJLQQLQJRI\HDUƂJXUHVSHUFHQWDJHGZWt
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a (VWLPDWHEDVHGRQDYDLODEOHLQIRUPDWLRQRIFRPPHUFLDOVHDJRLQJYHVVHOVRI}*7DQGDERYH
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 GT and above. 
b 7KHUHH[LVWVQRFOHDUGHƄQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPPDMRURSHQUHJLVWULHV7KHPDMRURSHQDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJLVWULHVKDYHEHHQ
JURXSHGE\81&7$'WRLQFOXGHWKHODUJHVWƅHHWVZLWKPRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWIRUHLJQFRQWUROOHGWRQQDJHLQVHH
annex II for the list of registries). The composition of this list has been kept constant to allow for year-to-year comparisons. 
Note, however, that the market shares and the percentage of foreign controlled tonnage changes from year to year (see also 
ƄJXUHIRUDQHVWLPDWHGVKDUHRIIRUHLJQFRQWUROOHGWRQQDJHIRUWKHWRSƅDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQ
Total
ƃHHW
Oil 
tankers
Bulk
carriers
General
cargo
Container
ships
Other 
types
World total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Developed countries  15.85  18.32  10.15  18.02  22.75  22.85 
-1.11 -1.10 -0.80 0.34 -1.23 -0.96
Countries with economies
in transition  0.82  0.79  0.33  4.23  0.08  1.85 
-0.11 -0.02 -0.08 -0.30 -0.01 -0.11
Developing countries  26.41  24.86  28.14  35.17  21.17  24.58 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Of which:
    Africa  0.65  0.75  0.29  2.25  0.11  1.77 
-0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.15 0.00 -0.01
    America  1.52  1.82  0.90  4.17  0.42  3.26 
-0.12 -0.01 -0.16 0.00 0.05 -0.23
    Asia  23.87  22.00  26.60  28.05  20.60  18.39 
1.07 1.21 1.30 0.08 0.49 0.13
    Oceania  0.37  0.30  0.35  0.69  0.03  1.16 
-0.01 0.12 -0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.02
Other, unallocated  0.30  0.18  0.12  1.55  0.06  1.24 
-0.21 -0.06 -0.19 -1.06 -0.07 -0.09
7HQPDMRURSHQUHJLVWULHVb  56.62  55.85  61.27  41.04  55.93  49.48 
0.52 -0.17 0.10 0.89 0.75 1.24
Table 2.8. Distribution of dwt capacity of vessel types, by country group of registration, 2012a
(Percentage change 2012/2011 in italics)
%DUEXGD7KHƅDJVRI3DQDPD0DOWD WKH%DKDPDV
and the Isle of Man are also used by a small number 
RIQDWLRQDOVKLSRZQHUVDOWKRXJKWKHPDMRULW\RIXVHUV
RIWKHVHƅDJVDUHIRUHLJQ2WKHUƅDJVIRUZKLFKPRUH
WKDQ}SHUFHQWRIWKHWRQQDJHLVRZQHGE\IRUHLJQ
nationals are those of Cyprus, the United Kingdom, the 
Philippines, Bermuda, Hong Kong (China), Singapore 
and France (including the international registry FIS). In 
the case of the Netherlands and the United States, 
DSSUR[LPDWHO\WZRRXWRIHYHU\ƄYHRZQHUVDUHIRUHLJQ
7KHƅDJVRI%HOJLXP,QGLD'HQPDUNLQFOXGLQJ',6
Japan and Germany are almost exclusively used by 
national owners.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 and annex III combine data 
RQ WKH WRS  VKLSRZQLQJ FRXQWULHV WDEOH} 
ZLWK LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH WRS  ƅDJV RI UHJLVWUDWLRQ
WDEOH}0RVWRZQHUVIURP-DSDQDQGWKH5HSXEOLF
RI .RUHD UHJLVWHU WKHLU WRQQDJH XQGHU WKH ƅDJ RI
3DQDPDZKLOH WKHPRVW FRPPRQ ƅDJRI FKRLFH IRU
German owners is Liberia. Owners from the United 
States are most likely to register their tonnage under 
WKH ƅDJ RI WKH 0DUVKDOO ,VODQGV *UHHN VKLSRZQHUV
KDYHWKHPRVWGLYHUVHSRUWIROLRRIƅDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQ
LQFOXGLQJD ODUJHVKDUHXQGHUWKHQDWLRQDO*UHHNƅDJ
ƄJXUH  $ PLUURU LPDJH RI WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW
RZQHUtƅDJFRPELQDWLRQLVREWDLQHGLQƄJXUH})RU
the Panamanian registry, Japanese owners are the 
most important clients, while for the registry of Liberia, 
owners from Germany are most important.
D. SHIPBUILDING, DEMOLITION AND 
NEW ORDERS
1. Deliveries of newbuildings
$OPRVW}SHUFHQWRI*7GHOLYHUHGLQZDVEXLOW
by Chinese shipyards, followed by shipyards from the 
5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD}SHUFHQW-DSDQ}SHUFHQW
DQGWKH3KLOLSSLQHV}SHUFHQW$OORWKHUFRXQWULHV
RIWKHZRUOGWRJHWKHUDFFRXQWHGIRURQO\}SHUFHQW
of GT built in 2011, mostly in shipyards in Viet Nam, 
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Foreign owners
National owners
)LJXUH )RUHLJQDQGQDWLRQDORZQHUVKLSRIWKHWRSƃHHWVE\ƃDJRIUHJLVWUDWLRQ
3HUFHQWDJHVKDUHRIƃHHWGZW
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, based on data provided by IHS Fairplay.
Note: 7KHWHUPQDWLRQDORZQHUVLQWKHQDWLRQDOO\ƅDJJHGƅHHWLQFOXGHVQDWLRQDOVPDNLQJXVHRIWKHFRXQWU\pVLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJLVWU\
such as DIS (Denmark), FIS (France) and NIS (Norway). The term foreign owners includes tonnage where the nationality of 
the owner is not known.
%UD]LODQG,QGLDWDEOH}0RUHWKDQKDOIRIGU\EXON
carriers (in GT) were built by China, while the Republic
RI .RUHD KDG D } SHU FHQW VKDUH RI FRQWDLQHU DQG
other dry cargo ships. The Republic of Korea’s lead in
container ship building was further evidenced by the
beginning of the construction of the world’s largest
FRQWDLQHUVKLSWKHƄUVWRI0DHUVNpV7ULSSOH(FODVVLQD
Daewoo shipyard in the Republic of Korea in May 2012.
Deliveries during the three years following the 
HFRQRPLFDQGƄQDQFLDOFULVLVDUHDOPRVW}SHUFHQW
higher than the tonnage built and delivered during 
the three years prior to the crisis. For new orders, the 
SLFWXUHLVMXVWWKHRSSRVLWHGXULQJWKHWKUHH\HDUVSULRU
WRVKLSRZQHUVRUGHUHGRQDYHUDJH}PLOOLRQ
dwt per year, which is 2.5 times as much as the annual 
new orders placed between 2009 and 2011.30
It is, largely, the orders placed prior to 2009 that are 
the cause of the present boom in deliveries. Based on 
the current order book, deliveries in 2012 are expected 
to be even higher than last year’s historical record; 
}SHUFHQWRIFRQWDLQHUVKLSVWKDWDUHWREHGHOLYHUHG
during 2012 were ordered in 2008 or earlier.31 Only in 
ZLOOWKHGHFOLQHRIQHZRUGHUVVLQFHƄQDOO\
also lead to a decline in shipbuilding.
Chinese shipyards and Chinese traders have a 
common interest in continuing deliveries of new ships 
by Chinese shipyards. The building activities maintain 
employment in shipbuilding, and the delivered tonnage 
ensures a high supply of maritime transport capacity, 
ZKLFK LV WR WKH EHQHƄW RI LPSRUWHUV DQG H[SRUWHUV
Shipowners, on the other hand, have reportedly 
expressed concerns that a continued oversupply of 
ships could prove devastating for them.32
In the longer term, in view of the reduced numbers 
of new orders, shipyards in most countries have 
been forced to reduce their capacity.33 An exception 
is the Philippines, which is expanding its shipbuilding 
capacity; factors contributing to this expansion include 
LQYHVWPHQW E\ +DQMLQ 5HSXEOLF RI .RUHD ZKLFK LV
reportedly planning to hire 10,000 additional workers 
for its facility in Subic Bay.34 India, too, is expected to 
expand its shipbuilding and repair capacity by 2015.35
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 1000 GT and above.
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Cargo-carrying vessels of 1000 GT and above.
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
China Korea,Republic of Japan Philippines Rest of world World total
Tankers  7 613  11 370  4 764    617  24 365 
Bulk carriers  26 719  11 678  11 656  1 658  1 290  53 001 
Container and other passenger  4 291  11 794  2 921   3  2 418  21 427 
Offshore and other work vessels   986  1 008   26   0  1 032  3 052 
Total  39 609  35 850  19 367  1 661  5 357  101 845 
India China Bangladesh Pakistan Turkey Rest of world Total
Tankers  1 811   610   830  1 485   98   157  4 992 
Bulk carriers  3 215  4 367  4 527  1 240   205   114  13 668 
Container and other passenger  3 370  1 318   464   176   830   353  6 511 
Offshore and other work vessels   366   59   136   548   18   260  1 388 
Total  8 762  6 354  5 957  3 449  1 152   884  26 558 
7DEOH 'HOLYHULHVRIQHZEXLOGLQJVPDMRUYHVVHOW\SHVDQGFRXQWULHVZKHUHEXLOWWKRXVDQGVRI*7
7DEOH 7RQQDJHUHSRUWHGVROGIRUGHPROLWLRQPDMRUYHVVHOW\SHVDQGFRXQWU\RIGHPROLWLRQ
(2011, thousands of GT)
2. Demolition of ships
Most of the world’s ship recycling takes place in 
developing countries in Asia. India accounted for 
}SHU FHQWRI*7GHPROLVKHG LQ IROORZHGE\
&KLQD } SHU FHQW %DQJODGHVK } SHU FHQW
DQG3DNLVWDQ}SHUFHQW7KHUHLVDOVRDSDWWHUQRI
specialization in India, which had its highest market 
share in the scrapping of container and other dry 
cargo ships. Scrapyards of Bangladesh and China 
purchased more tonnage of bulk carriers, while those 
RI3DNLVWDQPRVWO\GHPROLVKHGWDQNHUVWDEOH}
7KHODUJHPDMRULW\RIVKLSVGHPROLVKHGLQZHUH
between 20 and 40 years of age, with a peak at the 
DJHRIƄJXUH7DQNHUVWHQGHGWREHGHPROLVKHG
at a younger age, while general cargo and container 
ships were more likely to be kept in business beyond 
the age of 30. The shorter life cycle of oil tankers is in 
part the result of increasingly stringent environmental 
regulations.
,Q HDUO\ 02/ -DSDQ UHSRUWHGO\ VROG ƄYH RLO
tankers for scrapping, including modern double-hull 
ships, “to help alleviate overcapacity in the charter 
market”.36 Rather than sell the ships to other owners, 
who would then compete for the same cargo, it was 
considered preferable to demolish the ships – even 
if the immediate earnings from such a sale would be 
lower than from a sale on the second-hand market.
,Q WRWDO WKH TXDQWLW\ RI WRQQDJH VROG IRU GHPROLWLRQ
LQFUHDVHG E\ } SHU FHQW LQ  FRPSDUHG ZLWK
2010. The increase was due to the surge in the 
VFUDSSLQJRIGU\EXONVKLSVSOXV}SHUFHQWZKLOH
some other vessel types actually saw a slight decline 
in demolitions. Many of the dry bulk ships demolished 
were effectively still seaworthy, built in the eighties and 
ZLWKYDOLGFHUWLƄFDWHVIRUVHYHUDOPRUH\HDUVRIWUDGLQJ
+RZHYHU DV QHZ WRQQDJH LV PRUH HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQW
given the extremely low charter rates, many owners 
VWLOOIRXQGLWPRUHSURƄWDEOHWRVHOOIRUVFUDSLQVWHDGRI
FRQWLQXLQJ WUDGLQJDWD ƄQDQFLDO ORVV7KLVHFRQRPLF
context, combined with renewed demand from 
scrapyards in Bangladesh, has led to a further surge 
in ship recycling in early 2012. In May 2012, a 13-year-
old container ship was sold for demolition, making it 
the youngest merchant vessel to be demolished since 
the economic crisis in 2008.37
3. Tonnage on order
6LQFH WKHHFRQRPLFDQGƄQDQFLDOFULVLVRIDQG
2009, far fewer new orders have been placed than 
tonnage delivered by the world’s shipyards. This has 
KHOSHGWRUHGXFHVLJQLƄFDQWO\WKHH[LVWLQJRUGHUERRN
ƄJXUHDQGWDEOH}6LQFH LWVSHDN LQDXWXPQ
WKHWRWDORUGHUERRNKDVGHFUHDVHGE\}SHU
cent. The reduction in the order book for tankers has 
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Figure 2.8. Tonnage reported sold for demolition in 2011, by age (Years and dwt)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
been even more impressive – at the end of 2011 
WDQNHUWRQQDJHRQRUGHUKDGGHFOLQHGE\}SHUFHQW
compared with three years earlier. In terms of dwt, 
more than half of the existing order book is for dry 
bulk carriers.
&RPSDUHG ZLWK WKH H[LVWLQJ ƅHHW WDEOH}  WKH
order book for dry bulk carriers also continues to be 
WKH ODUJHVW DPRXQWLQJ WRDOPRVW}SHUFHQWRI WKH
tonnage existing in January 2012. Container ships on 
RUGHUDUHDOPRVW}SHUFHQWRIWKHFXUUHQWƅHHWDQG
RLOWDQNHUVXQGHU}SHUFHQW$VDQH[FHSWLRQDPRQJ
WKHPDMRUYHVVHO W\SHV IRU WKHƄUVW WLPHVLQFH
the order book for container ships actually increased 
between the end of 2010 and the end of 2011.
Among specialized vessels, the most important 
LQFUHDVHZDVUHFRUGHGIRUOLTXHƄHGQDWXUDOJDV/1*
tankers, for which the current order book now stands 
DWPRUH WKDQ}SHU FHQW RI WKH H[LVWLQJ ƅHHW$V D
response to the expected further surge in demand 
for LNG transport following opposition to the use 
of nuclear energy in Japan and other countries (this 
opposition being expected to increase the use of 
LNG), a historically high number of new orders for LNG 
carriers was placed in 2011. Several new orders are 
of the tri-fuel design, enabling the ship to run on either 
fuel oil, diesel, or natural gas.38 Another important 
increase was recorded for offshore vessels, including 
orders placed for drilling and support ships to serve 
new explorations in Brazil and West Africa.
New orders for dry cargo ships (bulk and containers) in 
2011 were about as high as in 2006, that is, during the 
ERRP\HDUVEHIRUHWKHƄQDQFLDODQGHFRQRPLFFULVLV
while new orders for tankers were among the lowest 
in recent history.39 $PRQJFRQWDLQHUVKLSVWKHPDMRULW\
of new orders are for ships above 10,000 TEU; these 
so-called mega-ships will account for more than half 
RIWKHFRQWDLQHUƅHHWLQ7(8E\40
Most of the world’s shipbuilding takes place in
$VLD &KLQD LV HVWLPDWHG WR KROG DERXW } SHU
cent of the current order book, followed by the
5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD}SHUFHQWDQG-DSDQ}SHU
cent).41 However, considering new orders placed in
2011, builders in the Republic of Korea generated
more new business during the year than Chinese
shipyards. Orders at Chinese shipyards tended to
be largely for dry bulk ships, while the Republic of
Korea has a larger share in higher value container
and specialized ships.
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Figure 2.9. World tonnage on order, 2000–2011a (Thousands of dwt)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by IHS Fairplay.
a Seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 GT and above.
4. Tonnage utilization
Tonnage reported as idle
%\WKHHQGRIOHVVWKDQ}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOG
PHUFKDQWƅHHWRIWDQNHUVGU\EXONDQGJHQHUDOFDUJR
carriers was reported as idle, which is less than half of 
WKHLGOHVKDUHDWWKHHQGRIWDEOH}$PRQJ
the different vessel types, the highest idle shares were 
UHSRUWHGIRU/1*WDQNHUV}SHUFHQWDQGIRUWKHUR
URƅHHW}SHUFHQWWDEOH}
:KLOHWKHUHLVQRDJUHHGGHƄQLWLRQRIWKHWHUPLGOHIRUWKH
SXUSRVHVRIWKLVUHSRUWWKHLGOHƅHHWLQFOXGHVVKLSVWKDW
are reported as laid up. However, not being reported
as laid up does not necessarily imply that the ship is at
present transporting cargo. For example, the available
tanker capacity waiting and ready to take cargo in the
RLOH[SRUWLQJ3HUVLDQ*XOIUHJLRQZDVUHSRUWHGO\}SHU
cent higher than the available cargo in early 2012.42
The share of idle tonnage in container shipping is not 
TXLWHFRPSDUDEOHZLWKWKHLGOHEXONDQGJHQHUDOFDUJR
ƅHHW:KLOH WDQNHUV EXON FDUULHUV DQGJHQHUDO FDUJR
ships in the tramp business may be waiting for new 
cargo without immediately being considered “idle”, 
a containership that is not participating in a regular 
liner service is reported as idle. In early 2012, about 
}SHUFHQWRIWKHFRQWDLQHUVKLSƅHHWZDVWKXVLQDFWLYH
including six ships larger than 10,000 TEU.
Slow steaming in container shipping
Since 2008, container shipping companies have
systematically reduced the speed of their services by
introducing slow steaming. This has allowed them to
absorb additional vessel capacity, thus reducing the
RYHUVXSSO\RIWRQQDJH,WKDVDOVRKHOSHGWRVLJQLƄFDQWO\
reduce fuel consumption. When initially introduced, slow
steaming did not meet much opposition from shippers,
because during the economic downturn many importers
were not particularly concerned about replenishing their
LQYHQWRULHV$WSUHVHQWDQHVWLPDWHG}SHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDO
FRQWDLQHUƅHHWFDSDFLW\LVDEVRUEHGE\VORZVWHDPLQJ43
Estimates for the average speed of shipping lines point 
to 15 to 20 knots for different levels of slow steaming. 
This is still faster than the usual sailing speeds for dry 
DQGOLTXLGEXONVKLSVZKLFKWHQGWREHDURXQGWR
15 knots. Depending on distance and speed, cost 
VDYLQJVFDQDPRXQWWREHWZHHQDQG}SHUFHQWRI
vessel operating costs.44
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Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, various issues.
a Tankers and dry bulk carriers of 10 000 dwt and above, and conventional general cargo vessels of 5,000 dwt and above.
b 7KHLGOHƅHHWLVGHƄQHGDVWRQQDJHWKDWLVUHSRUWHGDVODLGXS
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data from Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, various issues.
a This table excludes tankers and dry bulk carriers of less than 10 000 dwt and conventional general cargo vessels of less 
WKDQ}GZW
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0LOOLRQVRIGZW
0HUFKDQWƃHHWWKUHHPDLQ
vessel typesa  697.9  773.9  830.7  876.2  930.3  1,023.3  1,135.4 
,GOHƃHHWb  7.2  10.1  12.1  19.0  12.0  14.1  10.7 
$FWLYHƃHHW  690.7  763.7  818.6  857.2  918.3  1,009.1  1,124.7 
,GOHƃHHWDVSHUFHQWDJH
RIPHUFKDQWƃHHW  1.0  1.3  1.5  2.2  1.3  1.4  0.9 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
:RUOGWDQNHUƃHHWGZW     414.04   447.64 
,GOHWDQNHUƃHHWGZW  4.5  6.1  7.8  14.35  8.51  10.48  6.96 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQWDQNHUƃHHW  1.4  1.7  2.0  3.47  1.96  2.34  1.47 
:RUOGGU\EXONƃHHWGZW     417.62  452.52  522.52  608.60 
,GOHGU\EXONƃHHWGZW  2.0  3.4  3.6  3.68  2.64  2.86  2.87 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQGU\EXONƃHHW  0.6  0.9  0.9  0.88  0.58  0.55  0.47 
:RUOGFRQYHQWLRQDOJHQHUDOFDUJRƃHHWGZW  45.0  44.7   44.54    52.90 
,GOHFRQYHQWLRQDOJHQHUDOFDUJRƃHHWGZW  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.97  0.83  0.78  0.85 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQJHQHUDOFDUJRƃHHW  1.6  1.4  1.6  2.18  1.95  1.47  1.61 
:RUOGURURƃHHWGZW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.    10.28  9.99 
,GOHURURƃHHWGZW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.89  0.73  0.33  0.17 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQURURƃHHW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.83  6.68  3.21  1.70 
:RUOGYHKLFOHFDUULHUƃHHWGZW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  11.27  11.20  11.48  12.42 
,GOH9HKLFOHFDUULHUƃHHWGZW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.24  0.55  0.13  0.06 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQYHKLFOHFDUULHUƃHHW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2.13  4.91  1.13  0.48 
:RUOG/1*FDUULHUƃHHWP)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.   46.90  51.15 
,GOH/1*FDUULHUƃHHWP  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.87  1.29  1.53  0.98 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQ/1*ƃHHW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13.21  2.75  2.99  1.91 
:RUOG/LTXHƂHGSHWROHXPJDV/3*ƃHHWP)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  11.56  18.50  19.42  19.44 
,GOH/3*FDUULHUƃHHWP3)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.94  0.10  0.13  0.11 
6KDUHRILGOHƃHHWLQ/1*ƃHHW  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  8.13  0.54  0.67  0.57 
7DEOH 7RQQDJHUHSRUWHGDVLGOHt(QGRI\HDUƂJXUHV
7DEOH $QDO\VLVRILGOHWRQQDJHE\PDLQW\SHRIYHVVHOta0LOOLRQVRIGZWRUP)
The inventory cost (capital, depreciation) of the goods 
that spend more time en route may well be higher than 
the cost savings made by the carriers. Shippers, who 
have to bear the inventory costs, have accordingly 
complained about this situation. Nevertheless, 
shippers have also realized that slow steaming may 
improve service reliability, and in the end may not be 
too concerned about the speed of delivery.45
A further reduction of service speed would not make 
technological or economic sense – engines would 
suffer, and the savings made in fuel reduction would 
be outweighed by additional operating costs resulting 
from the need to deploy additional ships. Returning to 
the previous higher speeds appears unlikely, too, as 
businesses have now adapted to the inventory held 
on the ships, and in view of the continuing oversupply 
of tonnage, the carriers have no room to re-absorb 
additional capacity should it be released from 
slow steaming. It appears that the current speeds 
may become the norm, with high speeding being 
considered as a form of premium service.
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A. FREIGHT RATES
This section presents an analysis of maritime freight 
rate developments for containers, dry bulk and 
OLTXLG EXON VKLSSLQJ ,W KLJKOLJKWV VLJQLƄFDQW HYHQWV
OHDGLQJ WRPDMRUSULFH ƅXFWXDWLRQVGLVFXVVHV UHFHQW
industry trends and gives a selective outlook on future 
developments of freight markets.
1. Container freight rates
Having experienced one of the steepest freight 
rate cuts in history in 2008, the recovery remains 
sluggish in 2011. Current freight rates are still far from 
reaching pre-crisis levels, having experienced another 
downturn in the second half of 2011 after a temporary 
resurgence. Time charter rates for container ships 
have declined from May to December 2011 for most 
VKLSW\SHVUHDFKLQJD ORVVRI}SHUFHQWZLWKLQWKH
t IRRW HTXLYDOHQW XQLWV 7(8V FODVV
WDEOH}7KLVLVUHƅHFWHGE\WKH1HZ&RQ7H[LQGH[
a condensed container freight rate indicator covering 
a wide range of ship sizes, which experienced a dip of 
DOPRVW}SHUFHQWRILWVYDOXHIURP0D\WR'HFHPEHU
ƄJXUH}1
An overstretched container cargo market on the 
supply side precipitated the low freight rate levels in 
2011. While the demand is currently still recovering 
IURPWKHVHDERUQHWUDGHFROODSVHGXULQJWKHƄQDQFLDO
crisis, the growth rates of the global container carrier 
FDSDFLW\ KDYH UHPDLQHG UHODWLYHO\ VWDEOH ƄJXUH} 
due in part to shipowners not being able to withdraw 
from their buying contracts. In addition, ship operators 
suffer from substantial bunkering price increases that 
DUHQRWUHƅHFWHGLQGHYHORSPHQWVLQIUHLJKWUDWHV
As a result, the industry has experienced aggressive 
pricing policies of boxship operators competing for 
market shares.2 Many box carriers are still operating 
DWDORVVLQFLWLQJWKHPWRFXOOFDSDFLW\RQXQSURƄWDEOH
trade routes and/or raise prices for shippers. An 
H[DPSOH LV +DQMLQ ZKLFK DQQRXQFHG IUHLJKW SULFH
increases of between $200 and $400 on routes 
linking Asia to Northern Europe and Western Africa. 
Companies such as CMA CGM, CKYH and OOCL 
cut their capacity on the transatlantic lanes.3 These 
measures did not, however, lead to a substantial 
freight rate increase in the overall container shipping 
market in 2011. It is estimated that the total loss to the 
LQGXVWU\ZLOOUHDFK}ELOOLRQWKLV\HDU4
High-volume routes, in particular, are experiencing an 
increasing competition. Operators place their largest 
ships in these networks and aim at offering more regular 
services. As a result, shipping lines build alliances to 
share costs, bundle capacity and streamline their 
operations. Examples of this industry trend include the 
partnership of MSC and CMA CGM, or the merging 
of Asia–Europe services between the Grand Alliance 
(Hapag-Lloyd, NYK and OOCL) and the New World 
Alliance (HMM, APL and MOL).5 Individual shipping 
OLQHVZLWKVPDOOHUYHVVHOVZLOOƄQGLWLQFUHDVLQJO\GLIƄFXOW
to remain competitive on the world’s busiest shipping 
lanes. Furthermore, with a growth rate predicted at 
}SHUFHQWIRUWKHDERYH7(8VƅHHW LQ
large-scale capacity is continuing to enter this market 
segment.6
Container ship operators entering the reefer
business
The decline in freight rates in the container shipping 
business increasingly puts competitive pressures 
on specialized reefers. Refrigerated cargo is used 
E\ FRQWDLQHU VKLS RSHUDWRUV DV DQ RSSRUWXQLW\ WR ƄOO
some of the idle capacity in the business. This trend 
LVDOVRUHƅHFWHGLQWKHVKLSEX\HUVpRUGHUERRNZKLFK
contains an increasing share of vessels with large 
reefer capacity (see also chapter 2).7
Industry-leader reefers such as Star Reefers have 
described 2011, as for 2010, as one of the poorest 
years in the industry’s history, companies being hit 
hard by the low freight rates and increased competition 
from container ship operators.8 The spot market 
rates for larger reefer ships reached an average of 43 
cents per cubic feet per 30 days in 2011, following 
42 cents in 2010.9 The near collapse of banana 
exports from Ecuador and Central America since April 
2011 brought additional stress to reefer freight rates. 
Although a strong growth in demand for the transport 
of perishable goods is being predicted, the shipping 
industry will most likely also experience an ongoing 
cargo shift from specialized reefers to container 
ships. International container lines are constantly 
introducing new regular services for the transportation 
RISHULVKDEOHJRRGVFRQQHFWLQJWKHPDMRUSURGXFWLRQ
centres with the largest consumer markets, such as 
Europe and North America. According to Drewry, in 
 DERXW } SHU FHQW RI SHULVKDEOH UHHIHU JRRGV
will be transported by container ships, these providing 
VRPH}SHU FHQW RI WKH HQWLUH UHHIHUPDUNHW FDUJR
capacity.10
7KLV LQGXVWU\ WUHQG LV DOVR UHƅHFWHG LQ WKH VWUXFWXUH
RI WKH UHHIHU ƅHHW DQG WKH orderbook for specialized 
UHHIHUYHVVHOV7KHUHHIHUƅHHWLVFRPSDUDEO\ROGZLWK
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)LJXUH} 1HZ&RQ7H[t,QGH[EDVH2FWREHUSRLQWV
)LJXUH *URZWKRIGHPDQGDQGVXSSO\LQFRQWDLQHUVKLSSLQJt$QQXDOJURZWKUDWHV
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, using the New ConTex index produced by the Hamburg Shipbrokers’ Association. 
See http://www.vhss.de.
Note: 1HZ&RQ7H[LVDFRQWDLQHUVKLSWLPHFKDUWHUDVVHVVPHQWLQGH[FDOFXODWHGDVDQHTXLYDOHQWZHLJKWRISHUFHQWDJHFKDQJH
from six ConTex assessments, including the following ship sizes: 1,100, 1,700, 2,500, 2,700, 3,500 and 4,250 TEUs.
Source: Compiled by UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data from Clarkson Container Intelligence Monthly, various issues.
Note: 6XSSO\ GDWD UHIHUV WR WRWDO FRQWDLQHUFDUU\LQJ ƅHHW FDSDFLW\ LQFOXGLQJ PXOWLSXUSRVH DQG RWKHU YHVVHOV ZLWK VRPH
FRQWDLQHUFDUU\LQJFDSDFLW\'HPDQGJURZWKEDVHGRQ}PLOOLRQ7(8OLIWV7KHGDWDIRUDUHIRUHFDVWƄJXUHV
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7DEOH &RQWDLQHUVKLSWLPHFKDUWHUUDWHV'ROODUVSHUWRQVORWSHUGD\
Ship type and sailing speed
(TEUs)
Yearly averages
2002  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gearless
200–299 (min 14 kn) 16.9 19.6 25.0 31.7 26.7 27.2 26.0 12.5 12.4 12.4
300–500 (min 15 kn) 15.1 17.5 21.7 28.3 21.7 22.3 20.0 8.8 9.9 12.8
Geared/gearless
2 000–2 299 (min 22 kn) 4.9 9.8 13.8 16.4 10.5 11.7 10.0 2.7 4.8 6.3
2 300–3 400 (min 22.5 kn) 6.0 9.3 13.2 13.0 10.2 10.7 10.7 4.9 4.7 6.2
Geared
200–299 (min 14 kn) 17.0 18.9 27.0 35.4 28.0 29.8 32.1 16.7 18.3 22.1
300–500 (min 15 kn) 13.4 15.6 22.2 28.8 22.0 21.3 21.4 9.8 11.7 15.4
tPLQNQ 9.3 12.3 19.6 23.7 16.6 16.1 15.6 6.6 8.4 11.2
700–999 (min 18 kn) 9.1 12.1 18.4 22.0 16.7 16.9 15.4 6.0 8.5 11.5
800–999 (min 18 kn) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.9 7.8 10.8
1 000–1 260 (min 18 kn) 6.9 11.6 19.1 22.6 14.3 13.7 12.2 4.0 5.9 8.7
1 261–1 350 (min 19 kn) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.7 4.9 8.1
1 600–1 999 (min 20 kn) 5.7 10.0 16.1 15.8 11.8 12.8 10.8 3.5 5.0 6.8
Ship type and 
sailing speed
(TEUs)
0RQWKO\DYHUDJHVIRU
0RQWKO\
averages
for 2012
Jan Feb 0DU Apr 0D\ Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb
Gearless
200–299
(min 14 kn) 13.3 14.4 14.9 15.6 15.7 13.8 15.4 15.5 14.3 15.1 12.6 14.4 13.1 14.4
300–500
(min 15 kn) 11.3 12.3 13.4 14.4 14.4 14.1 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.4 11.9 10.3 9.8 12.3
Geared/
gearless
2 000–2 299 
(min 22 kn) 6.6 7.3 7.4 8.2 7.5 7.8 6.6 6.3 5.1 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.4 7.3
2 300–3 400 
(min 22.5 kn) 7.6 8.5 9.1 8.6 8.7 8.1 6.7 5.1 3.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0
Geared
200–299
(min 14 kn) 22.1 22.9 22.5 22.5 27.2 24.7 23.0 22.1 20.5 19.5 19.1 19.1 13.5 22.9
300–500
(min 15 kn) 17.2 16.1 17.2 15.5 15.3 18.2 17.1 15.4 14.6 13.2 13.6 11.4 12.3 16.1
600–799 (min 
NQ 10.4 12.9 12.6 12.4 13.4 12.7 11.7 11.3 10.6 9.8 8.9 7.9 7.4 12.9
700–999
(min 18 kn) 11.9 12.7 13.4 13.8 13.5 13.3 12.3 11.0 10.4 9.5 8.7 7.8 7.7 12.7
800–999
(min 18 kn) 10.3 12.7 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.1 11.8 10.8 9.8 9.0 8.7 7.1 7.3 12.7
1 000–1 260 
(min 18 kn) 7.5 8.7 9.9 10.1 10.4 10.3 9.6 8.9 8.4 7.9 6.9 6.2 6.3 8.7
1 261–1 350 
(min 19 kn) 7.6 8.0 8.9 9.4 9.5 9.6 8.9 8.2 7.8 7.3 6.1 5.4 5.2
1 600–1 999 
(min 20 kn) 6.7 7.5 7.9 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.3 6.9 6.2 5.7 4.8 4.4 4.1 7.5
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat based on data from Shipping Statistics and Market Review, various issues from 
2002–2012, produced by the Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics, Bremen, Germany. See also www.isl.org.
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}SHUFHQWRIWKHWRQQDJHKDYLQJRSHUDWHGIRUPRUH
WKHQ\HDUVDQGRQO\}SHUFHQWRIWKHVKLSVZLWKDQ
operating age below six years.11 Despite this fact, most 
carriers were not willing to invest in modern vessels 
WR XSJUDGH WKHLU DJHLQJ ƅHHWV DQG WKH RUGHUERRN
GURSSHGWR]HURLQ6HSWHPEHUIRUWKHƄUVWWLPH
In addition, an annual average of 36 reefer ships was 
sent for scrapping between 2008 and 2010.12
2. Tanker freight rates
The tanker market, which encompasses the 
transportation of crude oil and petroleum products, 
represents approximately one third of the world 
seaborne trade volume.
Freight rates for different ship sizes
)LJXUH} YLVXDOL]HV WDQNHU IUHLJKW UDWHV IRU GLIIHUHQW
YHVVHO VL]HV LQGROODUVSHU}GZWFDSDFLW\7KH
UHVXOWVFRQƄUPWKHVLJQLƄFDQFHRIHFRQRPLHVRIVFDOH
in the tanker business, with substantial price gaps 
EHWZHHQ WKH ODUJHVW }GZW DQG WKH VPDOOHVW
}GZWVKLSFDWHJRU\
The comparison of oil prices and tanker market freight 
UDWHV LQ WKH VDPH ƄJXUH} GHPRQVWUDWHV WKDW IUHLJKW
rates and oil prices trend in similar patterns.13 This is 
because vessel bunkering contributes a large share 
to the total ship operating costs (see also the vessel 
RSHUDWLQJ FRVW VSOLW LQ ƄJXUH}  ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH
world demand for oil and maritime transport services 
are both strongly linked to overall economic growth. 
During times of economic growth, the demand 
for maritime transport services and oil increases 
substantially, possibly outweighing, in parallel, their 
demand and supply balance and thus leading to 
price increases. In the past, seaborne trade has 
grown approximately two times faster than the world’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) (see also chapter 1). 
Oil demand increases during periods of economic 
SURVSHULW\ QRW RQO\ EHFDXVH LW LV D PDMRU VRXUFH RI
energy for the transport of goods, but also because it 
is used in some 70,000 manufactured products, such 
as synthetic fabrics, plastics and medicines.
From 2009 onwards, however, a divergence between 
the trends of oil price and freight rates can be 
observed. While the crude oil price has recovered to 
)LJXUH 'DLO\WDQNHUWLPHFKDUWHUUDWHLQGROODUVSHU}GZWFDSDFLW\IRUYDULRXVYHVVHOVL]HV
t'ROODUVSHUGD\SHU}GZW
Source: Compiled by UNCTAD secretariat based on information from Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network. Oil price data from 
United States of America Energy Information Administration, available at http://205.254.135.7/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_w.htm.
Note: 7KH[D[LVUHSUHVHQWVZHHNO\ƄJXUHV7KH\D[LVUHSUHVHQWVGDLO\WLPHFKDUWHUUDWHLQGROODUVSHU}GZWFDSDFLW\IRU
a modern tanker. Oil price is indexed with index base 150 in May 2001. Ship sizes are expressed in deadweight capacity 
LQWKRXVDQGVRI}GZW
Oil price
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pre-crisis levels, tanker freight rates have not shown 
substantial signs of recovery. On the contrary, freight 
rates on most routes can be seen to have decreased 
ZKHQFRPSDULQJWKHƄJXUHV IURPWKHEHJLQQLQJZLWK
WKRVHDWWKHHQGRIWDEOH}7DQNHUFDSDFLW\
RYHUVXSSO\FDQEHLGHQWLƄHGDVRQHRIWKHPDLQIDFWRUV
behind these discrepancies.
Freight rates on different trade routes
Freight rates vary on different trade routes depending 
RQ WKHLU VSHFLƄF GHPDQG DQG VXSSO\ VWUXFWXUH
WDEOH}  LOOXVWUDWHV DYHUDJH IUHLJKW UDWHV TXDQWLƄHG
LQ :RUOGVFDOH D XQLƄHG PHDVXUH IRU HVWDEOLVKLQJ
VSRW UDWHVRQPDMRU WDQNHU URXWHV IRU YDULRXVYHVVHO
sizes. Developments on some of these routes will be 
presented in this section.
$OPRVW}PLOOLRQEDUUHOVRIRLODFFRXQWLQJIRU}SHU
cent of seaborne petroleum trade, were transported 
through the Persian Gulf in 2011, making it the world’s 
busiest shipping strait for this product.14 In terms of 
YR\DJHV}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGpVYHU\ODUJH
crude carrier (VLCC) trips have passed through the 
Persian Gulf.15 Transport restrictions due to the 
oil embargo on the Islamic Republic of Iran could, 
therefore, heavily affect the world tanker shipping 
market as a whole. The cut in transport demand for 
oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran was expected 
to trigger freight rate drops. However, prices on the 
Persian Gulf–Europe route, as an example, rose from 
37 to 44 on the Worldscale from February to April 
 WDEOH}  7KLV LV EHFDXVH 6DXGL $UDELD KDV
ramped up oil production to compensate for the drop 
in exports from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Other oil 
SURGXFHUV ƄOOLQJ WKH VXSSO\JDSDUH ORFDWHG LQ:HVW
Africa, the Caribbean and the North Sea region. The 
routes from these sources to Asia are much longer 
than those from the Persian Gulf, thus increasing 
tanker ton miles and capacity utilization rates.16 With 
oil-consuming countries such as the United States and 
China building up their energy reservoirs, additional 
vessels have been taken out of the spot market.17
Freight rates on routes from West Africa were exposed 
to volatilities in 2011, with drops in the West Africa–
North-West Europe route from 107 on the Worldscale 
in March to 69 in August. Increasing demand for cargo 
and resistance of Suezmax tanker owners to accept 
7DEOH 'DLO\WLPHFKDUWHUUDWHVDQGWDQNHULQGLFHVtPRQWKO\ƂJXUHV
2011
'DLO\WDQNHUWLPHFKDUWHUUDWHLQPRQWKO\DYHUDJH ExchangeBaltic Tanker
 150 110 74 48 Dirty Index Clean Index
January  30 250  24 375  17 875  14 750  13 000  842  635
February  29 500  21 750  16 875  14 750  13 000  660  642
March  30 000  21 000  16 125  15 188  13 188  965  749
April  30 000  21 000  16 000  15 800  13 700  927  836
May  27 250  21 500  15 812  15 562  14 250  822  882
June  26 125  21 000  15 375  15 500  14 250  750  706
July  25 800  18 600  15 450  15 450  14 150  746  690
August  22 125  17 000  15 312  14 875  13 875  720  682
September  21 000  17 700  15 050  14 650  13 850  677  679
October  19 750  18 250  14 500  14 000  13 688  704  721
November  19 562  17 750  13 938  13 438  13 250  763  721
December  19 000  16 300  13 600  13 000  13 650  784  725
Average 2011  25 030  19 685  15 493  14 747  13 654  780  722
January  19 250  16 000  13 625  13 000  14 000  783  762
February  20 375  16 000  13 938  13 000  14 250  803  645
March  20 700  16 400  13 650  13 000  14 250  781  711
April  22 750  17 000  13 750  12 500  14 250  819  645
Source: Daily time charter rates expressed as monthly averages are based on information from Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network. 
7KHLQGLFHVDUHSURGXFHGE\WKH%DOWLF([FKDQJHWKHƄJXUHVUHSUHVHQWWKHYDOXHDWWKHƄUVWZRUNLQJGDWHRIHDFKPRQWK
Note: 7KHQXPEHUVLQWKHVHFRQGURZFROXPQVtUHIHUWRYHVVHOVL]HH[SUHVVHGLQWKRXVDQGVRI}GZW
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lower freight rates pushed price levels up again to 89 
on the Worldscale in October.18 While piracy along 
the Gulf of Guinea was almost non-existent about 10 
years ago, it has become an issue of growing concern, 
leading to insurance premium increases for vessels 
operating in the region.19 Expenses for rerouting to 
avoid high-risk piracy areas and investment in security 
HTXLSPHQW DUH DGGLWLRQDO FRVW GULYHUV FDXVHG E\
piracy. Ships also navigate at higher speeds to avoid 
KLMDFNLQJVZKLFKLQFUHDVHVIXHOFRVWV8SWRQR
VKLSKDVEHHQVXFFHVVIXOO\KLMDFNHGWKDWRSHUDWHGDW
18 knots or higher.20 The direct costs of piracy for the 
maritime industry were estimated to have reached a 
YDOXHRIEHWZHHQ}ELOOLRQDQG}ELOOLRQLQ21
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) reported 
46 piracy incidents in 7 countries in 2010 along the 
Gulf of Guinea. This number expanded to 64 incidents 
in 9 countries in 2011.22
Freight rates on export routes from the Mediterranean 
dropped in mid-2011 compared with the previous 
year. Price increases during 2011 were mostly 
caused by exceptional events and do not imply a 
long-term change in the market. The freight-level 
MXPSV LQ0DUFK ZHUHPRVWO\ FDXVHG E\ WKH
unrest and military operations in Libya that pushed 
buyers to ship their cargo out of the country. Due 
to the war, oil-extraction volumes dropped in Libya 
IURP }PLOOLRQ EDUUHOV WR DURXQG  WKRXVDQG
barrels per day. This dragged the freight rates 
GRZQDJDLQ DQG UHGXFHG WKH OLNHOLKRRGRI DTXLFN
recovery.23 The rally in freight rates in October was 
triggered by congestions on the Bosporus Strait, 
which is one of the maritime choke points for oil 
shipments. These were caused by bad weather 
conditions, which increased tanker freight prices 
across the Mediterranean and on routes out of West 
$IULFD7KUHH}PLOOLRQEDUUHOVRIRLOSDVVWKURXJKWKLV
bottleneck on Suezmax tankers every day.24
7KHDQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKHFORVXUHRIWKHRLOUHƄQHU\RQ
Saint Croix, one of the United States Virgin Islands, 
LQ-DQXDU\RQHRIWKHZRUOGpVODUJHVWUHƄQHULHV
caused short-term freight rate drops on the route 
linking the Caribbean to the United States Atlantic 
Coast. The closure has been caused by the economic 
VORZGRZQ GXULQJ WKH ƄQDQFLDO FULVLV DQG D JURZLQJ
FRPSHWLWLRQ IURP QHZEXLOG RLOUHƄQLQJ FDSDFLW\ LQ
emerging markets.25 The facility will now be used as a 
WUDQVVKLSPHQWKXE5HƄQHGRLOIRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
market will have to be imported from more distant 
sources to compensate for the capacity loss. This can 
positively affect product tanker freight rates on long-
KDXO YR\DJHV IURP UHƄQHULHV LQ WKH0LGGOH (DVW DQG
Asia. The added ton-miles may also increase freight 
rates within the product tanker market as a whole.26
Tanker market outlook
Tankers connect oil producing countries with energy 
consumers. A change in the geographical structure of oil 
GHPDQGDQGVXSSO\ZLOOWKHUHIRUHFDXVHPRGLƄFDWLRQV
within the global tanker route network. British 
3HWUROHXP %3 SUHGLFWV OLTXLGPDUNHW GHYHORSPHQWV
XQWLO WKH \HDU  ƄJXUH}  DQG LW IRUHFDVWV DQ
ongoing oil-demand shift from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
FRXQWULHVWR$VLDZLWK&KLQDFRQWULEXWLQJ}SHUFHQW
to the oil consumption growth until 2030. The BP 
analysis foresees that productions from the Middle 
East, and South and Central America together will add 
DQRWKHU}SHUFHQWWRWKHGHPDQGH[SDQVLRQ2QWKH
production side, the Middle East will supply more than 
}SHUFHQWRI WKHJURZWK LQRLOSURGXFWLRQFDSDFLW\
LQFOXGLQJ ODUJH VKDUHV IURP ,UDT DQG 6DXGL $UDELD
$QRWKHU}SHUFHQWRI WKHSURMHFWHGJURZWKZLOOEH
delivered by countries from North and South America, 
ZLWKVLJQLƄFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQVIURP%UD]LO
An ongoing volume expansion on the routes linking 
the traditional production centres around the Persian 
*XOIWRPDMRU$VLDQPDUNHWVZLOOEHWKHFRQVHTXHQFH
if these predictions materialize. At the other end, 
we will observe a sluggish capacity development 
on tanker routes to most developed economies. 
British Petroleum have predicted a balanced growth 
of oil supply and demand in Africa – accordingly the 
continent’s role as a world energy supplier will not 
VLJQLƄFDQWO\LQFUHDVH
Developments in tanker freight rates will also depend 
heavily on the willingness of oil producing and buying 
FRXQWULHV WR LQYHVW LQ WKHLU WDQNHU ƅHHWV &KLQD IRU
example, has announced that it aims to ship more of 
its seaborne oil imports with a domestically owned 
ƅHHW7KLVVWUDWHJLFJRDOLVDOVRUHƅHFWHGLQWKHJURZWK
RI WKH FRXQWU\pV 9/&& ƅHHW ZKLFK KDV LQFUHDVHG
from 11 vessels in 2006 to 38 in 2011. Competitive 
pressures have driven existing tanker operators out of 
the business. European shipowners have halved their 
PDUNHW VKDUH WR DURXQG } SHU FHQW RQ WKH0LGGOH
East–China lane from 2006 to 2011, losing capacity 
to their Chinese competitors.27 If industry policies of 
emerging economies increasingly focus on expanding 
their market shares in oil transportation, this will add 
more capacity to the current oversupply and keep 
freight rates at low levels. McQuilling predicts that 
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tanker freight rates will continue to be under pressure, 
estimating a total delivery of 767 tankers over the next 
ƄYH \HDUV 6XUSOXV LQFUHDVHV DUH JRLQJ WR EH PRUH
pronounced among larger ship sizes with a forecasted 
number of 62 VLCCs and 43 Suezmax entering the 
market in 2012.28
3. Dry bulk freight rates
7KH GU\ EXON VKLSSLQJPDUNHW FDQ EH FODVVLƄHG LQWR
WKHWZRFDWHJRULHVPDMRUEXONDQGPLQRUEXON0DMRU
bulk includes iron ore, coal and grain, typically 
transported by large Capesize and Panamax vessels. 
They contribute about two thirds of the world dry bulk 
trade. Minor bulks include fertilizers, steel products, 
construction materials such as cement and aluminium, 
non-grain agricultural products, forest products and 
sundry minerals (for example, phosphate rock), these 
adding another third to the total dry bulk seaborne 
trade. These goods are most commonly shipped by 
the smaller Handymax and Handysize vessels.29
The increasing vessel utilization rate reinforced hopes 
of a market recovery in mid-2011. This indicator 
UHDFKHG } SHU FHQW LQ $XJXVW  PDNLQJ WKH
GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ D VOXJJLVK DQG D ƄUP PDUNHW
environment.30 )UHLJKWUDWH LQFUHDVHV ZHUH UHƅHFWHG
in the development of the Baltic Exchange Dry Index 
ƄJXUH}  7KH LQGH[ SLFNHG XS LQ $XJXVW 
from 1,256 points to 2,173 points in October. One 
of several factors behind the rally was the increasing 
Asian demand for iron ore and coal.31 Japan, for 
example, increased its imports of these raw materials 
for reconstruction of areas affected by destruction as 
D UHVXOW RI WKH WVXQDPL DQG HDUWKTXDNH32 However, 
this has been a short-lived trend. Since October a 
continuous decrease of the index can be observed, 
persisting until February 2012 where it reached its 
bottom value of 647 points.
%HFDXVH RI WKH XQLTXH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI HDFK
individual ship class, large gaps in freight rates occur 
between the different dry bulk vessel segments. Small 
dry bulk carriers performed better than their larger 
FRXQWHUSDUWV ƄJXUH}  +HQFH WKH QHHG LQ WKLV
section, to look at the individual developments within 
the four segments: Handysize, Supramax, Panamax 
and Capesize.
)LJXUH} *URZWKLQOLTXLGVGHPDQGDQGVXSSO\XQWLO
Source: UNCTAD secretariat based on BP Energy Outlook 2030.
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)LJXUH} %DOWLF([FKDQJH'U\,QGH[t ,QGH[EDVH\HDUSRLQWV
)LJXUH}'DLO\HDUQLQJVRIEXONHUYHVVHOVt'ROODUVSHUGD\
Source: UNCTAD, based on London Baltic Exchange data.
Note:  The index is made up of 20 key dry bulk routes measured on a time charter basis. The index covers Handysize, Supramax, 
Panamax and Capesize dry bulk carriers, carrying commodities such as coal, iron ore and grain.
Source: 81&7$'EDVHGRQGDWDIURP&ODUNVRQ6KLSSLQJ,QWHOOLJHQFH1HWZRUNƄJXUHVSXEOLVKHGE\WKH/RQGRQ%DOWLF([FKDQJH
Note: +DQG\VL]HDYHUDJHRIWKHVL[WLPHFKDUWHU7&URXWHV6XSUDPD[DYHUDJHRIWKHƄYH7&URXWHV3DQDPD[DYHUDJHRIWKH
four T/C routes; Capesize: average of the four T/C routes.
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Capesize vessels
)LJXUH}  LOOXVWUDWHV GDLO\ HDUQLQJV RI WKH IRXU
different vessel sizes described in this section. The 
results underline that Capesize vessels are facing the 
PRVW GLIƄFXOW PDUNHW HQYLURQPHQW ZKHQ FRPSDUHG
to smaller bulk ships. From January 2011, daily 
earnings of Capesize carriers dropped over a period 
of several months to levels below those of the smaller 
Handysize, Supramax and Panamax ships.33 This can 
EHGHVFULEHGDVDSRVWƄQDQFLDOFULVLVSKHQRPHQRQ
According to Baltic Exchange, between 2000 and 
2008 Capesize vessels have constantly reached 
higher daily earnings than smaller ships. On 5 June 
2008, Baltic Exchange reported record earnings for 
Capesize vessels of $244,000 per day. Four years 
later, in May 2012, the same ships could be chartered 
for around $8,000 dollars.
3URQRXQFHGƅXFWXDWLRQVRIIUHLJKWUDWHLQWKH&DSHVL]H
segment are often the result of demand volatility 
in the coal and iron-ore market, these being goods 
typically transported by large bulk carriers. Low raw 
material prices most commonly indicate a sluggish 
world demand for these goods. However, in 2011, 
prices for iron ore were are at highs ($140.4 per ton in 
February 2012).34 In addition, thermal coal prices had 
QRWƅXFWXDWHGPXFKVLQFH'HFHPEHUUHDFKLQJ
DKLVWRULFDOO\ƄUP OHYHORISHU WRQ LQ)HEUXDU\
2012.35 Therefore, the supply-side overcapacity in 
the largest dry bulk segment appears again as the 
decisive factor precipitating current declines in freight 
rate.36 Bulk carriers accounted for two thirds of all 
newbuildings delivered in 2011. Recent investment 
ƄJXUHV GR QRW VXJJHVW D FHVVDWLRQ RI FRPSHWLWLYH
pressures in the Capesize segment. The orderbook 
IRUVKLSVZLWKD}GZWRIPRUHWKDQDPRXQWVLQ
)HEUXDU\WRD}SHUFHQWVKDUHRIWKHH[LVWLQJ
ƅHHW37 Competitive pressures are also triggered by 
WKH VSHFLƄF FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKLV PDUNHW VHJPHQW
Large Capesize vessels are restricted to navigate 
between a few ports mostly located in Australia, 
China and Brazil.38'HPDQGƅXFWXDWLRQVRQRQHNH\
route between these countries can therefore cause 
SURQRXQFHGƅXFWXDWLRQVRI IUHLJKW UDWH LQ WKHPDUNHW
as a whole.
Panamax vessels
Freight rates in the Panamax segment have been 
exposed to a long-term downward trend. Clarksons 
counted 1,632 Panamax bulkers at the beginning of 
2010 and during the same period the Baltic Exchange 
3DQDPD[ DYHUDJH WLPH FKDUWHU ƅXFWXDWHG EHWZHHQ
DQGƄJXUH} ,QHDUO\ WKH
ƅHHWJUHZWRYHVVHOVDQGIUHLJKWUDWHVVOXPSHG
to a $11,000–$15,000 corridor.39 In 2012, this trend 
KDVQRW\HWUHYHUVHGWKHGHSOR\HGƅHHWQRZFRXQWV
2,035 ships and the average daily time charter rate 
of below $9,000 reached its lowest level since July 
2008.40
The turbulent economic environment and mild weather 
conditions in Europe reduced the coal demand from the 
continent, thus leading to weak prices on the Atlantic 
route in early 2012. Per-day charges fell to $4,000 on 
the Baltic Exchange United States–Europe/Europe–
8QLWHG6WDWHV URXWH3DFLƄFGDLO\ UDWHV LQFUHDVHGE\
more than a factor of two, this also provoked by the 
demand for coal shipments from Indonesia to Asia.41
With the grain season ramping up in March in South 
America, freight rates on the spot market have risen, 
but this momentum has been lost again in May with 
the ebbing of the season.42
Supramax vessels
Supramax vessels increasingly compete with 
Panamax ships. This is due to their growing size. In 
2008, Supramax vessels had an average capacity of 
}GZW DQG WKLV ƄJXUH} KDV LQ  LQFUHDVHG
WR } GZW 6RPH RI WKHPRGHUQ FDUULHUV EHLQJ
handed over from shipyards reach a capacity of 
} GZW ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH\ EHQHƄW IURP EHWWHU
IXHO HIƄFLHQF\ 7KHVH YHVVHOV DUH RIWHQ JHDUHG ZLWK
cranes on board for loading and unloading, which can 
be an advantage in small and medium-sized ports 
in developing countries that often do not provide 
VXIƄFLHQWKDQGOLQJ IDFLOLWLHV43 The competitiveness of 
Supramax vessels when compared to Panamax is 
DOVRUHƅHFWHG LQWKHIUHLJKWUDWHGHYHORSPHQWV44 The 
estimated three-year dry bulk time charter rates in 
2011 were higher in 6 out of 12 months for Supramax 
WKDQWKHODUJHU3DQDPD[YHVVHOVWDEOH}45 However, 
the segment also experienced a steep cut in freight 
rate, with daily rates falling from $12,296 at the end of 
2011 to $6,348 in February 2012. Nevertheless, the 
VXEVHTXHQW UHFRYHU\ RI 6XSUDPD[ FKDUWHULQJ SULFHV
has been more sustainable, reaching earnings mostly 
DERYHWKRVHRIWKHODUJHU3DQDPD[FODVVWDEOH}
+DQG\VL]HYHVVHOV
Handysize vessels have been more resilient in the bleak 
GU\EXONPDUNHWDQGEHQHƄWIURPVHYHUDOFRPSHWLWLYH
advantages. They can load more than 30 cargo types, 
compared to only a handful of different goods carried 
REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201268
by larger vessels. Secondly, smaller ships can enter 
almost any port, while larger carriers are restricted to 
the high volume routes connecting the world’s busiest 
ports. Thirdly, ship oversupply ratios have been more 
SURQRXQFHG DPRQJ ODUJHU YHVVHOV WKH \HDUO\ ƅHHW
growth rate beginning in December 2011 reached 
}SHUFHQWIRU&DSHVL]HDQG}SHUFHQWIRU3DQDPD[
YHVVHOVZKLOHWKH+DQG\VL]HƅHHWRQO\JUHZE\DURXQG
}SHUFHQWGXULQJWKHVDPHSHULRG46 Three-year time 
charter rates for Handysize and Panamax vessels 
ZHUHDOPRVW HTXDOEHWZHHQ-DQXDU\DQG$SULO 
WDEOH}%HDULQJLQPLQGWKDW3DQDPD[YHVVHOVFDQ
carry about two times more than the Handysize class, 
this comparison underlines the weak demand for the 
larger vessel types.
B. FREIGHT MARKETS AND
TRANSPORT COSTS
7KH XQLTXHQHVV RI IUHLJKW UDWH SDWWHUQV IRU EXONHUV
WDQNHUVDQGFRQWDLQHUVKLSVFDQEHTXDQWLƄHGWKURXJK
D FRPSDULVRQ RI WKHPD[LPXP ƅXFWXDWLRQ RI IUHLJKW
rate within each segment. The maximum freight rate 
ƅXFWXDWLRQ UHIHUV WR WKH GLYLVRU EHWZHHQ WKH KLJKHVW
and the lowest freight rate reported between March 
 DQG $SULO  )UHLJKW UDWHV KDYH ƅXFWXDWHG
most in the bulker segment, with rates being 2.17 
times higher at the top level when compared with their 
lowest value. The two other segments appear to be 
PXFKPRUHVWDEOHZLWKDPD[LPXPƅXFWXDWLRQUDWHRI
1.4 for tankers and 1.87 for container ships during the 
same period.47
7KUHHPDMRU IDFWRUV FDQ WULJJHU SULFH ƅXFWXDWLRQV LQ
D FRPSHWLWLYH PDUNHW HQYLURQPHQW ƄUVW WKH FRVWV
of running a maritime shipping business; second, to 
break even the freight rates must cover all incurred 
expenses; third, the minimum freight price range that 
DYHVVHORSHUDWRULVZLOOLQJWRDFFHSW7ZRRWKHUPDMRU
external factors determine the price in a fundamental 
way: the demand and the supply in the maritime 
transport market. The following sections discuss 
these pricing factors.
1. Maritime transport costs
components
Maritime transport service providers that invest in the 
procurement and operation of a vessel aim at creating 
DSURƄWRQWKHLUFDSLWDOHPSOR\HG)OXFWXDWLRQVLQWKH
costs of buying and maintaining a vessel will impact 
on the freight rate a ship operator is willing to accept 
WRHQVXUHFRVWUHFRYHU\DQGSURƄW$FRVWEUHDNGRZQ
of the total vessel expenses allows an assessment 
of how each component affects freight rates and 
contributes to the total vessel costs. In addition, the 
volatility of each cost component is of importance 
ZKHQDVVHVVLQJIUHLJKWUDWHƅXFWXDWLRQV
)LJXUH}LOOXVWUDWHVIUHLJKWUDWHFRVWFRPSRQHQWVIRU
D}GZW WDQNHUZLWKDQDVVXPHGRSHUDWLQJ OLIH
RI  \HDUV )XHO FRQVXPSWLRQ UHSUHVHQWLQJ } SHU
cent of total expenditures, is the largest cost factor. 
&UHZLQJ LV WKHVHFRQG ODUJHVWFRQWULEXWLQJ}SHU
FHQW IROORZHGE\SRUWFKDUJHVDW}SHUFHQW0RVW
FRVW LQSXW IDFWRUV GR QRW DSSHDU WR EH VXEMHFW WR
7DEOH (VWLPDWHGWKUHH\HDUGU\EXONWLPHFKDUWHUUDWHVt7KRXVDQGVRIGROODUVSHUGD\
Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on various issues of Shipping Insight, produced by Drewry Publishing.
+DQG\VL]H
}GZW
Supramax
}GZW
Panamax
}GZW
Capesize
}GZW
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
January 13.0 10.5 15.2 11.0 16.5 11.0 12.0 12.0
February 13.0 9.5 15.2 10.0 16.7 10.0 20.5 11.0
0DUFK 13.1 10.5 15.5 10.8 17.0 10.9 20.5 10.0
April 13.5 10.7 16.3 11.0 15.5 11.2 16.0 11.5
0D\ 13.1 16.0 16.5 13.5
June 12.5 15.0 14.0 12.0
July 12.0 14.0 13.0 12.5
August 12.5 14.0 13.5 14.5
September 13.0 14.5 14.0 16.5
October 13.5 14.5 14.0 17.0
November 12.0 13.0 13.0 16.0
December 11.3 12.5 12.5 18.0
Annual average 12.7 10.3 14.6 10.7 14.7 10.8 15.8 11.1
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PDMRUSULFH ƅXFWXDWLRQV7KHSULFHRIFUXGHRLO LVDQ
H[FHSWLRQ DV VKRZQ LQ ƄJXUH}  DQG LV D PDMRU
LQƅXHQFLQJIDFWRURQIUHLJKWUDWHYRODWLOLW\
2. Maritime transport cost and
revenue comparison
Based upon the information from the freight rate 
cost breakdown, a more comprehensive cost and 
revenue comparison is conducted below for the three 
shipping sectors and their different vessel sizes. Such 
DQ DQDO\VLV DOORZV WKH LGHQWLƄFDWLRQ RI FKDUDFWHULVWLF
cost structures for different vessel types and potential 
FKDQJHV LQ WKH FRVW VWUXFWXUH RYHU WLPH WDEOH} 
illustrates the results of the calculations for 2006 and 
2011.
The yearly time charter rate represents the revenue 
side of the analysis. The ship operating costs have 
been derived from a yearly survey that is based on 
indications from ship operators, owners and brokers 
for over 2,600 vessels.48 As bunker costs and port 
handling charges are usually not included in the time 
charter rates, these expenses have also been excluded 
from the calculations. Assumptions have been made 
IRU VHYHUDO YDULDEOHV LQƅXHQFLQJ FRVW VXFK DV VKLS
utilization rates, interest rates or the commercial life 
expectancy of the ship, with the aim of obtaining a 
comparable dataset.49
Results for 2011
7KHUHVXOWVLQWDEOH}LOOXVWUDWHWKHHIIHFWRIHFRQRPLHV
of scale that can be reached with large scale vessels. 
Panamax tankers, for example, reported daily ship 
operating costs of $8,871 while the same expenses 
for the four-times-larger VLCC tanker were less than 
}SHUFHQWDERYHWKLVYDOXH,WFDQDOVREHREVHUYHG
that the share of vessel procurement costs as a 
percentage of the total vessel costs increases with 
D ODUJHU YHVVHO VL]H 7KLV LQGLFDWRU UHDFKHV}SHU
FHQW IRUD+DQG\VL]HEXONHUDQG}SHUFHQW IRUD
Capesize carrier.
7KH VKLS SURƄWDELOLW\ ƄJXUHV IRU  LOOXVWUDWH WKDW
year’s unfavourable economic environment for 
maritime transport service providers and show that 
PRVW VKLS VHJPHQWV KDYH KDG QHJDWLYH SURƄWDELOLW\
rates. Only the bulker segment has estimated positive 
margins. The results also show that, in 2011, larger 
VKLSVL]HVPRVWO\RSHUDWHGRQDORZHUSURƄWDELOLW\UDWH
)LJXUH} )UHLJKWUDWHFRVWFRPSRQHQWVIRUDWDQNHURI}GZWZLWK\HDUVRIHFRQRPLFDOOLIH
Source: Data received from a ship operator in February 2012.
Note:  Figures refer to share of cost component as a percentage of total costs. Results are based on the assumption that the ship 
is staffed with a Turkish crew. Relative costs depend on many factors that may change over time.
Port charges, 10.00%
Crewing, 18.50%
Bunkers, 35.00%
Classification, 1.99%
Registration, 0.01%
Repair & Maintenance,
6.50%
Insurance, 2.75%
Commissions, 6.25%
Ship procurement, 5.00%
Ship financing, 2.00%
Management, 4.00%
Profit, 8.00%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201270
Sh
ip
 ty
pe
Da
ily
 ti
m
e 
ch
ar
te
r r
at
e
in
 2
01
1,
 
da
ily
 ra
te
in
 $
a
Co
st
s 
fo
r 
op
er
at
io
ns
in
 2
01
1,
da
ily
in
 $
b
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
m
ar
gi
n 
Ic
Ne
w
bu
ild
in
g 
pr
ic
es
20
11
,
in
 $
Li
ne
ar
 v
es
se
l 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
co
st
s,
 d
ai
ly
 
in
 $
d
Co
st
s 
fo
r
ca
pi
ta
l
em
pl
oy
ed
,
da
ily
in
 $
e
To
ta
l v
es
se
l 
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t 
co
st
s,
da
ily
in
 $
To
ta
l c
os
ts
 
(o
pe
ra
tio
ns

YH
VV
HO

da
ily
in
 $
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
sh
ar
e,
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t 
co
st
s 
of
 to
ta
l 
ve
ss
el
 c
os
ts
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
m
ar
gi
n 
II,
 
da
ily
in
 $
f
3U
RƂ
WD
EL
OLW
\
in
pe
rc
en
tg
Ne
w
bu
ild
in
g
sh
ip
ty
pe
Ta
nk
er
Pr
od
uc
t
13
 6
00
8 
74
0
4 
86
0
36
10
0 
00
0
3 
95
6
1 
97
8
5 
93
4
14
 6
74
40
.4
%
-1
,0
74
-7
.3
%



}G
Z
W
Pa
na
m
ax
 
13
 8
00
8 
87
2
4 
92
8
44
50
0 
00
0
4 
87
7
2 
43
8
7 
31
5
16
 1
87
45
.2
%
-2
,3
87
-1
4.
7%



}G
Z
W
Su
ez
m
ax
19
 7
00
10
 1
02
9 
59
8
64
10
0 
00
0
7 
02
5
3 
51
2
10
 5
37
20
 6
39
51
.1
%
-9
39
-4
.5
%



}
GZ
W
VL
CC
24
 6
50
11
 3
42
13
 3
08
10
13
00
 0
00
11
 1
01
5 
55
1
16
 6
52
27
 9
94
59
.5
%
-3
,3
44
-1
1.
9%



}
GZ
W
Bu
lk
er
Ha
nd
ys
ize
12
 5
96
5 
58
9
7 
00
7
24
80
0 
00
0
2 
71
8
1 
35
9
4 
07
7
9 
66
6
42
.2
%
2,
93
0
30
.3
%



}G
Z
W
Ha
nd
ym
ax
14
 8
88
6 
31
8
8 
57
0
30
00
0 
00
0
3 
28
8
1 
64
4
4 
93
2
11
 2
50
43
.8
%
3,
63
8
32
.3
%



}G
Z
W
Pa
na
m
ax
14
 8
63
6 
85
4
8 
00
9
32
60
0 
00
0
3 
57
3
1 
78
6
5 
35
9
12
 2
13
43
.9
%
2,
65
0
21
.7
%



}G
Z
W
Ca
pe
si
ze
16
 3
54
7 
87
6
8 
47
8
51
60
0 
00
0
5 
65
5
2 
82
7
8 
48
2
16
 3
58
51
.9
%
-4
0.
0%



}
GZ
W
Co
nt
ai
ne
r s
hi
ps
Fe
ed
er
m
ax




7
(8

4 
25
0
4 
65
6


11
40
0 
00
0
1 
24
9
 6
25
1 
87
4
6 
53
0
28
.7
%
-2
,2
80
-3
4.
9%
50
0 
TE
U
(g
ea
re
d)
Co
nt
ai
ne
r s
hi
p 





7(
8
9 
82
5
5 
52
2
4 
30
3
27
40
0 
00
0
3 
00
3
1 
50
1
4 
50
4
10
 0
26
44
.9
%
-2
01
-2
.0
%
1 
50
0 
TE
U
 
(g
ea
re
d)
M
ai
n 
Li
ne
r





7
(8

14
 4
79
8 
04
0
6 
43
9
45
60
0 
00
0
4 
99
7
2 
49
9
7 
49
6
15
 5
36
48
.2
%
-1
,0
57
-6
.8
%
3 
50
0 
TE
U
(g
ea
rle
ss
)
7D
EO
H


%D
OWL
F(
[F
KD
QJ
H'
U\
,Q
GH
[


t


,Q
GH
[E
DV
H\
HD
U




S
RL
QW
V
CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 71
Sh
ip
 ty
pe
Da
ily
 ti
m
e 
ch
ar
te
r r
at
e 
in
 2
01
1,
 
da
ily
 ra
te
 
in
 $
a
Co
st
s 
fo
r 
op
er
at
io
ns
 in
 
20
06
,
da
ily
 c
os
ts
 
in
 $
b
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
m
ar
gi
n
Ic
Ne
w
bu
ild
in
g 
pr
ic
es
 2
00
6,
 
in
 $
Li
ne
ar
 v
es
se
l 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
co
st
s,
da
ily
 in
 $
d
Co
st
s 
fo
r
ca
pi
ta
l
em
pl
oy
ed
, 
da
ily
 in
 $
e
To
ta
l v
es
se
l 
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t 
co
st
s,
da
ily
 in
 $
To
ta
l c
os
ts
 
(o
pe
ra
-t
io
ns

YH
VV
HO

da
ily
 in
 $
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
sh
ar
e,
 
pr
oc
ur
em
en
t 
co
st
s 
of
 to
ta
l 
ve
ss
el
 c
os
ts
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
m
ar
gi
n 
II,
 
da
ily
 in
 $
f
3U
RƂ
WD
EL
OLW
\
in
 p
er
ce
nt
g
Ne
w
bu
ild
in
g
sh
ip
 ty
pe
Ta
nk
er
Pr
od
uc
t
26
 7
92
6 
54
1
18
 5
70
46
 8
00
 0
00
 5
 1
29
 2
 5
64
 7
 6
93
 1
5 
91
5



10
,8
77
68
.3
%



}GZ
W
Pa
na
m
ax
 
23
 2
25
6 
64
0
14
 8
79
48
 0
00
 0
00
 5
 2
60
 2
 6
30
 7
 8
90
 1
6 
23
6



6,
98
9
43
.0
%



}GZ
W
Su
ez
m
ax
42
 6
67
7 
56
0
33
 1
64
75
 5
00
 0
00
 8
 2
74
 4
 1
37
 1
2 
41
1
 2
1 
91
4



20
,7
53
94
.7
%



}
GZ
W
VL
CC
55
 9
92
8 
48
9
45
 3
22
12
4 
90
0 
00
0
 1
3 
68
8
 6
 8
44
 2
0 
53
2
 3
1 
20
2



24
,7
90
79
.5
%



}
GZ
W
Bu
lk
er
Ha
nd
ys
ize
15
 8
60
4 
04
8
10
 5
82
22
 3
00
 0
00
 2
 4
44
 1
 2
22
 3
 6
66
 8
 9
44



6,
91
6
77
.3
%



}GZ
W
Ha
nd
ym
ax
21
 8
00
4 
57
6
15
 8
34
31
 5
00
 0
00
 3
 4
52
 1
 7
26
 5
 1
78
 1
1 
14
4



10
,6
56
95
.6
%



}GZ
W
Pa
na
m
ax
22
 4
75
4 
96
4
16
 0
03
35
 7
00
 0
00
 3
 9
12
 1
 9
56
 5
 8
68
 1
2 
34
0



10
,1
35
82
.1
%



}GZ
W
Ca
pe
si
ze
45
 6
45
5 
70
5
38
 2
08
62
 1
00
 0
00
 6
 8
05
 3
 4
03
 1
0 
20
8
 1
7 
64
5



28
,0
00
15
8.
7%



}
GZ
W
Co
nt
ai
ne
r s
hi
ps
Fe
ed
er
m
ax




7
(8

6 
87
1
3 
56
7
2 
49
9
15
 8
00
 0
00
 1
 7
32
  8
66
 2
 5
97
 6
 9
69





-1
.4
%
50
0 
TE
U
(g
ea
re
d)
Co
nt
ai
ne
r s
hi
p 





7(
8
16
 4
92
4 
23
1
11
 3
07
33
 4
00
 0
00
 3
 6
60
 1
 8
30
 5
 4
90
 1
0 
67
5



5,
81
7
54
.5
%
1 
50
0 
TE
U 
(g
ea
re
d)
M
ai
n 
Li
ne
r





7
(8

24
 2
33
6 
16
0
16
 6
84
54
 5
00
 0
00
 5
 9
73
 2
 9
86
 8
 9
59
 1
6 
50
8



7,
72
5
46
.8
%
3 
50
0 
TE
U
(g
ea
rle
ss
)
S
ou
rc
es
:  
U
N
C
TA
D
 c
al
cu
la
tio
ns
. N
ew
bu
ild
in
g 
pr
ic
es
 a
nd
 d
ai
ly
 ti
m
e 
ch
ar
te
r 
ra
te
s 
fro
m
 D
re
w
ry
’s
 S
hi
pp
in
g 
In
si
gh
t. 
O
pe
ra
tin
g 
co
st
 d
at
a 
fro
m
 M
oo
re
 S
te
ph
en
s’
 re
po
rt
 O
pt
C
os
t 2
01
1.
a
7K
H
DV
VX
P
SW
LR
Q
LV
P
DG
H
WK
DW
WK
H
YH
VV
HO
LV

}
SH
UF
HQ
WX
WLOL
]H
G
b
%D
VH
G
RQ
R
SH
UD
WLQ
J
FR
VW
G
DW
D
IUR
P
0
RR
UH
6
WH
SK
HQ
VI
RU
WK
H
\H
DU



'
DW
D
IR
U


DU
H
IR
UZ
DU
G
SU
RM
HF
WLR
QV
D
FK
LHY
HG
E
\P
XO
WLS
O\L
QJ



GD
WD
E
\W
KH
D
YH
UD
JH
R
SH
UD
WLQ
J
FR
VW
J
UR
Z
WK

UD
WH
R
YH
UW
KH
OD
VW


\H
DU
V
'
DW
D
IR
U


GD
WD
D
UH
E
DF
NZ
DU
G
SU
RM
HF
WLR
QV
R
IW
KH



GD
WD
E
DV
HG
R
Q
0
RR
UH
6
WH
SK
HQ
Vp
R
SH
UD
WLQ
J
FR
VW
V
LQ
GH
[
2
SH
UD
WLQ
J
FR
VW
V
LQ
FOX
GH
F
UH
Z
F
RV
WV

sp
ar
es
, r
ep
ai
rs
 a
nd
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
, i
ns
ur
an
ce
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n.
c
&R
QW
ULE
XW
LR
Q
P
DU
JL
Q
, 
R
QH
\
HD
UW
LP
H
FK
DU
WH
UU
DW
H
Ÿ
F
RV
WV
IR
UR
SH
UD
WLR
QV

d
D
ep
re
ci
at
io
n 
co
st
s 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 a
 p
er
io
d 
of
 2
5 
ye
ar
s 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n.
e
&R
VW
V
GH
WH
UP
LQ
HG
E
\
P
XO
WLS
O\L
QJ
K
DOI
R
IW
KH
S
UR
FX
UH
P
HQ
WF
RV
WV
E
\
DQ
D
VV
XP
HG
LQ
WH
UH
VW
UD
WH
R
I

}S
HU
F
HQ
W
f
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
m
ar
gi
n 
II 
=
 (c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
m
ar
gi
n 
I) 
– 
(c
os
ts
 fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l e
m
pl
oy
ed
) –
 (v
es
se
l d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n 
co
st
s)
.
g
3U
RƄ
WD
EL
OLW\
 
W
LP
H
FK
DU
WH
UU
DW
H
W
RW
DO
YH
VV
HO
RS
HU
DW
LQ
J
FR
VW
V
t


REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201272
than smaller vessels. The reason for this is that, in 
2011, the advantage of economies of scale has been 
offset by a pronounced oversupply of larger vessels, 
particularly in the bulker segment. When interpreting 
these numbers, it should to be taken into consideration 
that the calculations are based on the assumption that 
YHVVHOV KDYH EHHQ } SHU FHQW XWLOL]HG +RZHYHU
among most operators utilization rates were much 
lower in 2011, which would translate into even lower 
SURƄWDELOLW\UDWHV
Results for 2006
The calculations for 2006 illustrate that the cost and 
UHYHQXHVWUXFWXUHVKDYHFKDQJHGVLJQLƄFDQWO\RYHUWKH
ODVW ƄYH\HDUV)UHLJKW UDWHVKDYHEHHQFRQVLGHUDEO\
higher. The yearly time charter rate for a Capesize tanker 
stood at an average of $45,645 in 2006 and reached 
RQO\LQ2SHUDWRUVDOVREHQHƄWHGIURP
lower operating costs, which demonstrated moderate 
DQGVWDEOHJURZWKUDWHVLQWKHODVWƄYH\HDUV7KHUHIRUH
SURƄWDELOLW\ UDWHVZHUHPXFKKLJKHU LQ YDU\LQJ
IURP } SHU FHQW IRU )HHGHUPD[ FRQWDLQHUVKLSV WR
}SHU FHQW IRU&DSHVL]HEXONHUV 7KHSURPLVLQJ
UHYHQXHƄJXUHVOHGWRPDVVLYHLQYHVWPHQWLQDGGLWLRQDO
tonnage, pushing up vessel prices. Hence, the share 
of ship procurement costs as a percentage of the total 
vessel expenses was considerably higher in 2006. The 
LQGLFDWRUUHDFKHG}SHUFHQWLQIRUD&DSHVL]H
EXONHULQFRPSDULVRQWR}SHUFHQWLQIRUWKH
same type of vessel.
Second-hand prices were exposed to even higher 
YRODWLOLWLHV DV WKHUH LV XVXDOO\ QR VLJQLƄFDQW WLPHJDS
between the ship being sold and handed over. Buyers 
FDQ EHQHƄW GLUHFWO\ IURP KLJK SURƄWDELOLW\ UDWHV LQ D
positive business environment, making them willing to 
accept elevated second-hand prices. A contrary effect 
occurs if freight rates are low: second-hand prices will 
then drop due to a lack of investors who are willing 
WRRSHUDWHDVKLSLQDQXQSURƄWDEOHPDUNHW3ULFHVIRU
VHFRQGKDQGYHVVHOVDUHLOOXVWUDWHGLQWDEOH}$ORQJ
with freight rates, second-hand values have been 
exposed to losses – the price for a Capesize ship, 
IRUH[DPSOHGURSSHGIURPDQDYHUDJH}PLOOLRQLQ
WR}PLOOLRQLQ
7KHFDOFXODWLRQVZLWKLQWKLVVHFWLRQKDYHTXDQWLƄHGWKH
effect of economies of scale on freight rates. In addition, 
WKH SRWHQWLDO ƅXFWXDWLRQV RI QHZ EXLOGLQJ FRVWV DQG
their impact on the overall vessel expenses have been 
HYDOXDWHG7KHƄJXUHVDOVRLOOXVWUDWHWKDWVKLSRSHUDWLQJ
FRVWV ƅXFWXDWHRQO\PRGHUDWHO\RYHU WLPH)LQDOO\ WKH
SURQRXQFHG SURƄWDELOLW\ YRODWLOLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH \HDUV
observed underlines the large impact of structural 
changes in demand and supply on the maritime shipping 
7DEOH 6HFRQGKDQGSULFHVt0LOOLRQVRIGROODUVHQGRI\HDUƂJXUHV
Type and size of vessel  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Percentage
change
2011/2010
2LOWDQNHUt+DQG\}GZW
5 years old  25  35  44  47  40  51  30  26  28 7.7
Oil tanker – Suezmax,
}GZW\HDUVROG  43  60  72  76  87  95  59  62  54 
2LOWDQNHUt9/&&}GZW
5 years old  60  91  113  116  124  145  84  86  77 
&KHPLFDOWDQNHUt}GZW
10 years old  9  11  12  14  23  23  20  13  11 
LPG carrier – 15 000 m,
10 years old  21  23  30  39  40  39  30  25  26 4.0
'U\EXONt+DQG\VL]H}GZW
10 years old  10  15  20  20  28  31  17  20  17 
'U\EXONt3DQDPD[}GZW
5 years old  20  35  40  39  83  70  31  25  31 24.0
'U\EXONt&DSHVL]H}GZW
5 years old  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  47  54  43 
Container – geared, 500 TEUs,
10 years old  5  7  11  10  9  13  4  6  7 16.7
Container – gearless, 2 500 TEUs, 
10 years old  20  29  39  41  24  36  18  23  30 30.4
&RQWDLQHUtJHDUOHVV7(8V
10 years old  25  34  43  44  43  45  24  28  34 21.4
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data from Drewry’s Shipping Insight.
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business, as discussed in the following section, when
commensurate demand is present.
3. Transport demand and supply
During different stages in the shipping market cycle,
diverging demand and supply lead to substantial
ƅXFWXDWLRQVLQIUHLJKWUDWHV,WFDQEHREVHUYHGWKDWIUHLJKW
rates and the volume of new ship orders often evolve in
parallel. In times of high freight rates, ship owners tend
to invest in new vessel capacity, this being also due to
an increased willingness of banks to lend money, thus
expanding the orderbook. With an increasing supply of
FDSDFLW\IUHLJKWUDWHVIDOODQGOHVVHIƄFLHQWVKLSVOLQHXS
for cargo, thus reducing the industry’s appetite to invest
in new vessel capacity.50 With this interplay between
supply and demand in mind, this section will assess
selected indicators for the two elements.
Growth rates of both supply (vessel capacity) and 
GHPDQGVKLSSHGYROXPHVDUHLOOXVWUDWHGLQWDEOH}
In all three segments, vessel capacity has grown 
faster than the seaborne trade volume. Between 
2000 and 2011, bulk carrier supply expanded almost 
two times faster than the transport demand. In the 
tanker segment, this gap was even larger, with a 
vessel capacity increasing 2.3 times faster than the 
transported volume of goods. In the coming years, 
the dry bulk sector in particular will experience high 
ƅHHW JURZWK UDWHV 7KH RUGHUERRN WR FXUUHQW ƅHHW
VL]HUDWLRRIWKHGU\EXONVHJPHQWVWDQGVDW}SHU
FHQW FRPSDUHGZLWK } SHU FHQW IRU WDQNHUV DQG
}SHUFHQWIRUFRQWDLQHUVKLSV7KLVZLOOSXWIUHLJKW
rates under additional pressure within an already 
oversupplied bulk shipping segment.
The supply side can also be assessed through a 
comparison of indicators that describe the structure of 
WKHƅHHW7KHDQDO\VLVRIPDUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQOHYHOV
for example, reveals the degree of competition in the 
PDUNHWZKLFKPD\LQƅXHQFHWKHSULFLQJPHFKDQLVP
Container shipping reaches the highest market 
concentration levels out of all the three segments. The 
 ODUJHVWFRPSDQLHVDFFRXQW IRUPRUH WKDQ}SHU
cent of the world’s containerized shipping market. 
On routes to remote regions with low trade volumes 
in particular, this may lead to higher freight rates and 
less volatile price reactions to changes in transport 
GHPDQG0DUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQOHYHOVDUHVLJQLƄFDQWO\
lower in the bulk trade business, with the 19 largest 
RSHUDWRUV VKDULQJ RQO\ } SHU FHQW RI WKH ZRUOG
transport supply.
4. Freight costs in developing
countries
)LJXUH}  VKRZV WKH PDULWLPH IUHLJKW FRVWV DV D
percentage of the total value of imported goods. The 
results illustrate that although volatilities occur over 
time, in the long term a tendency towards a lower ratio 
7DEOH &RPSDULVRQRIPDULWLPHWUDQVSRUWVHJPHQWV
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De
m
an
d 
an
d 
su
pp
ly
Ø Transport supply growth per year
tEDVHGRQƃHHWJURZWKLQ}GZW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Ø Transport demand growth per year
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  
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) Market share of the the top 3 companies D n.a. E
Market share of the the top 10 companies D F E
Market share of shipping business
EDVHGRQƃHHWFDSDFLW\LQ}GZW   
Sources: Growth in transport supply, transport demand and market shares from UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 2011;
UDWLRRIRUGHUERRNWRƅHHWVL]HIURPLloyd’s List Intelligence.
a Data for 2010 from Review of Maritime Transport 2011, based on the number of containers shipped. 
b Data for 2008 from Tanker Operator Annual Review March 2009EDVHGRQƅHHWVL]HLQ}GZW
c 'DWDIRUƄJXUH}LQFOXGHVWKHODUJHVWRSHUDWRUVEDVHGRQ}GZW
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between freight costs and value of goods has occurred 
among all country groupings. Furthermore, the freight 
rates share of developing countries tend to converge 
to those of developed economies. Developing 
Oceania achieved a transport cost share reduction 
IURP}SHUFHQW LQ WR}SHUFHQW LQ
while the developing nations of America and Asia have 
already reached a transport cost share approximately 
} SHU FHQW DERYH WKDW RI GHYHORSHG HFRQRPLHV $Q
exception from this trend of convergence is developing 
Africa, with a stable ratio of freight costs to import value 
RI}SHUFHQWEHWZHHQDQG
Low productivity, high charges and congestions in 
many African ports are some of the factors explaining 
these discrepancies.51 Vessel operators tend to 
pass these costs on to shippers when calculating 
their freight rates. In addition, African ports are often 
GLIƄFXOWWRDFFHVVIURPWKHKLQWHUODQGGXHWRDODFNRI
transport infrastructure.52
On the shipping side, the UNCTAD Liner Shipping 
Connectivity Index (LSCI) (see also chapter 4) reveals 
a lack of economies of scale and competition in many 
African countries. African ports cannot host the largest 
ships that offer the most competitive freight rates. The 
relatively small number of alternative operators serving 
most African ports results in low competitive pressure, 
thus keeping freight rates high. Trade imbalances are 
another factor contributing to higher freight rates in 
Africa. With an import surplus for containerized cargo, 
and exports that mostly comprise bulk goods, which 
are transported by tankers and dry bulk carriers, 
vessels can often only be fully utilized on one route.53
&RQVHTXHQWO\ VKLS RSHUDWRUV KDYH WR FKDUJH D
freight rate for a single trip that compensates their 
expenditures for both the fronthaul and the backhaul 
lanes.
C. POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE
MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS
Transport costs remain an important component of 
WKHSULFHRI WKHJRRGVZKHQSXUFKDVHGE\ WKH ƄQDO
consumer. High maritime transport costs for imported 
goods impact the price level of the basket of consumer 
goods. Conversely, excessive freight rates for exports 
affect the trade competitiveness of the products of a 
country in the global markets. Hence, countries may 
ZDQW WR GHƄQH DSSURDFKHV WR UHGXFH LQERXQG DQG
outbound maritime transport costs in their trade with 
partners, as discussed below.
)LJXUH )UHLJKWFRVWDVSHUFHQWDJHRIYDOXHRILPSRUWVƂYH\HDUPRYLQJDYHUDJH
Source: UNCTAD.
4
6
8
10
12
14
Developing Africa 12.3 12.55 12.83 12.63 12.38 12.18 12.18 12.18 12.23 12.49 12.78 12.92 13.21 13.1 12.46 11.91 11.55 11.02 10.56 10.89 10.78 10.72 10.74 10.68 10.66 10.77 10.93
Developing Oceania 11.52 11.55 11.78 12.34 11.95 11.61 12.12 12.05 11.4 11.66 11.74 11.35 11.32 11.6 12.08 12.22 11.61 11.16 11.03 10.41 9.893 9.567 9.397 8.864 8.817 8.47 8.559
Developing America 8.117 8.122 8.27 8.323 8.556 8.639 8.778 8.65 8.721 8.523 8.525 8.355 8.243 8.337 8.626 8.688 8.875 9.335 9.517 9.208 8.738 8.318 7.91 7.278 6.998 7.235 7.342
Developing Asia 8.867 8.959 9.039 8.714 8.665 8.628 8.802 8.784 9.034 9.466 9.614 9.526 9.563 9.378 8.817 8.561 8.288 8.07 7.954 8.035 8.049 7.945 7.799 7.913 7.924 7.932 7.894
Developed economies 7.479 6.899 6.537 6.515 6.232 6.402 6.688 6.954 6.887 7.152 7.523 7.622 7.801 7.524 7.021 6.61 6.26 5.886 6.065 6.339 6.388 6.448 6.51 6.389 6.264 6.244 6.517
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The freight rate cost analysis, conducted for the case of 
D}GZWWDQNHUƄJXUH}LOOXVWUDWHVPDMRUFRVW
elements of freight rates and can assist when identifying 
policy measures aimed at reducing individual cost 
drivers. The policy options available to a single country 
that could produce a substantial reduction of freight 
rates are, nonetheless, limited. Vessel operators can 
choose worldwide between many alternative suppliers 
when procuring the goods and services they need for 
their vessel operations, thus levelling comparative cost 
advantages of individual destinations. In most large 
ports, for instance, cheap fuelling services are offered 
and, even if these services are not provided, a ship 
can choose to use bunkering services at an alternative 
destination. If one country alone were able to offer 
JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV DW FRVWV VLJQLƄFDQWO\ EHORZ WKH
level of other nations, these competitive advantages 
ZRXOGSUREDEO\QRWEH UHƅHFWHG LQ WKH IUHLJKW UDWH WR
or from that country. Hosting competitive insurance 
service providers, for example, will not assist a country 
to reduce its maritime transport costs. These cost 
DGYDQWDJHVDUH OLNHO\ WREHSDVVHGRQHTXDOO\ WR WKH
freight rates for all routes a vessel operator serves 
within his shipping network.
When evaluating the elements comprising freight 
UDWH FRVWV WKUHHPDMRU VWUDWHJLF RSWLRQV UHPDLQ WKDW
countries can choose from, and by which maritime 
IUHLJKWUDWHVIURPDQGWRWKDWFRXQWU\FDQEHLQƅXHQFHG
)LJXUH}VXPPDUL]HVWKHVHRSWLRQVDQGWKHLUSRWHQWLDO
effect on ship operating costs and freight rates.
Option 1 – developing coastal shipping
Individual countries can exercise only a limited 
LQƅXHQFH RQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO PDULWLPH VKLSSLQJ ZKLFK
operates as an open market with very little regulation 
other than relevant international rules on carrier 
liability, security and safety. An exception to this is 
FRDVWDOVKLSSLQJDQGVSHFLƄFDOO\FDERWDJHZKLFKOLHV
FRPSOHWHO\ZLWKLQ WKH MXULVGLFWLRQRIDVLQJOHQDWLRQ
&RXQWULHV FDQ GLUHFWO\ LQƅXHQFH WKH SULFH OHYHO IRU
these services through the design of ship registration 
UHTXLUHPHQWV LQGXVWU\ GHYHORSPHQW SROLFLHV DQG
infrastructural investments such as the development 
of a feeder port network.
In a market where cabotage is restricted to domestic 
carriers only, ship operators have no choice but 
to comply with the country’s regulatory set up. An 
LPSURYHPHQWRIWKHVKLSUHJLVWUDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVZLOO
therefore directly affect operating costs. The potential 
PRQHWDU\ LPSDFW KDV EHHQ TXDQWLƄHG E\ D VWXG\ RI
the United States Department of Transportation. It 
estimates, for example, that the costs for United 
6WDWHVƅDJ YHVVHOV LQ  ZHUH DURXQG  WLPHV
KLJKHUWKDQWKRVHRIIRUHLJQƅDJHTXLYDOHQWV54
Opening cabotage to international shipping lines is 
another policy option. The entrance of new market 
players may reduce freight rates for shippers and 
lead to better and more diverse services. However, 
most countries often give cabotage rights exclusively 
to domestic carriers with the aim of protecting and 
promoting the national shipping industry.
Another measure to support cabotage is the expansion 
of a country’s feeder port network. This will facilitate 
access of traders to coastal shipping and encourage 
them to shift from land to maritime transport. The 
increased volumes may lead to higher utilization rates 
and lower freight rates.
Option 2 – developing port competitiveness
Countries with sea access can apply a wide range 
of policies that aim at increasing the operational 
DQG DGPLQLVWUDWLYH HIƄFLHQF\ RI WKHLU SRUW QHWZRUN
This includes decisions on the legal and institutional 
framework, the selection of an ownership model or the 
allocation of funds for infrastructure investments. The 
reforms should target all entities having a relevant role 
in the port, such as the landlord, regulator, operator, 
marketer and cargo handler, thus reducing port 
charges related to each function.
The negotiation of a balanced concession agreement 
between the terminal operator and the responsible 
regulatory institution is a critical element when shaping 
a performance-orientated port business environment. 
This should include appropriate incentives that promote 
a continuous improvement of operations, competitive 
price setting mechanisms and a comprehensive 
performance monitoring system. However, considering 
WKDWSRUWFKDUJHVRQO\FRQVWLWXWHDERXW}SHUFHQWRI
the total freight rate, the lever of these measures appears 
WREHOLPLWHGtDFFRUGLQJWRWKHƄJXUHVLQGLFDWHGLQWKH
H[DPSOHIUHLJKWUDWHEUHDNGRZQLQƄJXUH}DUHGXFWLRQ
RISRUWKDQGOLQJFKDUJHVE\}SHUFHQWZRXOGRQO\OHDG
WRDWRWDOIUHLJKWUDWHUHGXFWLRQRI}SHUFHQW
Option 3 – developing port hinterland connections
7KHƄUVWWZRRSWLRQVFRQWDLQSROLF\PHDVXUHVWDUJHWLQJ
directly the improvement of maritime transport chain 
elements. In contrast, the third option addresses other 
modes of transport that indirectly affect freight rates of 
ships through their role within the multimodal transport 
chain.
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Inland transport linkages are the arteries of ports 
connecting them to regional markets. They enable 
ports to consolidate exports from the region and 
GLVWULEXWH LPSRUWV WR WKHLU ƄQDO GHVWLQDWLRQ LQ WKH
hinterland.
As an example, the port of Durban in South Africa 
offers more modern and extensive rail linkages than 
WKHQHLJKERXULQJSRUWRI0DSXWRLQ0R]DPELTXHWKXV
giving it an advantage when competing for customers. 
Another example is the structure of the transport 
QHWZRUNZLWKLQ0R]DPELTXH,WRIIHUVZHOOGHYHORSHG
QRUWKtVRXWK URDG FRQQHFWLRQV ZKLFK VSHFLƄFDOO\
serve the transport needs within the country’s territory. 
However, only a few east–west linkages exist that 
connect domestic entrepreneurs with ports along the 
FRXQWU\pVORQJFRDVWOLQHPDNLQJLWGLIƄFXOWIRUWKHPWR
present their goods on the international markets.
Improving transport connections to and from 
markets in the hinterland, therefore, enables ports 
to attract greater cargo volumes. This does not only 
lead to economies of scale within the ports. It may 
also attract larger vessels with lower unit transport 
costs or more alternative maritime transport service 
providers.
)LJXUH 6WUDWHJLHVWRUHGXFHPDULWLPHIUHLJKWUDWHV
Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
Three national policy related generic strategies to reduce maritime freight rates
2.
Developing port
competitiveness
 Port administration related laws 
and regulations
 Port management structures and
ownership model
 Institutional framework (e.g. port
authority)
 Port operations
 Port infrastructure (e.g. links to
other modes of transport)
 Reducing port related charges for
maritime transport service providers 
through:
a. efficiency gains in port operations 
and port administration
b. reasonable profit margin of port
operator in a more competitive
business environment
Æ Includes charges for all port
functions: Landlord, regulator,
operator, marketer and cargo -
handler (e.g. cargo handling fees,
channel fees)
1.
Developing coastal shipping
 Opening cabotage to global
competition or restricting it to
domestic operators
 National ship registration policies
 Institutional framework (e.g.
maritime authority)
 Investment policies and
ownership model
 Maritime infrastructure (e.g.
feeder ports)
 The compliance with new ship
registration requirements may
reduce or increase operations costs
 Opening cabotage can increase
competitive pressure thus reducing
freight rates
 Improving coastal shipping
infrastructure connects remote
regions to international trade
networks Æ modal shift to maritime
transport and better economies of
scale
Selected field
of policy making
Strategy
Potential impact
on freight
rates
3.
Developing port hinterland 
connections
 Intermodal interface connecting
port with national and regional
markets (options: Rail, road,
waterway and air transport)
 Regulatory and institutional
framework for land transport
modes
 Regional transit and transport
development agreements 
 Public private partnerships
a. Increases cargo handling
volumes in ports Æ lower unit
handling costs
b. attracts larger ships Æ lower
unit transport costs
c. attracts new transport service
providers Æ lower margins due to
increased competition
 Improved port connectivity:
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:RUOGFRQWDLQHUSRUWWKURXJKSXWLQFUHDVHGE\DQHVWLPDWHG}SHUFHQWWR}PLOOLRQ
IRRWHTXLYDOHQWXQLWV7(8VLQLWVKLJKHVWOHYHOHYHU7KLVLQFUHDVHZDVORZHU
WKDQWKH}SHUFHQWLQFUHDVHRIWKDWZDVLWVHOIDVKDUSUHERXQGIURPWKHVOXPS
of 2009. Chinese mainland ports maintained their share of total world container port 
WKURXJKSXWDW}SHUFHQW
7KH81&7$'/LQHU6KLSSLQJ&RQQHFWLYLW\,QGH[/6&,VKRZHGDFRQWLQXDWLRQLQ
of the trend towards larger ships deployed by a smaller number of companies. Between 
2011 and 2012, the number of companies providing services per country went down 
E\ } SHU FHQW ZKLOH WKH DYHUDJH VL]H RI WKH ODUJHVW FRQWDLQHU VKLSV LQFUHDVHG E\ 
}SHUFHQW2QO\}SHUFHQWRIFRXQWU\SDLUVDUHVHUYHGE\GLUHFW OLQHUVKLSSLQJ
connections; for the remaining country pairs at least one trans-shipment port is required.
This chapter covers container port throughput, liner shipping connectivity and some of 
WKHPDMRUSRUWGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVXQGHUZD\LQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV,WDOVRDVVHVVHV
how recent trends in ship enlargement may impact ports.
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A. PORT THROUGHPUT
Port throughput is usually measured in tons and by 
FDUJR W\SH IRU H[DPSOH OLTXLG RU GU\ FDUJR /LTXLG
cargo is usually measured in tons or sometimes, in the 
case of oil, in barrels. Within the dry cargo sector there 
is bulk (coal, grain, iron ore, and the like) and break bulk 
(for example, general cargo, timber and containers). 
The dry cargo sector represents around two-thirds of 
ZRUOGVHDERUQH WUDGH$SSUR[LPDWHO\}SHUFHQWRI
WKHGU\FDUJRVHFWRUUHODWHVVSHFLƄFDOO\WRWKHƄYHPDMRU
bulks (coal, grain, iron ore, phosphates and bauxite/
DOXPLQDDQGDSSUR[LPDWHO\}SHUFHQW LVRWKHUGU\
cargo. These other dry cargoes (for example, timber, 
outsized cargo) are carried in general cargo vessels 
DQGE\FRQWDLQHUVKLSV$URXQG}SHUFHQWRIZRUOG
VHDERUQHWUDGHUHODWHVVSHFLƄFDOO\WRFRQWDLQHUWUDGH
The potential for container trade to continue increasing 
its share of the dry cargo sector is therefore a real 
possibility. The goods that are shipped in containers 
represent a variety of products ranging from scrap 
waste, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods 
WR ƄQLVKHG SURGXFWV UHDG\ IRU FRQVXPSWLRQ 7KH
container is popular because it is practical, versatile, 
XELTXLWRXVDQGZHOOXQGHUVWRRG7KHVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ
RIFDUJRSDFNDJLQJDQGKDQGOLQJKDVRWKHUEHQHƄWV
such as ease of movement between modes and 
reductions in cargo handling time and costs. The 
share of container cargo within a country’s break-
bulk trade could also serve as a barometer of how 
well a country is integrated into the international trade 
DUHQD7KLVFKDSWHU}WKHUHIRUHSD\VSDUWLFXODUDWWHQWLRQ
to developments in container shipping and container 
ports.
1. Container ports
Container-port throughput is measured in terms of 
TEUs. It is one of the few units which enable port activity 
WREHFRPSDUHGJOREDOO\7KHODWHVWƄJXUHVDYDLODEOHIRU
ZRUOGFRQWDLQHUSRUWWUDIƄFFDQEHVHHQLQWDEOH}
6HYHQW\ƄYH GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG HFRQRPLHV
in transition with an annual national throughput of 
over 100,000 TEUs are listed. (Annex IV shows port 
WKURXJKSXW ƄJXUHV IRU  FRXQWULHV ,Q  WKH
container throughput for developing economies grew 
E\DQHVWLPDWHG}SHUFHQWWR}PLOOLRQ7(8V
This growth is a turnaround in the sharp decline of 
the previous year that was largely a direct response 
to businesses reducing their inventories in light of 
uncertainties surrounding the global economic crisis. 
The growth rate for container throughput in developing 
HFRQRPLHV IRU  LV HVWLPDWHG DW } SHU FHQW
signifying a return to previous year-on-year growth 
levels. Developing economies’ share of world 
throughput continues to remain virtually unchanged at 
DSSUR[LPDWHO\}SHUFHQW2XWRIWKHGHYHORSLQJ
economies and economies in transition listed in 
WDEOH}RQO\H[SHULHQFHGQHJDWLYHJURZWKLQSRUW
throughput in 2010, signalling that there have not been 
any sustained affects on container ports as a result of 
the global economic crisis. Of the top 10 developing 
countries and countries in transition, nine are located 
in Asia. Sixteen of the top 20 countries are also in 
Asia, while two are in Central and South America and 
two in Africa. The dominance of Asia in container port 
WKURXJKSXW VLJQLƄHV WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH UHJLRQ LQ
producing exports. The 10 countries registering the 
KLJKHVW JURZWK ZHUH 0RURFFR } SHU FHQW WKH
5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ}SHUFHQW0H[LFR}SHU
FHQW 3DQDPD } SHU FHQW 8NUDLQH } SHU
FHQW*HRUJLD }SHUFHQW3HUX }SHUFHQW
$UJHQWLQD }SHUFHQW%UD]LO }SHUFHQW DQG
7XUNH\ } SHU FHQW 7KH FRXQWU\ZLWK WKH ODUJHVW
share of container throughput continues to be China, 
with eight of its ports amongst the top 20. Chinese 
ports, excluding Hong Kong (China), experienced 
DSRVLWLYHJURZWKRI}SHUFHQW LQ WR UHDFK
}PLOOLRQ7(8V3UHOLPLQDU\ƄJXUHVIRUVKRZ
a reduced growth for Chinese port throughput to 
DURXQG}SHUFHQWDW}PLOOLRQ7(8V&KLQHVH
ports, with the exception of Hong Kong (China) and 
Taiwan, Province of China, accounted for around 
}SHUFHQWRIZRUOGFRQWDLQHUWKURXJKSXWLQ
GRZQ IURP } SHU FHQW LQ WKH SUHYLRXV \HDU 7KH
reduction of Chinese ports’ share in world container 
throughput also corresponds to a reduction in Chinese 
imports of some raw materials, such as iron ore and 
thermal coal.1 In order to boost imports and achieve 
a more balanced trade with trading partners, China 
announced in 2012 a series of reductions on import 
taxes for certain goods.2 This move could translate 
into increased manufacture of goods for export, 
if these are not consumed domestically, and thus 
help increase container throughput (a more detailed 
account of international trade demand and supply is 
JLYHQLQFKDSWHU}
7DEOH}VKRZVWKHZRUOGpVOHDGLQJFRQWDLQHUSRUWV
for the period 2009–2011. The top 20 container ports 
DFFRXQWHG IRU DSSUR[LPDWHO\ } SHU FHQW RI ZRUOG
container port throughput in 2011. Combined, these 
SRUWVVKRZHGD}SHUFHQW LQFUHDVH LQ WKURXJKSXW
LQ  GRZQ IURP D } SHU FHQW LQFUHDVH LQ
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Table 4.1. Container port throughput for 75 developing countries and economies in transition for years 2009,
2010 and 2011 (TEUs) 
Country 2009 2010 PreliminaryƂJXUHVIRUa
Percentage change 
2010–2009
Percentage change 
2011–2010
China 107 963 180 128 929 895 138 391 031  19.42  7.34 
Singapore 26 592 800 29 178 500 30 722 470  9.72  5.29 
China, Hong Kong SAR 21 040 096 23 699 242 24 404 000  12.64  2.97 
Republic of Korea 15 699 161 18 537 801 20 809 210  18.08  12.25 
Malaysia 15 859 938 18 244 650 19 808 658  15.04  8.57 
United Arab Emirates 14 425 039 15 174 023 16 752 724  5.19  10.40 
China, Taiwan
Province of 11 352 097 12 501 107 13 463 919  10.12  7.70 
India 8 011 810 9 752 908 9 951 310  21.73  2.03 
Indonesia 7 243 557 8 371 058 8 884 888  15.57  6.14 
Brazil 6 574 617 8 121 324 8 597 733  23.53  5.87 
Thailand 5 897 935 6 648 532 7 170 500  12.73  7.85 
Egypt 6 250 443 6 709 053 6 556 189  7.34 
Panama 4 597 112 5 906 056 6 534 265  28.47  10.64 
Viet Nam 4 936 598 5 983 583 6 282 762  21.21  5.00 
Turkey 4 521 713 5 547 447 5 998 820  22.68  8.14 
Saudi Arabia 4 430 676 5 313 141 5 694 538  19.92  7.18 
Philippines 4 306 941 4 946 882 5 230 909  14.86  5.74 
Sri Lanka 3 464 297 4 000 000 4 200 000  15.46  5.00 
Oman 3 768 045 3 893 198 4 089 760  3.32  5.05 
South Africa 3 726 313 3 806 427 3 924 059  2.15  3.09 
Mexico 2 874 290 3 693 949 3 878 646  28.52  5.00 
Russian Federation 2 360 625 3 129 973 3 692 719  32.59  17.98 
Chile 2 795 989 3 171 950 3 387 348  13.45  6.79 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2 206 476 2 592 522 2 722 148  17.50  5.00 
Colombia 2 056 747 2 443 786 2 565 975  18.82  5.00 
Pakistan 2 058 056 2 149 000 2 256 450  4.42  5.00 
Morocco 1 222 000 2 058 430 2 161 352  68.45  5.00 
Argentina 1 626 351 2 018 424 2 119 345  24.11  5.00 
Jamaica 1 689 670 1 891 770 1 986 359  11.96  5.00 
Peru 1 232 849 1 533 809 1 610 499  24.41  5.00 
Dominican Republic 1 263 456 1 382 601 1 451 731  9.43  5.00 
Bangladesh 1 182 121 1 356 099 1 423 904  14.72  5.00 
Ecuador 1 000 895 1 221 849 1 282 941  22.08  5.00 
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1 238 717 1 216 208 1 277 018   5.00 
Bahamas 1 297 000 1 125 000 1 181 250   5.00 
Costa Rica  875 687 1 013 483 1 064 157  15.74  5.00 
Guatemala  906 326 1 012 360 1 062 978  11.70  5.00 
Lebanon  994 601  949 155 1 034 249   8.97 
Kuwait  854 044  888 206  932 616  4.00  5.00 
Kenya  618 816  696 000  730 800  12.47  5.00 
Uruguay  588 410  671 952  705 550  14.20  5.00 
Ukraine  516 698  659 541  692 069  27.65  4.93 
Syrian Arab Republic  685 299  649 005  681 455   5.00 
Honduras  571 720  619 867  650 860  8.42  5.00 
Jordan  674 525  619 000  649 950   5.00 
Côte d’Ivoire  677 029  607 730  638 117   5.00 
Djibouti  519 500  600 000  630 000  15.50  5.00 
Trinidad and Tobago  567 183  573 217  601 878  1.06  5.00 
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2010. The list includes 15 ports from developing 
HFRQRPLHVDOORIZKLFKDUHLQ$VLDWKHUHPDLQLQJƄYH
ports are from developed countries, three of which 
are located in Europe and two in North America. In 
}RIWKHSRUWVPDLQWDLQHGWKHVDPHUDQNLQJDV
in the previous year, with all of the top 13 maintaining 
exactly the same position. One North American port 
(New York and New Jersey) fell out of the top 20 and 
was replaced by one Asian port (Dalian). Shanghai 
maintained its top position, widening the gap between 
itself and the second in position, Singapore, from 
Country 2009 2010 PreliminaryƂJXUHVIRUa
Percentage change 
2010–2009
Percentage change 
2011–2010
Ghana  493 958  513 716  539 402  4.00  5.00 
Tunisia  418 880  466 375  489 693  11.34  5.00 
Sudan  431 232  439 100  461 055  1.82  5.00 
United Republic of 
Tanzania  370 401  426 847  448 189  15.24  5.00 
Mauritius  406 862  444 778  439 695  9.32 
Yemen  382 445  370 382  388 901   5.00 
Senegal  331 076  349 231  366 693  5.48  5.00 
Qatar  410 000  346 000  363 300   5.00 
Congo  285 690  297 118  311 973  4.00  5.00 
Bahrain  279 799  289 956  304 454  3.63  5.00 
Benin  267 000  277 680  291 564  4.00  5.00 
Papua New Guinea  262 209  268 649  283 839  2.46  5.65 
Algeria  247 986  265 628  278 910  7.11  5.00 
Cameroon  240 300  249 912  262 408  4.00  5.00 
Cuba  283 910  228 346  246 773   8.07 
Georgia  181 613  226 115  237 421  24.50  5.00 
Cambodia  207 577  224 206  235 416  8.01  5.00 
Mozambique  214 701  223 289  234 453  4.00  5.00 
Guam  157 096  183 214  192 375  16.63  5.00 
Myanmar  160 200  166 608  174 938  4.00  5.00 
Libya  155 596  161 820  169 911  4.00  5.00 
El Salvador  126 369  145 774  153 063  15.36  5.00 
Madagascar  132 278  141 093  148 148  6.66  5.00 
Croatia  130 740  137 048  143 900  4.82  5.00 
Gabon  130 758  135 988  142 788  4.00  5.00 
Aruba  125 000  130 000  136 500  4.00  5.00 
Namibia  265 663  256 319  107 606  
Subtotal    15.56 6.68
Other reported b   4 247 444 51.85 20.86
Total reported    15.82 6.81
World total    14.49 5.94
Sources: UNCTAD secretariat, derived from information contained in Containerisation International Online (May 2012), from
various Dynamar B.V. publications and from information obtained by the UNCTAD secretariat directly from terminal
and port authorities.
a In this list, Singapore includes the port of Jurong.
b 7KHWHUPRWKHUUHSRUWHGUHIHUVWRFRXQWULHVIRUZKLFKIHZHUWKDQ7(8VSHU\HDUZHUHUHSRUWHG1RWHV0DQ\ƄJXUHV
HVSHFLDOO\IRUDUHHVWLPDWHVWKHVHƄJXUHVDUHKLJKOLJKWHGLQLWDOLFV3RUWWKURXJKSXWƄJXUHVWHQGQRWWREHGLVFORVHGE\
ports until a considerable time after the end of the calendar year. Country totals may conceal the fact that minor ports may 
QRWEHLQFOXGHGWKHUHIRUHLQVRPHFDVHVWKHDFWXDOƄJXUHVPD\EHKLJKHUWKDQWKRVHJLYHQ
Table 4.1. Container port throughput for 75 developing countries and economies in transition for years 2009,
2010 and 2011 (TEUs) (continued)
WR}PLOOLRQ 7(8V7KHHQWU\ LQWRWKHWRS
20 container ports of Dalian comes on the back of a 
}SHUFHQWJURZWK LQWKURXJKSXW WKHKLJKHVW LQWKH
top 20. The ports of Antwerp and Hamburg swapped 
places, with the latter taking the lead on the back of 
D}SHUFHQWLQFUHDVHDJDLQVWWKHIRUPHUpV}SHU
cent growth. Long Beach moved down two places 
from eighteenth to twentieth position as container 
WKURXJKSXWFRQWUDFWHGE\}SHUFHQWWKHRQO\SRUW
in the top 20 to experience a negative growth. Xiamen 
moved up one place from nineteenth to eighteenth 
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SRVLWLRQZLWKDJURZWKRI}SHUFHQW7KHRYHUDOOSLFWXUH
that emerges is that most of the demand and growth 
IRU FRQWDLQHU SRUWV LV VWLOO ƄUPO\ LQ $VLD 7KLV VLJQDOV
greater intraregional trade in Asia and the importance 
of the region as a centre of international trade.
2. Liner shipping connectivity
Components of liner shipping connectivity
As regards the deployment of container ships by liner 
shipping companies, the year 2012 saw a continuation 
of trends already observed in previous years, that 
is, an increase in ship sizes and carrying capacity, 
and a decrease in the level of competition. Between 
mid-2004 and May 2012, the average number of 
companies deploying container ships on services 
from and to coastal countries’ seaports decreased 
IURP WRDGHFOLQHRI}SHUFHQW'XULQJ WKH
same period, the size of the largest vessels deployed 
continuously increased, from an average vessel 
maximum of 2,812 TEUs in 2004 to 5,452 TEUs in 
DQLQFUHDVHRI}SHUFHQWVHHƄJXUH}$V
vessel sizes have increased faster than the available 
Source: UNCTAD secretariat and Containerisation International Online (May 2012).
Note: In this list Singapore does not include the port of Jurong.
Table 4.2. Top 20 container terminals and their throughput for 2009, 2010 and 2011
(In TEUs and percentage change)
Port Name 2009 2010 3UHOLPLQDU\ƂJXUHVfor 2011
Percentage change 
2010–2009
Percentage change 
2011–2010
Shanghai 25 002 000 29 069 000 31 700 000  16.27  9.05 
Singapore 25 866 400 28 431 100 29 937 700  9.92  5.30 
Hong Kong 21 040 096 23 699 242 24 404 000  12.64  2.97 
Shenzhen 18 250 100 22 509 700 22 569 800  23.34  0.27 
Busan 11 954 861 14 194 334 16 184 706  18.73  14.02 
Ningbo 10 502 800 13 144 000 14 686 200  25.15  11.73 
Guangzhou 11 190 000 12 550 000 14 400 000  12.15  14.74 
Qingdao 10 260 000 12 012 000 13 020 000  17.08  8.39 
Dubai 11 124 082 11 600 000 13 000 000  4.28  12.07 
Rotterdam 9 743 290 11 145 804 11 900 000  14.39  6.77 
Tianjin 8 700 000 10 080 000 11 500 000  15.86  14.09 
Kaohsiung 8 581 273 9 181 211 9 636 289  6.99  4.96 
Port Klang 7 309 779 8 871 745 9 377 434  21.37  5.70 
Hamburg 7 007 704 7 900 000 9 021 800  12.73  14.20 
Antwerp 7 309 639 8 468 475 8 664 243  15.85  2.31 
Los Angeles 6 748 994 7 831 902 7 940 511  16.05  1.39 
Tanjung Pelepas 6 016 452 6 530 000 7 500 000  8.54  14.85 
Xiamen 4 680 355 5 820 000 6 460 700  24.35  11.01 
Dalian 4 552 000 5 242 000 6 400 000  15.16  22.09 
Long Beach 5 067 597 6 263 399 6 061 085  23.60 
Total top 20 220 907 422 254 543 912 274 364 468  15.23  7.79 
volume of cargo, there is less space for liner shipping 
companies in each market, and the average number 
RIFRPSDQLHVLVFRQVHTXHQWO\GHFUHDVLQJ
)LJXUH}LOOXVWUDWHVDQRWKHUDVSHFWRIWKLVWUHQG7KH
country average of the total TEU carrying capacity 
LQFUHDVHGE\}SHU FHQW EHWZHHQDQG
while the number of ships has remained almost 
constant. Using larger ships, the growing seaborne 
containerized trade can be transported without the 
need to increase vessel numbers.
'HYHORSLQJFRXQWU\FRQQHFWLRQV
Globally, the best-connected country continues to 
be China. In May 2012, there were 1,765 container 
ships deployed on liner shipping services to and 
from Chinese ports, with a total carrying capacity of 
}PLOOLRQ7(8VFRPSDQLHVRSHUDWHGVKLSVRQ
these services, the largest vessel having a capacity 
of 15,550 TEUs.3
The best-connected country in Latin America is 
Panama, with 23 companies deploying 342 ships 
ZLWKD WRWDOFDUU\LQJFDSDFLW\RI}PLOOLRQ 7(8V
followed by Brazil, with 937,000 TEUs. The position 
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)LJXUH 7UHQGVLQFRQWDLQHUVKLSƃHHWGHSOR\PHQWQXPEHURIFRPSDQLHVDQGVL]HRIWKHODUJHVW
ships deployed (Averages per country, midyear estimates)
)LJXUH 7UHQGVLQFRQWDLQHUVKLSƃHHWGHSOR\PHQWQXPEHURIVKLSVDQGWKHLUWRWDO7(8FDUU\LQJFDSDFLW\
(Averages per country, midyear estimates)
Source: Calculations by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Lloyd’s List Intelligence.
Source: Calculations by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by Lloyd’s List Intelligence.
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of Panama as a hub in Latin America is made evident 
by the large number of ships deployed on routes from 
Panama to China (147 container ships), to the United 
States (182 ships) and to Colombia (127 ships).
In Africa, the geographical positions of Egypt, 
Morocco and South Africa at the nodes of the 
global liner shipping networks contribute to 
these countries’ highest connectivity for this 
continent. There are more companies that provide 
services between South Africa and Singapore (15 
companies), China (14) and Malaysia (13) than for 
intra-African connections. For example, there are 
only eight companies that connect South Africa with 
Benin and Nigeria.
In South Asia, ports in Sri Lanka cater for larger 
container ships than ports in India, and the total TEU 
FDSDFLW\GHSOR\HGIURPDQGWR6UL/DQND}PLOOLRQ
TEUs) is higher than the TEU deployed from and to 
,QGLDQ SRUWV } PLOOLRQ  7(8V 6LQJDSRUH DQG
Malaysia are the best-connected countries in South-
(DVW$VLDZLWK}PLOOLRQ  DQG}PLOOLRQ 7(8V
capacity deployed, respectively.
Comparing different regions, the densest network of 
liner shipping services is within Asia. There are 794 
container ships deployed on regular services between 
China and the Republic of Korea, 718 between China 
and Singapore, and 600 between China and Malaysia. 
7KLV FRPSDUHV WR MXVW  VKLSV GHSOR\HG EHWZHHQ
China and the United States, and 111 ships between 
the United States and Germany.
Characteristics of the global network
An analysis of the structure of the global liner shipping 
QHWZRUN VKRZV WKDW RQO\ } SHU FHQW RI FRXQWU\
pairs are served by direct liner shipping connections.4 
For the remaining country pairs, at least one trans-
VKLSPHQWLVUHTXLUHG
Interestingly, at least in theory (potentially competing 
shipping companies and ports would need to 
FRRSHUDWH}SHUFHQWRISDLUVRIFRXQWULHVFRXOGEH
connected with only one trans-shipment (for example, 
&KLOHWR6XULQDPHYLD-DPDLFD2QO\IRU}SHUFHQW
of country pairs is a second trans-shipment needed; 
for example, to move a container from Cambodia to 
Namibia is possible via Singapore and South Africa. 
$ WKLUG WUDQVVKLSPHQW LV UHTXLUHG IRU RQO\ } SHU
cent of country pairs; an example of the latter would 
be containerized trade between Tuvalu and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo via New Zealand, 
Belgium and the Republic of the Congo. While it is 
GLIƄFXOWWRHQYLVDJHGHPDQGIRUDFRQWDLQHUL]HGWUDGH
transaction between these two countries, thanks to 
the global liner shipping network and trans-shipment 
ports, it would be possible.
B. RECENT PORT DEVELOPMENTS
Port developments continue throughout the world 
at an uneven pace spurred on by national needs to 
import and export and a chance to seize a share of 
growing world seaborne trade through trans-shipment 
opportunities. The following sections are a brief 
overview of some of these developments organized 
alphabetically. The list is not exhaustive and the 
ports mentioned are merely meant to give regional 
perspective as well as illustrate the variety and type 
of developments. Other developments mentioned in 
previous issues of the Review of Maritime Transport 
continue at their pace. Virtually every port or 
government has a development plan or is presently 
engaged in infrastructure improvements.
In Cameroon, work continues on the development 
of the Kribi port complex. The port will enable 
subregional integration through the Kribi–Bangui (the 
Central African Republic)–Kasangani (the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) transport and development 
corridor.5 The port, which is being built as the main 
export point for oil pumped from Chad via pipeline, 
will also handle containerised cargo and cargo for 
Cameroon’s mining sector, such as bauxite, iron, 
nickel and cobalt.
In China, port developments continue at a seemingly 
relentless pace. The port of Xiamen is planning to 
LQYHVWVRPH50%}ELOOLRQ}ELOOLRQRQXSJUDGLQJ
its facilities over the next few years. This is in 
DGGLWLRQ WR WKH}PLOOLRQ VSHQW WRRSHQ WKHQHZ
container terminal – Xiamen Ocean Gate Container 
Terminal – in 2011.6 For Ningbo-Zhoushan port, 
plans were announced to build two iron-ore berths 
of 300,000–400,000 deadweight ton (dwt) capacity, 
RQH}GZWEHUWKDQGWZR}GZWEHUWKV
7KH SURMHFW ZKLFK ZLOO FRVW DQ HVWLPDWHG RI 50%
}ELOOLRQ}PLOOLRQZLOOJLYHWKHSRUWDFRPELQHG
KDQGOLQJFDSDFLW\RI}PLOOLRQWRQVRILURQRUHSHU\HDU7
This suggests that the recent declines in the import of 
iron ore by Chinese ports is not envisaged to persist into 
the long term.
In Costa Rica, the Government approved a 33-year 
concession agreement with APM Terminals (APMT) 
to construct and operate the Caribbean port at Moin. 
Located 10 hours sailing time from the Panama Canal, 
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the construction is set to be completed by the end of 
DQGFRVW}PLOOLRQ:KHQFRPSOHWHWKHSRUW
will have an along-side depth of 16 metres and be able 
to serve the current maximum container vessels.8 It will 
be able to attract new clients by accommodating some 
RIWKHSDVVLQJWUDIƄFWUDQVLWLQJWKH3DQDPD&DQDO
In France, the ports of Le Havre, Rouen and Paris, 
ZKLFKVKDUHDFFHVVWRWKH5LYHU6HLQHMRLQHGWRJHWKHU
to form a new entity named HAROPA. The new entity 
aims to win back some of the trade lost in 2011 due 
to strikes by port workers in response to nation-wide 
port reforms. This concept enables synergies in pricing 
and marketing and if successful could be a concept 
which may be adopted by other ports in other regions.
In Georgia, transfer of the operations of the Black Sea 
port of Poti from Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority 
(RAKIA), a sovereign wealth fund of the United Arab 
Emirates, to APMT resulted in the retrenchment of 
HPSOR\HHVDOPRVWRQHTXDUWHURILWVODERXUIRUFH
0DQDJHPHQWRIWKHSRUWKDGEHHQDFTXLUHGE\5$.,$
in 2008, but the company had failed to stimulate local 
trade through the port.9 This example illustrates the 
LPSRUWDQFHRILPSRUWH[SRUWWUDIƄFWRDSRUWpVVXFFHVV
In Germany, the port of Wilhelmshaven partially opened 
for business in 2012. The port has experienced various 
challenges including, on the operational side, the 
provision of tug services and, on the infrastructure side, 
FUDFNVLQWKHTXD\DQGZHDNUDLOWUDFNIRXQGDWLRQV7KH
port, which has a depth of 18 metres, is able to serve 
the world’s largest container ships, such as Maersk’s 
Triple E-class vessels. To attract new business the 
SRUWpV PDQDJHPHQW LV UHSRUWHGO\ RIIHULQJ D } SHU
cent rebate on its standard tariff of €0.32 per ton on 
all ships until December 2013, after which the rebate 
UHGXFHVWR}SHUFHQWXQWLO,QDGGLWLRQWKHIHHV
SD\DEOHDUHRQO\DSSOLFDEOHIRUWKHƄUVWWRQV
This means that, for example, Maersk’s E-class vessel 
the 170,794 gross tonnage (GT) M/V Emma Maersk
7(8VZRXOGSD\MXVWbSHUFDOOLQVWHDG
of €46,400.10 Such pricing strategies could also be 
offered by other ports in order to stimulate demand.
,Q ,QGLD WKH 6WDWH RI *XMDUDW KDV ƄQDOL]HG SODQV IRU
WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIQHZSRUWVDW'DKHM1DUJRO9DQVL
Borsi and Kutchhigarh, which are to be undertaken 
using public–private partnership (PPP). Plans to 
develop ports at Dholera and Khambhat have been 
SXW RQ KROG LQ YLHZ RI WKH .DOSDVDU SURMHFW ZKLFK
aims to build a dam over the Gulf of Khambhat to 
establish a huge fresh-water reservoir. These port 
developments serve to illustrate that the Government 
of India is committed to undertaking improvements to 
its transport infrastructure. However, the task is huge 
DQG IRU RQO\  RI WKH HVWLPDWHG  SRUW SURMHFWV
LGHQWLƄHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWLQWKHSDVWƄYH\HDUVKDV
construction commenced, while only 25 have seen 
completion.11
In Indonesia, Perlindo II, the state-owned port 
operator and port authority, was given permission by 
the Government to start the construction of Kalibaru 
port. Phase one of the new port construction will see 
FRQWDLQHUKDQGOLQJFDSDFLW\RI}PLOOLRQ7(8VFRPH
online in early 2014, followed by further construction 
of two more terminals, bringing the total capacity 
RI WKHSRUW WR }PLOOLRQ 7(8V12 This development is 
important for a country which is seeing an average 
JURVVGRPHVWLF SURGXFW *'3 JURZWK UDWH RI }SHU
cent per year since 2008 and a growing per capita 
income of $3,000.13
In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, plans 
were announced to develop the port of Rason in the 
north-east of the country. Details of the plans are 
vague but refer to refurbishing three piers, developing 
an airport, a power station and the construction a 
34-mile cross-border railroad linking the port to the 
Chinese north-eastern city of Tumen.14 The agreement 
LQYROYHVDt\HDUFRQFHVVLRQDQG WKH}ELOOLRQ
investment is coming from China.15 The area around 
Rason will be a Special Economic Zone. Elsewhere in 
the country, similar plans are afoot to develop Wihwa 
Islands located in the north-west and across the Yalu 
River from the Chinese city of Dandong. Increasing 
trade between the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea and its neighbours allows for greater 
opportunities and backward linkages into the national 
economy, which may help raise the country’s GDP 
and living standards.
In Liberia, negotiations with a Dutch dredging 
company are near completion that will enable better 
utilization of a previous concession agreement signed 
between the Government and APMT to develop the 
port of Monrovia. In 2010, APMT signed a 25-year 
concession agreement to operate the port and invest 
} PLOOLRQ  LQ UHEXLOGLQJ WKH GDPDJHG PDUJLQDO
wharf and improve the port infrastructure.16 This will 
help improve market access for both importers and 
exports and may lead to lower transport costs.
In Morocco, the newly operational container port 
Tanger Med II is continuing to expand its container 
capacity with third and fourth terminals, scheduled 
to be operational in 2015/16. The new terminals 
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ZLOO LQFUHDVH WKH SRUWpV FDSDFLW\ WR } PLOOLRQ  7(8V
per annum. In 2012, Renault opened a new vehicle 
assembly plant near the port that is expected to 
ERRVW WUDIƄF 7KLVPDUNV D JRRGRSSRUWXQLW\ IRU WKH
port, which experienced a labour strike in 2011 over 
stevedore pay and conditions that then contributed 
to a reduction in cargo volumes at the port during 
the later part of 2011 and into 2012. A year-on-year 
FRPSDULVRQ VKRZV WKDW WKURXJKSXW GXULQJ WKH ƄUVW
TXDUWHURIZDV}SHUFHQWORZHUWKDQLQ17
In Nigeria, the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) 
announced plans to develop two new deepwater 
ports at Lekki, in Lagos State, and Ibaka, near the city 
of Uyo in Akwa Ibom. The Ibaka port development 
SURMHFW LV H[SHFWHG WR FUHDWH WKRXVDQGV RI MREV18
7KH/HNNL SRUWZKLFKZLOO FRQVLVW RI OLTXLG GU\ EXON
DQGFRQWDLQHU WHUPLQDOV LVHVWLPDWHG WRKDYHD ƄQDO
FDSDFLW\RI}PLOOLRQ 7(8V7KHSRUWRI/DJRVZLOO
DOVR EHQHƄW IURP D } PLOOLRQ  UHGHYHORSPHQW
SURMHFWDWWKHVRFDOOHG%XOO1RVHDUHDRI/DJRVSRUW
The work includes the construction and operation of 
an oil and gas facility on a 20-year concession basis.19
In South Africa, Transnet Port Terminals (TPT) 
DQQRXQFHGSODQV WR VSHQG5}ELOOLRQ }ELOOLRQ
over seven years on capital expenditure to encourage 
HFRQRPLF JURZWK DQG LPSURYH HIƄFLHQFLHV 7KH
areas marked for investment include container 
SRUW GHYHORSPHQW DW 'XUEDQ DQG 1JTXUD LURQ
ore bulk facilities at Saldanha, and the creation of 
additional manganese capacity by relocating cargo 
from Port Elizabeth to a newly created two-berth 
PDQJDQHVH IDFLOLW\ DW WKH 3RUW RI 1JTXUD 7KH SRUW
RI5LFKDUGV%D\ZLOO DOVR UHFHLYHPRELOH HTXLSPHQW
TXD\VLGH HTXLSPHQW DQG ZHLJKEULGJHV DQG ZLOO EH
re-engineered to create additional capacity for bulk 
products.207KH3RUWRI1JTXUD ORFDWHG MXVWRXWVLGH
3RUW(OL]DEHWKRIƄFLDOO\RSHQHGLQDIWHU\HDUV
LQ FRQVWUXFWLRQ 7KH5 } ELOOLRQ } ELOOLRQ IDFLOLW\
upon completion will include four container berths, a 
OLTXHƄHGQDWXUDOJDV/1*IDFLOLW\DQGDEXONDQGEUHDN
bulk berth. The port has been partially open since the 
HQGRIDQGFXUUHQWO\KDQGOHVDURXQG}PLOOLRQ
TEUs.21 Together, these developments help to mark 
the ascendance of South Africa as one of the world’s 
emerging economies, as described in various press 
articles under the acronym BRICS (Brazil, Russian 
Federation, India, China and South Africa).
In Ukraine, the Government gave approval for a new 
port to be built at Lake Donuzlav in the Crimea. The 
location is in an area free of ice all year round, has a 
natural depth of 25 metres and is directly accessible 
to the Black Sea. The new facilities will focus upon 
providing ferry, general cargo and container services. 
7KH DJUHHPHQW VDLG WR EH ZRUWK } ELOOLRQ ZDV
reached between the Ukraine Government and China 
National Technical Import and Export Corporation 
(CNTIC).22 The port will facilitate direct access for 
trade between Ukraine and Asia.
In the United Kingdom, the Olympic Games and the 
associated preparation have increased congestion 
DURXQG/RQGRQUHVXOWLQJLQWKHUHYLYDORIEDUJHWUDIƄF
along the River Thames. Two barges normally used for 
transporting non-containerized cargo on the Thames 
were deployed from Tilbury to Northumberland wharf 
– a few kilometres from the Olympic village – to carry 
 IRRW HTXLYDOHQW XQLWV )(8V ,I VXFFHVVIXO
the service could be extended further west along 
the Thames to Fulham, Battersea or Wandsworth.23 
(OVHZKHUHLQWKHFRXQWU\EDUJHWUDIƄFLVDOVRPDNLQJD
comeback, for example between the cities of Liverpool 
and Manchester.24 Together, these developments may 
mark the start of a shift to a more sustainable freight 
transport.
In the United States, the port of Long Beach is set 
WR LQYHVW DURXQG } ELOOLRQ RYHU WKH QH[W GHFDGH WR
XSJUDGH LWV IDFLOLWLHV 7KH SURMHFW LQFOXGHV DPRQJVW
RWKHUV } ELOOLRQ IRU WKH XSJUDGLQJ RI H[LVWLQJ
terminals to handle containers and provide rail access, 
}PLOOLRQWRUHSODFHDEULGJHSURYLGLQJDFFHVVWR
WKH SRUW DQG } PLOOLRQ  IRU WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI
a new container terminal.25 The port of New York/
New Jersey revealed plans to develop a terminal of 
}PLOOLRQ 7(8VFDSDFLW\DW%D\RQQH1HZ-HUVH\
The new terminal is expected to open in 2014 at a 
FRVWRIPRUHWKDQ}PLOOLRQ7KHORFDWLRQSURYLGHV
an advantage over close neighbours and competitors 
located west of the height-restricted Bayonne Bridge.26
These developments coincide with the enlargement 
of the Panama Canal and provide the opportunity to 
DWWUDFWVRPHRIWKHLQFUHDVHGWUDIƄFWKDWLWVRSHQLQJLV
envisaged to create.
C. PORT DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK
Port development is closely related to the actual, 
historical or anticipated volumes of trade that pass 
through the port, that is, the derived demand of the 
SRUWpVXVHUV6RPHSRUWGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWVDUHEXLOW
DKHDG RI GHPDQG W\SLFDOO\ JUHHQ ƄHOG SURMHFWV RU
when congestion at existing ports becomes a problem 
for one or more parties. Many traditional ports built 
close to rivers or natural harbours have become 
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constrained over time as cities have grown around 
WKHP 3RUW GHYHORSPHQW SURMHFWV DUH LQFUHDVLQJO\
VXEMHFW WR OHQJWK\ GLVFXVVLRQV DV GLIIHUHQW LQWHUHVW
groups (workers, residents, user groups, business 
owners, and the like) vie to advocate their concerns 
and express their needs. These landside users’ 
issues are in stark contrast with those of the seaside 
users. Landside users are constrained by the 
SK\VLFDO KLQWHUODQG DQG SURFHGXUDO UHTXLUHPHQWV RI
local or national governments and special-interest 
groups, whereas the seaside users are often able to 
make changes which may affect local communities 
EXWDUHQRWVXEMHFWWRWKHVDPHSURFHGXUHV2QHRI
these areas concerns the port’s maritime customers, 
the shipowners. Ships are mobile and generally do 
not operate where they were constructed. Local 
communities centred around their creation points 
tend to see their advantages (for example, direct and 
indirect local employment) and not their operational 
disadvantages (pollution through emissions of gases, 
noise and light, among others). Ship construction 
is a large employer with strong roots in the local 
community and usually closely associated with other 
industrial plants, such as smelting. Ports, on the other 
hand, have lost a lot of their employee-based relations 
with the local community through retrenchment of 
labour brought about by mechanisation, streamlined 
business practices and a concentration on trans-
VKLSPHQW WUDIƄF t ZKLFK VHHPLQJO\ KDV IHZ GLUHFW
EHQHƄWV IRU WKH ORFDO HFRQRP\ ,Q DGGLWLRQ SRUW
communities are very sensitive to change, because 
ports rarely move and their facilities usually last for 
several decades.
,QUHFHQWWLPHVVKLSRZQHUVKDYHVRXJKWWREHQHƄW
from economies of scale by building ships that are 
longer, wider and deeper than previous vessels. To 
service these customers, ports need to undertake 
a number of upgrades to their infrastructure 
TXD\V WXUQLQJ EDVLQV VHD GHIHQFHV DQG WKH
like), superstructure (for example, cranes, storage 
IDFLOLWLHV RIƄFHV DQG WKH OLNH DQG RSHUDWLRQV
(dredging, human resources, software, and the 
like). Port authorities or governments need to 
make informed choices about where to invest, 
the potential return on investment and the cost of 
each opportunity. Adaptation measures to possible 
negative impacts of climatic changes, such as sea-
level rise and extreme weather events also need to 
be considered. Infrastructure investments need to 
EHƄQDQFLDOO\VXVWDLQDEOHVRWKDWFRXQWULHVPDLQWDLQ
competiveness in international markets.
The impact of increased ship size upon ports can be 
substantial. For example, the ports of Rotterdam and 
Shanghai have, over time, become constrained by the 
cities which have grown around them. The only route 
for expansion is to build further into the sea as this 
VDWLVƄHVWKHQHHGIRUODQGDQGIRUWKHGHSWKUHTXLUHG
to accommodate larger ships. Both Rotterdam’s 
new Maasvlakte container terminal and Shanghai’s 
Yangshan container terminals are located at the most 
extreme outreaches of the ports with the greatest 
GHSWKV VXIƄFLHQW WRFDWHU IRU WKHQHZHVWJHQHUDWLRQ
of container vessels. In addition, some ports (for 
example, gateway and transit ports)27 need hinterland 
connections to facilitate the movement of cargo.
Container terminals
&RQWDLQHU WUDGH KDV JURZQ VLJQLƄFDQWO\ LQ WKH ODVW
IHZGHFDGHVWRUHSUHVHQWDSSUR[LPDWHO\}SHUFHQW
RIZRUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHE\YROXPHDQG}SHUFHQW
E\ YDOXH &RQWDLQHUL]HG WUDGH KDV JURZQ QRW MXVW
at the expense of the share of general break bulk 
cargo carried via other means, but also through 
increased global trade. Many ports have adapted 
to this changing pattern of trade by undertaking 
infrastructure development programmes to increase 
their market share of containerized cargo. Increased 
port throughput volumes may increase the port’s 
revenue collected through port dues or cargo 
handling fees. Local government may also see 
an increase in tax collection through higher trade 
volumes. However, increased cargo volumes driven 
by increased competition (between ports, exporters 
and importers, transport operators, and the like), 
could greatly improve the chances of return cargoes 
becoming available. This could lead to improved 
connectivity and lower transport costs per unit, to the 
EHQHƄWRIWKHHQGXVHU7KHHQGUHVXOWVIRULQFUHDVHG
trade are well documented and include higher levels 
of peace, security, health and living standards.28 While 
this outcome may seem far removed from ship size, 
improvements which help lower transport costs could 
spill over into other areas.
6LQFH WKH ODXQFK RI WKH ƄUVW SRVW3DQDPD[ YHVVHO
the 6,400 TEU M/V Regina Maersk, back in 1996, 
there has been a trend for ever larger ships. The M/V 
Regina Maersk LWVHOIZDV DURXQG}SHU FHQW ODUJHU
than its predecessors, but today is dwarfed by the 
latest class of container ships. In 2006, the M/V
Emma Maersk was launched with a reported capacity 
RI } 7(8V 6LQFH WKH VWDUW RI WKH UHFHVVLRQ
DURXQG  VKLSV RI PRUH WKDQ } 7(8V KDYH
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been launched, with around one and a half times that 
number set to be delivered over the next few years.29
In 2011, the shipping line Maersk ordered 20 vessels 
UHSRUWHGO\ RI PRUH WKDQ } 7(8V DQG SRVVLEO\
DV ODUJH DV } 7(8V 7KHVH VKLSV DUH NQRZQ
as super-post-Panamax, ultra-large container ships 
(ULCSs) or Malaccamax vessels (the maximum size of 
vessels that are able to transit the Straight of Malacca, 
a main route for cargo moving between the Far East 
and Western Asia, Africa and Europe).
6XFK ODUJH YHVVHOV UHTXLUH SRUWV ZLWK GHHSZDWHU
access channels, alongside berth depths of 18 
PHWUHV DGHTXDWH WXUQLQJ FLUFOHV DQG VSHFLDOLVHG
FDUJRKDQGOLQJHTXLSPHQW:KLOHQRWHYHU\SRUWPD\
be able to accommodate the latest ULCS vessels, 
their existence has an implication for all ports. Only 
a few of the world’s biggest ports on the East–West 
trade routes will be served by ULCSs. Displaced ships 
will, however, operate elsewhere and bring changes to 
RWKHUSRUWV 7KH ƄUVWJHQHUDWLRQSRVW3DQDPD[W\SH
vessels (for example, M/V Regina Maersk), which are 
too young to be scrapped, are still operating on the 
main East–West route.30 With a draft of 14.5 metres 
WKHVHYHVVHOVDUHVWLOOWRRELJIRUWKHPDMRULW\RI$IULFDQ
ports (excluding those located in South Africa, Egypt, 
Mauritius and Morocco). However, ports located 
LQ 'MLERXWL 1DPLELD 1LJHULD DQG 6XGDQ DOO UHFHLYH
vessels greater than 4,000 TEUs, this indicating that 
displaced East–West vessels are seizing opportunities 
in South–South trading. This implies that ports in these 
countries also need to undertake, in their turn, more 
costly infrastructure works and provide each vessel 
ZLWKDJUHDWHUSURYLVLRQRIHTXLSPHQW
The implications of ULCSs of 22,000 TEUs for ports are 
that larger shore-side gantry cranes, with an outreach 
RIPHWUHVDQGDOLIWKHLJKWRIPHWUHVDERYHTXD\
will be needed. The distance between the front and 
back legs of the cranes may also need to be increased 
from 30 to 35 metres.31 This can be problematic as 
WKH OHJVRSHUDWHRQ UDLOVEXLOW LQWR WKHTXD\PDNLQJ
XSJUDGLQJ VXEMHFW WR VSDWLDO DQG XQGHUSLQQLQJ
constraints. Some of the challenges with larger cranes 
include stiffness, weight, corner loads, wind loads, 
increased power and operational issues including 
visibility, handling speeds and performance.32 Another 
less common implication for ports concerns that of 
local residents, who may complain about unsightly 
cranes interrupting their view.33
The cost of purchasing new container gantry 
cranes capable of servicing ULCSs is around 
} PLOOLRQt} PLOOLRQ  HDFK DQG D VLQJOH YHVVHO
could theoretically employ 10 to 12 such cranes. 
These cranes are sometimes called Jumbo 23s, 
because their outreach stretches to 23 containers 
ZLGWKIURPWKHTXD\+RZHYHUZKLOH8/&6VPD\EH
23 containers wide, the ports of Jebel Ali in Dubai 
and Felixstowe in the United Kingdom have container 
gantry cranes with an outreach of 24 containers, and 
the new port of Wilhelmshaven in Germany reportedly 
has cranes with an outreach of 25.34 Adapting existing 
cranes could, however, prove a solution to some 
SRUWVZLWKFRVWVDWEHWZHHQWR}SHUFHQWRIWKH
cost of new material. In addition, long waiting lists and 
a limited number of manufacturers often means that 
WKHWLPHUHTXLUHGWRDGDSWDFUDQHLVVRPHWLPHVKDOI
that of procuring a new one.35 With two of the market 
leaders in the manufacture of container gantry cranes 
located in China, and customers located worldwide, 
the transportation of these cranes via ship can take 
VHYHUDOPRQWKV0RUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWRIJDQWU\FUDQHV
capable of handling 22 or more rows of containers 
IURPWKHTXD\DUHSRVLWLRQHGLQWHUPLQDOVZKHUHJOREDO
terminal operators have a shareholding.36 As of 2011, 
the order book for container gantry cranes with an 
outreach of greater than 22 container rows totalled 17, 
two destined for the Caribbean and Central America, 
four for North America, four for South-East Asia and 
seven for the Far East. However, the most popular 
size of cranes on order is for those with an outreach 
of 18–20 rows. This may imply that smaller ports 
are upgrading their facilities as the cascading effect 
of larger ships entering the market pushes smaller 
vessels to call at other ports.
Container gantry cranes with an outreach of 22 rows 
DQGDERYHDUH}SHUFHQWFRQWUROOHGE\WKHJOREDO
terminal operators in the Caribbean, Central America, 
South Asia and Southern Europe. In Northern Europe 
WKH ƄJXUH} LV RYHU } SHU FHQW LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW
DQG6RXWK(DVW$VLDWKHƄJXUHVDUHFORVHWR}SHU
cent. This shows that many governments have met 
WKHƄQDQFLDOFKDOOHQJHRISXUFKDVLQJSRUWHTXLSPHQW
through public–private partnerships. According to 
Drewry Shipping Consultants, of the 1,011 container 
gantry cranes of between 20 and 22 rows in operation, 
three are located in South Asia, 48 in the whole of 
Africa, 99 in South-East Asia and 542 in the Far East. 
7KLVUHƅHFWVFOHDUO\WKHVRXUFHRIFRQWDLQHUL]HGH[SRUWV
against other destinations, where containerized cargo 
relates primarily to import trade.
The world’s largest crane manufacture is the Chinese 
ƄUP =30&ZKLFK KROGV DSSUR[LPDWHO\ } SHU FHQW
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of the market share and is continually updating its 
designs.37 However, as good as each crane design may 
be, there are limitations to how many can be deployed 
per vessel and increasingly wider vessels do not 
necessarily permit more cranes to be deployed unless 
an indented berth concept is adopted.38 However, 
modern technology enables different concepts to be 
tried and tested. For example, the container terminal 
operator APMT is working on its own crane concept. 
This company’s FastNet container terminal concept 
allows gantry cranes to work more closely together, 
WKHUHE\LQFUHDVLQJVLJQLƄFDQWO\WKHQXPEHURIFUDQHV
deployed per vessel. The FastNet crane concept 
HQDEOHVFUDQHV WRZRUNDGMDFHQW URZVZKHUHDV WKH
present container gantry cranes are too wide to allow 
this. With ULCSs capable of holding 24 FEUs from 
fore to aft and 23 containers across their beams, 
employing more container gantry cranes is imperative 
WRLPSURYLQJSRUWHIƄFLHQF\
One area often overlooked when considering port 
development is insurance. According to one survey 
E\WKH77&OXERQDFFLGHQWVLQSRUWV}SHUFHQWRI
accidents were caused by human error.39 Maintenance 
RIFRPSOH[SRUWHTXLSPHQWLQDQHQYLURQPHQWZKHUH
HTXLSPHQW GRZQWLPH FDQ EH FRVWO\ PD\ DOVR EH
a factor in increased claims.40 In an analysis of its 
FODLPVWKH77&OXEUHYHDOHGWKDW}SHUFHQWRI WKH
cost of asset-related claims was directly related to 
container gantry cranes. The main causes of damage 
to container gantry cranes cited were:
s Wind damage – with ports being built further out
to sea to cater for larger ships, there are fewer 
QDWXUDOZLQGGHƅHFWRUVDYDLODEOH
s Hoist, spreaders and ropes – better preventative 
maintenance is needed;
s Structural integrity issues – again better 
maintenance or design could help;
s Operational issues – boom-to-ship collisions, 
spreaders, ship-cell guides and ropes all caused 
VLJQLƄFDQW GDPDJH ZKLFK FRXOG EH UHGXFHG E\
UHWURƄWWLQJDYRLGDQFHV\VWHPV41
Dry bulk terminals
In the dry bulk sector ships are also increasing in size. 
7KHGU\EXONVHFWRUUHSUHVHQWVDOPRVWRQHTXDUWHURI
world seaborne trade by volume but, because these 
YHVVHOVRIWHQFDUU\FKHDSUDZPDWHULDOVDPHUH}SHU
cent by value. The dry bulk sector is dominated by the 
QHHG WR WUDQVSRUW WKH ƄYHPDMRU EXON FDUJRHV FRDO
grain, iron ore, bauxite/alumina and phosphates). Two 
of the biggest mining companies are the Australian 
BHP Billiton and the Brazilian Vale, which compete on 
many fronts including shipments of iron ore to China, 
the world’s single biggest importer. In 2011, China 
LPSRUWHG}PLOOLRQWRQVRILURQRUH
Because of the greater distance from Brazil to China 
compared with that of Australia to China, more of the 
ƄQDOSULFHRI%UD]LOLDQLURQRUHJRHVWRZDUGVWUDQVSRUW
costs. The vessels plying a trade between Brazil and 
&KLQD XVXDOO\ &DSHVL]H YHVVHOV RI } GZW
FDQ SHUIRUP DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ƄYH URXQG WULSV D \HDU
including loading and unloading time, whereas on the 
Australia to China route the same vessel can perform 
an average of 12 voyages. Australian iron ore can thus 
command a higher price, grading excluded.
,QDWWKHKHLJKWRIWKHFRPPRGLW\ERRPDQGMXVW
SULRUWRWKHJOREDOƄQDQFLDOFULVLV9DOHPDGHDQRUGHU
IRUYHU\ODUJHRUHFDUULHUV9/2&VRI}GZW
Termed Valemax vessels, they are the world’s largest 
dry bulk ships. The Valemax vessels are an attempt 
E\ WKH %UD]LOLDQ ƄUP WR ORZHU LWV JHRJUDSKLFDO
disadvantage over its closest competitor, BHP Billiton, 
for its largest customer market, China. In terms of 
LURQRUHDORQH%UD]LOH[SRUWHGRYHU}PLOOLRQWRQV
DQG$XVWUDOLD}PLOOLRQWRQVLQ7KHWRWDOLURQ
RUHLPSRUWVE\&KLQDIURP%UD]LOHTXDOOHG}PLOOLRQ
WRQVLQVLJQLƄFDQWO\EHORZWKH}PLOOLRQWRQV
of BHP Billiton, and enough to theoretically keep 70 
Valemax vessels in full employment. Presently, it is 
reported that Vale have 35 Valemax vessels on order 
VHHFKDSWHU}
The Valemax vessels have, however, caused some 
controversy, generated especially by Chinese owners 
of smaller dry bulk vessels concerned about a lack 
RI FDUJR WR FDUU\ $V D FRQVHTXHQFH LQ HDUO\ 
the Chinese Government announced that dry bulk 
YHVVHOV RI RYHU } GZW DQG WDQNHUV RI RYHU
} GZW ZRXOG QR ORQJHU EH SHUPLWWHG WR FDOO
at Chinese ports.42 This decision was apparently 
superseded by another decision from the Chinese 
Government that stated that approval would be given 
to the port of Ningbo-Zhoushan to build two berths of 
}GZW FDSDFLW\ZKLFKFRXOG UHFHLYH9DOHPD[
vessels.
Vale, in an attempt to overcome Chinese port 
restrictions, is undertaking an innovative solution using 
ƅRDWLQJ VWRUDJH FHQWUHV EDVHG LQ FRXQWULHV QHDUE\
to China. In 2012, Vale took delivery of the world’s 
largest trans-shipment vessel, the M/V Ore Fabrica
RI }GZW. The vessel will serve as a platform 
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Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
7DEOH 7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQYHVVHOVL]HDQGWHUPLQDOW\SH
Terminal Type
Container terminal Dry-bulk terminal Tanker terminal
Maximum vessel carrying
capacity
ULCSs (maximum 18,000–22,000 
7(8V}GZW
9/2&VPD[LPXP}GZW Ultra large crude carriers 
(ULCCs) (maximum 440,000–
}GZW
Maximum vessel dimensions Length: 400 metres
Beam: 59 metres
Draught: 14.5 metres
Length: 362 metres
Beam: 65 metres
Draught: 23 metres
Length: 458 metres
Beam: 69 metres
Draught: 24.6 metres
Alongside berth depth needed 15 metres 23.5 metres 25 metres 
Berth length 1 000 metres. The whole vessel 
needs to be adjacent to the quay area 
to allow maximum unloading/loading 
and further berths needed at the 
same quay for feeder vessels.
Access to the vessel can be via 
a pier extended out into deeper 
water and cargo moved via 
conveyor.
Access to the vessel can be via 
a pier extended out into deeper 
water and cargo moved via 
pipeline.
Pilotage Increased assistance likely Increased assistance likely Increased assistance likely
Terminal area 7ZRZD\LPSRUWH[SRUWFDUJR
movement means increased storage 
space is needed to discharge and 
load cargo. Container yard depth 
should be at least 500 metres. 
Approximately 25–30 ha is needed 
for a terminal with an annual 
WKURXJKSXWRI}PLOOLRQ7(8V
As cargo tends to move in 
one way (export to import) the 
increase storage space needed is 
minimal and tends to be open air, 
i.e. requiring only land surface. 
2QH}PLOOLRQWRQVRILURQRUHRFFXS\
approximately 12–15 ha.
Although cargo tends to move 
in one direction, costly storage 
facilities and land surface are 
QHHGHG2QH}PLOOLRQEDUUHOVRI
storage occupy an area of 5 ha.
4XD\VLGHFDUJRKDQGOLQJ
equipment
8–10 gantry cranes per berth with an 
RXWUHDFKRI7(8V}PLOOLRQt
}PLOOLRQHDFK
1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH 1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
2QVKRUHFDUJRKDQGOLQJ
equipment
Increased number of vehicles needed 
to transport containers to stacking 
yard, automated guidance vehicles, 
higher reach stackers (possibly up to 
KLJKUDLOPRXQWHGJDQWU\FUDQHV
straddle carriers, etc.
1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH 1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
IT equipment More advanced IT systems needed 
to monitor increased number of 
containers.
1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH 1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
Customs/security checks Increased volume of containers and 
number of individual shippers could 
VLJQLƂFDQWO\LQFUHDVHWKHQXPEHURI
security checks.
1RVLJQLƂFDQWGLIIHUHQFH Extra security may be needed to 
deter terrorist attacks.
Inland congestion With most containers arriving/leaving 
ports on trucks, congestion could be 
severe and affect local residents.
Bulk cargo tends to arrive/leave 
port via trains/barges. Congestion 
depends upon other infrastructure.
Congestion within pipelines tends 
not to be noticeable.
Seaside congestion A restrictive access channel may 
cause delays to other vessels.
A restrictive access channel may 
cause delays to other vessels.
A restrictive access channel may 
cause delays to other vessels.
Environment Increased trucks on roads will raise 
levels of CO2 pollution. Noise and 
light pollution may also affect local 
residents. There may also be ballast 
water issues for loading ports.
Increased dust affecting the health 
of local residents is to be expected, 
as well as possible ballast water 
issues for loading ports.
In the absence of any spillage, 
environmental costs will be low. 
There may also be ballast water 
issues for loading ports.
Employment More skilled workers (for example, 
FUDQHVDQG,7V\VWHPVRSHUDWRUV
will be required. Increased potential 
for employment within supporting 
industries.
Minimal increase to port workers 
but a higher potential for 
employment within supporting 
industries.
Minimal increase to port workers 
but a higher potential for 
employment within supporting 
industries.
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to transfer iron ore from Vale’s VLOCs to smaller ships 
for transport to Asian markets, including China.43 The 
locations where these VLOCs will be based include 
the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and possibly 
Malaysia.44$OVRLQ0DOD\VLD9DOHKDVVSHQW}PLOOLRQ
RQWKHRUGHURISRUWHTXLSPHQWLQFOXGLQJORDGHUVXOWUD
large unloaders, bucket-wheel stackers and reclaimers 
for its break bulk trans-shipment centre at Teluk Rubiah.45
:LWK WKH GHSOR\PHQW RI ERWK ƅRDWLQJ DQG UHJLRQDO
trans-shipment centres, large iron ore shipments can 
be transported from Latin America to Asia at optimum 
economies of scale and cost savings passed on, allowing 
Vale to obtain the sought-after market share.
Trans-shipment in dry bulk differs from container trans-
shipment, the former being performed at sea and the 
latter on land. This is possible because, unlike containers, 
dry bulk cargo is homogenous and can be split and 
VROGHQURXWHZKHUHDVFRQWDLQHUVFRQWDLQYHU\VSHFLƄF
cargos sometimes with multiple owners. Furthermore, 
the trend of larger vessel sizes in the dry bulk sector 
does not affect ports in the same way as the increased 
sizes of container ships, as indicated by the comparison 
VKRZQLQWDEOH}/DUJHUGU\EXONRUWDQNHUYHVVHOVFDQ
VWLOOEHORDGHGDQGXQORDGHGZLWKWKHVDPHHTXLSPHQW
QHHGHGIRUVPDOOHUYHVVHOV$OOKRZHYHUUHTXLUHGHHSHU
alongside berths, but with dry bulk and tanker vessels, 
extending the reach of conveyor belts or pipelines and 
power is not technically as challenging.
Tanker terminals
7KHWDQNHUVHFWRUKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHQHƄWHGIURPODUJH
YHVVHOVZLWKWKHƄUVWYHU\ODUJHFUXGHFDUULHUV9/&&V
appearing in the 1970s. The tanker sector represents 
around one third of international seaborne trade by 
YROXPHDQG}SHUFHQWE\YDOXH7KHWDQNHUPDUNHWLV
generally concerned with the transportation of crude 
oil and petroleum products which are mainly used to 
manufacture other goods. The growth potential of this 
sector is enormous due to the increases in demand 
for carbon energy as a result of the growing middle 
classes in developing countries.
Ports have dealt with the challenges of receiving 
VLCCs by extending piers with pipelines further out 
to sea. The port infrastructure needed to service these 
vessels relates primarily to storage tanks within the 
port area. However, most oil importing countries would 
SUREDEO\ EHQHƄW IURP EHWWHU LQODQG VWRUDJH IDFLOLWLHV
closer to the consumer, depending on the geographic 
characteristics of the country, rather than to rely upon 
VKRUHVLGHVWRUDJHZKLFKEHWWHUEHQHƄWVRLOH[SRUWLQJ
countries. Thus, the role of ports in tanker storage 
VKRXOGSULPDULO\EHDEXIIHUUROHWRKHOSEDODQFHLQƅRZV
DQGRXWƅRZVUDWKHUWKDQVWRUDJH per se.
7KHWUHQGIRUODUJHUYHVVHOVDQGWKHFRQFHSWRIƅRDWLQJ
storage centres to act as trans-shipment hubs could 
be a competitor to ports which traditionally make their 
revenue from cargo handling. Floating storage centres 
already exist in the tanker sector, but their use is 
PDLQO\E\RLOUHƄQHULHVWRDEVRUEVXUSOXVFDSDFLW\7KH
largest vessel ever built was the tanker M/V Seawise 
Giant that, along with many other ULCCs, ended her 
ODVWGD\VDVDƅRDWLQJVWRUDJHSODWIRUPLQWKH3HUVLDQ
Gulf.46 Some vessels may be used by oil traders as 
temporary storage but these vessels do not trans-ship 
DQG WHQGRQO\ WREH ODLGXSDV ƅRDWLQJ VWRUDJHXQWLO
there is an upward movement in the price of oil.
Conclusions
2QHRI WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI LQFUHDVLQJ YHVVHO VL]H WR
WUDQVSRUWFDUJRPRUHHIƄFLHQWO\LVWKDWLQHIƄFLHQFLHVDUH
simply moved to elsewhere in the logistics chain. The 
TXD\VLGH FUDQHKDQGOLQJ LQSDUWLFXODUFRQWLQXHV WREH
a problem area, together with the landside entrance/
exit point where trains or trucks enter or leave the port. 
Unloading vessels tends to be more time consuming 
than loading (in container shipping) as boxes often 
originate from one country specializing in manufacture 
(for example, China) but are unloaded at many places 
LQORZHUYROXPHVPDNLQJLWGLIƄFXOWWRDFKLHYHWKHVDPH
RSHUDWLRQDO HIƄFLHQFLHV ,Q DGGLWLRQ UHFHLYLQJ FRXQWULHV
RIWHQQHHGWRVKXIƅHFRQWDLQHUVLQRUGHUWRJDLQDFFHVV
to those underneath. While computer software can 
make the process easier, space is still needed to perform 
the movement and thus the areas where work can be 
performed are reduced. One of the key challenges 
facing ports working with container shipping is the 
UHGXFWLRQLQIUHTXHQF\RISRUWFDOOVE\LQGLYLGXDOYHVVHOV
as highlighted in the LSCI. With larger ships calling at 
IHZHUKXESRUWV WKH IUHTXHQF\RIFDUJRDUULYDOZLOOSXW
PDQ\SRUWV WR WKH WHVW7KH UDWHDWZKLFKFDUJRƅRZV
into a port must match the rate at which it leaves for the 
port not to occupy large tracks of land or for congestion 
not to occur. As with most businesses, port operators 
SUHIHUVWHDG\VWUHDPVRIWUDIƄF&DUJRVXUJHVFRPELQHG
with time constraints and perhaps unfamiliarity of heavy 
HTXLSPHQW FDQ LQFUHDVH SUHVVXUH WKDW PD\ WUDQVODWH
into a slip in safety standards. With larger vessels and 
PRUHVSHFLDOLVHGFDUJRKDQGOLQJHTXLSPHQWWLHGXSZLWK
HDFKYHVVHODQ\SRUWGRZQWLPHFRXOGVLJQLƄFDQWO\DIIHFW
the ability of the port to earn enough revenue to make 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQYHVWPHQWƄQDQFLDOO\VXVWDLQDEOH
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This chapter provides information on legal issues and recent regulatory developments 
LQWKHƄHOGVRIWUDQVSRUWDQGWUDGHIDFLOLWDWLRQDQGRQWKHVWDWXVRIWKHPDLQPDULWLPH
conventions. Important issues include the recent adoption of amendments to the 1996 
&RQYHQWLRQRQ/LPLWDWLRQRI/LDELOLW\IRU0DULWLPH&ODLPV//0&DVZHOODVDUDQJH
of regulatory developments relating to maritime and supply-chain security, maritime 
safety and environmental issues.
Among the regulatory measures worth noting is a set of technical and operational 
PHDVXUHVWRLQFUHDVHHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\DQGUHGXFHJUHHQKRXVHJDV*+*HPLVVLRQV
from international shipping that was adopted under the auspices of the International 
0DULWLPH 2UJDQL]DWLRQ ,02 LQ -XO\  DQG LV H[SHFWHG WR HQWHU LQWR IRUFH RQ 
January 2013. To assist in the implementation of these new mandatory measures, four 
sets of guidelines were also adopted at IMO in March 2012. Discussions on possible 
PDUNHWEDVHGPHDVXUHVIRUWKHUHGXFWLRQRI*+*HPLVVLRQVIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOVKLSSLQJ
continued and remained controversial. In respect of liability and compensation for ship-
VRXUFHRLOSROOXWLRQDQHZ81&7$'UHSRUWSURYLGHVDQRYHUYLHZRI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
legal framework as well as some guidance for national policymaking.
$W WKH :RUOG 7UDGH 2UJDQL]DWLRQ :72 QHJRWLDWLRQV FRQWLQXHG RQ D IXWXUH 7UDGH
)DFLOLWDWLRQ7)$JUHHPHQW:KLOHQHJRWLDWRUVDGYDQFHGRQWKHGUDIWQHJRWLDWLQJWH[W
it has been suggested that an agreement in TF might be reached earlier than in other 
areas of the Doha Development Round of negotiations.
LEGAL ISSUES AND 
REGULATORY 
DEVELOPMENTS
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A. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
TRANSPORT LAW
Adoption of amendments to the 
1996 Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims 
National legislation or international legal instruments may 
give shipowners and others linked with the operation of 
a ship the right to limit their liability in respect of certain 
claims, whatever the basis of liability may be. Under 
these so-called global limitation regimes, limits of liability 
are calculated using either the ship’s value or a value 
calculated on the basis of the size of the ship and in 
particular on the basis of the ship’s tonnage.1 The most 
important global limitation regimes are the Convention 
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (1976 
LLMC),2 and the 1976 LLMC as amended by its 1996 
Protocol3 (hereafter 1996 LLMC).
%RWKWKH//0&DQGWKH//0&VHWVSHFLƄF
limits of liability for two types of claims against shipowners 
(and certain other persons),4 namely, claims for loss of life 
RUSHUVRQDO LQMXU\DQGFODLPV IRUSURSHUW\GDPDJHDV
IXUWKHUGHƄQHG5 In each case, the shipowner is entitled 
to limitation of liability except in certain cases of wilful 
misconduct.6 While the approach to limitation is the same 
under both regimes, there are important differences. In 
particular, the actual amounts to which the limitation is 
limited are higher under the 1996 LLMC.
An important development, of interest to parties engaged 
in international trade, was the adoption at IMO, in April 
2012, of amendments increasing the compensation 
limits set by the 1996 LLMC.7 In light of experience 
ZLWKUHOHYDQWLQFLGHQWVDVZHOODVLQƅDWLRQWKHOLPLWDWLRQ
DPRXQWVVSHFLƄHGLQWKH3URWRFROZHUHFRQVLGHUHG
LQDGHTXDWHWRFRYHUWKHFRVWVRIFODLPVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVH
arising from incidents involving bunker fuel spills. The new 
FRPSHQVDWLRQOLPLWVUHSUHVHQWLQJDQLQFUHDVHRI}SHU
cent over previous limits, are expected to enter into force 
IRU &RQWUDFWLQJ 6WDWHV WR WKH  //0&RQ } $SULO
2015, 36 months from the date of adoption, under the 
tacit acceptance procedure.8 In outline, the amendments 
may be summarized as follows: with respect to claims for 
ORVVRIOLIHRUSHUVRQDOLQMXU\ on ships with a tonnage not 
H[FHHGLQJWRQVWKHOLPLWRIOLDELOLW\LV}PLOOLRQ
6SHFLDO'UDZLQJ5LJKWV6'5XSIURP}PLOOLRQ6'59
For larger ships, the following additional amounts apply 
when calculating the limit of liability:
s )RUHDFKWRQIURPWRWRQV}6'5
(up from 800 SDR);
s )RUHDFKWRQIURPWRWRQV}6'5
(up from 600 SDR);
s )RUHDFKWRQLQH[FHVVRIWRQV}6'5
(up from 400 SDR).10
The limit of liability for property claims for ships not 
H[FHHGLQJ  WRQV LV } PLOOLRQ 6'5 XS IURP
}PLOOLRQ6'511 For larger ships, the following additional 
amounts apply when calculating the limit of liability:
s For each ton from 2,001 to 30,000 tons, 604 SDR 
(up from 400 SDR);
s )RUHDFKWRQIURPWRWRQV}6'5
(up from 300 SDR);
s For each ton in excess of 70,000 tons, 302 SDR 
(up from 200 SDR).12
With the adoption of increased limits of liability, the 
protection of maritime claimants has been strengthened. 
However, it should be noted that the amendments affect 
limitation of liability only under the 1996 LLMC.13 While 
many States have adopted the 1996 LLMC, some 
continue to adhere to the unamended 1976 LLMC, or the 
earlier International Convention Relating to the Limitation 
of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships, 1957.14 Few 
6WDWHVQRZFRQWLQXH WRDGKHUH WR WKHƄUVW LQWHUQDWLRQDO
FRQYHQWLRQ LQ WKHƄHOG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RQYHQWLRQ IRU
WKH8QLƄFDWLRQRI&HUWDLQ5XOHVUHODWLQJWRWKH/LPLWDWLRQ
of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, 1924. While 
each of the relevant Conventions deals with the issue 
of limitation of liability for maritime claims, there are 
substantive differences. Limitation of liability amounts vary 
VLJQLƄFDQWO\ZLWKWKHKLJKHVWDPRXQWVWKDWLVWKRVHPRVW
favourable to claimants, under the 1996 LLMC.15 In view 
of the most recent amendments, policy makers in States 
that are not yet Contracting States to the 1996 LLMC 
may wish to consider afresh the merits of accession.
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND 
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
1. Reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions from international
shipping 
For several years, efforts aimed at establishing a 
regulatory regime to control and reduce emissions of 
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GHGs from ships have been dominating substantive 
discussions at the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) of IMO.16 Relevant discussions 
focus on technical and operational measures, which, 
according to an IMO study published in 2009,17 have 
DVLJQLƄFDQWSRWHQWLDOIRUUHGXFWLRQRI*+*HPLVVLRQV
from international shipping,18 but also on the more 
controversial issue of potential market-based 
measures (MBMs).19
An overview of relevant recent developments at IMO 
is provided in the following sections. Attention should 
also be drawn to an UNCTAD-edited volume Maritime 
Transport and the Climate Change Challenge, 
published in May 2012, which provides detailed 
insight into a range of the potential implications of 
climate change for this key sector of global trade.20
(a) Adoption of new regulations on energy 
HIƂFLHQF\IRUVKLSVDQGJXLGHOLQHVIRU
their implementation
A key development under the auspices of IMO 
LQFOXGHV WKH ƄQDOL]DWLRQ DQG DGRSWLRQ RI PDQGDWRU\
regulatory measures for GHG emissions control. A set 
of technical and operational measures21 to increase 
HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ DQG UHGXFH HPLVVLRQV RI *+*V
from international shipping were adopted during the 
sixty-second session of the MEPC, which was held 
from 11 to 15 July 2011. The package of measures 
– adopted by roll-call vote rather than by consensus – 
was added by way of amendment to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
DVPRGLƄHGE\WKH3URWRFRORI0$532/
Annex VI22 Regulations on the Prevention of Air 
Pollution from Ships, as a new chapter (chapter 4) 
HQWLWOHG q5HJXODWLRQVRQHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\ IRU VKLSVr
The amendments are expected to enter into force on 
1 January 2013.23
Four sets of guidelines24 intended to support 
the uniform implementation of these mandatory 
UHJXODWLRQV ZHUH VXEVHTXHQWO\ DGRSWHG GXULQJ WKH
sixty-third session of MEPC, which was held from 27 
February to 2 March 2012. At the same session, the 
discussion continued on proposed MBMs that would 
complement the technical and operational measures 
already adopted.
5HJXODWLRQVRQHQHUJ\HIƂFLHQF\IRUVKLSV
7KH5HJXODWLRQVPDNH WKH (QHUJ\ (IƄFLHQF\'HVLJQ
Index (EEDI) mandatory for new ships and the 
6KLS (QHUJ\ (IƄFLHQF\ 0DQDJHPHQW 3ODQ 6((03
mandatory for all ships.25 The EEDI establishes 
D PLQLPXP HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ UHTXLUHPHQW &22
emissions per capacity mile) for new ships, depending 
RQ VKLS W\SH DQG VL]H 7KLV UHTXLUHG OHYHO ZLOO EH
UHGXFHG HYHU\ ƄYH \HDUV ZLWK VKLSV UHTXLUHG WR EH
LQFUHDVLQJO\HIƄFLHQWWKURXJKWHFKQLFDO LPSURYHPHQWV
WR HOHPHQWV RI GHVLJQ DQG FRPSRQHQWV LQƅXHQFLQJ
IXHO HIƄFLHQF\ 5HGXFWLRQ UDWHV DUH VHW XQWLO 
ZKHQD}SHUFHQW UHGXFWLRQ LVPDQGDWHGRYHU WKH
DYHUDJHHIƄFLHQF\ IRU VKLSVEXLOW EHWZHHQDQG
2009. The EEDI is a performance-based mechanism, 
DQGDVORQJDVWKHUHTXLUHGHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\OHYHO LV
attained, the industry is free to use the most cost-
HIƄFLHQW WHFKQRORJ\ IRU WKHLU VKLSV WR FRPSO\ ZLWK
the relevant Regulations. The current EEDI will cover 
DERXW}SHUFHQWRIHPLVVLRQVIURPQHZRLOWDQNHUV
gas tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo, refrigerated 
cargo and container ships, as well as combination 
FDUULHUVOLTXLGGU\EXON26
Under the Regulations, it will also become mandatory 
for ships to carry a SEEMP after 1 January 2013. 
The SEEMP is intended to be a practical tool to help 
shipowners manage their environmental performance 
DQG LPSURYH DQG PRQLWRU VKLS DQG ƅHHW HIƄFLHQF\
over time. It establishes a mechanism for operators to 
LPSURYHWKHHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\RIVKLSVWKURXJKXVHRI
WKH(QHUJ\(IƄFLHQF\2SHUDWLRQDO,QGLFDWRU((2,DVD
monitoring tool.27,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QHUJ\(IƄFLHQF\,((
&HUWLƄFDWHVIRUVKLSVVXEMHFWWRWKH5HJXODWLRQVZLOOEH
issued by the respective Governments.28
As of 1 January 2013, the new Regulations shall 
apply to all ships of 400 tons and above. However, 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQVPD\ZDLYH WKH UHTXLUHPHQW IRU VXFK
VKLSVWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKH((',UHTXLUHPHQWV$FFRUGLQJ
to the Regulations, this waiver may not be applied to 
ships above 400 tons:
“1. for which the building contract is placed on 
or after 1 January 2017; 2. in the absence of a 
building contract, the keel of which is laid or which 
is at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 
July 2017; 3. the delivery of which is on or after 
-XO\RULQFDVHVRIDPDMRUFRQYHUVLRQ
of a new or existing ship, … on or after 1 January 
2017.”29
7KH UHTXLUHG ((', DQG WKH DWWDLQHG ((', VKDOO EH
calculated for:
“1. each new ship; 2. each new ship which has 
XQGHUJRQHDPDMRUFRQYHUVLRQDQGHDFKQHZ
RU H[LVWLQJ VKLS ZKLFK KDV XQGHUJRQH D PDMRU
conversion that is so extensive that the ship 
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is regarded by the Administration as a newly 
constructed ship ….”
In addition:
qWKHDWWDLQHG((', VKDOO EH VSHFLƄF WRHDFKVKLS
and shall indicate the estimated performance 
RI WKH VKLS LQ WHUPV RI HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ ,W ZLOO
EH DFFRPSDQLHG E\ WKH ((', WHFKQLFDO ƄOH
that contains the information necessary for the 
calculation of the attained EEDI and that shows 
the process of calculation.”30
The calculation shall be done taking into account 
guidelines developed by IMO.
Guidelines for implementation of energy
HIƂFLHQF\PHDVXUHV
Four sets of guidelines intended to assist in the 
implementation of the mandatory Regulations on 
HQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\IRUVKLSVLQ0$532/$QQH[9,ZHUH
adopted by MEPC during its sixty-third session from 
27 February to 2 March 2012.31 They are:
s 2012 Guidelines on the Method of Calculation of 
WKH$WWDLQHG(QHUJ\(IƄFLHQF\'HVLJQ,QGH[((',
for New Ships;
s 2012 Guidelines for the Development of a Ship 
(QHUJ\(IƄFLHQF\0DQDJHPHQW3ODQ6((03;
s *XLGHOLQHVRQ6XUYH\DQG&HUWLƄFDWLRQRIWKH
(QHUJ\(IƄFLHQF\'HVLJQ,QGH[((',;
s Guidelines for Calculation of Reference Lines 
IRU XVH ZLWK WKH (QHUJ\ (IƄFLHQF\ 'HVLJQ ,QGH[
(EEDI).32
Administrations were invited to take these Guidelines 
into account when developing and enacting national 
laws which give force to and implement provisions 
set forth in the respective Regulations of MARPOL 
Annex VI, as amended, as well as to bring SEEMP to 
the attention of masters, seafarers, shipowners, ship 
operators and any other interested groups.
The 2012 Guidelines address some of the concerns 
that had been raised regarding the safety of the EEDI, 
both in debates among States at IMO discussions33
and within the shipping industry.34 The key concern 
in this respect had been that while the EEDI formula 
value can easily be met by using vessels with smaller, 
lower-power engines, these are potentially dangerous 
since they do not have enough reserve power available 
for emergency conditions, such as extreme weather 
or special manoeuvring in ports when necessary. 
The 2012 Guidelines on the method of calculation of 
the attained EEDI for new ships contain a provision 
which allows vessels to be built with whatever engine 
power the owner thinks necessary, as long as it is 
limited to provide a suitable shaft power to give the 
UHTXLUHG((',YDOXH ,QDQHPHUJHQF\WKH OLPLWHUZLOO
be deactivated or overridden so that more power can 
be used.35
An updated work plan36 was also agreed upon, for the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIIXUWKHUJXLGHOLQHVDQGHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\
frameworks for those ships not covered by the current 
EEDI regulations. According to the work plan, these 
JXLGHOLQHV DUH VHW WR EH ƄQDOL]HG E\ WKH HQG RI WKH
VL[W\ƄIWKVHVVLRQRIWKH0(3&WREHKHOGLQ
Draft MEPC resolution on promotion of technical 
cooperation and transfer of technology relating
WRWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIHQHUJ\HIƂFLHQF\RIVKLSV
Another new Regulation in chapter 4 of MARPOL 
Annex VI is that concerning “Promotion of technical 
cooperation and transfer of technology relating to the 
LPSURYHPHQWRIHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\RIVKLSVr8QGHUWKLV
Regulation, administrations, in cooperation with IMO 
DQGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOERGLHVDUHUHTXLUHGWRSURPRWH
and provide as appropriate – directly or through IMO 
– support to States, especially developing States, that 
UHTXHVW WHFKQLFDO DVVLVWDQFH 7KH 5HJXODWLRQ DOVR
UHTXLUHVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVWRFRRSHUDWHDFWLYHO\ZLWKRQH
DQRWKHUDQGVXEMHFWWRWKHLUQDWLRQDOODZVUHJXODWLRQV
and policies, “to promote the development and 
transfer of technology and exchange of information to 
6WDWHVZKLFKUHTXHVWWHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFHSDUWLFXODUO\
developing States, in respect of the implementation 
RIPHDVXUHVWRIXOƄOWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIFKDSWHU>RI
MARPOL Annex VI ].”37
Linked to the implementation of this Regulation, 
DQGRI WKHRWKHUHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\PHDVXUHVDGUDIW
resolution on the “Promotion of technical co-operation 
and transfer of technology relating to the improvement 
RIHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\RIVKLSVr38 was discussed during 
the sixty-third session of MEPC. A group of member 
States submitted an informal paper during the session, 
providing comments and proposing additional 
amendments to the draft resolution, on:
“a methodology for assessing implementation, 
WKH QHFHVVDU\ ƄQDQFLDO WHFKQRORJLFDO DQG
capacity-building support for developing countries 
by developed countries, taking into account 
the principles of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities 
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under the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] and its Kyoto 
Protocol.”39
$ZRUNLQJJURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGWRƄQDOL]HWKHGUDIW
resolution, but could not reach consensus on some 
of the proposals. Work on the draft resolution will 
continue during the sixty-fourth session of the MEPC, 
to be held from 1 to 5 October 2012.
Three other categories of issues relating to GHGs were 
considered during the sixty-third session of MEPC, 
namely the application of EEDI to existing ships, 
uncertainty in emission data, and a performance 
standard for fuel consumption measurement. 
Following concerns expressed by industry and 
supported by a large number of parties, the 
&RPPLWWHHFRQƄUPHGWKDW((',KDGEHHQGHYHORSHG
as a regulatory tool for new ships only; as a design 
LQGH[H[WHQVLRQRILWVDSSOLFDWLRQWRWKHH[LVWLQJƅHHW
would be inappropriate.40 The MEPC took note of 
concerns that the reduction effects of the EEDI and 
SEEMP may have been overestimated, and noted that 
XQFHUWDLQW\ H[LVWHG LQ WKH HVWLPDWHV DQG SURMHFWLRQV
of emissions from international shipping.41 The 
Committee agreed that further work should take place 
“to provide the Committee with reliable and up-to-date 
LQIRUPDWLRQ WR EDVH LWV GHFLVLRQV RQ DQG UHTXHVWHG
the secretariat to investigate possibilities and report 
to future sessions.”42 The Committee also agreed that 
development of an IMO performance standard for fuel 
consumption measurement for ships could be a useful 
tool and should be considered further.
(b) Market-based measures, and related 
matters
While a set of technical and operational measures 
WR LQFUHDVH HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ RI VKLSV KDV QRZ
been adopted, discussions on possible MBMs for 
the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping continue, and remain highly controversial.43
As reported in the Review of Maritime Transport
2011, an extensive debate on how to progress in the 
development of an MBM had been held during the 
VL[W\ƄUVW VHVVLRQ RI 0(3&44 The MBM proposals 
under review ranged from those envisaging a 
contribution or levy on all CO2 emissions from all ships, 
or only for those generated by ships not meeting the 
((',UHTXLUHPHQWWRHPLVVLRQVWUDGLQJVFKHPHVDQG
WRVFKHPHVEDVHGRQDVKLSpVDFWXDOHIƄFLHQF\ERWKE\
design (EEDI) and operation (EEOI).45 6XEVHTXHQWO\
the third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group 
on GHG Emissions from Ships (GHG-WG3), which was 
dedicated to further work on MBMs, was held from 
28 March to 1 April 2011.46 Due to time constraints, 
MEPC had been unable to address the issue of 
MBMs during its sixty-second session, held from 11 
to 15 July 2011, and agreed to defer consideration of 
relevant submissions to its sixty-third session. 
During its sixty-third session, MEPC continued 
its discussion of proposed MBMs, which would 
complement the technical and operational measures 
already adopted. It was agreed that the focus should 
be on a more comprehensive impact assessment 
RI WKH SRVVLEOH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI LQWURGXFLQJ DQ
MBM from international shipping under IMO. The 
discussions on MBMs covered a number of different 
WRSLFVZKLFKDUHEULHƅ\VXPPDUL]HGEHORZ
The sixty-third session of MEPC adopted the report of 
GHG-WG3, Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships,47
and, in this respect, noted that the third Intersessional 
Meeting had completed, as far as possible, the terms of 
reference given to it by the Committee and had placed 
the MBM proposals into two groups: (1) focus on in-
sector and, (2) in-sector and out-of-sector, based on 
the emission reduction mechanism used by the MBM 
proposals.48 Inter alia, MEPC further noted:
s That there were two opinions as to whether a 
compelling “need and purpose of an MBM” for 
international shipping under IMO had been clearly 
demonstrated, and agreed to return to the issue in 
due course;
s The debate on the “relation to relevant conventions 
and rules”, and agreed to consider the issue further, 
partly based on a submission by one delegation;
s The debate on “strengths and weaknesses” and 
WKDW IRU WKH 0%0 SURSRVDOV LGHQWLƄHG XQGHU
HDFK JURXS WKH SURSRQHQWV KDG LGHQWLƄHG DQG
listed strengths and weaknesses49 and that other 
delegations which were not proponents of MBMs 
KDG LGHQWLƄHG DGGLWLRQDO ZHDNQHVVHV IRU DOO WKH
MBM proposals;50
s That the Intersessional Meeting acknowledged the 
ƄQGLQJVDQGFRQFOXVLRQVRIWKHVWXG\RIWKH([SHUW
Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment 
of Possible Market-based Measures (MBM-EG),51
LQFOXGLQJ LWV LGHQWLƄFDWLRQ WKDW WKHUH ZRXOG EH
a need for further study of both the “direct and 
indirect impacts on developing countries” due to 
the introduction and non-introduction of an MBM 
for international shipping under IMO;
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s That two documents submitted by delegations,52
or relevant parts thereof, should be considered 
further at its current session.
The debate continued on the issue of further impact 
assessment of proposed MBMs for international 
maritime transport. Two documents prepared by the 
Chairperson were considered as part of this debate. 
7KH ƄUVW GRFXPHQW53 set out proposals on how an 
impact assessment may be undertaken to determine 
the possible effects of introduction of an MBM for 
international shipping, including the method and 
criteria for the assessment. The second document54
contained proposed draft terms of reference for 
a steering committee for the impact assessment 
of MBM proposals, to be established in order to 
supervise the impact assessment and to assist and 
provide advice to the IMO secretariat. The MEPC 
also noted that the feasibility study called for by the 
work plan for further consideration of MBMs had been 
successfully completed by the MBM-EG, which had 
concluded that all MBM proposals under review could 
be implemented, notwithstanding the challenges 
associated with the introduction of new measures.55
To illustrate the controversial nature of issues related 
to the introduction of MBMs, especially from the 
perspective of some developing countries, two 
submissions by national delegations are particularly 
pertinent, as detailed below.
$GRFXPHQWVXEPLWWHGE\,QGLDSUHVHQWHGWKHƄQGLQJV
of an MBM impact study on the country’s shipping 
sector and trade.56 According to the study, the 
adoption of an MBM would lead to adverse impacts 
RQWUDGHDQGJURZWKDQGFUHDWHDQLQHTXLWDEOHEXUGHQ
on Indian consumers. Moreover, it could have “a 
deleterious impact on the environment as consumers 
RI FRDO LQ ,QGLD PD\ UHVRUW WR XVH RI SRRU TXDOLW\
Indian coal.”57 Based on the results of the study, 
India reiterated its concerns about the economic 
implications of MBMs on consumers in developing 
countries, whose contribution to GHG emissions per 
capita, were minimal.
Another document submitted by China58 highlighted 
the need to carry out further impact assessment on 
developing countries, and proposed a list of revised 
criteria to be taken into account for the assessment. 
Nine criteria were proposed, namely:
(i) The “environmental effectiveness” of the 
proposed MBMs, particularly in limiting GHG 
emissions from international shipping;
(ii) The “cost-effectiveness” of the proposed 
MBMs and the direct and indirect socio-
economic impacts on trade, consumers and 
industries in developing countries, particularly 
in least developed countries (LDCs) and small 
island developing states (SIDSs);
(iii) The “potential of the proposed MBMs to 
provide incentives to technological reform and 
innovation”;
(iv) The “economic, technical and operational 
feasibility” of implementing the proposed 
MBMs;
Y 7KHqSRWHQWLDODGGLWLRQDOƄQDQFLDOZRUNORDGDQG
technical burden” for the shipbuilding industry 
and the maritime sector in developing countries 
of implementing and enforcing the proposed 
0%0V DQG WKH qQHHG IRU ƄQDQFLDO VXSSRUW
technology transfer and capacity-building”;
(vi) The “consistency of the proposed MBMs with 
other relevant conventions”, such as UNFCCC, 
Kyoto Protocol and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules, “especially the principle of 
[common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities] CBDR, as well as its 
compatibility with customary international law, 
as depicted in the [United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea] UNCLOS”;
(vii) When there is a potential to raise funds, the 
qFRVWV ERUQH E\ DQG EHQHƄWV IRU GHYHORSLQJ
countries”;
(viii) The “potential additional administrative 
burden”, and the legal aspects for national 
administrations relating to the implemention 
and enforcement of the proposed MBMs;
(ix) The “compatibility of the proposed MBMs 
with the existing enforcement and control 
provisions” under the IMO legal framework.
It was agreed by consensus that there was a need 
for a continued impact assessment and that its focus 
should be on possible impacts on consumers and 
industries in developing countries. Despite the efforts 
made to develop the draft terms of reference for further 
impact assessment of proposed MBMs, including 
the methodology and criteria for the assessment, 
a number of issues were still pending. One issue 
concerned whether the methodology for the impact 
assessment should be carried out by an expert group 
or by commissioned research institutes. Another issue 
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concerned the scope of impact assessment. It was 
agreed to consider the terms of reference further at 
the next session of MEPC. 
As part of the discussions on consideration and 
possible consolidation of MBM proposals, various 
submissions by delegations were considered.59 It was 
DJUHHG WKDW 0%0 SURSRVDOV WKDW ZRXOG EH VXEMHFW
to the impact assessment were those set out in the 
report of the GHG-WG3.60 Regarding consolidation of 
proposals, it was noted, inter alia, that:
s “A number of delegations felt it desirable to carry 
out the analysis with a reduced number of MBM 
proposals, but also recognized that, in so doing, 
vital information could be lost which could be used 
DW D ODWHU VWDJH ZKHQ WKH ƄQDO 0%0 KDG EHHQ
advanced in its development; the resultant MBM 
could be a combination of elements of different 
MBMs or some compromise solution rather than 
any of the proposals in their initial form”;61
s “Some delegations opposed further consideration 
of MBM, stating that IMO should focus on technical 
and operational measures”;62
s A large number of delegations were not ready to 
select a possible MBM proposal at this time; the 
presence or absence of draft legal text associated 
with proposals “[was] not directly linked to the 
maturity of the proposals and should not be used 
as the benchmark for selection.”63
No proposal was eliminated at the session. All 
SURSRVDOV VKRXOGEH IXUWKHUGHYHORSHGDQG ƄQDOL]HG
in time for the sixty-fourth session of the Committee, 
where they were expected to be considered further in 
order to determine whether they could be analysed 
against all criteria.
7KHLVVXHRIFOLPDWHƄQDQFHDQGSRVVLEOHXVHRI0%0
revenues was also considered, including its relation 
to the wider efforts of the international community 
WR PRELOL]H FOLPDWH ƄQDQFH IRU XVH LQ GHYHORSLQJ
countries.64 Once again, as is illustrated by the summary 
of the discussions in the report of the meeting, the issue 
is one where consensus has not yet been achieved. 
The Committee noted, inter alia, that: 
s “Divergent views were expressed on the use of 
revenues and the relation between an IMO MBM 
DQGFOLPDWHƄQDQFHZLWKDQXPEHURIGHOHJDWLRQV
advocating disbursement of revenues as a way to 
accommodate (reconcile) both CBDR and the IMO 
principles,65 while others opposed this, if applied 
universally to all ships, and advocated an approach 
that would ensure no net incidence on developing 
countries”;66
s “A large number of delegations expressed the 
view that the greater part of any MBM revenues 
VKRXOGEHXVHG IRUFOLPDWHƄQDQFH LQGHYHORSLQJ
countries”;67
s “A number of delegations expressed the view that 
an MBM for international shipping under IMO should 
QRWEHXVHGDVDVRXUFHIRUJHQHUDOFOLPDWHƄQDQFHLQ
the context of the Green Climate Fund where funding 
should be provided by developed countries”; 68
s “A number of delegations stated that the Rebate 
Mechanism (RM)69 – which aims to reconcile 
different principles of shipping and climate change 
conventions – “[was] an innovative and constructive 
proposal that addresses the CBDR principle and 
should be analysed and considered further.”70
The Committee also noted:
(i) The ongoing work under UNFCCC on climate 
ƄQDQFH
(ii) The Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level 
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing
(AGF);71
(iii) The G20 report by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund on mobilizing 
funding sources for the Green Climate Fund,72
ZKLFK KDG LGHQWLƄHG LQWHUQDWLRQDO VKLSSLQJ DV
RQHSRVVLEOHVRXUFHRIƄQDQFH
It is also pertinent that the international shipping 
industry – which, in respect of potential MBMs, has 
indicated a preference for a fuel levy rather than an 
emissions trading scheme – has expressed the view 
that potential revenues should, inter alia, be used for 
the purposes of adapting ports in developing countries 
to the impacts of climate change.73
Regarding the relation of an MBM to WTO rules, it was 
recalled that a large number of delegations at GHG-
WG3 had concluded that no incompatibility existed 
between a potential MBM for international shipping 
under IMO and the WTO rules. However, the view 
was also expressed that a WTO presentation on this 
matter at GHG-WG374 had to be viewed with caution, 
as it expressed the position of the WTO secretariat, 
and some delegations continued to remain concerned 
about inconsistency issues between an MBM and the 
WTO rules.75 The MEPC agreed to continue the debate 
at its sixty-fourth session, and further submissions 
and contributions were invited.
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(c) Matters concerning the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
With respect to matters concerning UNFCCC, it 
was noted that the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference held in Durban from 28 November to 11 
December 2011 resulted in the adoption of a number of 
decisions and conclusions,76 including those relevant 
to the control of GHG emissions from international 
transport,77 to IMO as the custodian of the London 
Convention and the London Protocol,78 and to the 
next annual Climate Change Conference, planned 
to take place from 26 November to 7 December 
2012 in Doha, Qatar.79 7KH 0(3& UHTXHVWHG WKH
IMO secretariat “to continue its well-established 
cooperation with the UNFCCC secretariat, to attend 
relevant UNFCCC meetings, including the meetings 
FRQFHUQLQJ WKH LGHQWLƄFDWLRQ RI SRVVLEOH IXQGLQJ
sources for the Green Climate Fund, and to bring the 
outcome of IMO’s work to the attention of appropriate 
UNFCCC bodies and meetings.”80
2. Ship-source pollution and
protection of the environment 
(a) Developments at the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development
Based on its mandate in the Accra Accord81 and in the 
outcome documents adopted at the conclusion of the 
thirteenth session of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD XIII), held from 
21 to 26 April 2012 in Doha, Qatar, UNCTAD, as 
SDUWRI LWVZRUN LQWKHƄHOGRI WUDQVSRUWKDVUHFHQWO\
published an analytical report with a focus on ship-
source oil pollution. The report, entitled Liability and 
Compensation for Ship-Source Oil Pollution: An 
Overview of the International Legal Framework for Oil 
Pollution Damage from Tankers,82 has been prepared 
to assist policy makers, particularly in developing 
countries, in their understanding of the complex 
international legal framework and in assessing the 
merits of accession to the relevant international legal 
instruments.
By way of background, it should be noted that 
approximately half the global crude oil production is 
carried by sea. Much of this navigation is taking place 
in relative proximity to the coasts of many countries, 
in some cases transiting through constrained areas or 
chokepoints, such as narrow straits or canals. At the 
same time, the steady increase in the size and carrying 
capacity of ships transporting cargo of any type means 
WKDW VLJQLƄFDQW TXDQWLWLHV RI KHDY\ EXQNHU IXHO DUH
carried across the oceans and along coastal zones. 
While the number and extent of large oil pollution 
incidents has decreased over time, exposure to ship-
VRXUFH RLO SROOXWLRQ UHPDLQV D SRWHQWLDOO\ VLJQLƄFDQW
economic threat for coastal States, in particular for 
developing countries and SIDS with economies heavily 
GHSHQGHQWRQLQFRPHIURPƄVKHULHVDQGWRXULVP
The international legal framework concerning oil 
pollution from tankers is very robust and provides 
VLJQLƄFDQWFRPSHQVDWLRQ IRU ORVVGXH WRRLOSROOXWLRQ
incidents. Relevant legal instruments, collectively 
known as the Civil Liability Convention–International 
Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (CLC–IOPC Fund) 
regime,83 HQMR\ EURDG VXSSRUW DQG KDYH EHHQ
widely adopted at the international level. However, 
a considerable number of coastal States, including 
developing countries that are potentially exposed 
to ship-source oil pollution incidents, are not yet 
Contracting Parties to the latest legal instruments 
LQ WKH ƄHOG DQG DV D UHVXOW ZRXOG QRW EHQHƄW IURP
VLJQLƄFDQW FRPSHQVDWLRQ LQ WKH HYHQW RI DQ RLOVSLOO
affecting their coasts or other areas under their marine 
MXULVGLFWLRQ WHUULWRULDOZDWHUVDQGH[FOXVLYHHFRQRPLF
zones). It is against this background that the report has 
been prepared, to assist policy makers, particularly in 
developing countries, in their understanding of the 
relevant legal instruments and in assessing the merits 
of accession.
The report highlights central features of the international 
legal framework and provides an analytical overview of 
key provisions of the most recent of the international 
legal instruments in force. It also offers considerations 
for national policymaking, focusing, inter alia, on:
s 7KHUHODWLYHEHQHƄWVRIDGKHUHQFHWRWKHODWHVWRI
the relevant international legal instruments;
s 7KHUHOHYDQWƄQDQFLDOEXUGHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWKVXFK
adherence;
s Levels of protection available to victims of tanker 
oil pollution depending on which of the different 
legal instruments have been adopted.
In conclusion, the report suggests that accession to 
relevant legal instruments could offer considerable 
EHQHƄWVWRDQXPEHURIFRDVWDOGHYHORSLQJ6WDWHVWKDW
may be vulnerable to oil pollution from tankers.
While the report focuses on the international liability and 
compensation framework for oil pollution from tankers, 
it also highlights some of the key features of two 
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important related international Conventions that cover 
other types of ship-source oil pollution. These are:
s The 2001 Bunker Oil Pollution Convention,84
providing for liability and compensation in the 
event of bunker oil spills from ships other than oil 
tankers (for example, container vessels, reefers, 
chemical tankers, general cargo ships, cruise 
ships and ferries);
s The 1996 Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) 
Convention85 and its 2010 amending Protocol86 (2010 
HNS Convention), which provides for compensation 
relating to incidents arising in connection with the 
carriage of a broad range of hazardous and noxious 
substances, including non-persistent oil.
(b) Developments at the International
Maritime Organization
During its sixty-third session, MEPC also adopted 
amendments to MARPOL relating to regional 
arrangements for port reception facilities, and adopted 
guidelines related to the implementation of the revised 
MARPOL Annex V (Garbage), and the Hong Kong 
International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally 
Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009 (Hong Kong 
Convention).87 The Committee also granted basic and 
ƄQDODSSURYDOWRDQXPEHURIEDOODVWZDWHUPDQDJHPHQW
systems that make use of active substances.
Air pollution from ships: establishment of new 
emission control areas (ECAs)
While CO2 is the main GHG emitted by ships, other 
relevant substances include sulphur oxides (SOx) and 
QLWURJHQR[LGHV12[7KHVHVLJQLƄFDQWO\FRQWULEXWHWR
air pollution from ships and are covered by MARPOL 
Annex VI,88 which had been amended in 2008 to 
introduce more stringent emission controls.89 With 
effect from 1 January 2012, Annex VI establishes 
reduced SOx thresholds for marine bunker fuels, with 
WKH JOREDO VXOSKXU FDS UHGXFHG IURP } SHU FHQW
SSPWR}SHUFHQWSSP7KHJOREDO
VXOSKXU FDSZLOO EH UHGXFHG IXUWKHU WR } SHU FHQW
SSP IURPVXEMHFW WRD IHDVLELOLW\ UHYLHZ
in 2018).90 Annex VI also contains provisions allowing 
for special SOx emission control areas (ECAs) to be 
established where even more stringent controls on 
sulphur emissions apply. Since 1 July 2010, these ECAs 
KDYH62[WKUHVKROGVIRUPDULQHIXHOVRI}SHUFHQWIURP
WKHSUHYLRXV}SHUFHQWIURP-DQXDU\VKLSV
RSHUDWLQJ LQ WKHVHDUHDVZLOO EH UHTXLUHG WREXUQ IXHO
ZLWKQRPRUH WKDQ}SHUFHQWVXOSKXU$OWHUQDWLYHO\
VKLSVPXVWƄWDQH[KDXVWJDVFOHDQLQJV\VWHPRUXVH
any other technological method to limit SOx emissions.
7KHƄUVWWZR62[(&$VWKH%DOWLF6HDDQGWKH1RUWK
Sea areas, were established in Europe, and took effect in 
2006 and 2007 respectively. The third area established 
was the North American ECA, taking effect on 1 August 
2012. In addition, in July 2011, a fourth ECA, the United 
States Caribbean Sea ECA, was established, covering 
FHUWDLQZDWHUV DGMDFHQW WR WKH FRDVWV RI3XHUWR5LFR
(United States) and the United States Virgin Islands, 
and will take effect on 1 January 2014.91
Progressive reductions in NOx emissions from ship 
engines have also been agreed. For ships that operate 
in ECAs, the strictest controls are applicable to ships 
constructed on or after 1 January 2016.
It should be noted that the shipping industry, while 
supportive of the 2008 amendments, has expressed 
concerns about some aspects of the implementation 
RI WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV 7KLV LQFOXGHV LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH
availability of compliant low sulphur fuel to meet the 
new demand.92
3RUWUHFHSWLRQIDFLOLWLHVVHZDJHIURPVKLSVDQG
garbage management
*DUEDJH IURP VKLSV FDQ EH MXVW DV GDQJHURXV WR
marine life as oil or chemicals. At its sixty-second 
session in July 2011, MEPC adopted amendments to 
MARPOL Annex V93, and these are expected to enter 
into force on 1 January 2013. The revised Annex V 
prohibits the discharge of all garbage into the sea, 
except as provided otherwise. An overview of the 
revised MARPOL Annex V discharge provisions is 
SURYLGHGLQWDEOH}
At its sixty-third session, MEPC also adopted:
s Amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV, V and 
VI,94 which are aimed at enabling SIDS to comply 
ZLWK UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU SRUW 6WDWHV WR SURYLGH
reception facilities for ship waste through regional 
arrangements. These amendments are expected 
to enter into force on 1 August 2013;95
s A resolution96 calling for the development, without 
GHOD\ RI SURYHQ DGHTXDWH DQG FRVWHIIHFWLYH
WHFKQLFDORQERDUGHTXLSPHQWWRPDNHLWSRVVLEOH
to meet the discharge standards for passenger 
ships operating in the Baltic Sea (designated a 
Special Area under MARPOL Annex IV Regulations 
for the Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from 
Ships);97
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s The 2012 Guidelines for the Implementation of 
0$532/ $QQH[ 998 and the 2012 Guidelines 
for the Development of Garbage Management 
Plans.99 These guidelines are intended to assist in 
the implementation of the revised MARPOL Annex 
V Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Garbage from Ships, which was adopted at the 
sixty-second session of MEPC in July 2011 and 
is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2013.
Ship recycling
At its sixty-third session, MEPC also adopted the 
2012 Guidelines for Safe and Environmentally Sound 
Ship Recycling100 and the 2012 Guidelines for the 
Authorization of Ship Recycling Facilities.101 These 
guidelines, along with the 2011 Guidelines for the 
Development of the Inventory of Hazardous Materials102 
and the 2011 Guidelines for the Development of the 
Source: www.imo.org.
1 These substances must not be harmful to the marine environment.
2 According to regulation 6.1.2 of MARPOL Annex V the discharge shall only be allowed if: (a) both the port of departure and 
the next port of destination are within the special area and the ship will not transit outside the special area between these 
SRUWVUHJXODWLRQDQGELIQRDGHTXDWHUHFHSWLRQIDFLOLWLHVDUHDYDLODEOHDWWKRVHSRUWVUHJXODWLRQ
7DEOH 6LPSOLƂHGRYHUYLHZRIWKHGLVFKDUJHSURYLVLRQVRIWKHUHYLVHG0$532/$QQH[9UHVROXWLRQ
0(3&ZKLFKZLOOHQWHULQWRIRUFHRQ-DQXDU\IRUPRUHGHWDLOHGJXLGDQFH
UHJDUGLQJWKHUHVSHFWLYHGLVFKDUJHUHTXLUHPHQWVSOHDVHUHIHUWRWKHWH[WRI0$532/$QQH[9
RUWRWKH*XLGHOLQHVIRUWKH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRI0$532/$QQH[9
Type of garbage Ships outside special areas Ships within special areas
Offshore platforms (more 
than 12 nm from land) and 
all ships within 500 m of 
such platforms
Food waste comminuted or 
ground
Discharge permitted 
ſQPIURPWKHQHDUHVWODQGHQ
route and as far as practicable
Discharge permitted 
ſQPIURPWKHQHDUHVWODQGHQ
route and as far as practicable 
Discharge permitted
Food waste not comminuted 
or ground
Discharge permitted 
ſQPIURPWKHQHDUHVWODQGHQ
route and as far as practicable
Discharge prohibited Discharge prohibited
Cargo residues1 not contained 
in wash water
Discharge permitted 
ſQPIURPWKHQHDUHVWODQGHQ
route and as far as practicable
Discharge prohibited Discharge prohibited
Cargo residues1 contained
in wash water
Discharge permitted 
ſQPIURPWKHQHDUHVWODQGHQ
route, as far as practicable and 
subject to two additional conditions2
Discharge prohibited
Cleaning agents and 
additives1 contained in
cargo hold wash water
Discharge permitted
Discharge permitted 
ſQPIURPWKHQHDUHVWODQGHQ
route, as far as practicable and 
subject to two additional conditions2
Discharge prohibited
Cleaning agents and
additives1 in deck and
external surfaces wash water
Discharge permitted Discharge prohibited
Carcasses of animals carried 
on board as cargo and which 
died during the voyage
Discharge permitted Discharge prohibited Discharge prohibited
All other garbage including 
plastics, synthetic ropes, 
ƂVKLQJJHDUSODVWLFJDUEDJH
bags, incinerator ashes, 
FOLQNHUVFRRNLQJRLOƃRDWLQJ
dunnage, lining and packing 
materials, paper, rags, glass, 
metal, bottles, crockery and 
similar refuse
Discharge prohibited Discharge prohibited Discharge prohibited
0L[HGJDUEDJH When garbage is mixed with or contaminated by other substances prohibited from discharge or having different discharge requirements, the more stringent requirements shall apply
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Ship Recycling Plan103 that were adopted during the 
sixty-second session of the MEPC, are intended to 
assist ship-recycling facilities and shipping companies 
to commence introducing voluntary improvements 
WR PHHW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKH +RQJ .RQJ
Convention,104 which had been adopted in May 2009.
Ballast water management
After considering the reports of the 18th, 19th and 20th 
PHHWLQJVRIWKH-RLQW*URXSRI([SHUWVRQWKH6FLHQWLƄF
Aspects of Marine Environment Protection (GESAMP), 
the Committee granted basic approval to three,105 and 
ƄQDO DSSURYDO WR ƄYH 106 ballast water management 
systems that make use of active substances.
Even though ballast water is essential to ensure safe 
operating conditions and stability for vessels at sea, it 
often carries with it a multitude of marine species that 
may survive to establish a reproductive population 
in the host environment, becoming invasive, out-
competing native species and multiplying into pest 
proportions. In February 2004, under the auspices 
of IMO, the International Convention for the Control 
and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments (BWM) was adopted to prevent, minimize 
and ultimately eliminate the risks to the environment, 
human health, property and resources arising from the 
WUDQVIHURIKDUPIXODTXDWLFRUJDQLVPVFDUULHGE\VKLSVp
ballast water from one region to another.107
With regard to the availability of ballast water 
management systems, MEPC at its sixty-third session 
noted that there were already 21 type-approved 
systems available. While some delegations108 
expressed concerns regarding the implementation 
of the BWM Convention due to lack of approved 
technologies, limited shipyard capacity, time 
availability and costs involved, other delegations109
ZHUHRIWKHYLHZWKDWWKHUHDUHVXIƄFLHQWEDOODVWZDWHU
treatment technologies and shipyard capacity, and 
encouraged shipowners to start installing ballast 
water management systems on their ships in order 
to avoid possible bottlenecks at a later stage. It was 
noted that despite some differences in views there 
was consensus regarding the need for additional 
information on the pace of implementation, and the 
availability of technologies and shipyard facilities 
and member States were invited to provide updated 
information regarding the status in their respective 
countries, according to an agreed template.110
The MEPC also adopted a number of amendments 
to BMW-related guidelines, including the 2012 
Guidelines on Design and Construction to Facilitate 
Sediment Control on Ships (G12).111 These are one 
of the 14 sets of guidelines developed to assist in 
the implementation of the BWM Convention – G12 
updates the previous version adopted in 2006. The 
MEPC also urged those countries that had not already 
done so to ratify the BWM Convention, at their earliest 
possible opportunity, so that it could enter into force.112
Dangerous chemicals and oil spill response
In an effort to develop further measures to prevent 
pollution from ships, the International Convention 
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation (OPRC) was adopted in 1990. The OPRC 
UHTXLUHV&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWHVWRHVWDEOLVKPHDVXUHVIRU
dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in 
cooperation with other countries. A Protocol to the 
OPRC relating to hazardous and noxious substances 
(OPRC-HNS Protocol) was adopted in 2000. To assist 
States in implementing the Convention, the OPRC-
HNS Technical Group of  MEPC was set up. At its 
sixty-third session, MEPC approved the following 
guidance manuals, which were developed by the 
OPRC-HNS Technical Group:
s IMO/IPIECA Guidance on Sensitivity Mapping for 
Oil Spill Response;
s Guideline for Oil Spill Response in Fast Currents;
s Operational Guide on the Use of Sorbents;
s Oil Spill Waste Management Decision Support 
Tool.
)RUWKHƄQDOL]HGGUDIWVRIWKHIRXUJXLGHVVHH0(3&
annexes 62/8, 62/8/1, 62/8/2 and 62/8/3, respectively.
C. OTHER LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING
TRANSPORTATION
7KLVVHFWLRQKLJKOLJKWVVRPHNH\LVVXHVLQWKHƄHOGRI
maritime security and safety, which may be of particular 
interest to parties engaged in international trade and 
transport. These include developments relating to 
maritime and supply chain security, as well as the 
entry into force of the International Convention on 
6WDQGDUGVRI7UDLQLQJ&HUWLƄFDWLRQDQG:DWFKNHHSLQJ
for Fishing Vessel Personnel, 1995. Issues related 
to piracy will, for reasons of space, not be covered. 
However, a separate document on issues related to 
piracy is in preparation by the secretariat.
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1. Maritime and supply-chain security
There have been a number of developments in 
relation to existing maritime and supply-chain security 
standards that had been adopted under the auspices 
of various international organizations such as the World 
Customs Organization (WCO), IMO and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), as well as at the 
European Union (EU) level and in the United States, both 
important trade partners for many developing countries.
(a) World Customs Organization–SAFE 
Framework of Standards
As noted in previous editions of the Review of Maritime 
Transport, in 2005, WCO had adopted the Framework 
of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade 
(the SAFE Framework),113 ZLWK WKH REMHFWLYH RI
developing a global supply-chain framework. The 
SAFE Framework provides a set of standards and 
principles that must be adopted as a minimum 
threshold by national customs administrations. These 
standards are contained within two pillars – pillar 1: 
customs-to-customs network arrangements, and 
pillar 2: customs–business partnerships.114 The SAFE 
Framework has fast gained widespread international 
acceptance and as of 1 March 2011, 164 out of 
177 WCO members had expressed their intention to 
implement it.115
An important feature of the SAFE Framework is the 
concept of Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs),116
which are essentially parties that have been accredited 
by national customs administrations as compliant with 
:&2 RU HTXLYDOHQW VXSSO\FKDLQ VHFXULW\ VWDQGDUGV
6SHFLDO UHTXLUHPHQWV KDYH WR EH PHW E\ $(2V LQ
respect of physical security of premises, hidden camera 
VXUYHLOODQFH DQG VHOHFWLYH VWDIƄQJ DQG UHFUXLWPHQW
policies. In return, AEOs are typically rewarded by way 
RIWUDGHIDFLOLWDWLRQEHQHƄWVVXFKDVIDVWHUFOHDUDQFHRI
goods and fewer physical inspections. 
In recent years, a number of agreements on 
mutual recognition of AEO programmes have been 
concluded, mainly on a bilateral level.117 However, 
there still appears to be a lack of consensus on what 
mutual recognition means in practice. According to the 
SAFE Framework, for a system of mutual recognition 
to work it is essential that:
s There is an agreed set of common standards that 
LQFOXGH VXIƄFLHQWO\ UREXVW DFWLRQ SURYLVLRQV IRU
both customs and AEOs;
s Standards are applied in a uniform manner so that 
RQHFXVWRPVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQPD\KDYHFRQƄGHQFH
in the authorization of another;
s ,I WKH FHUWLƄFDWLRQ SURFHVV LV GHOHJDWHG WR D
designated authority by an authorizing customs 
administration, that there is an agreed-upon 
mechanism and standards for that authority;
s Legislation to enable the implementation of a 
mutual recognition system is in place.118
In June 2010, WCO issued its SAFE Package, 
bringing together all WCO instruments and 
guidelines that support its implementation.119 A 
number of updates have recently been made to this 
package. This includes the 2011 version of the SAFE 
Framework, providing a separate annex for data 
elements for security purposes and incorporating 
the remaining 10 + 2 data elements into those that 
were listed in the previous version of 2007, with the 
aim of improving WCO members’ risk assessment 
capabilities in this area. The 2011 version of the 
6$)( )UDPHZRUN DOVR LQFOXGHV GHƄQLWLRQV RI WKH
terms scanning and screening to clarify their use in 
day-to-day customs work. Other updates include 
2011 versions of the Compendium of Authorized 
Economic Operator (AEO) Programmes UHƅHFWLQJ
relevant data as of June 2011, and of the WCO 
Guidelines for the Procurement and Deployment of 
Scanning/NII Equipment.
In addition, a new set of Guidelines for Developing 
a Mutual Recognition Arrangement/Agreement was 
added to the SAFE Package. As noted above, mutual 
recognition is a broad concept embodied within 
the WCO SAFE Framework, and its interpretation 
might still be unclear. Therefore, the issuance of the 
new Guidelines aims to assist States and industry 
in this respect. According to the Guidelines, mutual 
recognition is a concept “whereby an action or decision 
taken or an authorization that has been properly 
granted by one customs administration is recognized 
and accepted by another customs administration” – 
based on a formalized document generally termed 
Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) or Mutual 
5HFRJQLWLRQ$UUDQJHPHQW$VFRQFHUQVWKHREMHFWLYH
of mutual recognition, the Guidelines note: “one 
customs administration recognizes the validation 
ƄQGLQJV DQG DXWKRUL]DWLRQV E\ WKH RWKHU FXVWRPV
administration issued under the other programme and 
agrees to provide substantial, comparable and, where 
SRVVLEOHUHFLSURFDOEHQHƄWVIDFLOLWDWLRQWRWKHPXWXDOO\
recognized AEOs. This recognition is generally 
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premised on the existence (or creation) of both 
relevant legislation (where applicable) and operational 
compatibility of both or more programmes.”120
The issue of mutual recognition is also addressed in a 
WCO research paper,121ZKHUHWKHFRQFHSWLVFODULƄHG
in line with the general WCO approach, as follows:
“Mutual recognition of AEOs is perceived as 
an arrangement or agreement between two or 
more customs administrations (or governments) 
that recognize each other’s audits, controls and 
DXWKRUL]DWLRQVDVHTXLYDOHQWDQGWKHUHIRUHSURYLGH
UHFLSURFDOEHQHƄWVWR$(2V,QSUDFWLFHWKLVPHDQV
that AEOs authorized by the partner country are 
recognized as being as secure and reliable as 
AEOs authorized by their own administration and 
ZLOO WKHUHIRUH UHFHLYH EHQHƄWV VXFK DV UHGXFHG
risk score and reduced controls when importing 
into the customs territory.”
The research paper also suggests, however, that 
some advocate a more expansive interpretation. 
Some assert that an AEO accredited by one mutual 
recognition agreement party should have exactly the 
same status and be recognized as an AEO by the 
other party or parties to that agreement, and thus 
need not apply in the country of the other party. It is 
XQFOHDU ZKHWKHU WKLV ODVW LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV VLJQLƄFDQW
or necessary, considering that international trade is 
dominated by SMEs with a limited geographic range 
of trade compared to multinationals.122
In recent years, a number of MRAs have been 
adopted by customs administrations, usually on a 
bilateral basis. However, it is hoped that these will, in 
due course, form the basis for multilateral agreements 
DWWKHVXEUHJLRQDODQGUHJLRQDO OHYHOV7KHƄUVW05$
was concluded between the United States and New 
Zealand in June 2007. As of 30 June 2012, 19 bilateral 
MRAs have been concluded and a further 10 are being 
negotiated between the following: China-EU, China-
Japan, Japan-Malaysia, China-Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong (China)-Republic of Korea, India-Republic 
of Korea, Israel-Republic of Korea, New Zealand-
Singapore, Norway-Switzerland and Singapore-
United States. Many countries already having customs 
compliance programmes123 are also in the process of 
adopting legislative measures and taking other steps 
necessary to establish their own AEO programmes. 
As of 30 June 2012, 23 AEO programmes have been 
established in 49 countries124 and eight more countries 
plan to establish them in the near future.125
(b) Developments at the European Union 
level and in the United States
At the regional level, EU and the United States have 
continued to develop measures to improve maritime 
and supply-chain security. Given the particular 
importance for many developing countries of trade 
with EU and the United States, it is pertinent to 
mention certain developments in this context.
As regards EU, previous editions of the Review of 
Maritime Transport have provided information on the 
security amendment to the Customs Code (Regulation 
648/2005 and its implementing provisions), which 
DLPV WR HQVXUH DQ HTXLYDOHQW OHYHO RI SURWHFWLRQ
through customs controls for all goods brought into 
or out of the customs territory of EU. The Review of 
Maritime Transport 2011126 provided an analysis of 
WKHPDMRUFKDQJHVWKLVDPHQGPHQWLQWURGXFHGWRWKH
Customs Code, and related developments. 
Part of these changes involved the introduction of 
provisions regarding AEOs, a status that reliable traders 
PD\EHJUDQWHGDQGZKLFKHQWDLOVEHQHƄWVLQWHUPVRIWUDGH
IDFLOLWDWLRQPHDVXUHV6XEVHTXHQWUHOHYDQWGHYHORSPHQWV
such as the recommendation for self-assessment of 
economic operators to be submitted together with their 
DSSOLFDWLRQIRU$(2FHUWLƄFDWHV127 and the issuance of a 
UHYLVHGVHOIDVVHVVPHQWTXHVWLRQQDLUH128 to guarantee a 
uniform approach throughout all EU member States, are 
also worth mentioning.
The EU is in the process of negotiating MRAs with 
WKLUG FRXQWULHV LQFOXGLQJ PDMRU WUDGLQJ SDUWQHUV129 
such as the United States.130 In this respect, it is 
worth noting that EU and the United States signed a 
decision on mutual recognition of their “secure traders” 
programmes, namely the EU AEO and the United 
States Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT)131 programmes, on 4 May 2012.132 The 
decision represents a formal agreement on mutual 
recognition of safe traders, allowing these companies to 
EHQHƄWIURPIDVWHUFRQWUROVDQGUHGXFHGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
IRU FXVWRPV FOHDUDQFH HQMR\ ORZHU FRVWV VLPSOLƄHG
procedures and greater predictability in their 
transatlantic activities. Importantly, mutual recognition 
is also expected to improve security on imports and 
exports by enabling customs authorities to focus their 
DWWHQWLRQ RQ JHQXLQH DUHDV RI ULVN 7KH MRLQW GHFLVLRQ
started to be implemented from 1 July 2012.133
As noted in previous editions of the Review of Maritime 
TransportDOHJLVODWLYHUHTXLUHPHQWZDVLQWURGXFHGLQWR
United States law in 2007134 to provide, by July 2012, 
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IRU}SHUFHQWVFDQQLQJRIDOO8QLWHG6WDWHVERXQG
cargo containers before being loaded at a foreign 
port. In October 2009, the United States Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) had acknowledged that 
WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKLVVFDQQLQJUHTXLUHPHQWZDV
unlikely to be met, and that the target date would 
be postponed until July 2014.135 Relevant concerns 
relating to the feasibility of implementing the legislation 
appear, however, to remain,136 as is illustrated by the 
conclusions of a recent United States Government 
$FFRXQWDELOLW\2IƄFH*$2UHSRUW.137 On 2 May 2012, 
DQRIƄFLDOQRWLƄFDWLRQOHWWHUZDVVXEPLWWHGE\WKH'+6
Secretary to the US Congress, thus giving effect to 
WKHDQWLFLSDWHGGHIHUUDORIWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRU}SHU
cent scanning of United States-bound maritime 
FRQWDLQHUVDW IRUHLJQSRUWV IRU WZR\HDUVXQWLO}-XO\
2014.138 ,QWHUDOLDWKH OHWWHUVWDWHVWKDW}SHUFHQW
VFDQQLQJRIFRQWDLQHUVZDVQHLWKHUWKHPRVWHIƄFLHQW
nor a cost-effective way to secure the supply chain 
DJDLQVWWHUURULVP,QDGGLWLRQGLSORPDWLFƄQDQFLDODQG
logistical challenges of such a measure would cost an 
HVWLPDWHG}ELOOLRQ139
(c) International Maritime Organization
(i) Measures to enhance maritime security
Both the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and 
the Facilitation Committee (FAL) of IMO consider 
measures to enhance maritime security as part of their 
agenda. In this respect, certain developments at the 
most recent sessions of these Committees over the 
past year, relating to the effective implementation of 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS) chapter XI-2 and the International Ship 
and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code, to voluntary 
self-assessment for port facilities and ship security, as 
well as to the search for solutions to stowaway cases, 
are relevant to the present Review.
At its ninetieth session, held from 16–25 May 
2012, MSC recalled that it had previously urged 
SOLAS Contracting Governments and international 
organizations to bring to its attention, at the earliest 
opportunity, the results of the experience gained 
from the use of the relevant maritime security 
guidance140 for consideration of action to be taken. 
One country informed the Committee that it had, in 
early 2012, conducted and completed a voluntary 
self-assessment of its port facilities and ship security 
using the guidance provided in the above circulars, 
which had demonstrated to it the value of these self-
assessment tools.141
A number of maritime security-related measures were 
considered during the thirty-seventh session of FAL, 
held from 5–9 September 2011. During the session 
the Committee adopted resolution FAL.11(37), 
Revised Guidelines on the Prevention of Access by 
Stowaways and the Allocation of Responsibilities 
to Seek the Successful Resolution of Stowaway 
Cases.142 Finding a solution to stowaway cases can 
be challenging because of differences between the 
national legislation of, potentially, several involved 
States: the State of embarkation, the State of 
GLVHPEDUNDWLRQ WKHƅDJ6WDWHRI WKHVKLS WKH6WDWH
of apparent, claimed or actual nationality/citizenship 
or right of residence of the stowaway, and States 
of transit during repatriation. The revised Guidelines 
outline comprehensive strategies to improve access 
control and prevent intending stowaways from gaining 
access to ships. They also provide guidance for 
public authorities, port authorities, shipowners and 
masters, to enable them to cooperate to the fullest 
extent possible in order to resolve stowaway cases 
expeditiously and ensure that an early return or 
repatriation of the stowaway will take place.
The Committee also endorsed the inclusion, in the 
Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS), 
of a module on stowaways, and urged member States 
to make as much use as possible of the GISIS reporting 
facilities. In 2008, 494 reports of stowaway cases were 
received by IMO, 314 in 2009, 253 in 2010 and 47 in 
2011 (up to August 2011). The reported cases involved 
2,052 stowaways in 2008, 1,070 in 2009, 721 in 2010 
DQGLQWKHƄUVWHLJKWPRQWKVRI+RZHYHUWKH
low number of reporting sources meant that meaningful 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHUHSRUWVZDVGLIƄFXOW143 Associating the 
increasing problem of stowaways with a lack of proper 
implementation of physical security measures and 
access controls on board ships and within port facilities, 
member States’ obligations to implement fully the 
provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code 
ZHUHUHFDOOHGDQGLQSDUWLFXODUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUƅDJ
States to assess, on a continuous basis, all threats to 
VKLSVHQWLWOHG WRƅ\ WKHLU ƅDJ WRVHW WKHVHFXULW\ OHYHO
accordingly, and to ensure that ships implement fully 
the security procedures appropriate to the security level 
as detailed in the ship security plan.144
(ii) Measures to improve security and
facilitation of international trade
and transport
A number of developments aimed at improving security 
and facilitation of international trade and transport are 
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also relevant. In particular, FAL, at its thirty-seventh 
session, adopted a set of Guidelines for Setting up a 
Single Window System in Maritime Transport.145 Single 
window systems enable information to be provided 
to multiple users through a single report. Hence 
they facilitate trade and decrease the administrative 
burden on the shipmaster, while at the same time 
LPSURYLQJWKHLQIRUPDWLRQƅRZWRERWKLQGLYLGXDOSRUW
authorities and government agencies concerned. The 
Committee also adopted a revised IMO Compendium 
on Facilitation and Electronic Business.146 The 
compendium provides updated information, guidance 
and recommended formats for electronic exchange 
RI LQIRUPDWLRQ UHTXLUHG E\ SXEOLF DXWKRULWLHV IRU WKH
arrival, stay and departure of the ship, persons and 
cargo in order to facilitate clearance processes.
At its ninetieth session, MSC adopted Amendments 
to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods 
(IMDG) Code147 which are intended to harmonize 
the IMDG Code with the amendments to the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous 
Goods (17th revised edition). The Committee also issued 
a circular, Interim Measures for Early Implementation of 
the Draft Amendments to the International Maritime 
Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code;148 these measures 
are set to be adopted in 2013, following recent incidents 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHOLTXHIDFWLRQRIFDUJRHV
(d) International Organization for
Standardization
During the last decade, ISO has been actively engaged 
in matters of maritime transport and supply chain 
security. Shortly after the release of the ISPS Code, 
and to facilitate its implementation by the industry, the 
Box 5.1. The current status149 of the ISO 28000 series of standards
Published standards:
s ISO 28000:2007 – 6SHFLƄFDWLRQIRU6HFXULW\0DQDJHPHQW6\VWHPVIRUWKH6XSSO\&KDLQ. This provides the overall umbrella 
standard.
s ISO 28001:2007 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Best Practices for Implementing Supply Chain 
Security, Assessments and Plans 7KLV VWDQGDUG LV GHVLJQHG WR DVVLVW WKH LQGXVWU\PHHW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU$(2
status.
s ISO 28002:2011 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Development of Resilience in the Supply Chain 
– Requirements with Guidance for Use. This standard provides additional focus on resilience, and emphasizes the need 
for an ongoing, interactive process to prevent, respond to and assure continuation of an organization’s core operations 
DIWHUDPDMRUGLVUXSWLYHHYHQW
s ,62 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Requirements for Bodies Providing Audit and 
&HUWLƄFDWLRQRI6XSSO\&KDLQ6HFXULW\0DQDJHPHQW6\VWHPV. This standard provides guidance for accreditation and 
FHUWLƄFDWLRQERGLHV
s ISO 28004:2007 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Guidelines for the Implementation of ISO 28000. 
7KHREMHFWLYHRIWKLVVWDQGDUGLVWRDVVLVWXVHUVWRLPSOHPHQW,62
s ISO 28005-2:2011 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Electronic Port Clearance (EPC) – Part 2: Core 
Data Elements7KLVVWDQGDUGFRQWDLQVWHFKQLFDOVSHFLƄFDWLRQVWKDWIDFLOLWDWHHIƄFLHQWH[FKDQJHRIHOHFWURQLFLQIRUPDWLRQ
EHWZHHQVKLSVDQGVKRUH IRUFRDVWDO WUDQVLWRUSRUWFDOOVDVZHOODVGHƄQLWLRQVRIFRUHGDWDHOHPHQWV WKDWFRYHUDOO
UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUVKLSWRVKRUHDQGVKRUHWRVKLSUHSRUWLQJDVGHƄQHGLQWKH,636&RGH)$/&RQYHQWLRQDQGUHOHYDQW
IMO resolutions.
Standards under development:
s ISO 28004-Addenda – Additional Guidance for Adopting and Certifying ISO 28000:
– For use in medium & small seaport operations;
– Adopting ISO 28000 for small–medium-sized businesses (SME);
t)RUVHFXULW\UHTXLUHPHQWVIRU$(2V
s ISO 28005-1 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Electronic Port Clearance (EPC) - Part 1: Message 
Structures. Provides for computer-to-computer data transmission.
s ISO 28006 – Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Security Management of RO-RO Passenger Ferries. 
Includes best practices for application of security measures.
s ISO 20858 – Uniform Implementation of ISPS Code. If IMO revises the ISPS Code, ISO 20858 may also need revision.
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ISO Technical Committee ISO/TC 8 published ISO 
20858:2007, Ships and Marine Technology – Maritime 
Port Facility Security Assessments and Security Plan 
Development.
Another important contribution is the ongoing 
development of the ISO 28000 series of standards, 
Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain,
which are designed to help the industry successfully plan 
IRUDQGUHFRYHUIURPDQ\GLVUXSWLYHHYHQWVHHER[}
These standards promote a holistic, risk-based approach 
to managing risks associated with any disruptive incident 
in the supply chain, before, during and after the event.
The core standard, ISO 28000:2007, 6SHFLƄFDWLRQ
for Security Management Systems for the Supply 
Chain, serves as an umbrella management system 
that enhances all aspects of security: risk assessment, 
emergency preparedness, business continuity, 
sustainability, recovery, resilience and/or disaster 
management, whether relating to terrorism, piracy, 
cargo theft, fraud, and many other security disruptions. 
The standard also serves as a basis for AEO and 
&73$7FHUWLƄFDWLRQV9DULRXVRUJDQL]DWLRQVDGRSWLQJ
such standards may tailor an approach compatible 
with their existing operating systems.
2. Maritime safety: entry into force 
of the International Convention on 
6WDQGDUGVRI7UDLQLQJ&HUWLƂFDWLRQ
and Watchkeeping for Fishing
Vessel Personnel, 1995 (STCW-F)
A Convention containing special rules on standards 
RI WUDLQLQJFHUWLƄFDWLRQDQGZDWFKNHHSLQJ applicable 
WR ƄVKLQJ YHVVHO SHUVRQQHO ZDV DGRSWHG RQ 
July 1995.150 The STCW-F Convention, consisting 
of 15 articles and an annex containing technical 
UHJXODWLRQVVHWVWKHFHUWLƄFDWLRQDQGPLQLPXPWUDLQLQJ
UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUFUHZVRIVHDJRLQJƄVKLQJYHVVHOVRI
24 metres in length and above. Seventeen years after 
LWVDGRSWLRQWKH&RQYHQWLRQƄQDOO\HQWHUHGLQWRIRUFH
RQ6HSWHPEHUKDYLQJUHDFKHGWKHUHTXLUHG
QXPEHU RI UDWLƄFDWLRQV WZHOYH PRQWKV HDUOLHU RQ 
September 2011.151 The entry into force of the STCW-F 
Convention coincided with a diplomatic conference, 
held from 9 to 11 October 2012, in South Africa for 
the purpose of adopting an international agreement 
on the implementation of the 1993 Protocol152 relating 
to the 1977 Torremolinos International Convention for 
the Safety of Fishing Vessels.
7KHVDIHW\RIƄVKHUPHQDQGƄVKLQJYHVVHOVFRQVWLWXWHV
an important part of the mandate of IMO. However, the 
WZR LQVWUXPHQWV RQ ƄVKLQJ YHVVHO VDIHW\ PHQWLRQHG
above, that is, the 1977 Convention and its 1993 
Protocol, have not come into force due to a variety of 
technical and legal obstacles and unfortunately many 
OLYHVFRQWLQXHWREHORVWLQDFFLGHQWVLQYROYLQJƄVKLQJ
vessels every year. With the entry into force of the 
STCW-F Convention on 29 September 2012, and the 
renewed efforts to reach agreement at the diplomatic 
conference held from 9 to 11 October 2012, it is 
expected and hoped that the Torremolinos Protocol 
ZLOODOVRPHHWLWVHQWU\IRUFHUHTXLUHPHQWVDVVRRQDV
possible.153
D. STATUS OF CONVENTIONS
$ QXPEHU RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO &RQYHQWLRQV LQ WKH ƄHOG
of maritime transport have been prepared or were 
DGRSWHGXQGHU WKH DXVSLFHVRI81&7$'%R[}
SURYLGHV LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHVWDWXVRIUDWLƄFDWLRQRI
each of these Conventions, as at 19 September 
2012. 
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Box 5.2. Contracting States  to selected international conventions on maritime transport,
as at 19 September 2012
Title of Convention
Date of entry into force or 
conditions for entry into force
Contracting States
United Nations 
Convention on a 
Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences, 
1974
Entered into force
}2FWREHU
Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, 
*X\DQD+RQGXUDV,QGLD,QGRQHVLD,UDT,WDO\-DPDLFD-RUGDQ
Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, 
0R]DPELTXH1LJHU1LJHULD1RUZD\3DNLVWDQ3HUX3KLOLSSLQHV
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Somalia, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia.                                                      (76)
United Nations 
Convention on the 
Carriage of Goods 
by Sea, 1978 
(Hamburg Rules)
Entered into force
}1RYHPEHU
Albania, Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Paraguay, 
Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia.                                                            
International 
Convention on 
Maritime Liens and 
Mortgages, 1993
Entered into force
}6HSWHPEHU
Albania, Benin, Ecuador, Estonia, Lithuania, Monaco, Nigeria, 
Peru, Russian Federation, Spain, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, Vanuatu.                   (17)
United Nations 
Convention on 
International 
Multimodal Transport 
of Goods, 1980
1RW\HWLQIRUFHtUHTXLUHV
}FRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHV
Burundi, Chile, Georgia, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mexico, 
Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Zambia.                                 (11)
United Nations 
Convention on 
Conditions for 
Registration of
Ships, 1986
1RW\HWLQIRUFHtUHTXLUHV
40 contracting parties 
ZLWKDWOHDVW}SHUFHQW
of the world’s tonnage 
as per Annex III to the 
Convention
Albania, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, 
+XQJDU\,UDT/LEHULD/LE\D0H[LFR0RURFFR2PDQ6\ULDQ
Arab Republic.                                                                     (15)
International 
Convention on Arrest 
of Ships, 1999
Entered into force
}6HSWHPEHU
Albania, Algeria, Benin, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Estonia, Latvia, 
Liberia, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic.                                  (10)
 Source: )RURIƄFLDOVWDWXVLQIRUPDWLRQVHHKWWSZZZXQRUJODZ
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E. TRADE FACILITATION IN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
1. Towards multilateral rules on trade 
facilitation at the World Trade
Organization: the early or only
harvest of the Doha Round?
(LJKW\HDUVVLQFHWKHLURIƄFLDOVWDUWLQWKH:72
negotiations on trade facilitation (TF) may be close to 
delivering what could be the early – if not the only – 
harvest of the Doha Round. Indeed, while the Round 
itself is now largely considered to be failing,154 TF 
is increasingly seen as a rare success story of the 
negotiations. At the same time, the WTO Negotiating 
*URXSRQ7UDGH)DFLOLWDWLRQ1*7)KDV\HWWRƄQDOL]H
the draft consolidated negotiating text on the individual 
TF measures. What is also lacking at this stage of 
the negotiations is an agreement on the degree of 
commitment of the developed members to delivering 
technical assistance and capacity building (TACB) to 
developing and least developed countries in exchange 
for their commitments to implement TF.
The fate of the future WTO agreement, therefore, 
hinges on two elements: delinking TF from the 
:72'RKD5RXQG DQG ƄQDOL]LQJ WKH 7) DJUHHPHQW
itself and, in particular, its provisions on special and 
differential treatment (SDT).
2. Delinking trade facilitation from
the WTO Doha Round
In the climate of uneasiness and scepticism 
surrounding the Doha Round and its unsuccessful last 
ministerial meeting in December 2011, some WTO 
members, representatives of the business community 
DQGKLJKOHYHO:72RIƄFLDOVLVVXHGRIƄFLDOVWDWHPHQWV
where they singled out TF as one of the very few areas 
where an agreement was within the reach.155
The support expressed by G20 Ministers in Mexico, 
April 2012, for breaking up the Doha Round into its 
component parts, with an emphasis on TF, fuelled 
the appeals for the delinking of TF from the rest of 
the Doha issues. The idea is widely discussed and 
supported by such countries or groups of countries 
as Australia, Canada, Chile, the United States, and the 
European Union and their business communities. In 
June 2012, the World Bank and Regional Development 
Bank Presidents issued a personal press article, 
published later in the press around the world and 
in developing countries. In the article they urged, in 
particular, the countries to conclude the TF Agreement 
and reiterated the commitment for capacity-building 
SURMHFWV DQG WHFKQLFDO DVVLVWDQFH WR DGGUHVV WKH
needs of developing countries so that they may be 
able to fully implement the Agreement.156
The proponents of de-linking TF from the Doha 
5RXQGHPSKDVL]HWKDWWKHH[SHFWHGEHQHƄWVIURPD
7)$JUHHPHQW LQ:72 UHSUHVHQWPRUH WKDQ}SHU
FHQW RI WKH H[SHFWHG EHQHƄWV RI WKH HQWLUH 5RXQG
ZLWKWZRWKLUGVRIWKHVHJDLQVEHQHƄWLQJGHYHORSLQJ
and the least developed countries.157 They also 
consider that the current negotiating text on TF is 
close to receiving the overall consensus. In his 
speech at the UNCTAD Multi-year Expert Meeting on 
Transport and Trade Facilitation in December 2011, 
the Ambassador and Permanent Representative 
of Sweden to the WTO voiced strong support for 
the WTO TF Agreement in 2012, presenting the 
Agreement as a “win–win”, especially in the light of 
LWV EHQHƄWV IRU GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG /'&V+H
DUJXHGWKDWWKLVZDVDXQLTXHRSSRUWXQLW\WRPXVWHUD
much-needed boost to world economy and the best 
way to address the key legitimate concern of poorer 
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV WKDW LVJHWWLQJDGHTXDWHDQG
sustained support for their TF reforms, through the 
mechanism of SDT.158
The opponents of the idea of de-linking TF from the 
'RKD 5RXQG LQFOXGH PDMRU HPHUJLQJ HFRQRPLHV
such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India and South 
Africa. They stress the importance of the rest of the 
'RKDSDFNDJHDJULFXOWXUHVXEVLGLHVGXW\IUHHTXRWD
free market access and a services waiver for LDCs) 
for the developing countries. For them an agreement 
on TF could not and should not be separated from 
the rest of the negotiations and, therefore, should 
VKDUHWKHƄQDOIDWHRIWKHRWKHUPDMRUHOHPHQWVRIWKH
Doha Round. They also reiterate that implementing 
TF commitments would be much more onerous for 
developing countries, as opposed to the industrialized 
countries, who have already implemented most of 
the TF measures under consideration.159 In their 
eyes, agreeing on other Doha issues that would be of 
EHQHƄW WRGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVZRXOG WLS WKHRYHUDOO
balance in favour of signing up to legal obligations in 
the TF area.
The idea of TF as an early harvest, which has emerged 
WLPLGO\ RYHU WKH ODVW WZR \HDUV LV QRZ D IUHTXHQW
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feature of the trade talks, media reports and speeches 
RI WKHKLJK OHYHORIƄFLDOV IURP:72 WKH:RUOG%DQN
DQGRWKHUPDMRUƄQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV,WUHPDLQVWREH
VHHQZKHWKHU WKHHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDO EHQHƄWVRI
agreeing on TF would sway the opposition, leading 
to the signature of the agreement in the near future. 
But, while the debates on delinking TF from the Doha 
Round are intensifying and gaining prominence, some 
ZRUNUHPDLQVWREHGRQHWRƄQDOL]HWKH7)$JUHHPHQW
itself.
3. Finalizing the TF provisions,
including the commitments on the 
special and differential treatment 
The draft consolidated negotiating text, currently 
in its 12th revision, released on 8 May 2012 (TN/
TF/W/165/12), contains a total of 26 articles160 with 
 SDLUV RI VTXDUH EUDFNHWV GHQRWLQJ SURYLVLRQV
RU SDUWV RI SURYLVLRQV \HW WR EH ƄQDOL]HG 2QO\ RQH
substantial provision (draft article 14 on the National 
Committee on Trade Facilitation) contains no such 
brackets.
The provisions of the current draft consolidated 
negotiating text can be divided into three sets:161
(a) Provisions on the individual TF measures;
(b) Institutional arrangements;
(c) Provisions on the special and differential treatment.
(a) Provisions on individual measures – 
codifying the best practices in trade 
facilitation
The individual TF measures currently included in the 
draft consolidated negotiating text constitute what 
can generally be seen as a set of the TF best practices 
ER[}
Many of these measures are present in such classical 
TF instruments as the Revised International Convention 
RQ WKH 6LPSOLƄFDWLRQ DQG +DUPRQL]DWLRQ RI &XVWRPV
Procedures (Revised Kyoto Convention) of the World 
Customs Organizations, the 1982 Convention on the 
Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods, and the 
United Nations trade facilitation recommendations.162 In 
addition, the draft article 10 paragraph 4 – in its more 
binding version – aims to establish the obligation to 
use relevant international standards or parts thereof for 
their importation, exportation or transit formalities and 
procedures. This potentially includes in the scope of the 
agreement international TF standards, so far used on 
a voluntary basis, such as the United Nations Layout 
Key (UNLK)163, the United Nations Trade Data Element 
Directory and the WCO Data Model. Furthermore, as 
documented by UNCTAD in the Review of Maritime 
Transport 2011 and in a special technical note on 
Trade Facilitation in Regional Trade Agreements, the TF 
measures being negotiated by WTO are increasingly 
part of the regional and bilateral trade agreements, 
reinforcing their status as generally recognized and 
promoted measures of trade facilitation.164
The draft negotiating text, therefore, constitutes 
already at this stage a framework of reference on TF 
best practices and is already used as a basis for the 
national and/or regional TF strategies, bilateral and 
regional trade cooperation, as well as in TF technical 
DQGƄQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHGHOLYHUHGE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
organizations.165 At the same time, almost all 
SURYLVLRQVRQ7)PHDVXUHVQHHGVLJQLƄFDQWƄQHWXQLQJ
of the exact language and, thus, of the scope and 
WKH VWULFWQHVV RI WKH PHDVXUH 7KH REMHFWLYH RI WKH
negotiations, as reported by some countries, is to 
identify the elements of the substantial disagreement 
so that a political decision can be taken, and to make 
a decision on the desired degree of precision in the 
legal wording.166
(b) Institutional arrangements –
coordinating at the World Trade
Organization and the national levels
The draft consolidated negotiating text also addresses 
the issue of creating and maintaining institutional 
arrangements at both WTO and national levels.
The draft article 13 establishes a WTO TF Committee, 
ZKLFKLVWRFDUU\RXWVSHFLƄFUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDVDVVLJQHG
to it by agreement or by the members, such as receiving 
QRWLƄFDWLRQVRQWKHPRGDOLWLHVRIWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
certain obligations (publication, Internet publication, 
implementation categories and schedules), overseeing 
the implementation of SDT, identifying relevant 
international standards on export, import and transit 
procedures and, possibly, carrying out dispute 
settlement during a transitional period. The mandate 
of the Committee is potentially vast, as, according to 
the current draft, it can address “any matters related to 
the operation of this Agreement or the furtherance of its 
REMHFWLYHVrZKLFKLWLVH[SHFWHGWRGRLQFORVHFRQWDFW
with other international organizations dealing with TF to 
avoid duplication of efforts.
At the national level, the draft negotiating text of article 
14 of the Agreement contains a future obligation 
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for all members to establish a national committee 
on TF to facilitate both domestic coordination and 
implementation of the agreement. This proposal 
is based on a particular set of TF best practices 
traditionally promoted by the United Nations (UNCTAD 
and the United Nations regional commissions) and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ƄQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV VXFK DV WKH:RUOG
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).167 The 
usefulness of such a mechanism is widely recognized 
and in many countries the WTO negotiations on TF 
created the momentum and the political support for 
such bodies. Setting up and, much more importantly, 
maintaining such a committee is not an easy task, 
especially for developing countries and LDCs, where 
ensuring the domestic coordination and cooperation 
RQ7) LVRIWHQYHU\GLIƄFXOW LQWKHDEVHQFHRIDFOHDU
legal basis, the strong political support and regular 
technical assistance. Article 14 may, therefore, provide 
the much needed legal basis and, where appropriate, 
VROLGJURXQGVIRU UHTXHVWLQJDQGUHFHLYLQJ ORQJWHUP
technical assistance, ensuring the viability and the 
DGHTXDWHSHUIRUPDQFHRIVXFKDPHFKDQLVP
(c) Provisions on the special and
differential treatment – overcoming the 
stumbling block of the commitment 
on technical assistance and capacity 
building?
While progress has been made on identifying and 
ƅHVKLQJRXWWKHOHJDOWH[WIRULQGLYLGXDO7)PHDVXUHV
achieving the agreement between all the negotiators 
on SDT for developing countries and LDCs is still seen 
as problematic and far from guaranteed.
Special and differential treatment is built into the draft 
negotiating text and is embodied in the introduction 
of three categories of commitments for developing 
country and LDC members, using which these 
%R[ ,QGLYLGXDOPHDVXUHVFXUUHQWO\LQFOXGHGLQWKHGUDIWQHJRWLDWLQJWH[W
TF measures currently included in the draft consolidated negotiating text
1. Publication 21. [Authorized operators]
2. Information available through Internet 22. Expedited shipments
3. (QTXLU\SRLQWV 23. 3URKLELWLRQRIFRQVXODUWUDQVDFWLRQUHTXLUHPHQW
4. 1RWLƄFDWLRQ 24. Border agency cooperation
5. Interval between publication and entry into force 25. [Declaration of trans-shipped or in transit goods] 
[domestic transit]
6. Opportunity to comment on new and amended 
rules
26. Review of formalities and documentation 
UHTXLUHPHQWV
7. Consultations 27. Reduction/limitation of formalities and 
GRFXPHQWDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
8. Provision of advance ruling 28. Acceptance of copies
9. Right of appeal 29. Use of international standards
10.
Appeal mechanism [in a custom union] [that is a 
WTO Member]
30. Single window
11. Import alerts/rapid alerts 31.
[Elimination of] [Mandatory] Pre-shipment [and 
Post-shipment inspections]
12. Detention 32. Use of customs brokers
13. Test procedures 33. &RPPRQERUGHUSURFHGXUHV>DQGUHTXLUHPHQWV@
14.
Disciplines on fees and charges imposed on or in 
connection with importation and exportation
34.
8QLIRUPIRUPVDQGGRFXPHQWDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
relating to clearance
15. Penalty disciplines 35. 2SWLRQWRUHWXUQUHMHFWHGJRRGVWRWKHH[SRUWHU
16. Pre-arrival processing 36. Temporary admission of goods
17.
6HSDUDWLRQRIUHOHDVHIURPƄQDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
and payment of customs duties, taxes, fees and 
charges
37. Inward and outward processing
18. Risk management 38. Freedom of transit
19. Post-clearance audit/customs audit 39. Customs cooperation 
20.
Establishment and publication of average release 
times
40. National committee on Trade Facilitation
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countries can delay the implementation of some 
measures and/or make it conditional upon receiving 
the appropriate TACB.168 Special and differential 
treatment is also expressed in other elements, such 
as the proposed “grace period” for the application of 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (the period of 
time for which has yet to be agreed on).
Setting aside the technicalities of making this 
differentiated speed of the implementation of the 
7)PHDVXUHVSRVVLEOHZKLFKDUH\HW WREHƄQDOL]HG
the stumbling block in the eyes of many negotiators 
and analysts is the reticent attitude of the developed 
members vis-à-vis the inclusion of a clear legal 
commitment to provide TACB to developing countries 
and LDCs and to report on the assistance provided 
individually or through international aid agencies.
,WLVWUXHWKDWWRGDWHOLQNLQJLPSOHPHQWDWLRQƅH[LELOLWLHV
to technical assistance delivery, and introducing the 
mandatory reporting obligations on the TACB provided 
is unprecedented in the WTO.169 Furthermore, 
the developed countries explain their reservations 
by pointing out the fact that the global TF-related 
assistance is booming and, therefore, the needed 
TACB is already available to the countries in need 
RI WKH DVVLVWDQFH DQG LQ VXIƄFLHQW TXDQWLW\170 In the 
course of the negotiations, some developed country 
WTO members submitted several comprehensive 
UHSRUWVWR1*7)HLWKHURQWKHLUƄQDQFLQJRIWKHSURMHFWV
in the area of TF, or with TF illustrating this point.171 
The overall share of TACB assigned to TF has, in fact, 
EHHQLQFUHDVLQJVLJQLƄFDQWO\RYHUWKHODVW\HDUV$WWKH
same time, the UNCTAD calculations, based on data 
provided by OECD, also show a difference between 
the middle-income developing countries and the 
LDCs. The share of technical assistances assigned 
to TF is much lower in LDCs than in middle-income 
developing countries.172 This element, coupled with 
the reasonable expectations that the costs of TF 
implementation will be the highest in LDCs, lends 
grounds to the concern of the developing countries 
regarding a legally binding promise of TACB. Linking 
TF commitments to a technical assistance was already 
incorporated in some bilateral trade agreements more 
than a decade ago, as illustrated by the 2001 Canada–
Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, and references to 
technical assistance are increasingly included in the 
new bilateral and regional trade agreements.173
4. Conclusion: Window of opportunity 
for the World Trade Organization 
trade facilitation agreement?
(LJKW\HDUVDIWHUWKHLURIƄFLDOODXQFK7)QHJRWLDWLRQV
LQ:72KDYHJDLQHGVXIƄFLHQWWHFKQLFDODQGSROLWLFDO
momentum to deliver, perhaps, multilateral legally 
binding rules and the institutional setting for their 
implementation. While the speed of the negotiations 
may appear relatively moderate, it is important to 
bear in mind that drafting technical agreements on 
WUDGHDQGWUDQVSRUWIDFLOLWDWLRQLVVXHVXVXDOO\UHTXLUHV
several years even at the regional level. Already at 
this stage, the WTO negotiations on TF have an 
impact on the current regional and bilateral trade 
agreements, on the TF-related TACB and national TF 
strategies.174
$W SUHVHQW 7) VHHPV WR KDYH D GHƄQLWH ZLQGRZ RI
opportunity in WTO. What, in the end, will dictate 
the ultimate fate of the agreement is the negotiators’ 
willingness and ability to meet each other halfway 
ERWK LQ GHOLQNLQJ 7) IURP'RKD DQG LQ ƄQDOL]LQJ WKH
WH[WRI WKHDJUHHPHQW:KDWHYHU WKHLUƄQDORXWFRPH
WKH:72 7) QHJRWLDWLRQV DUH DOUHDG\ D GHƄQLWH DQG
important chapter of the international regulatory and 
legal framework of TF.
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a “Special Area” under this Annex. Those amendments are expected to enter into force on 1 January 2013.
98 Resolution MEPC.219(63), MEPC 63/23, Annex 24.
99 Resolution MEPC.220(63), MEPC 63/23, Annex 25.
100 Resolution MEPC.210(63), MEPC 63/23, Annex 4.
101 MEPC.211(63), MEPC 63/23, Annex 5.
102 Resolution MEPC.197(62), MEPC 62/24, Annex 3.
103 Resolution MEPC.196(62), MEPC 62/24, Annex 2.
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104 The Hong Kong Convention was open for accession since 1 September 2010, and it is not yet into force. It will enter 
LQWRIRUFHPRQWKVDIWHUWKHGDWHRQZKLFK6WDWHVUHSUHVHQWLQJ}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGpVPHUFKDQWƅHHWWRQQDJH
have become Parties to it. 
105 These were “Smart Ballast” Ballast Water Management System proposed by the Republic of Korea in document 
MEPC 62/2/8; DMU OH Ballast Water Management System proposed by China in document MEPC 63/2; and 
EcoGuardianTM Ballast Water Management System proposed by the Republic of Korea in document MEPC 63/2/4.
106 1These were: SiCURE™ Ballast Water Management System proposed by Germany in document MEPC 62/2/10; 
ERMA FIRST Ballast Water Management System proposed by Greece in document MEPC 63/2/1; MICROFADETM
%DOODVW :DWHU 0DQDJHPHQW 6\VWHP SURSRVHG E\ -DSDQ LQ GRFXPHQW 0(3&  $TXD6WDUTM Ballast Water 
Management System proposed by the Republic of Korea in document MEPC 63/2/3; and Neo-PurimarTM Ballast 
Water Management System proposed by the Republic of Korea in document MEPC 63/2/6.
107 See The 2004 Ballast Water Management Convention with international acceptance growing, the Convention may 
soon enter into force, UNCTAD, Transport Newsletter No.50, Second Quarter 2011, p.8.
108 The delegations of Brazil; Liberia; Malaysia; Malta; Panama; Singapore; Hong Kong, China and ICS.
109 The delegations of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Spain.
110 See the 5HSRUWRIWKH0DULQH(QYLURQPHQW3URWHFWLRQ&RPPLWWHHRQLWVVL[W\WKLUGVHVVLRQ, MEPC 63/23, p.12.
111 See Resolution MEPC.209(63), MEPC 63/23, Annex 3.
112 The BWM Convention has been open for accession by any State since 31 May 2005, and as of 30 June 2012, it had 
3DUWLHVUHSUHVHQWLQJ}SHUFHQWRIWKHZRUOGpVPHUFKDQWƅHHWWRQQDJH$FFRUGLQJWR$UWLFOHRIWKH%:0
the Convention will enter into force twelve months after the date on which not fewer than 30 States, the combined 
PHUFKDQWƅHHWVRIZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHQRWOHVVWKDQ}SHUFHQWRIWKHJURVVWRQQDJHRIWKHZRUOGpVPHUFKDQWVKLSSLQJ
have become Parties to it.
113 $}-XQH}}XSGDWHG}YHUVLRQ}RI}WKH}6$)(})UDPHZRUN}LV}DYDLODEOH}DWKWWSZZZZFRRPGRUJƄOHV3XEOLF
ƄOHV3')DQG'RFXPHQWV3URFHGXUHVDQG)DFLOLWDWLRQVDIHBSDFNDJHVDIHBSDFNDJHB,BSGI.
114 Pillar 1 is based on the model of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) introduced in the U.S. in 2002. Pillar 2 is based 
on the model of the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programme introduced in the U.S. in 2001. 
For more information on these as well as for an analysis of the main features of the customs supply chain security, 
namely advance cargo information, risk management, cargo scanning and Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs), 
see “WCO research paper No.18, The Customs Supply Chain Security Paradigm and 9/11: Ten Years On and Beyond”, 
September 2011, available at www.wcoomd.org. For a summary of the various U.S. security programmes adopted 
after Septemeber 11 see UNCTAD report Container Security: Major initiatives and related international developments}
UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2004/1, available at http://r0.unctad.org/ttl/ttl-docs-legal-reports+docs.htm.
115 For the list of WCO members who have expressed their intention to implement the SAFE Framework, see http://www.
ZFRRPGRUJƄOHV3XEOLFƄOHV3')DQG'RFXPHQWV(QIRUFHPHQW)26BELOBSGI.
116 The SAFE Framework AEO concept has its origins in the revised Kyoto Convention which contains standards on 
“authorized persons”, and national programmes.
117 See text to fn. 122 below.
118 WCO Safe Framework of Standards, June 2011, p.49.
119 See also Review of Maritime Transport 2011, p.121-122. The Package included the SAFE Framework of Standards, 
Customs Guidelines on Integrated Supply Chain Management, AEO Implementation Guidance, AEO Compendium, 
Model AEO Appeal Procedures, $(2%HQHƄWV $ FRQWULEXWLRQ IURP WKH:&23ULYDWH 6HFWRU&RQVXOWDWLYH*URXS, 
Guidelines for the Purchase and Deployment of Scanning/Imaging Equipment, SAFE Data Element Maintenance 
Mechanism, Trade Recovery Guidelines, and FAQ for Small and Medium Enterprises. The SAFE package is available 
at: www.wcoomd.org/home_pfoverviewboxes_safepackage.htm.
120 See Guidelines for developing a mutual recognition arrangement/agreement, 2011, p.2.
121 See WCO research paper No.18, The Customs Supply Chain Security Paradigm and 9/11: Ten Years On and 
Beyond} 6HSWHPEHU} } DYDLODEOH} DW} KWWSZZZZFRRPGRUJƄOHV3XEOLFƄOHV3')DQG'RFXPHQWV
research/18_CSCSP_911.pdf.
122 Ibid.
123 &XVWRPVFRPSOLDQFHSURJUDPPHVDUHPDLQO\IRFXVHGRQWUDGLWLRQDOƄVFDOUDWKHUWKDQVHFXULW\FULWHULD
124 Due to the fact that 27 EU countries have one common uniform AEO programme.
125 According to information provided by the WCO secretariat. For more information see Compendium of AEO 
Programmes, 2012 Edition, available at www.wcoomd.org/home_research_researchseries.htm.
126 See p.122-123.
127 7KHUHDUH WKUHH W\SHVRIFHUWLƄFDWH WKDWPD\EHDSSOLHG IRU&XVWRPV6LPSOLƄFDWLRQV $(2&6HFXULW\DQG6DIHW\
$(26DQG&XVWRPV6LPSOLƄFDWLRQV6HFXULW\DQG6DIHW\MRLQWO\$(2)$FFRUGLQJWRLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\WKH
European Commission’s Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union, as of 8 February 2012, a total of 
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DSSOLFDWLRQVIRU$(2FHUWLƄFDWHVKDGEHHQVXEPLWWHGDQGDWRWDORIFHUWLƄFDWHVKDGEHHQLVVXHG7KH
WRWDOQXPEHURIDSSOLFDWLRQVUHMHFWHGXSXQWLOWKDWGDWHZDV}SHUFHQWRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQVUHFHLYHGDQGWKH
WRWDOQXPEHURIFHUWLƄFDWHVUHYRNHGZDV}SHUFHQWRIFHUWLƄFDWHVLVVXHG7KHQXPEHURIDSSOLFDWLRQVUHFHLYHG
LQWKHVSDFHRIRQH\HDUIURP-DQXDU\WR'HFHPEHUZDV7KHQXPEHURIFHUWLƄFDWHVLVVXHGGXULQJ
WKDWVDPHSHULRGZDVDQDYHUDJHRISHUPRQWK7KHEUHDNGRZQUHSRUWHGSHUFHUWLƄFDWHW\SHLVVXHGZDV
$(2)}SHUFHQW$(2&}SHUFHQWDQG$(26}SHUFHQW
128 )RU WKH VHOIDVVHVVPHQW TXHVWLRQQDLUH VHH http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/
policy_issues/customs_security/aeo_self_assessment_en.pdf . Explanatory notes are also available at http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/policy_issues/customs_security/aeo_self_
assessment_explanatory_en.pdf.
129 MRAs have already been concluded with Switzerland, Norway and Japan. A similar agreement is also being explored 
with China.
130 7KH(8DQGWKH86$DUHVWUDWHJLFWUDGHSDUWQHUVZLWKLPSRUWVDQGH[SRUWVDFFRXQWLQJIRUDOPRVWb}ELOOLRQLQ
131 Membership in the C-TPAT has reached 10,221 companies as of January 12, 2012. CBP currently has signed MRAs 
with the European Union, New Zealand, Canada, Jordan, Japan and the Republic of Korea and is continuing to work 
towards similar recognition with Singapore, Taiwan and other countries.
132 Preparatory work on mutual recognition was completed in November 2011, when they came to an agreement to 
PXWXDOO\UHFRJQL]HHDFKRWKHUVVHFXUHWUDGHUVSURJUDPPHV$FRS\RIWKHGHFLVLRQLVSXEOLVKHGLQWKH2IƄFLDO-RXUQDO
of the European Union, L 144/44, 5 June 2012, p.44-47, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu.
133 See Customs: EU and USA agree to recognize each other’s “trusted traders”, EU Press Release IP/12/449, 4 May 
2012.
134 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. Public Law 110-53, 3 August 2007. For an 
analysis of the respective provisions, see UNCTAD’s Transport Newsletter QRƄUVWTXDUWHUDYDLODEOHDWwww.
unctad.org/ttl.
135 See Review of Maritime Transport 2010, p.128.
136 See also “Balancing maritime security and trade facilitation: Protecting our ports, increasing commerce and securing 
the supply chain”, Joint Statement by DHS before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security, 7 February 2012, available at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/
ƄOHV7HVWLPRQ\+H\PDQ&=XQNXQIW&0F$OHHQDQSGI.
137 Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, 
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director Homeland Security and Justice, 7 February 2012, GAO-12-422T, available 
at: www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-422T. The report states that “uncertainty persists over how the Department 
RI+RPHODQG6HFXULW\ '+6 DQG WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHV&XVWRPV DQG%RUGHU 3URWHFWLRQ &%3ZLOO IXOƄO WKHPDQGDWH
IRU}SHUFHQWVFDQQLQJJLYHQWKDW WKHIHDVLELOLW\UHPDLQVXQSURYHQ LQ OLJKWRI WKHFKDOOHQJHVWKH&%3KDVIDFHG
LPSOHPHQWLQJDSLORWSURJUDPIRU}SHUFHQWVFDQQLQJ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH6$)(3RUW$FWUHTXLUHPHQWWRLPSOHPHQWD
SLORWSURJUDPWRGHWHUPLQHWKHIHDVLELOLW\RI}SHUFHQWVFDQQLQJ&%3WKH'HSDUWPHQWRI6WDWHDQGWKH'HSDUWPHQW
of Energy announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program in December 2006. However, 
ORJLVWLFDOWHFKQRORJLFDODQGRWKHUFKDOOHQJHVSUHYHQWHGWKHSDUWLFLSDWLQJSRUWVIURPDFKLHYLQJ}SHUFHQWVFDQQLQJ
and CBP has since reduced the scope of the SFI program from six ports to one. In October 2009, GAO recommended 
WKDW&%3SHUIRUPDQDVVHVVPHQWWRGHWHUPLQHLI}SHUFHQWVFDQQLQJLVIHDVLEOHDQGLILWLVWKHEHVWZD\WRDFKLHYH
it, or if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives”.
138 In order for a two-year extension to take effect, the Secretary of the Department for Homeland Security (DHS) was 
UHTXLUHGWRSURYLGHDUHSRUWWR&RQJUHVVGD\VEHIRUH-XO\LHE\0D\6HH6HFWLRQERI
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) which amends the SAFE Port 
Act.
139 )RU}WKH}IXOO}WH[W}RI}WKH}OHWWHU}VHH}www.brymar-consulting.com/wp content/uploads/security/Scanning_deferral_120502.
pdf.
140 MSC.1/Circ.1192 on Guidance on voluntary self-assessment by SOLAS Contracting Governments and by port 
facilities; MSC.1/Circ.1193 on Guidance on voluntary self-assessment by Administrations and for ship security; and 
MSC.1/Circ.1194 on Effective implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code.
141 See document MSC 90/4/1 (Australia).
142 Resolution FAL.11(37), Report of the Facilitation Committee on its thirty-seventh session, FAL 37/17 Annex 1.
143 See FAL 37/17, p.18. Reports on stowaway incidents were received by the IMO from nine Member States; one 
Associate Member and one NGO in 2008; from eight Member States, one Associate Member and one NGO in 2009, 
IURPƄYH0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGRQH$VVRFLDWH0HPEHULQDQGRQH0HPEHU6WDWHLQ
144 Ibid., p.21.
145 FAL.5/Circ.36.
146 FAL.5/Circ.35.
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147 For more information on these amendments adopted during the ninetieth session of the MSC see the report of the 
MSC on its ninetieth session, document MSC 90/28, Annex 4.
148 MSC.1/Circ.1441.
149 For more information see www.iso.org. See also FAL 37/8/3, ISO 28000 Series Standards Update, submitted by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)UHƅHFWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDVRI-XO\7KHSURFHGXUHRISUHSDULQJ
International Standards at the ISO is as follows: Draft International Standards adopted by the technical committees 
(TCs) are circulated to the member bodies for voting. Approval by at least 75% of the member bodies casting a vote 
LV UHTXHVWHG IRUDQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUG WREHSXEOLVKHG:KHQ WKHUH LVDQXUJHQWPDUNHW UHTXLUHPHQW IRU VXFK
GRFXPHQWVD7&PD\GHFLGHWRSXEOLVKRWKHUW\SHVRIGRFXPHQWVVXFKDVDQ,623XEOLFO\$YDLODEOH6SHFLƄFDWLRQ
,623$6RUDQ,627HFKQLFDO6SHFLƄFDWLRQ,6276$Q,623$6LVDFFHSWHGIRUSXEOLFDWLRQLILWLVDSSURYHGE\PRUH
than 50% of the members of the parent committee casting a vote, while an ISO/TS is accepted for publication if it 
is approved by 2/3 of the members of the TC casting a vote. An ISO/PAS or ISO/TS is reviewed after three years in 
RUGHUWRGHFLGHZKHWKHULWZLOOEHFRQƄUPHGIRUDIXUWKHUWKUHH\HDUVUHYLVHGWREHFRPHDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUGRU
ZLWKGUDZQ,IDQ,623$6RU,6276LVFRQƄUPHGLWLVUHYLHZHGDJDLQIRUDIXUWKHUWKUHH\HDUVDWZKLFKWLPHLWPXVW
either be transformed into an International Standard or be withdrawn.
150 For further information see http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-
RQVWDQGDUGVRIWUDLQLQJFHUWLƄFDWLRQDQGZDWFKNHHSLQJIRUƄVKLQJYHVVHOSHUVRQQHODVS[.
151 According to Article 12 of the Convention, it will enter into force 12 months after the date on which not fewer than 15 
6WDWHVKDYHUDWLƄHGLW2Q6HSWHPEHUWKH5HSXEOLFRI3DODXZDVWKHƄIWHHQWK6WDWHWRUDWLI\WKH&RQYHQWLRQ
LQFUHDVLQJLWVOHYHORIUDWLƄFDWLRQWR}SHUFHQWRIZRUOGWRQQDJH
152 The 1993 Protocol had been adopted to amend the original Torremolinos Convention of 1977.
153 For information on another related convention of a more general nature, the International Convention on Standards of 
7UDLQLQJ&HUWLƄFDWLRQDQG:DWFKNHHSLQJIRU6HDIDUHUV67&:DQGLWVVXEVHTXHQWDPHQGPHQWVVHHReview 
of Maritime Transport 2011, p.126-128.
154 Policy Brief, Global Governance Programme, Issue 2011/1, June 2011; Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Volume 
15, Number 15, 27 April 2011.
155 See reports on the recent informal ministerial trade talks in Paris on 22 May 2012, as reported by 24 May 2012 issue of 
Washington Trade Daily and the Wall Street Journal on 23 May 2012; Joint Statement of 13 December 2011 of ANTAD 
0H[LFR(XUR&RPPHUFH(XURSHWKH&RQVHLOTXÆEÆFRLVGXFRPPHUFHGHGÆWDLO&DQDGD)7$(XURSHDQG15)
(US) and P. Lamy (WTO) on March 19 2012, as reported by Reuters (US Edition) on 19 March 2012.
156 “A Down Payment on Development: Conclude a WTO Trade Facilitation Deal”, 27 June 2012, Ahmad Mohamed 
Ali Al-Madani, President of the Islamic Development Bank, Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development 
Bank, Haruhiko Kuroda, President of the Asian Development Bank, Thomas Mirow, President of the European Bank 
for  Reconstruction and Development, Luis Alberto Moreno, President of the InterAmerican Development Bank and 
Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank Group.
157 ,QWHUYLHZ ZLWK 3DEOR /RQJXHLUD 0LQLVWHU RI (FRQRPLFV 'HYHORSPHQW DQG 7RXULVP RI &KLOH DQG *DEULHO 'XTXH
'HSXW\0LQLVWHURI7UDGHRI&RORPELD$SULOWUDQVFULEHGE\WKHRIƄFHRIWKH$XVWUDOLDQ0LQLVWHUIRU7UDGHDQG
Competitiveness.
158 “The Case for a WTO agreement – now”, Mr. Joakim Reiter, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden 
to the WTO, 8 December 2011, UNCTAD Multi-year Expert Meeting on Transport and Trade Facilitation.
159 )RUDUHFHQWRYHUYLHZVHH-XQHWDONVRIWKHWUDGHPLQLVWHUVIURPWKH$VLD3DFLƄF(FRQRPLF&RRSHUDWLRQ
(APEC), as reported by Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Volume 16 · Number 22, 6 June 2012.
160 Section I contains 16 articles and section II on STD, while not divided in articles, contains 11 distinct provisions.
161 The text also deals with the cross-cutting matters which include relationship to other WTO agreements, dispute settlement, 
ƄQDOSURYLVLRQVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQVFKHGXOHVDQGH[FHSWLRQV'XHWRWKHOLPLWHGVSDFHWKH\DUHQRWDQDO\VHGKHUH
162 See, for instance, Recommendation No. 18 on Facilitation Measures Related to International Trade Procedures of the 
United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT).
163 In some trade and transport agreements, however, such as the abovementioned Harmonization Convention, however, 
the Contracting Parties commit to align their documents on UNLK.
164 UNCTAD, Transport and Trade Facilitation, Series No.3, “Trade Facilitation in Regional Trade Agreements”, UNCTAD/
DTL/TLB/2011/1.
165 ,QVHYHUDORILWVRQJRLQJFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJSURMHFWVDQGUHJLRQDOZRUNVKRSVRQ7)81&7$'LVXVLQJWKHGUDIWQHJRWLDWLQJ
text of WTO as a reference for assessing the state of TF in the participating countries. For more information, see http://
unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/Trade-Logistics-Branch.aspx.
166 Switzerland, Note on TF negotiations, August 2011.
167 See UNCTAD, Technical Notes on Trade Facilitation Measures UNCTAD/DTL/TLB/2010/1, and UNCTAD, Trade 
Facilitation Handbook (Part I):  National Facilitation Bodies: Lessons from Experience, UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2005/1 
(currently under revision).
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168 The proposed categories are as follows:
Category A: Provisions that a developing country member or a least developed country member has designated for 
implementation upon entry into force of the agreement.
Category B: Provisions that a developing country member or a least developed country member has designated for 
implementation on a date after a transitional period of time following the entry into force of the agreement.
Category C:  Provisions that a developing country member or a least developed country member has designated for
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRQDGDWHDVUHTXLULQJDWUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRGRIWLPHDIWHUWKHHQWU\LQWRIRUFHRIWKHDJUHHPHQWDQG
WHFKQLFDODQGRUƄQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHDQGVXSSRUWIRUFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJ
169 6HH81&7$'5HƅHFWLRQRQD)XWXUH7UDGH)DFLOLWDWLRQ$JUHHPHQW},PSOHPHQWDWLRQRI:72REOLJDWLRQV$FRPSDULVRQ
of existing WTO agreements, UNCTAD/DTL/TLB/2010/2, p.45.
170 “The Case for a WTO agreement – now”, supra, p.5.
171 For the most recent example, see the communication from the European Union, TN/TF/W/149/Rev.3 of 12 May 2012.
172 Challenges and policy options for transport and trade facilitation, Note by UNCTAD secretariat, 28 September 2011, 
TD/B/C.I/MEM.1/11, pp. 65-68.
173 A detailed analysis of the TF related provisions in bilateral and regional agreements is available in the abovementioned 
note by UNCTAD on “Trade Facilitation in Regional Trade Agreements”.
174 For a recent example, see the presentation by Argentina at the last UNCTAD Multi-year Expert Meeting on Transport 
and Trade Facilitation on 7-9 December 2011.

The importance of freight transport as a trade enabler, engine of growth and a driver of 
social development is widely recognized. However, the associated adverse impacts of 
freight transport activity on the environment, human health and climate are also cause 
for concern. Overall, transport consumes over 50 per cent of global liquid fossil fuels 
DQGLVSURMHFWHGWRJURZE\SHUFHQWSHU\HDUIURPWRDQGWRDFFRXQWIRU
SHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOSURMHFWHGLQFUHPHQWLQOLTXLGIXHOXVH,WLVDOVRHVWLPDWHGWKDW
freight in tons per kilometre will triple by 2050 and that energy demand of commercial 
transportation – trucks, aeroplanes, ships and trains – will rise by over 70 per cent by 
2040, driven by economic growth particularly in developing countries. At the same time, 
the transport sector accounts for around 13 per cent of all world greenhouse gases 
*+*VRIZKLFKSHUFHQWDUHUHODWHGWRORJLVWLFVZLWKIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWDFFRXQWLQJ
IRU}SHUFHQWRI WKHWRWDOVKDUH1HDUO\SHUFHQWRIJOREDOFDUERQGLR[LGH &22
HPLVVLRQV DUH WUDQVSRUW UHODWHG DQG WKHVH DUH H[SHFWHG WR LQFUHDVH E\ } SHU FHQW
ZRUOGZLGHRU}SHUFHQWD\HDUEHWZHHQDQG
If left unchecked, unsustainable patterns are likely to intensify, increasing the potential 
for global energy and environmental crises, and undermining progress being made 
on sustainable development and growth. This chapter highlights the relevance of 
sustainability imperatives in the freight transport sector and focuses on the need 
to reduce the sector’s energy consumption and air emissions. Some of the main 
developments and initiatives undertaken by countries, industry and the international 
community with a view to promoting sustainable freight transport are also presented, 
DORQJ ZLWK D QXPEHU RI ƄQDQFLDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV WKDW FDQ GHWHUPLQH WKH DELOLW\ WR
implement a shift towards sustainable freight transport systems.
SUSTAINABLE 
FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
DEVELOPMENT 
AND FINANCE
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental sustainability is a pressing issue that 
is gathering momentum globally. This is triggered by 
the growing needs of an expanding world population 
and increasing economic activity which are depleting 
world natural resources and imposing great pressure 
on the environment, including the climate. In this 
context, adhering to sustainability principles becomes 
crucial to enable an effective balancing act between 
these competing trends and developments.
7KHQHHGWRDFKLHYHVXVWDLQDELOLW\REMHFWLYHVKDVEHHQ
IXUWKHUPRXOGHGE\WKHJOREDOHFRQRPLFDQGƄQDQFLDO
crisis, highlighting the emergence of so-called green 
economies. This term is understood to mean an 
HFRQRP\ZKLFKLVORZFDUERQUHVRXUFHHIƄFLHQWDQG
socially inclusive.1 The green economy is seen as a key 
policy option that can address the growing economic, 
environmental and social challenges.
The United Nations General Assembly and several 
United Nations agencies have called for the 
development of green economy initiatives as part 
of the stimulus packages put in place to support 
recovery and stimulate growth. The green economy 
FRQFHSW ZDV DOVR RQH RI WKH WZR PDMRU WKHPHV
considered during the United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), held in June 
2012 in Brazil (RIO+20)2ZKLFKLQFOXGHGIRUWKHƄUVW
time, explicit reference to sustainable transport. The 
Conference recognized the importance of sustainable 
transport within the framework of global sustainable 
GHYHORSPHQW DQG LGHQWLƄHG PHDVXUHV WR SURPRWH
such transport systems, including, inter alia, by 
HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQWPXOWLPRGDO WUDQVSRUW V\VWHPV FOHDQ
fuels and vehicles, as well as improved transportation 
systems in rural areas and the promotion of integrated 
approaches to policymaking.3
Achieving a green economy also implies tackling 
climate change and accelerating low-carbon green 
growth. Estimates indicate that by 2050 the world 
ZLOO QHHG}SHU FHQWPRUH IRRG}SHU FHQWPRUH
HQHUJ\ DQG } SHU FHQW PRUH ZDWHU4 At the same 
time, these resources are likely to become depleted 
or scarce, and only available at prohibitive costs 
due, in particular, to the negative impacts of climate 
change. Despite international efforts, namely under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), which promoted the adoption of 
an international binding regulatory regime to mitigate 
FOLPDWHFKDQJH*+*HPLVVLRQV LQFUHDVHGE\}SHU
cent in 2010, taking the total volume of emissions 
to 30.6 gigatons (Gt).5 Thus, immediate and strong 
action to cut GHG emissions, while at the same time 
promoting growth and development, is ever more 
crucial.
Against this background, an appraisal of the transport 
sector, including freight transport, within the framework 
of sustainable development is seen as an essential 
FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHSUHVHQW5HYLHZ$URXQG}SHUFHQW
of fuels used in the transport sector are fossil based. 
With transport depending heavily on oil for propulsion, 
the sector emits large amounts of GHGs (notably CO2
6) 
and other air emissions such as nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
sulphur oxides (SOx), volatile organic compounds, 
particulate matter and lead. All these emissions have 
negative impacts on human health, the environment 
ZDWHUTXDOLW\ VRLO TXDOLW\ELRGLYHUVLW\ ODQG WDNH ODQG
use, congestion and noise)7 and the climate.
Freight transport activity will continue to grow in 
WDQGHPZLWKSURMHFWHGJURZWK LQEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHV
rising incomes and greater movements of goods 
– both within and between nations. Growing freight 
transport activity will in turn lead to a commensurate 
rise in global demand and use of oil and emissions of 
GHGs, which can lead to unpredictable changes in 
the global climate.
In addition to GHG emissions and related global climate 
effects, local and regional emissions of air pollutants 
are also raising concerns. Worldwide, air pollution 
IURP WUDQVSRUW LV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU DERXW}SHU FHQW
of all deaths annually.87UXFNVDQGVKLSVDUHDPDMRU
source of air pollutants, especially particulate matter. 
)RU LQVWDQFH DOWKRXJK RQO\ } SHU FHQW RI YHKLFOHV
LQ&KLQD DUH WUXFNV WKH\ DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU } SHU
cent of particulate emissions from transport.9  Also, 
particular matter contains black carbon and diesel 
HPLVVLRQVWKDWDUHQRZFRQƄUPHGFDUFLQRJHQV10
6XVWDLQDELOLW\LQIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWUHTXLUHVDEDODQFLQJ
act between economic, social and environmental 
considerations, and entails the ability to provide fuel 
HIƄFLHQW FRVWHIIHFWLYH HQYLURQPHQWDOO\ IULHQGO\
low-carbon, and climate-resilient transport systems.11
Governments and industry have now started to 
mainstream sustainability criteria into their planning 
SURFHVVHV SROLFLHV DQG SURJUDPPHV 6SHFLƄF
actions may involve reshaping transport architecture 
and networks, balancing transport modes, adapting 
and developing appropriate infrastructure, rethinking 
supply chain designs and operating procedures 
of freight logistics, harnessing new technologies, 
and supporting information and communications 
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technology (ICT) and intelligent transport systems 
,76(YHQWKRXJKWKHUHKDVEHHQVLJQLƄFDQWSURJUHVV
in sustainable freight approaches and practices, 
meeting effectively and in full the sector’s sustainability 
REMHFWLYHVKDV\HWWREHDFKLHYHG
While addressing climate change impacts on freight 
transport through adaptation action is also a key 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQZKHQSXUVXLQJVXVWDLQDELOLW\REMHFWLYHV
this issue falls outside the scope of this chapter and is 
addressed in greater detail in chapter 1. This chapter 
highlights the importance of achieving sustainability 
in freight transport and the need to mitigate the 
sector’s emissions and to reduce the sector’s energy 
consumption as well as its heavy reliance on oil. 
Some key developments and initiatives undertaken by 
countries, industry and the international community 
with a view to promoting sustainable freight transport 
are also discussed in the present chapter, along with 
D QXPEHU RI ƄQDQFLDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV WKDW PD\ KHOS
to determine the ability to implement a shift towards 
sustainable freight transport systems.
B. TRANSPORT SECTOR ENERGY USE 
AND EMISSIONS
This section highlights the large energy use and emissions 
from transport, including freight transport, and underlines 
the importance of reducing the sector’s oil consumption 
and dependency to achieve greater environmental 
sustainability, and reduce exposure to rising and volatile 
energy prices that drive up fuel and transport costs.
1. Energy use
The transport sector is heavily dependent on oil 
DV LWVPDLQ VRXUFH RI IXHO $V VKRZQ LQ ƄJXUH 
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ FRQVXPHV PRUH WKDQ } SHU FHQW
RI JOREDO OLTXLG IRVVLO IXHOV DQG LWV VKDUH RI ZRUOG
FRQVXPSWLRQ KDV JURZQ E\ } SHU FHQW EHWZHHQ
1973 and 2010.12 In comparison, other economic 
sectors have recorded a declining trend during the 
VDPH SHULRG :RUOG OLTXLG IXHO FRQVXPSWLRQ IRU
WUDQVSRUWDWLRQLVH[SHFWHGWRJURZE\}SHUFHQWSHU
)LJXUH :RUOGRLOFRQVXPSWLRQDQG
Source: Key World Energy Statistics 2012 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (QHUJ\ $JHQF\ ,($ 7KH RLO SURGXFWV FRPSULVH UHƄQHU\ JDV HWKDQH
OLTXHƄHGSHWUROHXPJDV/3*DYLDWLRQJDVROLQHPRWRUJDVROLQHMHWIXHOVNHURVHQHJDVGLHVHORLOIXHORLOQDSKWKDZKLWH
VSLULWOXEULFDQWVELWXPHQSDUDIƄQZD[HVSHWUROHXPFRNHDQGRWKHURLOSURGXFWV
(a) Includes international aviation and international marine bunkers.
(b) Includes agriculture, commercial and public services.
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\HDUIURPWRDQGDFFRXQWVIRU}SHUFHQW
RIWKHWRWDOSURMHFWHGLQFUHPHQWLQOLTXLGIXHOXVH13
Freight transport has been growing more rapidly than 
passenger transport and is expected to continue rising 
in the future. Some existing forecasts indicate that 
freight in tons per kilometre will triple between 2010 
and 2050, driven by economic growth particularly in 
developing countries.14 Energy demand for commercial 
transportation – trucks, aeroplanes, ships and trains – 
LVSURMHFWHGWRULVHE\PRUHWKDQ}SHUFHQWIURP
to 2040. Most of this growth will come from heavy duty 
vehicles, which include freight trucks of all sizes, as well 
as buses, emergency vehicles and work trucks. 15
2LO VXSSO\ DQG GHPDQG DQG SULFH ƅXFWXDWLRQ DUH
important considerations for transport and will continue 
WRSOD\DVLJQLƄFDQW UROH LQ WKH IXWXUHDVXQFHUWDLQW\
over global oil reserves, among other issues, become 
more prevalent. Alternative sources of energy and fuel 
HIƄFLHQF\LQWUDQVSRUWPD\WDNHXSDPRUHSURPLQHQW
role, assuming continued research and development, 
technological advances and strong policies are put in 
place to ensure their implementation at an affordable 
cost and on a massive scale. In the meantime, this 
should not prevent practical steps being taken to 
JHDUFXUUHQWRSHUDWLRQVWRZDUGVPRUHHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQW
practices (see section C).
2. Emissions
The transport sector is estimated to have accounted 
IRUDURXQG}SHUFHQWRIDOOZRUOG*+*V LQ16 
Logistics, including freight transport and ‘logistics 
EXLOGLQJVp DFFRXQW IRU } SHU FHQW RI JOREDO *+*
emissions. Of this total, freight transport accounts 
IRU WKH OLRQVKDUHRI}SHUFHQWRU}SHUFHQWRI
total GHG emissions.17 In terms of CO2 emissions, the 
transport sector is estimated to have accounted for 
DURXQG}SHUFHQWRIJOREDO&22 emissions in 2009.18
$VVKRZQ LQ ƄJXUH WKH WUDQVSRUW LQGXVWU\ LV WKH
second largest CO2-emitting sector after electricity 
and heat production. 
Figure 6.3 compares CO2HPLVVLRQVIURPPDMRUIUHLJKW
transport modes. It shows that in terms of grams of 
CO2 produced for every ton carried over one kilometre, 
air transport is the largest emitter, followed by road. It 
should also be noted that air and road transport are 
the two most expensive modes of transport in terms 
of freight rates per volume.
If current trends persist, transport-related CO2
HPLVVLRQV DUH HVWLPDWHG WR LQFUHDVH E\ } SHU
FHQWZRUOGZLGH }SHUFHQWD \HDU IRU WKHSHULRG
2005–2030.20 It is also expected that more than 
} SHU FHQW RI WKH SUHGLFWHG JURZWK LQ WUDQVSRUW
Figure 6.2. World CO2 emissions from fuel combustion by sector, 2009 (a)
Source: CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Highlights, 2011, IEA.
(a) Includes international bunkers in the transport sector.
(b) ,QFOXGHVHPLVVLRQVIURPRZQXVHLQSHWUROHXPUHƄQLQJWKHPDQXIDFWXUHRIVROLGIXHOVFRDOPLQLQJRLODQGJDVH[WUDFWLRQ
and other energy-producing industries.
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emissions would be in developing countries (with 
China and India alone accounting for more than 
}SHUFHQWRI WKHJOREDO LQFUHDVH21) and with most 
of the emissions being generated by land transport. 
Air pollution is also expected to be more intensive in 
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVGXHWRWKHTXDOLW\RI IXHOXVHG
IRU SURSXOVLRQ DQG WKH FRQGLWLRQ RI HTXLSPHQW DQG
vehicles, in particular the ageing trucks.
The challenge now is for all countries to promote 
sustainable transport policies, strategies, planning 
and investment decisions that balance the 
HFRQRPLF HQYLURQPHQWDO DQG VRFLDO REMHFWLYHV
This is particularly crucial for developing countries 
that have the opportunity to consider from inception 
a sustainable development path. Missing this 
opportunity may lead to increased costs in the 
future, as Governments and industries would 
eventually face additional expenses to adapt to new 
circumstances and adopt new transport systems, 
including new technologies and operating practices. 
5HWURƄWWLQJH[LVWLQJ LQIUDVWUXFWXUHDQGHTXLSPHQW WR
shocks, including those caused by climate change 
impacts, can be burdensome, capital intensive 
and costly. Thus, timely action at an early stage is 
FUXFLDO$Q\GHOD\ LQSXUVXLQJHQHUJ\ IXHOHIƄFLHQF\
and low carbon systems will promote false savings. 
It is estimated that every United States dollar spent 
RQ HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ VDYHV  WKURXJK LQYHVWPHQWV
in new supply, with the savings being even greater in 
developing countries.22
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SUSTAINABLE FREIGHT
TRANSPORT
Addressing sustainability in the freight transport sector 
UHTXLUHVDKROLVWLFDSSURDFKZKHUHWKHSHUVSHFWLYHVRI
all private and public stakeholders in the system must 
be considered and integrated, inclusive of all modes 
and activities. Institutional, technical and operational 
PHDVXUHV KDYH WR EH GHƄQHG DQG FRPELQHG WR
overcome the various cross-cutting sustainability 
challenges characteristic of the sector. Some of 
the salient measures can generally be associated 
with three main areas for action – also described 
as the avoid–shift–improve approach23 – which 
would encounter cross-cutting issues that can be 
summarized as follows:
)LJXUH &RPSDULVRQRI&22 emissions in freight transport by mode of transport
(Grams carbon per ton freight carried per kilometre)
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)19
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s $YRLGLQHIƄFLHQWIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWDYRLGRUUHGXFH
wasteful and unnecessary or empty trips, and 
duplication of roads, thus optimizing freight 
transport planning/volume/operations and 
reducing congestion, and the like.
s Shift to sustainable transport modes and systems: 
shift to cleaner transport modes (railways and 
waterways when applicable), to alternative fuels 
and to appropriate vehicle size, loads and routes, 
and the like.
s Improve the sustainability of freight transport, 
logistics, vessels and vehicles: improve 
infrastructure design and construction; improve 
IXHOV HIƄFLHQF\ LQ DOOPRGHV E\ LPSURYLQJ IUHLJKW
transport operations (for example, by better 
PDQDJHPHQW RI WUDQVSRUW V\VWHP ƅRZV DQG
capacities) and freight logistical systems (for 
example, creating smart logistics network 
concepts), leveraging technologies capable of 
LPSURYLQJ IXHOHIƄFLHQF\DQG UHGXFLQJHPLVVLRQV
and improving drivers’ behaviour (for example, 
through training and capacity building).
This section focuses on some of the measures and 
initiatives undertaken by the sector (maritime and 
inland) to promote a shift towards sustainable freight 
transport.  These initiatives are expected to produce 
EHQHƄWVLQWHUPVRILPSURYLQJWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRI
environmentally friendly transport modes and systems, 
LQFUHDVLQJIXHOHIƄFLHQF\WLPHDQGFRVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV
thereby reducing the sector carbon footprint.
1. The maritime sector
As the debate on climate change has been gaining 
momentum globally, the maritime and shipping sector 
has been facing pressure to respond to the challenges 
of increasing GHG emissions (CO2, SOx, NOx, etc.) 
and air pollution (especially particulate matter) and 
possible mitigation and adaptation measures are 
being considered, both at the regulatory and industry 
levels.
$OWKRXJKFRQVLGHUHGWREHDUHODWLYHO\HQHUJ\HIƄFLHQW
and climate-friendly mode of transport, especially in 
terms of emissions per ton of freight per kilometre, 
shipping and its environmental footprint is increasingly 
coming under public scrutiny.
According to the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), shipping was estimated to have accounted 
IRU}SHUFHQWRI WKHJOREDOHPLVVLRQVGXULQJ
International shipping was estimated to be responsible 
IRU}SHUFHQWRIWKHJOREDOHPLVVLRQVRI&22 in 2007. In 
the absence of global policies to control emissions from 
international shipping, ship emissions may increase 
E\t}SHUFHQWE\WKH\HDUFRPSDUHGWR
the emissions in 2007) due to the expected continued 
growth in international seaborne trade.24
There does, however, appear to be a consensus 
within the International community, including the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), that some 
measures affecting the technology of ships and 
IXHOVFRXOGKHOSDFKLHYHVRPHHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\DQG
reduce GHG emission intensity rates (CO2/ton-mile) 
E\t}SHUFHQWEHORZWKHFXUUHQWOHYHOV0RUHRYHU
the international shipping industry is of the view that 
WKURXJKMRLQWDQGFRPELQHGWHFKQLFDODQGRSHUDWLRQDO
HIIRUWV LW VKRXOG EH SRVVLEOH WR UHGXFH t} SHU
cent of CO2 emissions per ton freight per kilometre 
by 2020.25
At the regulatory level, the international shipping 
industry is adhering increasingly to environmental 
sustainability principles and is recognizing its important 
role in maintaining the current international momentum 
on sustainability and climate change action in maritime 
transport. In 2011, the IMO (the body entrusted by 
UNFCCC to develop and enact global regulations 
to control GHG emissions from ships engaged in 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO WUDGH DGRSWHG WKH ƄUVW JOREDO UHJLPH
that addresses carbon emissions from international 
VKLSSLQJ QDPHO\ WKH (QHUJ\ (IƄFLHQF\ 'HVLJQ ,QGH[
((',DQGWKH6KLS(QHUJ\(IƄFLHQF\0DQDJHPHQW3ODQ
(SEEMP) (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion 
of the new rules). Market-based measures, such as 
emissions trading or a global levy to help cut further 
emissions from international shipping are also being 
considered by IMO, but a number of outstanding issues 
are holding back a rapid adoption of an international 
agreement. These include the need to reconcile the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities (CBDR) under the UNFCCC 
with the principle of uniform and global application of 
IMO instruments, as well as the need to determine the 
level of contribution by shipping into the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF) (established in December 2011 at the 
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban 
t VHH WKH IROORZLQJ VHFWLRQ RQ FOLPDWH ƄQDQFH 7KH
)XQGDLPVWRJHQHUDWH}ELOOLRQSHU\HDUE\WR
enable mitigation and adaptation action in developing 
countries. While the United Nations Secretary-General’s 
High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing 
(AGF), established in 2010, suggested that some 
}ELOOLRQSHU\HDUFRXOGEHUDLVHGIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDO
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shipping, the World Bank suggests that instead some 
}ELOOLRQSHU\HDUFRXOGEHJHQHUDWHG26 The shipping 
industry is concerned that its potential contribution into 
the Fund will be disproportionate to its responsibility for 
global CO2 emissions, and that it will be doubly charged 
through the UNFCCC as well as via a potential market-
based instrument under the IMO.27
At the industry level, the shipping industry is taking 
important actions, including technological, operational 
or engineering-based measures to improve the 
VHFWRUpV HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ UHGXFH IXHO FRQVXPSWLRQ
and emissions. Relevant initiatives include building 
fuel-saving and environment-friendly ships, promoting 
the switch to cleaner fuels and increasingly adopting 
VORZ VWHDPLQJ $V DQ H[DPSOH 6LQR3DFLƄF
Shipbuilding Group launched, in May 2012, a new 
generation of fuel-saving and environment-friendly 
bulk carriers which aim at the segmented markets 
for 60,000, 80,000 and 120,000 deadweight ton 
(dwt) bulk carriers (CROWN 63, CROWN MHI 82 
and CROWN 121 Ultimate, respectively). At a service 
speed of 14.3 knots, the fuel consumption of CROWN 
63 Ultramax bulk carriers is reduced to 25.8 tons 
SHUGD\UHSUHVHQWLQJD}SHUFHQWUHGXFWLRQ LQ IXHO
FRQVXPSWLRQ FRPSDUHG WR HTXLYDOHQWVL]HG EXON
carriers currently operating.
For the ports and terminals, various opportunities 
have also emerged for improving environmental 
sustainability. Examples vary from enhanced port 
infrastructure design, switching to greener modes 
of transport for hinterland access (e.g. rail, inland 
ZDWHUZD\V WKH DGRSWLRQ RI HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\
programmes and using renewable energy (such 
as biofuels, solar energy and wind turbines) to 
cater for port operations in general, including cargo 
ORDGLQJXQORDGLQJDQGZDUHKRXVHVDVZHOODVWUDIƄF
management systems (both for servicing vessels and 
for cargo handling inside the terminals). In this context, 
RQH VWXG\ KDV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW E\PL[LQJ } SHU
FHQWELRIXHOVZLWKXVHGGLHVHOFDQOHDGWRDt}SHU
cent reduction of CO2 emissions per terminal and to a 
}SHUFHQWHPLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQRIWKHWRWDOFRQWDLQHU
sector.28 The so-called cold ironing – whereby ships, 
while in the port, use onshore electricity as energy 
source instead of running their engines – constitutes 
another strategy able to reduce emissions in ports and 
even in some cases completely eliminating, harmful 
air emissions from diesel engines. Furthermore, ports 
and terminal operators see a competitive advantage to 
be gained in integrating technology to their business 
processes and in using cleaner land-based cargo-
KDQGOLQJ HTXLSPHQW VXFK DV ,7GULYHQ TXD\ FUDQHV
and eco-friendly rubber-tyred gantry cranes. 
Other port-based measures aiming to achieve greater 
HIƄFLHQFLHVLQSRUWVLQFOXGHFKDQJLQJWHUPLQDOOD\RXWV
WR UHGXFH WLPH DQG SURFHVVHV UHTXLUHG WR PRYH
containers and cargo. By doing so, a reduction 
of CO2 emissions can be generated, as illustrated 
by the Rotterdam Shortsea Terminal which noted 
a CO2 HPLVVLRQ UHGXFWLRQ RI QHDUO\ } SHU FHQW29 
Another more comprehensive approach consists of 
incorporating systemic logistics solutions aimed at 
reducing time and cost into the design and planning 
of ports and terminals, as shown by the port-centric 
logistics or cargo hub operating structure.30 Recent 
studies31 have shown that the port-centric model 
does address the key supply chain challenges of 
time, cost and carbon emissions. However, in some 
countries land availability and affordability may be a 
EDUULHUWRGHOLYHULQJIXOO\HIƄFLHQWSRUWFHQWULFVROXWLRQV
The development of port-centric models have been 
widely accepted in Europe, where there is a growing 
VKLIW WR WKH EXLOGLQJ RI ORJLVWLFV FHQWUHV DGMDFHQW WR
new sea or inland water transport terminals.32 For 
example, DP World’s London Gateway is developing 
a large port-centric logistics park connected to a new 
}PLOOLRQ7(8GHHSVHDFRQWDLQHUSRUWORFDWHGHDVW
RI /RQGRQ /RQGRQ*DWHZD\ ZRXOG RIIHU D TXLFNHU
more reliable and greener way to transport goods to 
their destination compared with existing supply chain 
PRGHOV ,W LV HVWLPDWHG WKDW } PLOOLRQ URDGIUHLJKW
miles every year will be saved since goods will no 
longer need to be transported from deep-sea ports 
to inland distribution centres.33 Another scheme to 
improve sustainability is to investigate how logistics 
chains can be developed in ways that mitigate empty 
FDUJRORDGVDQGFRQVROLGDWHVKLSSLQJMRXUQH\VYLDVR
called optimization. Enhanced logistics and supply 
chain management can improve freight loads and 
VWRUDJHWKHUHE\UHGXFLQJWKHQXPEHURIWULSVUHTXLUHG
for deliveries. Other innovative approaches used by 
ports to reduce emissions include the so-called low 
emissions zones RUWKHJHRJUDSKLFDOO\GHƄQHGDUHDV
that seek to restrict or prevent access to polluting 
vehicles within and around port areas.  Low emissions 
zones exist in Singapore, Hong Kong (China), Seattle 
and Antwerp and coast lines such as the West Coast 
of the United States and the East Coast of China 
(planned). Together, all these measures can help 
reduce the carbon footprint and control air pollution 
in the maritime transport sector while, at the same, 
LPSURYHHIƄFLHQF\LQWKHEXVLQHVV
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2. Inland freight transport and
logistics
As previously mentioned, the large scale of transport 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions is due mainly 
to land modes, in particular haulage by road. This is 
OLNHO\WRJURZVLJQLƄFDQWO\LQWKHQH[WGHFDGHVPRVWO\
in developing countries. The travel activity of surface 
freight transport– including rail, medium-duty truck and 
heavy truck (in ton-kilometres) worldwide is expected 
WRLQFUHDVHE\DQDYHUDJHDQQXDOUDWHRI}SHUFHQW
from 2000 to 2050.34 In India, this growth will likely be 
}SHUFHQWRYHUWKHVDPHSHULRGIROORZHGE\&KLQD
DW}SHUFHQW$IULFD}SHUFHQWDQG/DWLQ$PHULFD
} SHU FHQW35 Therefore, achieving growth and 
VXVWDLQDELOLW\ ZLOO EHFRPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLIƄFXOW LQ WKH
future, without taking into consideration improving fuel 
HIƄFLHQF\DQGUHGXFLQJHPLVVLRQIURPODQGWUDQVSRUW
Past experiences, namely from the developed 
countries, have demonstrated that given the 
long-lived nature of the transport assets and 
huge investment implications of the sector, land 
transport is one of the toughest sectors to switch 
from or within which to reduce emissions once 
the systems have been established. For instance, 
switching to more environmentally friendly modes, 
such as rail and inland waterways, offers a well-
NQRZQ LQLWLDOO\FRVWO\DOWHUQDWLYH WKDWZRXOG UHTXLUH
long-term planning and appropriate corrective and 
supportive measures at policy, as well as business 
and operational levels. 
Moreover, there are several challenges, including a 
IUDJPHQWHG LQODQG IUHLJKW VHFWRU LQDGHTXDWHSROLFLHV
and institutional arrangements, as well as the limited 
availability and high cost of technologies that are 
preventing wide adoption of sustainable strategies. 
Yet, there are considerable opportunities to improve 
sustainability in land freight transport and logistics 
through a “comprehensive and integrated approach”. 
6XEMHFW WR D FRQVLGHUHG FRVWtEHQHƄW DQDO\VLV DQG
DVVHVVPHQW RI WUDGHRIIV HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ JDLQV
transport costs, speed and reliability of services, 
and the like), a number of integrated options have 
the potential to promote sustainability in land freight 
transport. This entails, inter-alia, optimizing the 
performance of multimodal logistics chains, improving 
the competitiveness of environmentally friendly modes 
of transport, leveraging technologies capable of 
LPSURYLQJ HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ ORJLVWLFDO HIƄFLHQF\ DQG
reducing emissions, as well as creating integrated 
transport networks and environmentally -friendly 
dedicated freight corridors.
An example of an integrated transport planning 
approach is the European Commission White Paper 
RQWUDQVSRUW DGRSWHG LQ0DUFK WKDWGHƄQHVD
VWUDWHJ\ WRZDUGV FRPSHWLWLYH DQG UHVRXUFHHIƄFLHQW
WUDQVSRUW V\VWHPV DQG VHWV FOHDU REMHFWLYHV DQG
targets such as:
(a) Optimizing the performance of multimodal logistics 
chains;
E 3URPRWLQJWKHXVHRIPRUHHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQWPRGHV
RIWUDQVSRUWDWDODUJHUVFDOHIDFLOLWDWHGE\HIƄFLHQW
and environmentally friendly freight corridors;
F ,QVWLJDWLQJ D } SHU FHQW VKLIW LQ ORQJHUGLVWDQFH
IUHLJKWMRXUQH\VIURPURDGWRRWKHUPRGHV
G ,QVWLJDWLQJD}SHUFHQWXVHRIVXVWDLQDEOH ORZ
carbon fuels in aviation;
H $FKLHYLQJ DW OHDVW D } SHU FHQW FXW LQ VKLSSLQJ
emissions.
7KLV KDV WKH RYHUDOO REMHFWLYH RI DFKLHYLQJ D WRWDO
RI } SHU FHQW UHGXFWLRQ LQ &22 emissions and a 
comparable reduction in oil dependency.36
Another example is provided by the Government of 
Indonesia, which has introduced comprehensive 
policies that aim at promoting sustainable freight 
transport systems and reducing the transport 
burden on roads, the predominant mode of transport 
ZKLFKDFFRXQWVIRUDERXW}SHUFHQWRIIUHLJKWWRQ
kilometres). These policies include a shift towards 
greener modes of transport such as rail and short 
sea shipping (where ferries can carry out roll-on, roll-
off operations) and develop rail-based logistics in 
-DNDUWDWRUHOLHYHWUDIƄFFRQJHVWLRQFDXVHGE\IUHLJKW
PRYHPHQWV ,PSURYLQJ IXHO HIƄFLHQF\ DQG UHGXFLQJ
land transport related emissions is crucial, given 
the recent growth in freight movement in Indonesia 
ZKLFKKDV LQFUHDVHGE\}SHUFHQW LQ\HDUV LH
IURP } ELOOLRQ WRQV LQ  WR } ELOOLRQ WRQV LQ
DQGWKHVLJQLƄFDQWVKDUHRI&22 emissions from 
ODQG WUDQVSRUW ZKLFK UHSUHVHQW } SHU FHQW RI WRWDO
WUDQVSRUW HPLVVLRQV DQG DERXW } SHU FHQW RI WRWDO
national emissions).37
An integrated transport planning strategy aimed 
DW SURPRWLQJ PRUH HIƄFLHQW WUDQVSRUW DQG ORJLVWLFV
systems would usually encompass the development 
of intermodal transport and integrated freight transport 
QHWZRUNV7KHVHZRXOGDOVRUHTXLUHWKHGHYHORSPHQW
of appropriate infrastructure and services, facilitating 
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movement of goods and reducing or eliminating 
cumbersome procedures along the supply chain, 
ZKLFK LQ WXUQ ZRXOG HQKDQFH HIƄFLHQF\ RI IUHLJKW
transport systems. One example is the development 
of multimodal hubs and logistical centres (linked 
to seaport and freight terminals through railways 
or waterways) which exist already and are 
TXLWH DGYDQFHG LQ VHYHUDO GHYHORSHG DQG VRPH
developing countries. In Asia, for instance, dry ports 
with logistics service centres are being developed 
as an integrating mechanism for regional transport 
networks. Examples can be found in China, India, 
Nepal, and Thailand.38
Other innovative concepts that countries have 
developed to promote sustainable freight transport 
is the establishment of dedicated freight corridors
(such as in Australia and India). The purpose of these 
FRUULGRUVLVWRHQVXUHHIƄFLHQWIUHLJKWPRYHPHQWVDQG
VKLIW IUHLJKW WUDIƄF IURP FDUERQ LQWHQVLYH WUDQVSRUW
modes such as roads to less carbon intensive 
transport modes such as rail.39 Other initiatives have 
fostered the development of urban logistics centres
(such as in Germany and the United Kingdom) to 
SURPRWH HIƄFLHQW GHOLYHULQJ DQG FROOHFWLQJ JRRGV LQ
town and city centres while mitigating congestion and 
HQYLURQPHQWDO H[WHUQDOLWLHV7KHJURZLQJVLJQLƄFDQFH
of urban freight transport and logistics is related 
to increased population and sustained economic 
growth in urban areas. Similarly, in many developing 
countries, where trade remains largely dependent on 
SULPDU\ SURGXFWV DQG UHSUHVHQWV DPDMRU VRXUFH RI
income for a big part of the population, rural transport 
and logistics networks (such as in China, India and 
South Africa) are increasingly becoming key for the 
countries’ overall economic development. Many of 
WKHVHFRXQWULHVIDFHVLJQLƄFDQWWUDQVSRUWLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
GHƄFLWVLQUXUDODUHDVLQFOXGLQJORJLVWLFVSUDFWLFHVDQG
services which increase their losses and hamper their 
competitiveness.40 Promoting such concepts would 
KHOS FRXQWULHV WR UHGXFH LPSRUWDQW LQHIƄFLHQFLHV LQ
their value chain systems and introduce sustainable 
and environmentally-friendly transport solutions.
,QJHQHUDOWKHUHLVQRVLQJOHXQLƄHGDSSURDFKWRGHƄQLQJ
and implementing sustainability measures in freight 
transport for all countries and regions, particularly 
when dealing with land-freight transport and logistics. 
Measures to promote sustainable freight transport 
have to be consistent with a country’s longer-term 
GHYHORSPHQWSODQVDQGREMHFWLYHV7KHVHDOVRQHHG
to take into account the relative importance of fuel 
security, emissions, air pollution and the geographical 
situation of a country. Furthermore, they have to be 
compatible with the country’s level of infrastructure 
DQGORJLVWLFVGHYHORSPHQWDVZHOODVLWVVSHFLƄFORFDO
circumstances, including socio-economic issues. 
An overview of the nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions (NAMAs)41 for non-annex I countries (that is, 
countries not bound by Kyoto targets) shows that 
there are no systemic actions presented by countries 
to promote less energy-intensive and carbon-intensive 
freight transport systems. Countries actions vary in 
WHUPV RI VXEVHFWRU DQG REMHFWLYHV DV GHVFULEHG LQ
WDEOH}42
Various studies also demonstrate how a combined 
package of measures (institutional and technical) 
UHODWLQJWRLQWHUDOLDHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\HPLVVLRQLQWHQVLW\
supply chain structure, modal split and vehicle 
utilization, can enable the move to sustainable freight 
logistics, but also underline the relative importance 
of a country’s level of development and geography 
for the application of these measures. For example, 
WKHDHURG\QDPLFSURƄOLQJRI WUXFNVZKLFK LVDFRVW
Country Subsector Type of action 2EMHFWLYH
Modernization of freight train 
infrastructure Argentina Rail cargo Not known
Modernize the infrastructure of the Belgrano Cargas freight 
rail system and promote a modal shift from trucks to rail for 
agricultural products
Programme for energy 
HIƂFLHQF\LQWKHWUDQVSRUW
sector in Chile
Chile Road cargo Strategy/plan
3URPRWLRQRIHQHUJ\HIƂFLHQF\LQWKHWUDQVSRUWVHFWRUWRUHGXFH
GHG emissions and to secure sustainable cargo and passenger 
transport
National plan for freight 
transport: NAMA pilot study Colombia Road cargo Strategy/plan
Build the planning and implementation capacity of the Ministry 
of Transport and the National Planning Department in Colombia 
to structure NAMAs in the transportation sector and more 
VSHFLƂFDOO\LQWKHƂHOGRIIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
Shifting freight to electric rail
Ethiopia Rail cargo Project
,QFUHDVHLQWRQNPRIIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUWHGE\HOHFWULFUDLODV
opposed to road transport. Rail transport will be powered by 
renewable electricity.
Table 6.1. Overview of nationally appropriate mitigation actions in freight transport (2011)
Source: NAMA database.
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effective measure of cutting fuel consumption and 
emissions in developed countries possessing good 
road infrastructure and high speed operations, may 
EHPXFK OHVV EHQHƄFLDO LQ OHVV GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV
ZKHUH LQIUDVWUXFWXUH LV QRW DGHTXDWH DQG DYHUDJH
speeds are much lower.43
The role of industry
At the industry level, a large number of sustainable 
freight transport initiatives have been introduced, 
VXFK DV SURPRWLQJ HQHUJ\ HIƄFLHQF\ LQ YHKLFOHV LQ
kilometres and ton-kilometres, using simple options 
VXFKDVDGMXVWLQJW\UHSUHVVXUHVDQGSURPRWLQJHFR
driving, and more advanced use of technologies 
such as hybrid diesel–electric engine trucks), shifting 
to cleaner modes of transport, as well as using 
ORZFDUERQ WHFKQRORJLHV DQG ,&7 7KH HIƄFLHQF\ RI
logistics operations can be improved in a number 
of ways using ICT, including for instance the use 
of software able to improve the design of transport 
networks and allow the running of centralized 
distribution networks and management systems. 
Implementing such solutions will enable the reduction 
of freight congestion, waiting times in delivery places, 
XQQHFHVVDU\ WULSV UHGXFLQJ IUHTXHQF\ RI YHKLFOHV
travelling empty or partially loaded), storage needed 
for inventory, and so lead to a greener and more 
HIƄFLHQWWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ ,WZDVQRWHGWKDWRSWLPL]LQJ
ORJLVWLFV XVLQJ ,&7 FRXOG UHVXOW LQ D } SHU FHQW
reduction in transport emissions globally and could 
achieve a decline in total global emissions of 1.52 Gt 
CO2 by 2020.
44
Some of the successful private-sector led sustainable 
freight transport initiatives are provided below:
s The German chemical company, BASF, has set a 
new policy to use inland waterways to transport 
RYHU}SHUFHQWRI LWVVXSSOLHVDQG ,.($KDVD
policy of using trains wherever possible;
s The German food company, Kraft Jacobs Suchard, 
uses trains to carry raw coffee beans from Bremen 
to its factories in Berlin. The coffee bean trains, 
which have replaced local delivery trips by road, 
KDYHVDYHG}SHUFHQWRI WKHHQHUJ\SUHYLRXVO\
used for road transport;
s In the Netherlands, EVO, the employers’ 
organization for logistics and transport, organizes 
courses and training programmes to teach drivers 
to drive more economically. Drivers who follow 
these courses can achieve fuel consumption 
UHGXFWLRQVRIXSWR}SHUFHQW45
s :DOPDUW DLPV WR GRXEOH WKH WUXFN ƅHHWpV IXHO
economy by 2015 and reduce CO2 emissions by 
} ELOOLRQ SRXQGV E\  7UXFNV LQ :DOPDUWpV
GLVWULEXWLRQQHWZRUNGULYH}PLOOLRQPLOHVD\HDU
to deliver goods to the retailer’s 4,000 stores. 
Aside from tyre and aerodynamics technologies, 
auxiliary power units (APUs) were installed in 2006 
on all trucks that made overnight trips, reducing 
CO2 emissions by an estimated 100,000 tons and 
IXHOXVHE\}PLOOLRQJDOORQV46
s FedEx has launched “EarthSmart” Initiative 
which encompasses various sustainability efforts, 
including adding more sustainable delivery 
vehicles, optimizing delivery routes in order to 
minimize driving time, and maximizing cargo 
VSDFHLQIXHOHIƄFLHQWSODQHVWRUHGXFHWKHQXPEHU
RISODQHVLQWKHVN\)XHOHIƄFLHQF\KDVLQFUHDVHG
from 5.4% in 2006 to 15.1% in 2010; 
s In China, the Henan Anyang Modern Logistics 
Information Development, a company established 
in 2006 as an online logistics information platform 
that provides freight information exchange 
services and other value-added services, has 
helped trucking companies in Anyang city (Henan 
Province) to reduce the empty mile percentage 
IURP}SHUFHQWLQWR}SHUFHQWLQ
The total freight empty mileage saving in Anyang 
LV DERXW } PLOOLRQ NLORPHWUHV ZKLFK VDYHG
} PLOOLRQ OLWUHV RI IXHO HTXDO WR } PLOOLRQ
Chinese yuan (CNY)) during the same period. The 
platform has since expanded to the entire province, 
with more than 50,000 deals made per month and 
ZLWK DYHUDJH VDYLQJV SHU PRQWK RI } PLOOLRQ
NLORPHWUHV}PLOOLRQOLWUHVRIIXHODQG}PLOOLRQ
&1<DSSUR[LPDWHO\}PLOOLRQ48
s The European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) 
introduced in 2011 a study – Guidelines for 
Measuring and Managing CO2 Emissions from 
Freight Transport Operations – to assist chemical 
companies understanding how they can assess 
and improve their transport-related operations and 
reduce emissions;49
s The Green Freight Asia Network, involving global 
freight logistics companies, manufacturers, freight 
carriers and industry associations was established 
in 2011 to support green freight initiatives and 
programmes in Asia;50
s $ MRLQW YROXQWDU\ FRPPLWPHQW WR SURPRWH JUHHQ
freight in Europe and Asia has been reached 
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between the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities 
(CAI-Asia), the Secretariat for Green Freight Europe 
(European Shippers’ Council - ESC and EVO 
Dutch Shippers’ Council), and the Sustainable 
6XSSO\ &KDLQ &HQWUH $VLD 3DFLƄF 66&&$3
under the auspice of the Rio+20 conference. 
The programme, which will be fully operational in 
Europe and Asia, aims to help countries reduce 
IRVVLOIXHO GHSHQGHQF\ LPSURYH DLU TXDOLW\ DQG
minimize CO2 emissions that contribute to climate 
change, without hindering economic development.
(YHQ WKRXJK WKHUH KDV EHHQ VLJQLƄFDQW SURJUHVV LQ
sustainable freight approaches and practices in recent 
years, sustainable freight transport is still in its infancy 
and most stakeholders are still in the learning phase. To 
ensure the delivery of successful initiatives, combined 
efforts emanating from both the public and private 
sectors, including comprehensive approaches that 
would ensure interdisciplinary and inter-institutional 
collaborations in areas such as research, data analysis 
and technology, must be strengthened. Strategic 
thinking and development related to sustainable freight 
WUDQVSRUWPXVWDOVREHUHLQIRUFHGZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHRI
VHHNLQJFRPPRQLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGRSHUDWLRQDOEHQHƄWV
DQGHIƄFLHQFLHVLQWHUPVRIWUDQVSRUWGHFDUERQL]DWLRQ
HQHUJ\FRQVHUYDWLRQFRVWPDQDJHPHQWDQGHIƄFLHQW
freight logistics movement in support of global trade 
and development.51
D.  ENABLING SUSTAINABLE FREIGHT 
TRANSPORT: FINANCE-RELATED 
CONSIDERATIONS
7UDQVSRUW LV VKDSHG E\ ƄQDQFLDO ƅRZV IURP
various sources – public and private, national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO7KHVWDWHRIƄQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVLQ
LQGLFDWHVWKDWGRPHVWLFƅRZVSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHDUH
WKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWVRXUFHRIƄQDQFHLQWKHWUDQVSRUW
VHFWRU UHSUHVHQWLQJ DURXQG } ELOOLRQ IROORZHG
E\ IRUHLJQ GLUHFW LQYHVWPHQW DURXQG } ELOOLRQ
DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO GHEW ƄQDQFH } ELOOLRQ 2IƄFLDO
development assistance (ODA) has been also available 
EXWRIPXFKOHVVHUPDJQLWXGHDURXQG}ELOOLRQ2WKHU
VRXUFHVRIƄQDQFHVXFKDVFOLPDWHƄQDQFHDUHHYHQ
OHVVVLJQLƄFDQWUHSUHVHQWLQJDURXQG}ELOOLRQ52
Shifting towards sustainable freight transport will 
UHTXLUH DGYDQFHG V\VWHPV ZKLFK ZLOO QHFHVVLWDWH
more resources and capacities than are available. A 
fundamental element in this respect will be the promotion 
of a collaborative approach between public and private 
investment partners to meet the increased investment 
UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUPRUHVXVWDLQDEOHWUDQVSRUWSDWWHUQV
This section will provide a brief overview of some of the 
UHOHYDQWVRXUFHVRIƄQDQFLQJDQGWKHLUUROHLQSURPSWLQJ
current and future development of sustainable freight 
transport. It is by no means comprehensive, but does 
highlight some of the main considerations that arise in 
FRQQHFWLRQZLWKƄQDQFLQJDVKLIWWRZDUGVVXVWDLQDEOH
freight transport.
 'RPHVWLFSXEOLFƂQDQFH
'RPHVWLF SXEOLF ƄQDQFH XVLQJ ERWK GRPHVWLF DQG
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ƅRZV VXFK DV 2'$ LV DQ HVVHQWLDO
VRXUFH RI ƄQDQFLQJ IRU WKH WUDQVSRUW VHFWRU QDPHO\
for infrastructure construction and maintenance. 
&RXQWULHV W\SLFDOO\ VSHQG t} SHU FHQW RI WKHLU
public budgets on transport.53 For many developing 
FRXQWULHVSXEOLF ƄQDQFLQJRI WUDQVSRUW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH
faces a number of challenges. These include:
(a) Competition with other high-priority areas for 
public funds such as health care, education and 
debt service;
(b) Tightly constrained national budgets and limited 
ability of Governments to borrow either at home or 
abroad;
F $VLJQLƄFDQWDPRXQWRISXEOLFƄQDQFHLVVSHQWRQ
environmentally harmful subsidies, most notably 
on fossil fuels.54
Nevertheless, the public sector remains a key player. 
The role of Government can vary from that of an 
investment provider to a co-sharer of risks and facilitator 
of transport infrastructure and services development. 
The Government has a key role to play in providing 
incentives and market signals to trigger the shift to 
sustainable freight transport systems. These can take 
various forms, such as: the phasing out of fuel subsidies 
as deemed appropriate and supporting greener 
freight modes; the application of appropriate pricing 
mechanisms (such as road pricing taking into account 
actual externalities); the support of investment (through 
guarantee/funding) appropriate for the development 
and operation of sustainable freight transport systems. 
Other incentives may involve the development of 
GHGLFDWHG ƄQDQFLQJ VFKHPHV WKDW ZRXOG VXSSRUW
infrastructure development of sustainable freight 
transport. As an example, the United Kingdom 
Department for Transport has developed two freight 
grant funds to promote a shift of freight movement 
from road to rail or inland water. The two schemes 
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(the Mode Shift Revenue Support Scheme and the 
Waterborne Freight Grant Scheme) are designed to 
VXSSRUWHQYLURQPHQWDODQGVRFLDOEHQHƄWVWKDW UHVXOW
from using rail or water transport.55
Another example is provided by South Africa, which in 
its new policy framework for achieving more inclusive 
DQGJUHHQHUJURZWKKDVGHƄQHGJUHHQ WUDQVSRUWDV
a key strategy that encompasses a new freight rail 
transport strategy to accelerate the shift from road. 
The state-owned transport enterprise, Transnet, will 
LQYHVW DERXW 5} ELOOLRQ } ELOOLRQ LQ WKH IUHLJKW UDLO
V\VWHPRYHUDƄYH\HDUSHULRGDQGFRQWLQXHSURPRWLQJ
greater use of rail freight by companies.56
 3ULYDWHƂQDQFHDQGSXEOLFtSULYDWH
partnerships
Traditionally, Governments have had the main 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI ƄQDQFLQJ DQG PDQDJLQJ WUDQVSRUW
infrastructure, but with the growing demand for 
QHZ LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG HIƄFLHQW DQG FRVWHIIHFWLYH
infrastructure services, many countries have 
increasingly turned to the private sector. In recent 
decades, public–private partnerships (PPPs) have 
emerged as an important mechanism to scale up 
public contribution with private sector investment 
DQG H[SHUWLVH 7RGD\pV WUDQVSRUW V\VWHPV UHTXLUH
highly specialized managerial and operational skills, 
as well as cutting-edge technologies. Therefore, the 
expertise of private partners for building, operating 
and maintaining transport infrastructure and services 
LVVLJQLƄFDQWDQGFRQVWLWXWHVDQLPSRUWDQWUHVRXUFHWR
GUDZIURPLQDGGLWLRQWRƄQDQFH
The private sector is a key player to leverage greater 
investment and most importantly it allows access to 
specialized skills, innovations and new technologies 
associated with sustainable freight transport. Public 
ƄQDQFHDORQHZLOOQRWEHDEOHWRIXQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQWR
sustainable freight transport, particularly for developing 
53%
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Nu
m
be
r o
f p
ro
je
ct
s
Seaports 370
Roads 707
Railroads 114
Airports 142
Project Count
52.5%
50 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
300 000
350 000
US
$ 
m
ill
io
n
55 945
154 167
51 117
32 558
Total Investment
Number of projects by
subsector  
Investment in projects by
subsector  - in US$ million  
Seaports
Roads
Railroads
Airports
)LJXUH 1XPEHURISURMHFWVDQGLQYHVWPHQWLQSURMHFWVE\VXEVHFWRUt
Source: 3ULYDWH3DUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH3URMHFWV'DWDEDVHt WKH:RUOG%DQNDQGWKH3XEOLFt3ULYDWH ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH$GYLVRU\
Facility.
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FRXQWULHVDWWKHVSHHGVFDOHDQGH[SHUWLVHUHTXLUHG
3ULYDWH VHFWRU SDUWLFLSDWLRQ FDQ HQDEOH WKH UHTXLUHG
changes and PPPs can serve as an effective means 
to realize sustainable investments and skills. In 
many countries, the potential of the private sector 
still remains largely underutilized and Governments 
may wish to explore alternative collaboration models 
of PPPs with appropriate risk-sharing frameworks 
and administrative and institutional arrangements 
supported by the necessary legal, regulatory and 
policy provisions. 
Yet, the contribution of private sector investment in the 
WUDQVSRUW LQGXVWU\ LV JUHDWO\ LQƅXHQFHG E\ WKH WUHQGV
LQ SXEOLF ƄQDQFH ƅRZV DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO VXSSRUW
Observing the investment commitments of private 
participation in transport infrastructure in the last two 
GHFDGHVƄJXUHLWLVFOHDUWKDWWKHURDGVXEVHFWRU
received a large amount of private investment in 
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV2IWKHSURMHFWVZLWKSULYDWH
DFWLYLWLHV WRWDOOLQJ DERXW } ELOOLRQ FDUULHG RXW LQ
developing countries over the period 1990–2011, 
}SHUFHQWZKHUHLQWKHURDGVXEVHFWRU3ULYDWH
DFWLYLW\ LQ URDG SURMHFWV LQ GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV KDV
undergone a resurgence in the past years. Investment 
FRPPLWPHQWVWRURDGSURMHFWVZLWKSULYDWHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ
JUHZIURP}ELOOLRQLQWR}ELOOLRQLQ57
These trends will have to shift to enable the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIPRUHVXVWDLQDEOHDQGHIƄFLHQWPRGHV
of transport. The ability of the public sector to reorient 
DQG OHYHUDJH VLJQLƄFDQW SULYDWH LQYHVWPHQW DQG
FRRSHUDWLRQ LQWR VXVWDLQDEOH WUDQVSRUW SURMHFWV DQG
initiatives will therefore be crucial. 
3. Climate Finance
&OLPDWHƄQDQFHLVDQLPSRUWDQWFRPSRQHQWWKDWFRXOG
help the shift towards low-carbon and climate-resilient 
transport development. 
&OLPDWH ƄQDQFH UHODWHV WR IXQGLQJ WKDW FDQ EH XVHG
to support climate change mitigation and adaptation 
activities. It encompasses both public and private 
VRXUFHVRIƄQDQFHDQGFDQEHXVHGWRVXSSRUWDFWLYLWLHV
CLIMATE
FINANCE
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Clean Technology Fund
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)LJXUH &OLPDWHƂQDQFHPHFKDQLVPV
Source: UNCTAD secretariat.
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in all sectors of the economy in both developed and 
GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV &RQVHTXHQWO\ FOLPDWH ƄQDQFH
can be used to help achieve the shift and scale-
up of funding for sustainable low-carbon freight 
transport that directly contributes to the enactment of 
sustainable development on a larger scale. Yet, climate 
and environmental concerns are not usually given all 
the necessary attention when evaluating transport 
LQYHVWPHQW SURMHFWV *HQHUDOO\ FRVWtWLPH DQDO\VLV
UHPDLQVWKHPRVWVLJQLƄFDQWIRFXVLQDSURMHFWDSSUDLVDO
There are, however, several sources and mechanisms 
RI FOLPDWH ƄQDQFH WKDW FDQ EH DSSOLHG LQ WUDQVSRUW
VHFWRU WRGD\ ƄJXUH7KHVHPHFKDQLVPVFDQEH
grouped into two categories: the carbon market and 
climate funds.
Carbon markets
Carbon markets are mechanisms that provide an 
incentive to reduce GHG emissions by creating a market 
for emissions allowances and credits. The carbon market 
FKDQQHOVƄQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRORZFDUERQLQYHVWPHQWV
WKURXJKLQWHUDOLDSURMHFWEDVHGPHFKDQLVPVVXFKDV
the clean development mechanism – CDM (regulatory/
compliance market) and voluntary markets.58 The CDM 
SURMHFWV DUH VXSSRVHG WR FRQWULEXWH WR VXVWDLQDEOH
development in developing countries, and also generate 
real and additional emission savings.
2QO\  RXW RI  SURMHFWV LQ WKH&'0SLSHOLQH
were related to transport as of January 2012 (11 of 
which had been registered).597KHVHSURMHFWVDUH
expected to reduce 5.5 megatons CO2HTXLYDOHQWV
SHU\HDUXSWRt MXVW}SHUFHQWRI WKHWRWDO
reductions of the current CDM pipeline.60 The 
barriers which currently prevent the application 
RI &'0 SURMHFWV LQ WKH WUDQVSRUW VHFWRU UHODWH WR
the size, scope and complexity of the sector itself. 
The narrow approach to measuring the mitigation 
potential of policy actions (and the associated 
incremental costs), together with the lack of data to 
DOORZIRUWKHPHDVXUHPHQWUHSRUWLQJDQGYHULƄFDWLRQ
of mitigation actions, limits the transport sector’s 
DFFHVV WR WKLV VRXUFH RI ƄQDQFH 1HYHUWKHOHVV
within the context of the ongoing negotiations on 
FOLPDWH FKDQJH WKH GHVLJQ RI ƄQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV
is becoming increasingly concentrated on tools that 
can be applied to the transport sector, something 
that the existing instruments such as CDM have not 
succeeded in covering (see box 6.1).
Climate funds for sustainable freight
transportation
7KHWHUPFOLPDWHIXQGVGHVLJQDWHVƄQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
LQYHVWPHQW IXQGVDQGƄQDQFLQJ LQVWUXPHQWVWKDWFDQ
be used to address the adaptation and mitigation of 
the climate change impacts activities. Recently, there 
has been a proliferation of climate fund initiatives 
(multilateral and bilateral), which seek to mitigate 
climate risks and help the most vulnerable adapt to 
FOLPDWH FKDQJH $OWKRXJK QRW VSHFLƄFDOO\ GHYRWHG
to transport, several of the existing climate funds 
can be used for the mitigation of GHG emissions or 
to reduce the negative effect of impacts activities in 
the transport sector. These include, for example, the 
Global Environment Facilities, the Clean Technology 
Fund, the Global Climate Change Alliance, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) Sustainable 
Environmental Climate Change Initiative, the ADB 
Climate Change Fund, and the ADB Clean Energy 
Fund. Many of the funds include a sunset clause that 
stipulates the necessary steps that will be taken to 
FRQFOXGH RSHUDWLRQV RQFH D QHZ81)&&& ƄQDQFLDO
architecture takes effect (see box 6.2). It is, however, 
far from clear what the future funding landscape will 
look like in the post-2012 regime.
)RU VXVWDLQDEOH IUHLJKW WUDQVSRUW FOLPDWH ƄQDQFH FDQ
be an important tool to support activities targeted to 
%R[ 7KHIXWXUHUROHRIFOLPDWHƂQDQFHLQHQDFWLQJJUHHQWUDQVSRUW
Within a post-2012 framework, mitigation actions in transport in developing countries are likely to fall under the umbrella of 
1$0$VZKLFKFRXOGEHƄQDQFHGWKURXJK
s $WUDQVSRUWZLQGRZXQGHUDPLWLJDWLRQIXQGVXFKDVWKH*&)tVHHER[
s $VFDOHGXSSURJUDPPDWLF&'0
s $WUDQVSRUWVSHFLƄFLQVWUXPHQW
s 2WKHUSRWHQWLDOIXQGVVSHFLƄFWRFDSDFLW\EXLOGLQJRUWHFKQRORJ\
7KH1$0$VVXSSRUWHGE\GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVDUHOLNHO\WREHƄQDQFHGE\IXQGW\SHLQVWUXPHQWVZKHUHDVDFWLRQVWDNHQ
WRDFTXLUHFUHGLWVZRXOGEHHQDFWHGWKURXJKDFUHGLWLQJVFKHPHVXFKDVDVFDOHGXS&'0
Source: United Nations Environment Programme, http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/ger/GER_10_
Transport.pdf.
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Box 6.2. The United Nations Green Climate Fund
The establishment of the GCF was decided at the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, 
KHOGLQ&DQFXQ0H[LFRLQZLWKWKHJRDORIEHFRPLQJWKHPDLQPXOWLODWHUDOƄQDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPWRVXSSRUWFOLPDWH
action in developing countries.
The GCF is expected to start operating by 2014 and is intended to provide $100 billion each year by 2020 to help the 
mitigation and adaptation activities of the world’s poorest countries. Private sector funds can also contribute to programmes.
7KH*&)ZLOOFRQWULEXWHWRWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKHXOWLPDWHREMHFWLYHRIWKH81)&&&E\SURYLGLQJVXSSRUWWRGHYHORSLQJ
countries to limit or reduce their GHG emissions and to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Application of the Fund will 
take into account the needs of those developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 
7KH)XQGZLOODOVRSOD\DNH\UROHLQFKDQQHOOLQJQHZDGGLWLRQDODGHTXDWHDQGSUHGLFWDEOHƄQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRGHYHORSLQJ
FRXQWULHVDQGZLOOFDWDO\VHFOLPDWHƄQDQFHERWKSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHDQGDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGQDWLRQDOOHYHOV,WZLOOSXUVXH
a country-driven approach and promote and strengthen engagement at the country level through effective involvement of 
UHOHYDQWLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVWDNHKROGHUV7KHƄQDQFLQJFDQEHLQWKHIRUPRIFRQFHVVLRQDOOHQGLQJJUDQWVDQGRWKHUW\SHVDV
decided by the board.
The GCF will be a legally independent institution with its own separate secretariat and the World Bank as its interim trustee, 
but functioning under the guidance of and accountable to the COP. Arrangements between the COP and the GCF are to 
be concluded at COP 18 (in Doha, December 2012) to ensure that it is accountable to and functions under the guidance 
of the COP.
7KHELJJHVWFKDOOHQJHRIWKH*&)LVWRVHFXUHDGHTXDWHDQGVXVWDLQHGORQJWHUPIXQGLQJ6XEVWDQWLDOƄQDQFLDOSOHGJHVE\
contributing countries will be necessary to show broad political support for the GCF and secure its viability.
Source: GCF; for more information please refer to http://gcfund.net/home.html.
reducing GHG emissions. The range of eligible activities 
is broad and encompasses supporting programmes, 
SROLFLHVSURMHFWVDQGHQDEOLQJPHDVXUHVDQGVWUDWHJLHV
However, given the unpredictable size of climate 
ƄQDQFHDQGWKHFRQGLWLRQDOLW\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKLWGLUHFW
funding to support large infrastructure, even by way 
RIFRƄQDQFLQJ LVSUREDEO\RXWRI UDQJH<HWFOLPDWH
ƄQDQFHFDQKDYHDSDUWLFXODULPSDFWZKHUHVXVWDLQDEOH
IUHLJKW WUDQVSRUW SURJUDPPHV UHTXLUH IXQGLQJ IURP D
combination of sources and when the availability of 
FOLPDWHƄQDQFHFDQSXVKDQDFWLYLW\EH\RQGWKHWLSSLQJ
SRLQWWKDWGHWHUPLQHVZKHWKHURUQRWDJLYHQSURMHFWFDQ
EHLPSOHPHQWHG&OLPDWHƄQDQFHLQVWUXPHQWVFDQDOVR
be used as a leveraging device that can help promote 
sustainable freight transport in several ways, including 
by awareness raising and capacity building, supporting 
national assessment and policy reforms, implementing 
pilot measures, identifying and implementing pilot 
SURMHFWV PDNLQJ PDUJLQDO SURMHFWV ƄQDQFLDOO\ YLDEOH
DQGOHYHUDJLQJRWKHUIXQGLQJƅRZV
E. SUMMARIZING THE POINTS
Some key elements appear as outstanding in the 
preceding discussions regarding the development 
DQGƄQDQFHRIVXVWDLQDEOHIUHLJKWWUDQVSRUW7KHVHFDQ
be summarized as follows:
D 7KHWUDQVSRUWVHFWRULVDPDMRUFRQVXPHURIZRUOG
fossil fuels and is responsible for an important part 
of global GHG emissions and air pollution at local 
and regional level. To achieve global sustainability 
and attain the global goal of reducing emissions, 
urgent actions are needed. These actions must 
transform the way in which freight transport 
LV JURZLQJ DQG DGGUHVV WKH IXHO HIƄFLHQF\ DQG
rapid increase in all emissions from the transport 
sector. This is particularly relevant for developing 
countries, where freight transport activities will 
grow substantially and transport systems are 
being developed. Sustainable freight transport 
has the potential to increase energy economy 
DQGHIƄFLHQF\DQGWKHUHE\DGGUHVVFRQFHUQVRYHU
non-renewable sources, costs and environmental 
degradation.
(b) Promoting sustainable freight transport systems 
UHTXLUHVDEDODQFLQJDFWEHWZHHQHFRQRPLFVRFLDO
and environmental considerations, and entails 
WKH DELOLW\ WR SURYLGH IXHO HIƄFLHQW FRVWHIIHFWLYH
environmentally friendly, low-carbon, and climate-
resilient transport systems. Developing sustainable 
freight transport systems, based on the avoid–
shift–improve approach will help addressing in a 
systemic fashion different transport and logistics 
concerns and issues stemming from current and 
future anticipated economic demands, and climate 
change and environmental challenges. Reconciling 
growth imperatives with climate protection and 
environmental sustainability can be challenging for 
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WUDQVSRUWDQGORJLVWLFVEXWQRWLPSRVVLEOH6XEMHFW
WR D FRQVLGHUHG FRVWtEHQHƄW DQDO\VLV DQG DQ
DVVHVVPHQWRIWUDGHRIIVHQHUJ\HIƄFLHQF\JDLQV
transport costs, speed and reliability of services, 
and the like) a number of options have the potential 
to reduce GHG emissions from transport, while 
at the same time tackling other environmental 
concerns such as soil, water and air pollution, noise 
and infrastructure degradation. Relevant options 
include, for example, including reshaping transport 
architecture and networks, rethinking supply chain 
designs and logistics, balancing transport modes, 
using cleaner technologies and ICT, switching to 
low-carbon fuel sources, and the like.
(c) Developing sustainable freight transport systems, 
based on an avoid–shift–improve approach can 
help developing countries to leapfrog towards 
a sustainable development path. By investing 
in sustainable freight transport systems today, 
developing countries will be better prepared to 
reap future economic, social and environment 
EHQHƄWV 0LVVLQJ WKLV RSSRUWXQLW\ PD\ OHDG WR
increased costs in the future, as Governments 
and industries would eventually face additional 
expenses to adapt to new circumstances and 
adopt new transport systems, including new 
technologies and operating practices.
(d) Although global freight transport has over recent 
years made important progress regarding 
compliance with sustainability imperatives, 
including the efforts made to reduce negative 
H[WHUQDOLWLHVWKHVHHIIRUWVDUHVWLOOLQVXIƄFLHQW0RUH
work is needed and should include comprehensive 
and integrated approaches that will ensure 
interdisciplinary and inter-institutional collaboration 
at all levels (local, national, regional and global) 
as well as a greater involvement of industry. In 
this respect, coordinated and combined efforts 
by both public and private sectors in key areas 
(such as research and analysis, data collection, 
policy and regulatory frameworks, technology 
development) must be reinforced to achieve 
FRPPRQLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGRSHUDWLRQDOEHQHƄWVDQG
HIƄFLHQFLHV7KHVHDGYDQFHVVKRXOGEHLQWKHƄHOGV
of transport decarbonization, energy conservation, 
DQGHIƄFLHQWIUHLJKWORJLVWLFVPRYHPHQWLQVXSSRUW
of global trade and development, and the like.
H 7KHUH LV QR qRQH VL]H ƄWV DOOr VWDQGDUG DSSURDFK
to addressing the challenges associated with the 
development and the implementation of sustainable 
freight transport. While it will be important to draw 
from existing experiences and best practices, each 
country and region will have to formulate its own 
approach that will take into account its local-regional 
circumstances, conditions and opportunities, and 
that will be consistent with its longer-term strategic 
GHYHORSPHQWSODQVDQGREMHFWLYHV
I 6XVWDLQDEOH IUHLJKW WUDQVSRUW UHTXLUHV VXEVWDQWLDO
investments in transport infrastructure, services 
DQGHTXLSPHQW7KHSXEOLFVHFWRUDVDQLQYHVWPHQW
provider, a co-sharer of risk or guarantor, or as 
facilitator) and the private sectors (through PPPs) 
KDYHLPSRUWDQWUROHVWRSOD\WRHQVXUHWKDWUHTXLVLWH
IXQGLQJLVIRUWKFRPLQJWKURXJKGLYHUVLƄHGVRXUFHV
RI ƄQDQFH LQFOXGLQJ FOLPDWH ƄQDQFH &OLPDWH
ƄQDQFH LQVWUXPHQWV FDQ EH XVHG DV OHYHUDJLQJ
devices that can help promote sustainable freight 
transport in several ways, including by awareness 
raising and capacity building, supporting national 
assessment and policy reforms, implementing 
pilot measures, identifying and implementing 
SLORWSURMHFWVPDNLQJPDUJLQDOSURMHFWVƄQDQFLDOO\
YLDEOHDQG OHYHUDJLQJRWKHU IXQGLQJƅRZV7KHVH
different sources can be designed to complement 
each other to drive the change towards sustainable 
freight transport. Therefore, there is a clear need to 
WDNH VWRFN RI H[LVWLQJ WUDQVSRUWUHOHYDQW ƄQDQFLDO
sources as well as to reorient and structure the 
sources in accordance with the sustainability 
criteria.
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$QQH[, :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHE\FRXQWU\JURXS0LOOLRQVRIWRQV
Area Year Goods loaded Total 
goods 
loaded
Goods unloaded Total 
goods 
unloadedOil & gas Dry cargo Oil & gas Dry cargo  
Crude  Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Crude   Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Developed economies 
North America 
2006  22.2  86.4  436.8  545.4  501.0  155.7  492.1 1 148.7
2007  24.9  91.3  516.7  632.9  513.5  156.1  453.1 1 122.7
2008  24.1  119.0  549.4  692.5  481.3  138.9  414.3 1 034.5
2009  23.9  123.8  498.5  646.1  445.2  132.0  306.4  883.6
2010  25.5  126.9  530.1  682.5  465.2  113.7  331.0  909.9
2011  24.0  123.9  590.6  738.6  439.3  113.7  336.4  889.5
Europe
2006  100.9  235.8  768.6 1 105.2  535.6  281.9 1 245.2 2 062.7
2007  96.9  253.3  776.6 1 126.8  492.2  262.2 1 154.7 1 909.2
2008  88.2  261.5  751.1 1 100.8  487.9  273.0 1 213.1 1 974.0
2009  78.1  236.0  693.8 1 008.0  467.9  281.8  935.0 1 684.6
2010  93.7  266.3  735.1 1 095.1  484.2  280.6 1 044.1 1 808.9
2011  81.9  275.8  752.5 1 110.2  456.5  312.3 1 067.1 1 835.9
Japan
and Israel
2006  0.0  10.0  153.1  163.1  219.3  84.4  559.6  863.3
2007  0.0  14.4  161.2  175.7  213.3  88.5  560.9  862.6
2008  0.0  21.0  162.0  183.0  254.7  92.8  548.8  896.2
2009 0.0  19.3  139.8  159.0  190.7  102.3  417.0  710.0
2010 0.0  24.7  148.4  173.1  191.1  109.6  480.4  781.2
2011 0.0  19.1  147.9  166.9  187.1  123.9  466.9  777.9
Australia
and
New Zealand
2006  9.9  4.2  632.7  646.8  26.2  13.5  50.2  90.0
2007  13.3  4.0  656.3  673.6  27.0  17.3  51.7  96.0
2008  16.7  3.8  718.5  739.1  27.3  19.2  56.7  103.2
2009  12.9  4.8  723.4  741.1  21.5  13.8  60.8  96.1
2010  16.7  4.3  893.6  914.6  24.8  18.7  60.9  104.5
2011  17.5  4.5  928.6  950.5  26.6  20.0  65.4  112.0
Subtotal:
developed
economies
2006  132.9  336.4 1 991.3 2 460.5 1 282.0  535.5 2 347.2 4 164.7
2007  135.1  363.0 2 110.8 2 608.9 1 246.0  524.0 2 220.5 3 990.5
2008  129.0  405.3 2 181.1 2 715.4 1 251.1  523.8 2 233.0 4 007.9
2009  115.0  383.8 2 055.5 2 554.3 1 125.3  529.9 1 719.2 3 374.4
2010  135.9  422.3 2 307.3 2 865.4 1 165.4  522.6 1 916.5 3 604.5
2011  123.3  423.3 2 419.5 2 966.2 1 109.6  569.9 1 935.7 3 615.3
Economies
in
transition
2006  123.1  41.3  245.9  410.3  5.6  3.1  61.9  70.6
2007  124.4  39.9  243.7  407.9  7.3  3.5  66.0  76.8
2008  138.2  36.7  256.6  431.5  6.3  3.8  79.2  89.3
2009  142.1  44.4  318.8  505.3  3.5  4.6  85.3  93.3
2010  150.2  45.9  319.7  515.7  3.5  4.6  114.0  122.1
2011  138.7  49.7  322.0  510.4  4.2  4.4  146.1  154.7
STATISTICAL ANNEX 147
$QQH[, :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHE\FRXQWU\JURXS0LOOLRQVRIWRQV (continued)
Area Year Goods loaded Total 
goods 
loaded
Goods unloaded Total 
goods 
unloadedOil & gas Dry cargo Oil & gas Dry cargo  
Crude  Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Crude   Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Developing economies 
North Africa
2006  117.4  63.8  77.2  258.5  6.0  13.3  142.0  161.3
2007  116.1  61.8  80.2  258.1  7.5  14.6  155.4  177.4
2008  113.2  61.3  77.2  251.8  11.3  16.1  151.1  178.5
2009  101.1  64.9  71.3  237.3  12.2  14.3  156.2  182.7
2010  94.4  65.5  76.2  236.1  11.3  14.4  171.1  196.8
2011  72.4  72.4  81.4  226.2  9.2  17.4  129.0  155.6
Western Africa
2006  110.6  12.6  39.8  162.9  5.4  14.2  62.4  82.0
2007  110.1  10.3  46.5  166.9  7.6  17.1  67.8  92.6
2008  111.8  9.1  54.2  175.1  6.8  13.5  61.5  81.8
2009  104.4  10.5  41.4  156.2  6.8  10.8  66.2  83.8
2010  112.1  13.5  56.0  181.5  7.4  12.8  92.3  112.5
2011  123.2  21.0  62.3  206.5  6.4  12.8  94.4  113.6
Eastern Africa
2006  11.8  1.1  29.0  42.0  2.1  7.7  18.2  28.0
2007  13.6  1.2  23.3  38.1  2.1  8.3  19.8  30.3
2008  19.7  0.8  27.8  48.2  1.8  7.9  23.8  33.5
2009  19.0  0.6  18.3  37.8  1.7  9.2  24.4  35.3
2010  19.0  0.5  29.5  49.1  1.9  8.6  26.3  36.8
2011  22.0  0.6  31.1  53.8  1.4  8.3  28.8  38.6
Central Africa
2006  114.0  2.6  6.3  122.8  2.1  1.7  7.3  11.2
2007  122.7  2.6  7.8  133.1  2.8  1.9  7.7  12.3
2008  134.2  5.8  9.0  149.0  1.7  2.8  8.9  13.5
2009  129.3  2.0  8.5  139.7  1.9  2.7  10.9  15.5
2010  125.3  7.2  9.7  142.1  1.4  2.3  8.3  12.0
2011  126.8  12.5  8.7  148.0  1.4  2.3  8.8  12.5
Southern Africa
2006  0.0  5.9  129.9  135.8  25.6  2.6  39.1  67.4
2007  0.0  5.9  129.9  135.8  25.6  2.6  39.1  67.4
2008  0.3  6.2  136.0  142.5  23.4  3.1  42.8  69.3
2009  0.3  5.1  131.5  136.8  22.0  2.7  44.8  69.4
2010  0.3  5.4  139.5  145.1  20.8  2.3  35.7  58.8
2011  0.0  2.5  150.7  153.2  21.7  2.5  26.8  51.0
Subtotal:
developing
Africa 
2006  353.8  86.0  282.2  721.9  41.3  39.4  269.1  349.8
2007  362.5  81.8  287.6  732.0  45.7  44.5  289.8  380.0
2008  379.2  83.3  304.2  766.7  45.0  43.5  288.1  376.6
2009  354.0  83.0  271.0  708.0  44.6  39.7  302.5  386.8
2010  351.1  92.0  310.9  754.0  42.7  40.5  333.7  416.9
2011  344.5  108.9  334.2  787.7  40.1  43.4  287.8  371.3
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Area Year Goods loaded Total 
goods 
loaded
Goods unloaded Total 
goods 
unloadedOil & gas Dry cargo Oil & gas Dry cargo  
Crude  Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Crude   Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Caribbean
and Central 
America
2006 108.4  34.6  73.5  216.6  18.5  42.1  101.5  162.2
2007  100.4  32.4  75.2  208.1  38.8  44.5  103.1  186.5
2008  89.1  41.0  84.4  214.5  35.7  47.0  103.5  186.2
2009  75.1  27.4  71.0  173.4  33.6  46.8  87.2  167.6
2010  75.9  29.3  81.3  186.5  34.7  51.4  99.4  185.5
2011  80.1  32.6  100.1  212.8  37.6  53.5  108.9  200.0
South America: 
northern
and eastern 
seaboards
2006  110.8  49.1  499.5  659.4  16.9  10.3  116.2  143.5
2007  120.2  47.8  530.7  698.7  19.9  10.8  125.3  156.1
2008  112.6  40.5  560.2  713.2  22.7  13.9  128.3  165.0
2009  119.0  38.8  524.4  682.2  19.6  14.5  94.8  128.9
2010  123.5  42.6  620.6  786.8  17.5  11.4  144.2  173.1
2011  125.9  43.0  653.6  822.5  21.2  12.4  161.0  194.6
South America: 
western
seaboard
2006  32.1  10.2  112.4  154.8  14.1  7.7  45.9  67.8
2007  31.6  10.5  118.3  160.4  17.2  8.7  47.5  73.4
2008  32.9  11.5  136.0  180.4  15.8  9.0  60.9  85.7
2009  31.7  7.8  134.7  174.2  11.1  12.3  52.0  75.4
2010  42.1  13.2  144.0  199.3  17.6  12.0  60.6  90.1
2011  48.1  17.9  158.7  224.7  15.3  13.4  68.2  96.9
Subtotal:
developing
America 
2006  251.3  93.9  685.5 1 030.7  49.6  60.1  263.7  373.4
2007  252.3  90.7  724.2 1 067.1  76.0  64.0  275.9  415.9
2008  234.6  93.0  780.6 1 108.2  74.2  69.9  292.7  436.8
2009  225.7  74.0  730.1 1 029.8  64.4  73.6  234.0  371.9
2010  241.6  85.1  846.0 1 172.6  69.9  74.7  304.2  448.7
2011  254.0  93.5  912.4 1 260.0  74.1  79.3  338.1  491.5
Western Asia
2006  729.1  158.1  151.0 1 038.2  27.0  50.3  296.5  373.8
2007  753.7  155.2  179.5 1 088.5  34.4  51.2  344.4  430.0
2008  714.0  159.8  181.9 1 055.7  30.6  54.5  349.8  434.9
2009  717.0  135.8  172.4 1 025.2  22.3  53.1  320.1  395.6
2010  720.4  152.7  183.8 1 056.9  30.2  55.6  343.7  429.6
2011  730.4  155.0  195.8 1 081.2  20.1  54.7  366.3  441.1
Southern and 
Eastern Asia
2006  132.3  102.5  922.6 1 157.3  411.3  104.0 1 482.0 1 997.4
2007  128.1  104.7  959.7 1 192.5  455.0  106.9 1 674.7 2 236.7
2008  130.7  103.0  943.0 1 176.7  420.5  124.3 1 811.2 2 356.0
2009  107.6  115.2  823.7 1 046.5  498.8  126.1 2 034.0 2 659.0
2010  128.7  111.8  964.0 1 204.5  514.5  143.2 2 198.7 2 856.4
2011  107.5  119.4  955.4 1 182.2  537.4  151.4 2 390.2 3 078.9
$QQH[, :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHE\FRXQWU\JURXS0LOOLRQVRIWRQV (continued)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 149
Area Year Goods loaded Total 
goods 
loaded
Goods unloaded Total 
goods 
unloadedOil & gas Dry cargo Oil & gas Dry cargo  
Crude  Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
Crude   Petroleum 
products 
and gasa
South-Eastern
Asia
2006  59.8  96.5  721.3  877.6  114.4  94.4  326.8  535.6 
2007  56.4  98.2  779.0  933.6  131.3  102.6  363.0  596.9 
2008  58.1  75.8  837.3  971.2  114.6  108.0  348.5  571.0 
2009  47.7  94.7  840.3  982.7  115.2  90.7  332.0  537.9 
2010  58.4  73.7  701.0  833.2  107.0  134.2  311.0  552.3 
2011  62.2  83.5  807.2  952.9  121.5  131.6  348.9  602.0 
Subtotal:
developing
Asia 
2006  921.2  357.0 1 794.8 3 073.1  552.7  248.8 2 105.3  2 906.8 
2007  938.2  358.1 1 918.3 3 214.6  620.7  260.8 2 382.1  3 263.6 
2008  902.7  338.6 1 962.2 3 203.6  565.6  286.8 2 509.5  3 361.9 
2009  872.3  345.8 1 836.3 3 054.3  636.3  269.9 2 686.2  3 592.4 
2010  907.5  338.3 1 848.8 3 094.6  651.8  333.1 2 853.4  3 838.2 
2011  900.1  357.9 1 958.4 3 216.4  679.0  337.7 3 105.3  4 122.0 
Developing 
Oceania
2006  1.2  0.1  2.5  3.8  0.0  6.7  6.2  12.9
2007  0.9  0.1  2.5  7.1  0.0  7.0  6.5  13.5
2008  1.5  0.1  2.6  4.2  0.0  7.1  6.7  13.8
2009  1.5  0.2  4.6  6.3  0.0  3.6  9.5  13.1
2010  1.5  0.2  4.8  6.5  0.0  3.7  9.7  13.4
2011  1.6  0.2  5.3  7.1  0.0  3.9  10.6  14.5
Subtotal: 
developing     
economies and 
territories 
2006 1 527.5  537.1 2 765.0 4 829.5  643.6  355.1 2 644.3 3 642.9
2007 1 553.9  530.7 2 932.6 5 020.8  742.4  376.3 2 954.3 4 073.0
2008 1 518.0  515.1 3 049.6 5 082.6  684.9  407.2 3 097.0 4 189.1
2009 1 453.5  502.9 2 842.0 4 798.4  745.3  386.9 3 232.1 4 364.2
2010 1 501.6  515.6 3 010.5 5 027.8  764.4  452.0 3 500.9 4 717.3
2011 1 500.3  560.5 3 210.3 5 271.2  793.2  464.3 3 741.8 4 999.3
World total 
2006 1 783.4  914.8 5 002.1 7 700.3 1 931.2  893.7 5 053.4 7 878.3
2007 1 813.4  933.5 5 287.1 8 034.1 1 995.7  903.8 5 240.8 8 140.2
2008 1 785.2  957.0 5 487.2 8 229.5 1 942.3  934.9 5 409.2 8 286.3
2009 1 710.5  931.1 5 216.4 7 858.0 1 874.1  921.3 5 036.6 7 832.0
2010 1 787.7  983.8 5 637.5 8 408.9 1 933.2  979.2 5 531.4 8 443.8
2011 1 762.4 1 033.5 5 951.9 8 747.7 1 907.0 1 038.6 5 823.7 8 769.3
$QQH[, :RUOGVHDERUQHWUDGHE\FRXQWU\JURXS0LOOLRQVRIWRQV (continued)
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries, as published on the relevant
government and port industry websites and by specialist sources. The data for 2006 onwards have been revised and
XSGDWHGWRUHƅHFW LPSURYHGUHSRUWLQJ LQFOXGLQJPRUHUHFHQWƄJXUHVDQGEHWWHU LQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHEUHDNGRZQE\
cargo type. Figures for 2011 are estimates based on preliminary data or on the last year for which data were available.
a ,QFOXGLQJ/1*/3*QDSKWKDJDVROLQHMHWIXHONHURVHQHOLJKWRLOKHDY\IXHORLODQGRWKHUV
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$)5,&$
Algeria   121 –   66   19   586   792 
Angola – –   11   6   55   72 
Benin – – – –   2   2 
Cameroon – –   2 –   14   16 
Cape Verde – –   9   7   25   41 
Comoros   167   4   336   101   122   730 
Congo – – – –   4   4 
Côte d’Ivoire – – –   1   8   8 
Democratic Republic of the Congo – –   0   1   10   12 
Djibouti – – – –   3   3 
Egypt   514   55   188   184   196  1 136 
Equatorial Guinea – –   10   21   27   59 
Eritrea – –   10   2   1   13 
Ethiopia – –   112 –   0   112 
Gabon – –   5   0   10   15 
Gambia – – – –   2   2 
Ghana – –   15   1   101   117 
Guinea – –   1 –   26   27 
*XLQHD%LVVDX – –   1 –   5   6 
Kenya – – –   1   9   10 
Libya – –   5   788   49   842 
Madagascar – –   6   0   10   16 
Mauritania – –   1   1   44   46 
Mauritius – –   14   44   62   120 
Morocco –   64   11   14   328   416 
Mozambique – –   7 –   34   41 
Namibia – –   3 –   122   125 
Nigeria – –   6   432   219   658 
Saint Helena – – – –   2   2 
Sao Tome and Principe – –   6 –   4   10 
Senegal – –   2   0   51   53 
Seychelles – –   43   122   37   202 
Sierra Leone   178   24   483   173   115   973 
Somalia – –   2 –   3   5 
South Africa – –   0   13   154   168 
Sudan – –   20 –   4   24 
Togo   45   30   160   147   16   398 
Tunisia   17 –   50   59   107   233 
United Republic of Tanzania   39 –   369   50   39   497 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$)5,&$
Total
 1 081   176  1 954  2 188  2 606  8 005 
$QQH[,,D 0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQJURXSVRIHFRQRPLHVDQGW\SHVRIVKLSDVDW-DQXDU\
(Thousands of GT)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 151
$QQH[,,D 0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQJURXSVRIHFRQRPLHVDQGW\SHVRIVKLSDVDW-DQXDU\
(Thousands of GT)  (continued)
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$0(5,&$
Anguilla – –   0 –   0   0 
Argentina   14   13   33   319   222   601 
Aruba – – – –   0   0 
Barbados   536   157   260   308   139  1 399 
Belize   303 –   800   81   297  1 482 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)   18 –   69   2   4   93 
Brazil   359   366   210   938   471  2 344 
British Virgin Islands – –   0   0   5   6 
Cayman Islands   690 –  1 220  1 243   185  3 338 
Chile   254   23   42   215   258   792 
Colombia – –   28   15   49   91 
Costa Rica – – – –   6   6 
Cuba   0 –   4   0   34   39 
Curaçao   40 –   852   99   166  1 157 
Dominica   532 –   72   382   45  1 031 
Dominican Republic – –   0 –   5   5 
Ecuador – –   8   204   135   347 
El Salvador – – – –   11   11 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)d – – – –   46   46 
Grenada – –   1 –   1   2 
Guatemala – – –   0   4   4 
Guyana – –   23   6   14   42 
Haiti – –   1 –   0   1 
Honduras   25 –   179   89   188   481 
Jamaica   81   28   45 –   3   157 
Mexico   144 –   39   757   633  1 573 
Nicaragua – –   1   1   4   6 
Paraguay –   8   46   2   8   63 
Peru –   12   12   275   140   439 
Saint Kitts and Nevis   227   39   390   176   171  1 003 
Suriname – –   1   2   2   5 
Trinidad and Tobago – –   1   3   47   50 
Turks and Caicos Islands – –   0 –   2   2 
Uruguay   2 –   6   13   78   98 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)   110 –   32   419   445  1 007 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$0(5,&$
Total
   646   5 550  
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$6,$
Bahrain   33   247   0   107   156   544 
Bangladesh   739   28   349   118   36  1 271 
Brunei Darussalam – –   3   5   532   540 
Cambodia   164   10  1 127   18   111  1 429 
China  18 435  5 268  3 941  7 389  2 890  37 924 
China, Hong Kong SAR  38 712  12 827  3 370  14 061  1 236  70 206 
China, Macao SAR – – – –   0   0 
China, Taiwan Province of  1 383   693   113   434   367  2 990 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea   98   16   521   39   35   709 
India  2 952   224   342  5 016  1 228  9 762 
Indonesia  1 635   823  2 585  3 026  2 361  10 430 
Iran, Islamic Republic of   137   31   242   244   215   870 
Iraq – – –   17   2   19 
Jordan – –   39   137   24   201 
Kuwait   46   269   96  1 766   231  2 408 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic   15 –   0 – –   15 
Lebanon   23 –   110   0   3   136 
Malaysia   212   650   431  3 465  3 439  8 197 
Maldives   1 –   70   6   11   88 
Mongolia   320   8   163   21   25   538 
Myanmar, Republic of the Union of –   1   152   4   29   186 
Oman – –   2   1   28   32 
Pakistan   149 –   25   179   26   379 
Philippines  2 099   318  1 420   500   674  5 012 
Qatar   70   300   1   223   295   888 
Republic of Korea  7 337   779  1 487   846  1 635  12 084 
Saudi Arabia –   172   266   955   310  1 704 
Singapore  12 866  10 887  4 859  20 815  4 403  53 830 
Sri Lanka   60   16   75   7   24   181 
Syrian Arab Republic   40 –   47 –   3   89 
Thailand   583   217   483  1 125   307  2 715 
7LPRU/HVWH – – – –   1   1 
Turkey  2 822   564  1 482  1 065   485  6 419 
United Arab Emirates   51   280   70   371   233  1 005 
Viet Nam  1 163   124  1 385   922   202  3 796 
Yemen – –   5   17   13   35 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$6,$
Total
 92 144    62 900  21 571 
$QQH[,,D 0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQJURXSVRIHFRQRPLHVDQGW\SHVRIVKLSDVDW-DQXDU\
(Thousands of GT)  (continued)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 153
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)2&($1,$
Fiji – –   8 –   36   45 
Kiribati   71 –   187   34   76   368 
Micronesia, Federal States of   0 –   6 –   9   16 
Papua New Guinea   18 –   74   4   23   119 
Samoa – –   8 –   4   12 
Solomon Islands – –   2 –   8   10 
Tonga – –   26   1   9   36 
Tuvalu   83   34   79   797   143  1 136 
Vanuatu  1 145   25   245 –  1 099  2 515 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)2&($1,$
Total
   60    1 408  4 257 
23(15(*,675<(&2120,(6
Antigua and Barbuda   902  5 875  4 216   11   158  11 163 
Bahamas  8 417  1 693  6 846  18 770  16 663  52 390 
Bermuda  1 805   595   101  1 489  7 333  11 323 
Cyprus  9 096  3 954  1 300  5 241  1 402  20 993 
Isle of Man  3 980   91   471  6 913  1 886  13 341 
Liberia  33 897  37 681  4 310  39 910  5 721  121 519 
Malta  18 682  4 661  3 134  15 417  3 223  45 117 
Marshall Islands  24 941  7 175  1 749  31 527  10 662  76 054 
Panama  106 605  33 779  24 151  36 082  14 143  214 760 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  1 260   81  1 959   181   540  4 020 
23(15(*,675<(&2120,(6
Total
 209 586  95 586   155 541   570 680 
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Australia   298 –   153   37  1 117  1 604 
Belgium  1 654   75   227   846  1 626  4 429 
Bulgaria   183 –   112   6   16   318 
Canada  1 240   16   140   552  1 107  3 056 
Denmark   215  6 614   355  3 305  1 412  11 901 
Estonia – –   11   8   300   319 
Finland   52   29   556   363   581  1 581 
France   181  1 962   153  2 905  1 851  7 052 
Germany   377  13 486   372   345   740  15 320 
Greece  12 687  2 280   256  23 953  2 100  41 276 
Iceland   0 –   1   0   167   169 
Ireland –   5   144   13   67   229 
Israel –   243   2   3   9   256 
Italy  4 666   863  2 736  5 196  5 032  18 492 
Japan  6 206   115  2 917  3 532  4 653  17 423 
Latvia – –   14   9   165   187 
$QQH[,,D 0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQJURXSVRIHFRQRPLHVDQGW\SHVRIVKLSDVDW-DQXDU\
(Thousands of GT)  (continued)
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
Lithuania –   10   192 –   205   407 
Luxembourg   51   85   287   181   495  1 098 
Netherlands   466  1 072  3 344   438  2 250  7 570 
New Zealand   79   7   131   57   160   434 
Norway  2 421 –  3 976  4 977  5 139  16 512 
Poland – –   15   5   90   110 
Portugal   56   50   322   365   448  1 241 
Romania – –   8   4   72   84 
Slovakia – –   19 –   0   19 
Slovenia – – – –   3   3 
Spain   32   35   336   559  2 066  3 028 
Sweden   20 –  1 924   174  1 252  3 369 
Switzerland   514   85   82   55   6   742 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland
 1 874  9 820  3 559  1 878  2 676  19 807 
United States of America  1 079  3 412  1 773  2 051  3 286  11 601 
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Total
  40 264  24 117  51 816  
(&2120,(6,175$16,7,21
Albania – –   43 –   2   45 
Azerbaijan – –   128   249   363   740 
Croatia   696 –   27   701   138  1 562 
Georgia   46   8   163   20   26   264 
Kazakhstan – –   3   61   63   127 
Montenegro   22 –   2 –   2   27 
Republic of Moldova   67 –   339   17   60   484 
Russian Federation   405   143  2 836  1 468  2 740  7 591 
Turkmenistan – –   17   24   39   80 
Ukraine   36 –   322   26   327   710 
(&2120,(6,175$16,7,21
Total
 1 272   151  3 880  2 566  3 760  11 629 
8QNQRZQƃDJ    1 228   551  2 147  4 468 
World totale   171 741  109 685  281 950  
$QQH[,,D 0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQJURXSVRIHFRQRPLHVDQGW\SHVRIVKLSDVDW-DQXDU\
(Thousands of GT)  (continued)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 155
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$)5,&$
Algeria   204    66   27   512   809 
Angola     13   10   34   58 
Benin       0   0 
Cameroon     3    6   9 
Cape Verde     12   10   5   26 
Comoros   269   5   410   177   85   946 
Congo       1   1 
Côte d’Ivoire      1   3   4 
Democratic Republic of the Congo     1   2   12   14 
Djibouti       1   1 
Egypt   900   63   190   319   158  1 630 
Equatorial Guinea     11   33   20   63 
Eritrea     10   3   1   14 
Ethiopia     146     146 
Gabon     5   0   4   10 
Gambia       2   2 
Ghana     20   2   65   87 
Guinea     0    12   12 
*XLQHD%LVVDX     0    2   2 
Kenya      2   6   8 
Libya     5  1 461   25  1 492 
Madagascar     8   0   4   13 
Mauritania     1   2   18   22 
Mauritius     12   77   53   142 
Morocco    78   8   20   132   239 
Mozambique     12    25   37 
Namibia     2    69   70 
Nigeria     9   730   200   939 
Saint Helena       1   1 
Sao Tome and Principe     8    2   11 
Senegal     3   0   19   22 
Seychelles     56   201   31   287 
Sierra Leone   265   30   587   276   111  1 268 
Somalia     3    2   5 
South Africa     0   18   82   101 
Sudan     25    2   27 
Togo   73   39   222   241   10   585 
Tunisia   26    35   107   27   195 
United Republic of Tanzania   63    510   81   25   679 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$)5,&$
Total
 1 801   216    1 766  9 977 
$QQH[,,E0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at January 2012
(Thousands of dwt)
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$0(5,&$
Anguilla     0     0 
Argentina   24   18   50   541   185   818 
Aruba       0   0 
Barbados   914   211   343   473   99  2 040 
Belize   477    971   128   239  1 815 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)   29    91   3   2   124 
Brazil   614   478   258  1 521   489  3 360 
British Virgin Islands     1   1   0   1 
Cayman Islands  1 084    458  2 056   205  3 804 
Chile   418   30   47   362   209  1 066 
Colombia     40   24   48   113 
Costa Rica       2   2 
Cuba   1    5   1   24   30 
Curaçao   74   1 087   172   228  1 561 
Dominica  1 003    101   701   38  1 843 
Dominican Republic       1   1 
Ecuador     8   344   68   421 
El Salvador       2   2 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)d       34   34 
Grenada     1    0   1 
Guatemala      1   2   3 
Guyana     29   9   7   45 
Haiti     1    0   1 
Honduras   45    235   160   75   514 
Jamaica   128   35   54    0   217 
Mexico   252    27  1 242   550  2 071 
Nicaragua     1   1   1   3 
Paraguay    10   53   4   1   67 
Peru    15   14   433   85   546 
Saint Kitts and Nevis   374   44   516   280   114  1 329 
Suriname     2   3   1   6 
Trinidad and Tobago      4   17   21 
Turks and Caicos Islands       0   0 
Uruguay   3    8   19   30   60 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)   187    42   732   494  1 455 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$0(5,&$
Total
 5 627   841  4 441  9 216  
$QQH[,,E0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at January 2012
(Thousands of dwt)  (continued)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 157
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$6,$
Bahrain   44   271   1   192   122   630 
Bangladesh  1 263   39   493   219   27  2 041 
Brunei Darussalam     3   7   411   421 
Cambodia   231   14  1 418   24   53  1 740 
China  32 041  6 323  4 962  12 787  2 083  58 195 
China, Hong Kong SAR  70 993  14 646  4 444  25 544  1 177  116 806 
China, Macao SAR      
China, Taiwan Province of  2 549   784   154   725   117  4 328 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea   165   22   735   68   32  1 023 
India  5 225   294   353  9 052  1 217  16 141 
Indonesia  2 753  1 090  3 258  4 916  1 494  13 512 
Iran, Islamic Republic of   233   43   310   416   177  1 179 
Iraq      27   2   29 
Jordan     45   290   9   344 
Kuwait   78   292   74  3 294   239  3 976 
Lao People's Democratic Republic   20    2     22 
Lebanon   36    103   1   3   143 
Malaysia   364   794   471  6 079  3 187  10 895 
Maldives   2    96   12   7   116 
Mongolia   538   11   227   31   23   830 
Myanmar, Republic of the Union of     178   7   14   198 
Oman     3   2   12   17 
Pakistan   271    36   329   26   663 
Philippines  3 442   383  1 716   797   357  6 694 
Qatar   116   331   0   393   307  1 147 
Republic of Korea  13 608   987  1 843  1 430  1 290  19 157 
Saudi Arabia    185   269  1 645   234  2 333 
Singapore  23 612  12 785  3 633  37 293  4 760  82 084 
Sri Lanka   99   17   99   13   16   245 
Syrian Arab Republic   64    65    0   129 
Thailand   966   297   698  2 009   280  4 249 
7LPRU/HVWH       0   0 
Turkey  4 873   711  1 813  1 843   296  9 535 
United Arab Emirates   72   307   75   622   198  1 273 
Viet Nam  1 969   165  2 266  1 527   146  6 072 
Yemen     2   28   6   36 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$6,$
Total
 165 624  40 792  29 844  111 619  
$QQH[,,E0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at January 2012
(Thousands of dwt)  (continued)
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)2&($1,$
Fiji     5    11   16 
Kiribati   121    243   57   48   469 
Micronesia, Federal States of   0    6    5   11 
Papua New Guinea   24    93   6   18   141 
Samoa     9    1   10 
Solomon Islands     2    5   7 
Tonga     30   1   4   35 
Tuvalu   125   38   111  1 444   149  1 868 
Vanuatu  1 881   29   232    917  3 058 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)2&($1,$
Total
 2 151   67   1 509  1 157  5 616 
23(15(*,675<(&2120,(6
Antigua and Barbuda  1 499  7 404  5 308   16   175  14 402 
Bahamas  14 830  1 907  5 880  34 612  11 875  69 105 
Bermuda  3 489   629   113  2 769  4 598  11 598 
Cyprus  16 283  4 703  1 611  9 466   923  32 986 
Isle of Man  194 843  37 686  18 112  65 623  11 946  328 210 
Liberia  7 521   119   552  12 461  1 888  22 542 
Malta  61 767  44 449  4 447  72 597  6 651  189 911 
Marshall Islands  45 403  8 442  1 777  57 791  9 443  122 857 
Panama  33 579  5 303  3 255  27 772  1 377  71 287 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  2 181   109  2 601   322   424  5 636 
23(15(*,675<(&2120,(6
Total
  110 752    49 299 
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Australia   481    144   52  1 137  1 815 
Belgium  3 188   93   150  1 634  1 597  6 663 
Bulgaria   297    123   10   11   440 
Canada  1 914   17   136   922   544  3 532 
Denmark   420  7 419   265  5 290   793  14 187 
Estonia     15   13   58   86 
Finland   81   37   408   609   123  1 258 
France   348  2 148   86  5 367   941  8 890 
Germany   752  15 432   392   522   385  17 482 
Greece  23 832  2 491   270  44 882  1 083  72 558 
Iceland   1    1   0   74   76 
Ireland    7   212   18   25   263 
Israel    297   3   5   5   309 
Italy  8 630   948  1 696  8 895  1 594  21 763 
Japan  11 440   125  2 513  6 560  2 934  23 572 
$QQH[,,E0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at January 2012
(Thousands of dwt)  (continued)
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$QQH[,,E0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at January 2012
(Thousands of dwt)  (continued)
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
Latvia     19   12   47   79 
Lithuania    14   238    73   325 
Luxembourg   85   98   157   278   613  1 231 
Netherlands   804  1 256  4 307   669  1 242  8 279 
New Zealand   124   8   170   89   63   454 
Norway  4 205   2 853  8 634  4 081  19 774 
Poland     20   7   47   73 
Portugal   88   63   292   640   152  1 236 
Romania     10   6   43   59 
Slovakia     22    0   22 
Slovenia       1   1 
Spain   47   48   221  1 024  1 308  2 647 
Sweden   26   1 059   255   279  1 619 
Switzerland   872   118   106   87   7  1 189 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland
 3 458  10 752  2 379  2 997  1 642  21 228 
United States of America  2 075  3 678   904  3 480  1 861  11 997 
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Total
  45 048  19 168  92 959  22 765 
75$16,7,21(&2120,(6
Albania     62    0   63 
Azerbaijan     133   357   180   670 
Croatia  1 213    35  1 291   32  2 571 
Georgia   70   12   196   34   19   331 
Kazakhstan     2   103   39   145 
Montenegro   35    2    1   37 
Republic of Moldova   112    409   31   33   584 
Russian Federation   565   149  3 261  2 117  1 322  7 413 
Turkmenistan     15   34   31   81 
Ukraine   56    388   45   189   679 
75$16,21(&2120,(6
Total
 2 051   161   4 012  1 848  12 574 
8QNQRZQƃDJ   718   124  1 648   908  
World total   198 002   507 454  99 642 
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$QQH[,,F0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at 1 January 2012
(Number of ships)
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$)5,&$
Algeria   6    12   11   108   137 
Angola     15   6   156   177 
Benin       8   8 
Cameroon     4    57   61 
Cape Verde     11   5   27   43 
Comoros   17   1   117   22   120   277 
Congo       22   22 
Côte d 'Ivoire      2   31   33 
Democratic People's Republic of the Congo     1   1   16   18 
Djibouti       13   13 
Egypt   14   3   31   37   269   354 
Equatorial Guinea     6   6   33   45 
Eritrea     4   1   8   13 
Ethiopia     8    1   9 
Gabon     11   1   39   51 
Gambia       8   8 
Ghana     15   1   216   232 
Guinea     2    43   45 
*XLQHD%LVVDX     7    17   24 
Kenya      2   26   28 
Libya     3   19   141   163 
Madagascar     16   1   53   70 
Mauritania     3   1   133   137 
Mauritius     5   4   47   56 
Morocco    7   5   3   494   509 
Mozambique     10    114   124 
Namibia     1    166   167 
Nigeria     11   86   467   564 
Saint Helena       2   2 
Sao Tome and Principe     9    12   21 
Senegal     5   1   203   209 
Seychelles     7   6   40   53 
Sierra Leone   24   5   231   71   119   450 
Somalia     2    10   12 
South Africa     2   7   249   258 
Sudan     2    17   19 
Togo   4   3   69   24   30   130 
Tunisia   1    5   1   69   76 
United Republic of Tanzania   5    139   16   73   233 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$)5,&$
Total
  71   19   769    4 851 
STATISTICAL ANNEX 161
$QQH[,,F0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at 1 January 2012
(Number of ships)  (continued)
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$0(5,&$
Anguilla     1    1   2 
Argentina   1   1   7   27   394   430 
Aruba       1   1 
Barbados   26   6   64   18   30   144 
Belize   37    210   21   178   446 
Bolivia   2    23   1   9   35 
Brazil   15   16   23   45   385   484 
British Virgin Islands     2   1   15   18 
Cayman Islands   21    30   68   44   163 
Chile   12   2   18   13   344   389 
Colombia     22   9   120   151 
Costa Rica       17   17 
Cuba   1    5   1   42   49 
Curaçao   1    88   4   44   137 
Dominica   13    30   8   51   102 
Dominican Republic     1    20   21 
Ecuador     8   39   236   283 
El Salvador       16   16 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)d       26   26 
Grenada     3    4   7 
Guatemala      1   11   12 
Guyana     35   5   77   117 
Haiti     2    1   3 
Honduras   16    230   83   555   884 
Jamaica   4   4   8    18   34 
Mexico   5    9   40   803   857 
Nicaragua     2   1   26   29 
Paraguay    5   24   2   18   49 
Peru    1   1   19   395   416 
Saint Kitts and Nevis   15   3   101   63   104   286 
Suriname     3   3   10   16 
Trinidad and Tobago     1   1   128   130 
Turks and Caicos Islands     1    6   7 
Uruguay   1    4   7   106   118 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)   4    21   22   284   331 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$0(5,&$
Total
  174    977   502  4 519  6 210 
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$6,$
Bahrain   2   4   2   6   209   223 
Bangladesh   30   4   86   72   120   312 
Brunei Darussalem     8   3   69   80 
Cambodia   38   3   451   10   89   591 
China   681   220  1 048   512  1 687  4 148 
China, Hong Kong SAR   868   295   240   336   196  1 935 
China, Taiwan Province of   43   31   70   30   732   906 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea   11   3   157   16   36   223 
India   104   13   171   128  1 027  1 443 
Indonesia   158   127  1 789   447  3 811  6 332 
Iran, Islamic Republic of   13   4   260   14   356   647 
Iraq      2   1   3 
Jordan     6   1   16   23 
Kuwait   2   6   15   22   161   206 
Lao People's Democratic Republic   1    1     2 
Lebanon   4    31   1   8   44 
Malaysia   11   40   191   176  1 031  1 449 
Maldives   1    38   13   27   79 
Mongolia   19   2   51   14   52   138 
Myanmar, Republic of the Union of    1   50   6   70   127 
Oman     9   1   39   49 
Pakistan   5    2   6   46   59 
Philippines   86   16   663   193  1 037  1 995 
Qatar   3   13   2   5   99   122 
Republic of Korea   213   73   419   291  1 920  2 916 
Saudi Arabia    3   17   50   259   329 
Singapore   286   346   205   779  1 261  2 877 
Sri Lanka   5   1   12   8   61   87 
Syrian Arab Republic   3    11    14   28 
Thailand   32   31   166   236   385   850 
7LPRU/HVWH       1   1 
Turkey   109   43   471   188   549  1 360 
United Arab Emirates   4   5   78   38   408   533 
Viet Nam   156   20   975   109   265  1 525 
Yemen     3   4   42   49 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)$6,$
Total
 2 888   7 698   16 084 
$QQH[,,F0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at 1 January 2012
(Number of ships)  (continued)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 163
Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)2&($1,$
Fiji     15    101   116 
Kiribati   6    58   17   30   111 
Micronesia, Federal States of   2    10    21   33 
Papua New Guinea   7    65   4   74   150 
Samoa     4    7   11 
Solomon Islands     11    23   34 
Tonga     15   2   19   36 
Tuvalu   6   2   29   36   87   160 
Vanuatu   39   1   35    426   501 
'(9(/23,1*(&2120,(62)2&($1,$
Total
  60    242   59   788  1 152 
OPEN REGISTRY COUNTRIES
Antigua and Barbuda   42   409   799   5   67  1 322 
Bahamas   258   60   348   304   439  1 409 
Bermuda   23   16   9   25   91   164 
Cyprus   277   195   183   128   239  1 022 
Isle of Man   67   6   68   144   125   410 
Liberia   736   978   288   771   257  3 030 
Malta   567   120   394   489   245  1 815 
Marshall Islands   616   229   102   656   273  1 876 
Panama  2 624   737  1 928  1 074  1 764  8 127 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   62   12   319   16   448   857 
23(15(*,675<(&2120,(6
Total
 5 272  2 762    
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Australia   12    67   11   648   738 
Belgium   22   3   26   13   171   235 
Bulgaria   9    20   9   46   84 
Canada   63   2   40   31   794   930 
Denmark   6   95   105   166   609   981 
Estonia     5   5   97   107 
Finland   3   3   84   12   178   280 
France   5   26   57   55   676   819 
Germany   5   278   84   37   464   868 
Greece   257   35   92   417   585  1 386 
Iceland   1    4   1   216   222 
Ireland    1   39   2   205   247 
Israel    5   1   6   24   36 
Italy   112   19   133   240  1 163  1 667 
Japan   401   15  1 465   623  3 115  5 619 
$QQH[,,F0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at 1 January 2012
(Number of ships)  (continued)
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Bulk 
carriers
Container
 ships
General 
cargo ships c
Oil
 tankers
Other
types
Grand
total
Latvia     8   6   119   133 
Lithuania    1   34    61   96 
Luxembourg   2   7   15   18   109   151 
Netherlands   10   67   586   53   666  1 382 
New Zealand   8   1   45   4   206   264 
Norway   71    351   175  1 407  2 004 
Poland     12   6   164   182 
Portugal   6   6   56   20   371   459 
Romania     5   6   69   80 
Slovakia     6    1   7 
Slovenia       8   8 
Spain   8   5   52   33  1 157  1 255 
Sweden   7    81   37   327   452 
Switzerland   21   3   9   5   1   39 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland
  47   202   339   174  1 203  1 965 
United States of America   55   85   89   55  6 177  6 461 
'(9(/23('(&2120,(6
Total
   859   2 220   29 157 
Economies In Transition
Albania     51    9   60 
Azerbaijan     36   51   195   282 
Croatia   29    33   20   218   300 
Georgia   8   1   69   10   66   154 
Kazakhstan     8   12   109   129 
Montenegro   1    1    9   11 
Republic of Moldova   4    133   4   18   159 
Russian Federation   60   13   942   367  1 980  3 362 
Turkmenistan     8   6   54   68 
Ukraine   2    135   18   368   523 
75$16,7,21(&2120,(6
Total
  104   14  1 416   488   5 048 
8QNQRZQƃDJ   116   1 080   281  4 674  6 164 
World totale  9 816  5 012   11 214  
Source: IHS Fairplay.
a 7KHGHVLJQDWLRQVHPSOR\HGDQGWKHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIPDWHULDOLQWKLVWDEOHUHIHUWRƅDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQDQGGRQRWLPSO\WKH
H[SUHVVLRQRIDQ\RSLQLRQE\WKH6HFUHWDULDWRIWKH8QLWHG}1DWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIDQ\FRXQWU\RUWHUULWRU\RU
of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
b 6HDJRLQJSURSHOOHGPHUFKDQWVKLSVRI*7DQGDERYHH[FOXGLQJWKH*UHDW/DNHVƅHHWVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVRI$PHULFD
and Canada and the United States of America Reserve Fleet.
c Including passenger/cargo.
d $GLVSXWHH[LVWVEHWZHHQ WKH*RYHUQPHQWVRI$UJHQWLQDDQG WKH8QLWHG}.LQJGRPRI*UHDW}%ULWDLQDQG1RUWKHUQ} ,UHODQG
FRQFHUQLQJVRYHUHLJQW\RYHUWKH)DONODQG},VODQGV0DOYLQDV
e ([FOXGLQJHVWLPDWHVRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV5HVHUYH)OHHWDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG&DQDGLDQ*UHDW/DNHVƅHHWV
$QQH[,,F0HUFKDQWƃHHWVRIWKHZRUOGE\ƃDJVRIUHJLVWUDWLRQa groups of economies and types of ship,b as at 1 January 2012
(Number of ships)  (continued)
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Norway (NIS)
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Republic of Korea
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Country or territory 
of ownership
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China, Hong Kong SAR
Cyprus
Denmark (DIS)
Germany
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India
,VOHRI0DQ
Italy
Japan
Liberia
0DOWD
0DUVKDOO,VODQGV
Norway (NIS)
Panama
Republic of Korea
Singapore
United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland
Total, top 20 registries
All other registries
Unknown registry
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0 
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
50
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 169
Country/territory 2009 2010 Rank 2010 (2009) 
Albania 68 780 86 875 113 (114)
Algeria 250 095 279 784 89 (88)
Antigua and Barbuda 29 150 24 615 123 (123)
Argentina 1 626 835 2 021 675 42 (42)
Aruba 125 000 130 000 107 (107)
Australia 6 200 325 6 668 075 20 (20)
Austria 330 995 350 461 78 (82)
Bahamas 1 297 000 1 125 000 53 (43)
Bahrain 279 799 289 956 87 (91)
Bangladesh 1182121 1 356 099 48 (50)
Barbados 75 015 80 424 114 (113)
Belgium 9 701 494 10 984 824 13 (13)
Belize 31 344 31 919 122 (122)
Benin 272 820 316 744 84 (85)
Brazil 6 590 363 8 138 608 18 (18)
Brunei Darussalam 85 577 99 354 109 (111)
Bulgaria 136 444 142 611 104 (101)
Cambodia 207 577 224 206 95 (93)
Cameroon 245 538 285 069 88 (90)
Canada 4 191 568 4 829 806 28 (28)
Cayman Islands 44 215 40 281 121 (120)
Chile 2 795 990 3 171 958 34 (33)
China 108 799 933 130 290 443 1 (1)
China, Hong Kong SAR 21 040 096 23 699 242 4 (4)
China, Taiwan Province of 11 352 097 12 501 107 11 (11)
Colombia 2 056 789 2 443 786 38 (39)
Congo 291 917 338 916 82 (83)
Costa Rica 875 687 1 013 483 55 (56)
Côte d'Ivoire 677 029 607 730 69 (60)
Croatia 130 740 137 048 106 (105)
Cuba 290 098 228 346 93 (84)
Cyprus 353 913 349 357 79 (78)
Denmark 621 546 709 147 60 (63)
Djibouti 519 500 600 000 70 (69)
Dominican Republic 1 263 467 1 382 679 47 (44)
Ecuador 1 000 895 1 221 849 51 (52)
Egypt 6 250 443 6 709 053 19 (19)
El Salvador 126 369 145 774 103 (106)
Estonia 130 939 151 969 102 (103)
Finland 1 125 532 1 247 520 49 (51)
France 4 490 583 5 346 799 25 (25)
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$QQH[,9 &RQWDLQHUL]HGSRUWWUDIƂF(continued)
Country/territory 2009 2010 Rank 2010 (2009) 
French Guiana 40 923 47 511 120 (121)
French Polynesia 63 807 68 889 115 (115)
Gabon 132348 153 656 101 (104)
Georgia 181 613 226 115 94 (96)
Germany 13 296 300 14 821 766 9 (9)
Ghana 557 323 647 052 66 (71)
Greece 935 076 1 165 185 52 (54)
Guadeloupe 142 692 165 665 100 (100)
Guam 157 096 183 214 99 (98)
Guatemala 906 326 1 012 360 56 (55)
Honduras 571 720 619 867 67 (67)
Iceland 193 816 192 778 96 (94)
India 8 014 487 9 752 908 15 (15)
Indonesia 7 255 004 8 482 635 17 (16)
Iran, Islamic Republic of 2 206 476 2 592 522 35 (37)
Ireland 832 021 790 067 59 (58)
Israel 2 033 000 2 281 552 39 (40)
Italy 9 532 462 9 787 403 14 (14)
Jamaica 1 689 670 1 891 770 43 (41)
Japan 16 285 918 18 098 345 7 (5)
Jordan 674 525 619 000 68 (61)
Kenya 618 816 696 000 61 (64)
Kuwait 854 044 991 545 57 (57)
Latvia 184 399 256 713 90 (95)
Lebanon 994 601 949 155 58 (53)
Libya 158 987 184 584 98 (99)
Lithuania 247 982 294 954 86 (89)
Madagascar 132 278 141 093 105 (102)
Malaysia 15 922 799 18 267 475 6 (7)
Maldives 56 000 65 016 118 (118)
Malta 2 323 941 2 450 665 37 (35)
Mauritania 62 269 65 705 117 (116)
Mauritius 406 862 4 447 78 75 (75)
Mexico 2 874 312 3 693 956 32 (32)
Morocco 1 222 000 2 058 430 41 (49)
Mozambique 219 380 254 701 92 (92)
Myanmar, Republic of the Union of 163 692 190 046 97 (97)
Namibia 265 663 256 319 91 (86)
Netherlands 10 066 374 11 345 167 12 (12)
Netherlands Antilles 97 913 93 603 111 (109)
New Caledonia 119 147 90 574 112 (108)
STATISTICAL ANNEX 171
Country/territory 2009 2010 Rank 2010 (2009) 
New Zealand 2 324 969 2 463 278 36 (36)
Nicaragua 59 471 68 545 116 (117)
Nigeria 87 000 101 007 108 (110)
Norway 318 924 330 873 83 (81)
Oman 3 768 045 3 893 198 30 (29)
Pakistan 2 058 056 2 149 000 40 (38)
Panama 4 597 112 6 003 297 22 (23)
Papua New Guinea 262 209 295 286 85 (87)
Paraguay 7 045 8 179 125 (125)
Peru 1 232 849 1 534 055 45 (48)
Philippines 4 306 964 4 947 039 27 (27)
Poland 671 552 1 045 232 54 (62)
Portugal 1 233 482 1 622 246 44 (47)
Qatar 410 000 346 000 81 (74)
Republic of Korea 15 699 663 18 542 803 5 (6)
Romania 594 299 556 694 72 (65)
Russian Federation 2 427 743 3 199 980 33 (34)
Saint Helena 623 650 126 (126)
Saint Lucia 51 942 52 479 119 (119)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 16 238 18 852 124 (124)
Saudi Arabia 4 430 676 5 313 141 26 (26)
Senegal 331 076 349 231 80 (80)
Singapore 26 592 800 29 178 500 3 (3)
Slovenia 343 165 476 731 73 (79)
South Africa 3 726 313 3 806 427 31 (30)
Spain 11 803 192 12 613 015 10 (10)
Sri Lanka 3 464 297 4 000 000 29 (31)
Sudan 431 232 439 100 76 (72)
Sweden 1 251 424 1 390 504 46 (45)
Switzerland 78 285 99 048 110 (112)
Syrian Arab Republic 685 299 649 005 65 (59)
Thailand 5 897 935 6 648 532 21 (21)
Trinidad and Tobago 567 183 573 217 71 (68)
Tunisia 418 883 466 397 74 (73)
Turkey 4 521 713 5 574 017 24 (24)
Ukraine 516 698 659 541 64 (70)
United Arab Emirates 14 425 039 15 176 524 8 (8)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 7 671 299 8 590 282 16 (17)
United Republic of Tanzania 370 764 429 284 77 (77)
United States of America 37 353 574 42 337 513 2 (2)
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$QQH[,9 &RQWDLQHUL]HGSRUWWUDIƂF(continued)
Country/territory 2009 2010 Rank 2010(2009) 
Uruguay 588 410 671 952 62 (66)
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 1 240 251 1 226 507 50 (46)
Viet Nam 4 936 598 5 983 583 23 (22)
Yemen 639 670 669 020 63 (76)
TOTAL  
Source: UNCTAD secretariat, derived from information contained in Containerisation International Online (May 2012), from various 
Dynamar B.V. publications and from information obtained by UNCTAD secretariat directly from terminal and port authorities.
STATISTICAL ANNEX 173
Index points
Country or territory ,62 2004 2011 2012
Average 
annual 
change 
2004–2012
Change 
2012/2011 
Rank 
2004
Rank 
2012
China CHN 100.00 152.06 156.19 7.02 4.12 1 1
Hong Kong, China HKG 94.42 115.27 117.18 2.84 1.91 2 2
Singapore SGP 81.87 105.02 113.16 3.91 8.15 4 3
Republic of Korea KOR 68.68 92.02 101.73 4.13 9.70 10 4
Malaysia MYS 62.83 90.96 99.69 4.61 8.73 12 5
United States USA 83.30 81.63 91.70 1.05 10.07 3 6
Germany DEU 76.59 93.32 90.63 1.75  7 7
Netherlands NLD 78.81 92.10 88.93 1.26  6 8
United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern 
Ireland
GBR 81.69 87.46 84.00 0.29  5 9
Belgium BEL 73.16 88.47 78.85 0.71  8 10
Spain ESP 54.44 76.58 74.44 2.50  15 11
France FRA 67.34 71.84 70.09 0.34  11 12
Taiwan Province of China TWN 59.56 66.69 66.62 0.88  13 13
Italy ITA 58.13 70.18 66.33 1.03  14 14
Japan JPN 69.15 67.81 63.09   9 15
United Arab Emirates ARE 38.06 62.50 61.09 2.88  18 16
Saudi Arabia SAU 35.83 59.97 60.40 3.07 0.43 19 17
Egypt EGY 42.86 51.15 57.39 1.82 6.24 16 18
Morocco MAR 9.39 55.13 55.09 5.71  78 19
Turkey TUR 25.60 39.40 53.15 3.44 13.75 29 20
Sweden SWE 14.76 30.02 49.45 4.34 19.43 48 21
Viet Nam VNM 12.86 49.71 48.71 4.48  55 22
Oman OMN 23.33 49.33 47.25 2.99  31 23
Portugal PRT 17.54 21.08 46.23 3.59 25.15 41 24
Greece GRC 30.22 32.15 45.50 1.91 13.35 24 25
Malta MLT 27.53 40.95 45.02 2.19 4.08 25 26
Denmark DNK 11.56 26.41 44.71 4.14 18.30 64 27
Poland POL 7.28 26.54 44.62 4.67 18.08 92 28
Sri Lanka LKA 34.68 41.13 43.43 1.09 2.30 20 29
Lebanon LBN 10.57 35.09 43.21 4.08 8.11 67 30
Panama PAN 32.05 37.51 42.38 1.29 4.88 22 31
India IND 34.14 41.52 41.29 0.89  21 32
Mexico MEX 25.29 36.09 38.81 1.69 2.71 30 33
Brazil BRA 25.83 34.62 38.53 1.59 3.92 28 34
Canada CAN 39.67 38.41 38.29   17 35
Thailand THA 31.01 36.70 37.66 0.83 0.97 23 36
Colombia COL 18.61 27.25 37.25 2.33 10.00 39 37
Russian Federation RUS 11.90 20.64 37.01 3.14 16.37 62 38
South Africa ZAF 23.13 35.67 36.83 1.71 1.16 32 39
Annex V. UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (ordered by rank at 2012)
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Annex V. UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (ordered by rank at 2012) (continued)
Index points
Country or territory ,62 2004 2011 2012
Average 
annual 
change 
2004–2012
Change 
2012/2011 
Rank 
2004
Rank 
2012
Argentina ARG 20.09 30.62 34.21 1.76 3.59 37 40
Chile CHL 15.48 22.76 32.98 2.19 10.22 44 41
Peru PER 14.79 21.18 32.80 2.25 11.62 47 42
Uruguay URY 16.44 24.38 32.00 1.95 7.62 43 43
Israel ISR 20.37 28.49 31.24 1.36 2.75 35 44
Australia AUS 26.58 28.34 28.81 0.28 0.48 26 45
Pakistan PAK 20.18 30.54 28.12 0.99  36 46
Bahamas BHS 17.49 25.18 27.06 1.20 1.88 42 47
Indonesia IDN 25.88 25.91 26.28 0.05 0.37 27 48
Ukraine UKR 11.18 21.35 24.47 1.66 3.12 65 49
Mauritius MUS 13.13 15.37 23.86 1.34 8.49 54 50
Dominican Republic DOM 12.45 22.87 23.72 1.41 0.84 59 51
Romania ROU 12.02 21.37 23.28 1.41 1.91 61 52
Ecuador ECU 11.84 22.48 23.05 1.40 0.58 63 53
Jordan JOR 11.00 16.65 22.75 1.47 6.10 66 54
Islamic Republic of Iran IRN 13.69 30.27 22.62 1.12  52 55
Slovenia SVN 13.91 21.93 21.94 1.00 0.01 51 56
Nigeria NGA 12.83 19.85 21.81 1.12 1.96 56 57
Jamaica JAM 21.32 28.16 21.57 0.03  33 58
Croatia HRV 8.58 21.75 21.38 1.60  85 59
Guatemala GTM 12.28 20.88 20.07 0.97  60 60
New Zealand NZL 20.88 18.50 19.35  0.85 34 61
Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela
VEN 18.22 19.97 18.93 0.09  40 62
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 13.18 17.89 18.90 0.71 1.02 53 63
Ghana GHA 12.48 18.01 17.89 0.68  58 64
Bahrain BHR 5.39 9.77 17.86 1.56 8.09 111 65
Philippines PHL 15.45 18.56 17.15 0.21  45 66
Djibouti DJI 6.76 21.02 16.56 1.23  98 67
Côte d'Ivoire CIV 14.39 17.38 16.45 0.26  50 68
Cyprus CYP 14.39 17.12 16.02 0.20  49 69
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 8.54 16.77 15.64 0.89  86 70
Finland FIN 9.45 11.27 15.51 0.76 4.24 77 71
Namibia NAM 6.28 12.02 15.18 1.11 3.16 102 72
Benin BEN 10.13 12.69 15.04 0.61 2.35 73 73
Costa Rica CRI 12.59 10.69 14.13 0.19 3.44 57 74
Togo TGO 10.19 14.08 14.07 0.48  71 75
Angola AGO 9.67 11.27 13.95 0.54 2.68 76 76
Puerto Rico PRI 14.82 10.70 13.67  2.97 46 77
Senegal SEN 10.15 12.27 13.59 0.43 1.32 72 78
Cameroon CMR 10.46 11.40 13.44 0.37 2.04 69 79
Yemen YEM 19.21 11.89 13.19  1.30 38 80
Ireland IRL 8.78 5.94 12.99 0.53 7.05 82 81
Sudan SDN 6.95 9.33 12.75 0.72 3.41 95 82
Congo COG 8.29 10.78 12.57 0.54 1.79 87 83
Fiji FJI 8.26 9.23 12.39 0.52 3.17 88 84
Madagascar MDG 6.90 7.72 11.80 0.61 4.08 96 85
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Annex V. UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (ordered by rank at 2012) (continued)
Index points
Country or territory ,62 2004 2011 2012
Average 
annual 
change 
2004–2012
Change 
2012/2011 
Rank 
2004
Rank 
2012
Kenya KEN 8.59 12.00 11.75 0.39  84 86
United Republic 
of Tanzania 
TZA 8.10 11.49 11.07 0.37  90 87
French Polynesia PYF 10.46 8.59 10.86 0.05 2.27 70 88
Honduras HND 9.11 9.42 10.03 0.11 0.61 80 89
Belize BLZ 2.19 3.85 9.99 0.97 6.14 149 90
Mozambique MOZ 6.64 10.12 9.82 0.40  99 91
Lithuania LTU 5.22 9.77 9.55 0.54  115 92
New Caledonia NCL 9.83 9.17 9.41  0.24 75 93
Gabon GAB 8.78 7.97 9.23 0.06 1.26 81 94
El Salvador SLV 6.30 12.02 8.75 0.31  101 95
Guam GUM 10.50 8.76 8.41   68 96
Nicaragua NIC 4.75 8.41 8.23 0.43  122 97
Mauritania MRT 5.36 5.62 8.20 0.35 2.58 112 98
Liberia LBR 5.29 6.17 8.11 0.35 1.94 113 99
Bangladesh BGD 5.20 8.15 8.02 0.35  116 100
Gambia GMB 4.91 5.24 7.81 0.36 2.57 119 101
Algeria DZA 10.00 31.06 7.80   74 102
Libya LBY 5.25 6.59 7.51 0.28 0.92 114 103
Guinea GIN 6.13 6.21 7.42 0.16 1.21 104 104
Sierra Leone SLE 5.84 5.41 7.40 0.20 1.99 107 105
Iraq IRQ 1.40 4.19 7.10 0.71 2.92 156 106
Papua New Guinea PNG 6.97 8.83 6.86   94 107
Kuwait KWT 5.87 5.60 6.60 0.09 1.00 106 108
Curaçao a CUW 8.16 8.14 6.59   89 109
Qatar QAT 2.64 3.60 6.53 0.49 2.93 144 110
Seychelles SYC 4.88 6.45 6.50 0.20 0.06 120 111
Bulgaria BGR 6.17 5.37 6.36 0.02 0.99 103 112
Tunisia TUN 8.76 6.33 6.35  0.02 83 113
Solomon Islands SLB 3.62 5.87 6.07 0.31 0.20 133 114
Aruba ABW 7.37 6.21 6.03   91 115
Cuba CUB 6.78 6.55 5.96   97 116
Latvia LVA 6.37 5.51 5.45   100 117
Estonia EST 7.05 5.84 5.43   93 118
Norway NOR 9.23 7.32 5.31   79 119
Comoros COM 6.07 7.14 5.17   105 120
Haiti HTI 4.91 4.75 5.08 0.02 0.33 118 121
Georgia GEO 3.46 3.79 4.99 0.19 1.19 136 122
Barbados BRB 5.47 5.85 4.82   109 123
Iceland ISL 4.72 4.68 4.68 0.00 0.00 123 124
Saint Lucia LCA 3.70 4.08 4.55 0.11 0.47 132 125
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 4.04 3.68 4.54 0.06 0.85 127 126
Cape Verde CPV 1.90 4.24 4.48 0.32 0.24 152 127
Suriname SUR 4.77 4.16 4.48  0.31 121 128
Brunei Darussalam BRN 3.91 4.68 4.44 0.07  129 129
American Samoa ASM 5.17 4.56 4.39   117 130
Samoa WSM 5.44 4.56 4.39   110 131
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Annex V. UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (ordered by rank at 2012) (continued)
Index points
Country or territory ,62 2004 2011 2012
Average 
annual 
change 
2004–2012
Change 
2012/2011 
Rank 
2004
Rank 
2012
Somalia SOM 3.09 4.20 4.34 0.16 0.14 139 132
*XLQHD%LVVDX GNB 2.12 4.07 4.31 0.27 0.24 151 133
Faeroe Islands FRO 4.22 4.20 4.21 0.00 0.00 125 134
Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar
MMR 3.12 3.22 4.20 0.13 0.99 138 135
Eritrea ERI 3.36 4.02 4.17 0.10 0.14 137 136
Cayman Islands CYM 1.90 4.03 4.07 0.27 0.04 153 137
Guyana GUY 4.54 3.96 4.06  0.10 124 138
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
COD 3.05 3.73 4.05 0.13 0.33 141 139
Grenada GRD 2.30 3.93 4.04 0.22 0.10 148 140
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
VCT 3.56 3.95 4.02 0.06 0.07 134 141
Vanuatu VUT 3.92 3.70 3.88  0.18 128 142
Federated States of 
Micronesia
FSM 2.80 3.62 3.58 0.10  143 143
Palau PLW 1.04 3.62 3.58 0.32  157 144
Cambodia KHM 3.89 5.36 3.45   130 145
Northern Mariana Islands MNP 2.17 3.65 3.44 0.16  150 146
Tonga TON 3.81 3.72 3.37   131 147
United States Virgin Islands VIR 1.77 3.39 3.34 0.20  154 148
Kiribati KIR 3.06 3.11 2.91   140 149
Marshall Islands MHL 3.49 3.08 2.91   135 150
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 5.49 2.66 2.67  0.01 108 151
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 2.33 2.40 2.41 0.01 0.01 145 152
Greenland GRL 2.32 2.30 2.30 0.00 0.00 147 153
Sao Tome and Principe STP 0.91 2.13 2.28 0.17 0.15 158 154
Dominica DMA 2.33 2.08 2.08  0.00 146 155
Maldives MDV 4.15 1.62 1.60   126 156
Bermuda BMU 1.54 1.57 1.57 0.00 0.00 155 157
Montenegro MNE 2.92 4.04 1.35   142 158
Albania ALB 0.40 4.54 0.53 0.02  159 159
Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by Lloyd’s List Intelligence. 
Note: 7KH/LQHU6KLSSLQJ&RQQHFWLYLW\,QGH[LVJHQHUDWHGIURPƄYHFRPSRQHQWVDWKHQXPEHURIVKLSVEWKHWRWDOFRQWDLQHU
carrying capacity of those ships, (c) the maximum vessel size, (d) the number of services and (e) the number of companies 
that deploy container ships on services to and from a country’s ports. The index is generated as follows: for each of the 
ƄYHFRPSRQHQWVDFRXQWU\pVYDOXHLVGLYLGHGE\WKHPD[LPXPYDOXHRIWKDWFRPSRQHQWLQDQGIRUHDFKFRXQWU\WKH
DYHUDJHRIWKHƄYHFRPSRQHQWVLVFDOFXODWHG7KLVDYHUDJHLVWKHQGLYLGHGE\WKHPD[LPXPDYHUDJHIRUDQGPXOWLSOLHG
E\,QWKLVZD\WKHLQGH[JHQHUDWHVWKHYDOXHIRUWKHFRXQWU\ZLWKWKHKLJKHVWDYHUDJHLQGH[RIWKHƄYHFRPSRQHQWV
in 2004. 
a ƄJXUHIRU&XUDÄDRLVEDVHGRQ1HWKHUODQGV$QWLOOHVpGDWD
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